Ministry of Higher Education and scientific Research
University of Algiers3
Faculty of political sciences and international relations

Comparative political regimes Module

Lectures directed to second-year(common core) students

Licence degree

Prepared by :

DR: Hamour Assia

Introduction :

Regimes are the various types of political systems found in the sovereign countries of the world. These can be defined as specific individual regime types or as contrasting types. In comparative politics, the concept of a political regime refers to the formal and informal structure and nature of political power in a country, including the method of determining office holders and the relations between the office holders and the society at large. These relations could or could not involve accountability of office holders to the *demos* and likewise could involve various freedoms granted to society or, conversely, none at all.

The procedural approach understands political regimes as the set of formal (and sometimes informal) rules that determine how political power, conceived as control of national political institutions, can be achieved and used. Perhaps the most important and enduring procedural definition of "regime" is that a regime or system of governance is an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions . or briefly is the strategic acceptance of these rules by all major political actors and the lack of normative rejection of these rules by any major political actor".

General objectives :

This module is an introduction to the study of comparative political regimes and provides an overview of some of the key theoretical frameworks, concepts, and analytical methods of this field of study, as applied to the developing world. We particularly examine political regime types (e.g., democracy, totalitarianism and authoritarianism), asking why and how authoritarian regimes persist and what the origins of democracy are. Other topics covered in depth include the causes democratic transition, political parties, hybrid regimes.

By the end of this module the student will be able to :

1. provide students with an awareness of the variety of political regimes that exist across the globe.
2. To explore similarities among and differences between various political regimes.
3. To cultivate methodological and analytical skills of comparison.
4. dentify and understand theoretical approaches in comparative politics
5. apply critical reasoning to analyse the use of key concepts in comparative regimes
6. demonstrate awareness of how scholars employ comparison to explain the emergence of specific institutions in different polities/countries and their impacts on policy outcome

Lecture01 : Comparative method and Comparative regimes

Introduction :

Comparison is a key tool in the social sciences. Or an essential part of scientific research in the social sciences. It is focus as well as the **core of the scientific method** in the words of **Alexis de Tocqueville**. Human knowledge is founded on comparative thought; throught history, sociologists have compared classes, subcultures.

More specifically,Comparison in the social sciences is the **substitute for experimentation** in the natural sciences. It can achieve many of the aims of experimentation.

Comparison meaning :

Compare is taken from Latin word **"comparare**", which means "**like or equal to another**

In its broadest sense is the process of discovering similarities and differences among phenomena.

John Stewart Mill defined comparison as "study of homologous or analogous phenomena in different societies "[1] . in the same fashion, **Harold Laswell** stated that " for any one with a scientific approach to political phenomena. The idea of an independent comparative method seems redundant because the scientific approach is unvariably comparative'[2] .

Camparison can be understood as the juxtaposition of values(units of variation) of attributes (proprieties) shared by two or more objects or cases (units of observation)[3].

Comparison process :

Comparison can be analyzed from three different perspectives, **first :** it is a common way of thinking about and looking at the reality we live in ."to **compare and contrast**" is one of, the most common human mental exercises, in this context Swanson stated that "**thinking without comparison is unthinkable"[4].**

Second : belongs to realm of the social sciences. In fact, a substantive part of sociology, political science or history is the fruit of comparison. This is what might also be called comparative sociology, comparative history.

Third perspective :the third notion of comparison; as a very long tradition in western thought going back to Aristotle's classification of political regimes, but what is of greatest interest here is the conscious use and methodological awarness of comparison rather the activity of comparison.

Why we compare ? there are many good reasons , but three of the most important are

1. We cannot understand our own country without a knowledge of others;

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[1] Henry Teune, "**Comparative Research, Experimental Design, and the Comparative Method**," Comparative Political Studies vol. 8, N° 2 , 1975, p 195

[2] Harold Laswell, **The future of the Comparative Method**, comparative politics , Vol 1, N°1, 1968,p3

[3] Daniel Caramani, **Introduction to Comparative Method with Boolean Algebra,** London : Sage Publishers, 2009. P 1

[4] Swason, **frameworks for comparative research : structural Anthropology and the theory of actions**, in Vallier, comparative methods in Sociology :Essays on trends and applications, Berkeley :University of California Press,1971, p 145

2. We cannot understand other countries without a knowledge of their background, institutions and history;
3. We cannot arrive at valid generalizations about government and politics, without comparative method.

The primary advantages of the comparative method can be summarized under four headings: it allows us to contextualize knowledge; to improve classifications; to formulate and test hypotheses; and to make predictions[1].

Giovani sartori offered us a very simple answer, namely, we compare to control, we use comparisons as a way to check (verify or falsify) whether our claims or assertions about certain phenomena[2].

	Comparing to control	**Comparing to understand**	**Comparing to explain**
Basic strategy or purpose	Comparative checking	Interpretation	Analytical induction
Logic or approach to comparative analysis	Researcher uses a range of case a way to test(verify or falsify) specific claim, hypothesis	Researcher is primarily interested in a single case and uses different cases as a way to learn more about the case being studied	Researcher uses cases a way to build a stronger theoretical explanation. Cases are used in a step-by step manner, with each case contributing to the development of a general theory
Examples	Begin with a claim : a high level of gun ownership will lead to a high of gun – related homicide	Use existing theories and other cases to better understand case: researcher uses a range of theories on gun violence to better understand why south Africa is the most violent country in the world. Researcher also uses other cases to see what those cases can tell him about south Africa	Use various cases to strengthen the theory : researcher begins by looking at the democratization process in Mexico, this examination may lea researcher to revise elements of theory; the researcher then looks at Taiwan, Poland, and Ukraine, each case is used as a steppingstone in developing or strengthening original theory.

Ref: Lim Timothy**, Opcit**, p23

Comparison is a general way of thinking, in order to know, distinguish, and evaluate our actions, and the actions of other individuals and nations. The first aim of comparison is achieving and enlarging knowledge , **F. Braudel**, the French historian , said "live a year in London, but you will know so little about England , rather you'll understand many important

[1] Kenneth Newton and Jan Van Deth, **Foundations of Comparative Politics**, Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, p 1.
[2] Lim Timothy, **Doing Comparative politics : An Introduction to Approaches and Issues** , London :Lynne Reinner Publishers,2006, p22.

French traits"[1]. Without understanding the other , society will never define its own identity, **Woodrow Wilson** said "I believe that our institutions can be understood and really evaluated only in the eyes of those who know something about other systems and essential facts of history"[2].

Contextual description :

This first objective of comparative politics is the process of describing the political phenomena and events of a particular country, or group of countries. Traditionally in political science, this objective of comparative politics was realized in countries that were different to those of the researcher. Through often highly detailed description, scholars sought to escape their own ethnocentrism by studying those countries and cultures foreign to them[3] .

Classification :

Classification can be a simple dichotomy such as between authoritarianism and democracy, or it can be a more complex 'typology' of regimes and governmental systems. Like contextual description, classification is a necessary component of systematic comparison, but in many ways it represents a higher level of comparison since it seeks to group many separate descriptive entities into simpler categories [4]

Typologies imply the interaction of two or more variables to produce a classification system. Typologies is the beginning of a theory but the subject matter used to classify the cases other forms of classification (taxonomies) assume a scheme that uses variables to classify cases(taxa). unlike typologies these do not involve the interaction betweentwo variables.[5]

It reduces the complexity of the world by seeking out those qualities that countries share and those that they do not share The process of classification is not new.

The most famous effort at classification is found in **Aristotle's *Politics***, in which he establishes six types of rule. Based on the combination of their form of rule (good or corrupt) and the number of those who rule (one, few, or many), Aristotle derived the following six forms: monarchy, aristocracy, polity, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy

Hypothesis testing :

once things have been described and classified, the comparativist can then move on to search for those factors that may help *explain* what has been described and classified. Since the 1950s, political scientists have increasingly sought to use comparative methods to help build more complete theories of politics as stated by **Arend Lijphart** claims that comparison allows 'testing hypothesized empirical relationships among variables.

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[1] Dogan and Pelassy, **How to Compare Nations : Strategies In Comparative Politics**, New Jersey : Chatman House, p8.

[2] Sigmund Neumann, **Comparative Politics :A Half-Century Appraisal**, in Louis Cantori, Comparative Political Systems, Boston : Holbrook Press, 1974, p 8

[3] Todd, **Issues and Methods and Methods in Comparative Politics**, New York : Routledge Publishers, 2003, p3.

[4] Guy Peters, **Comparative Politics : Theory and Methods,** New York : Palgrave Macmillan**,** 1998, p 16

[5] Ibid, p 16.

Prediction :

The final and most difficult objective of comparative politics is a logical extension of hypothesis-testing, namely, to make predictions about outcomes in other countries based on the generalizations from the initial comparison, or to make claims about future political outcomes. Prediction in comparative politics tends to be made in probabilistic terms, such as 'countries with systems of proportional representation are more likely to have multiple political parties'. In this example, a political scientist would know the likely effect of a nation switching its electoral system from a plurality or 'first-past-the-post' rule to a proportional one.

Comparative government :

Comparative government signifies the study of the legal instrumentalities of government and of political processes conceived as a result of the interaction between the properly constituted organs of government, namely the electorate,the legislature, the executive, the administration, and the courts[1].

Roy Macridis argued that comparative study has far been comparative in name only. It has been part of what may be called the study of foreign government, in which the governmental structures and the formal organization of state institutions were treated in a descriptive, historical , or legalistic manner.

In this vein James Shotwell noted that "we pass from France to Italy, Switzerland, Germany and Ussr, there is no common thread, no criterion of why these particular countries were selected and no examination of the factors that account for similarities and diversities "[2]

For **Ronald Chiclote** comparative government refers to the study of institutions to their executives, legislatures, and judiciaries, as well as supplementary organizations as political parties and pressure groups[3].

Geoffrey Roberts "comparative government is more appropriate as a study of states, their institutions and functions, with perhaps also the most immediate supplementary groupings connected with the state activity- parties and pressure –groups: in other words, what professor Mackenzie has called 'statecraft'"[4]

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[1] Samirenda Ray, **Modern Comparative Politics : Approaches, Methods and Issues**, New Delhi: Prestice Hall of India, 2004, pp 2-"3.

[2] Roy Macridis, **The Study of Comparative Government: Studies in Political Science**, New York: Random House, 1996, p7.

[3] Roland Chiclote, **Theories of Comparative Politics**, : **The Search for a paradigm Reconsidered**, Routledge : Routledge Publishers, 1994, p3.

[4] Geoffrey Roberts, **What is Comparative Politics**, UK: Macmillan Education, 1972,p 14.

Comparative politics :

Comparative politics is the study of the forms of political organizations, their properties, correlating variations and modes of change.

Comparative politics involves the systematic study and comparison of the world's political systems. It seeks to explain differences between as well as similarities among countries. In contrast to journalistic reporting on a single country , comparative politics is particularly interested in exploring patterns, processes, and regularities among political systems.

Comparative politics involves both a subject of study foreign countries and a method of study-comparison. Comparative politics as the study of patterns of national governments in the contemporary world[1].

What is comparative politics?

It is two things, first a word, second a discipline. As 'world', comparative politics encompasses political behavior and institutions in all parts of the earth. The 'discipline 'of comparative politics is a field of study that desperately tries to keep up with, to encompass, to understand, to explain, and perhaps to influence the fascinating and often riotous world of comparative politics[2].

From the above we can state that comparative politics is concerned with significant regularities, similarities and differences in the working of political institutions and political behavior.

Furthermore , Comparative politics involves no more and no less than a comparative study of politics- a search for similarities and differences between and among political phenomena, including political institutions (such as legislatures, political parties, or political interest groups), political behavior (such as voting, demonstrating, or reading political pamphlets), or political ideas(such as liberalism, conservatism, or Marxism) . everything that politics studies, comparative politics studies ; the latter just undertakes the study with an explicit comparative methodology in mind[3].

Difference between comparative politics and comparative government:

Comparative government covers a comparative study of different political systems with special emphasis on their institutions and functions, comparative politics has a broader scope so as to cover all that comes within the purview of the former and , in addition to that, all else that may be designated as the study of 'non-state' politics.in other words, the scope of

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[1] Howard Wiarda, **Comparative Politics :Critical Concepts in Political Science**, Routeledge : Routledge Publishers, p14.

[2] Ruth Lane, **The Art of Comparative Politics**, Boston : Allyn and Bacon, 1997, p 2.

[3] Gregory Mahler, **Comparative Politics : Exploring Concepts and Institutions Across Nations,** USA : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019, p 7.

comparative politics is wider than that of comparative government despite the fact that the search for making comparisons is central to the study of both. The concern of a student of comparative politics does not end with the study of rule-making (legislature), rule – implementing (executive) and rule adjudicating (judicial)[1].

Comparative Political Regimes: regime is a relationship between rulers and ruled . scholars argue that there are three main definitions of political regimes:

The procedural definition :

This definition considers political regimes as the set of formal (and sometimes informal) rules that determine how political power, conceived as control of national political institutions, can be achieved and used. As mentioned by **Schmitter and Karl**, "a regime or system of governance is an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions".

in the same fashion, **Gerardo Munck**, puts forwad a his famous definition regime includes the strategic acceptance of these rules by all major polit ical actors and the lack of normative rejection of these rules by any major political actor[2].

The actor-centred definition: regime as the ruling elite :

"regime" means the ruling coalition. As they are concerned with who is in power, scholars working within this definition typically focus on the horizontal dimension of powersharing among influential elites owning different resources . they point to the capacity of a ruling coalition to not merely dominate the government, but to lead allied political groups, private interests, and state apparatuses in order to control the flow and distribution of resources (who gets what, when, and how)[3].

The sociological definition: regime as the relationship between the rulers and the ruled :

The sociological definition was introduced by **Tilly** who argued that "a regime consists of regularized interactions among states, citizens, and constituted political actors"[4].

[1] Samirenda Ray, **Modern Comparative Politics : Approaches, Methods and Issues**, New Delhi: Prestice Hall of India, 2004, pp 2-3

[2] Licia Cianetti and Gianni Del Panta, **What is a "regime"? Three definitions and their implications for the future of regime studies**, Democratization, Vol 32, N°8, 2025, P 1977.

[3] Ibid, P 1978.

[4] Licia Cianetti and Gianni Del Panta, **Opcit,** P 1982.

Eventually, political regimes may be defined as the rules and basic political resource allocations according to which actors exercise authority by imposing and enforcing collective decisions on a bounded constituency[1]

Comparative method : According to **Arend Lijphart** the comparative method is defined as one of the scientific basic methods-the others being experimental, statistical, and case study . **"The comparative method consists of identifying similarities and differences.**

Comparative method is regarded as a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables(method of testing hypothesized empirical relationships among variables). It is a unique approach especially designed to address a methodological problem in political science. It is set of strategies that one uses to deal with situation of having too few cases, and too many potential explanatory factors .

Comparative method provides a means by which we can learn about other societies, how they work and how they change, through comparison, we can learn that what works in one society may not work in another, and why, comparative politics also provides an antidote to ethnocentrism-a method by which to understand other societies on their own terms and in their own context[2].

Types of comparative studies :

***Studies of one country,* or a particular institution** (political parties, militaries, parliaments, interest groups), political process (decision-making), or public policy (for instance, labor or welfare policy) in that country. Such single-country studies are probably the easiest for young students in the field to do. But in focusing on only one country or institution .

Studies of two or more countries. Such genuinely *comparative* studies are harder to carry out, and they are usually more expensive in terms of travel and research costs. It is often difficult for the beginning student to understand and master one even harder[3].

Regional or area studies: These may include studies of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe or other sub regions (Southern Europe or North Africa, for example). Such studies are useful because they involve *groups* of countries that may have several things in common-for example, similar histories, cultures, languages, religions, colonial backgrounds, legal system, geographical location, and so on. Such regional or area studies are often particularly interesting because they are almost like a science laboratory.

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[1] Zarina Kulaeva, **Three Challenges in Political Regime Classification: The Regime Configuration Framework, Politics** and Policy, 2025, p2.

[2] Arthur Kalleberg, **The Logic of Comparison :A Methodological Note on the study of Political Systems**, World politics, N°19,1966, p 72.

[3] Todd Landman, **Opcit,** PP 20-21.

Studies across regions*:* Such studies are becoming more prevalent, but at more advanced levels they are often expensive and difficult to carry out. One must know, master, and travel to not just one region but two or more. Such studies might involve comparisons of the role of the military in Africa and the Middle East, or of the quite different paths to development of the East Asian countries and Latin America. Such studies can be very interesting, although one must recognize that it is very difficult for a single scholar to stay well informed on so many countries and areas[1].

Global comparison: With the improved statistical data collected by the World Bank, the UN, and other agencies, it is now possible to do comparisons on a global basis. We can, for example, trace the relationship in *all* countries between economic development and the growth of democratization, or between the size of the middle class and democratization, or between greater affluence and the decline of authoritarianism and Marxism-Leninism.

Thematic studies:

Comparative politics focuses on themes as well as countries and regions. For example, some scholars may be interested in a comparative perspective on the changing role of the state, the process of military professionalization, the structure of class relations, or in the process of political socialization, (how we learn about politics, where our political ideas come from). Others may be interested in such themes as dependency theory (the dependence of some countries on others), the processes by which emerging countries achieve democracy and national development, or the newer systems of interest group representation called **"corporatism"[2].**

How to compare ?: several studies have shown that comparison is a mental process that require different ways , including:

1. Comparing many countries:

This method covers a large number of cases, usually more than six to 20, 30 or even more[3]. Comparing many countries most closely approximates the experimental method of science, since it is particularly suited to quantitative analysis through measurement and analysis of aggregate data collected on many countries.

2: Comparing few countries

Between 3 and 8 countries are usually examined in these types of study. however, the small –N strategy involves the choice of a limited number of cases[4].

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[1] Ibid, p21

[2] Todd Landman, **Opcit,** p 2

[3] Leonardo Molino, **Comparison :A Methodological Introduction for the social sciences**, Berlin : Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2018, p 54

[4] Ibid **,** p 53

Variously called the comparative method, the 'comparable cases strategy' or 'focused comparison' comparing few countries, achieves control through the careful selection of countries that are analyzed using a middle level of conceptual abstraction.

The method of comparing few countries is divided primarily into two types of system design: 'most similar systems design' and '**most different systems design', Most similar systems design** (MSSD) seeks to compare political systems that share a host of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others. Based on J. S. Mill's method of difference, MSSD seeks to identify the key features that are different among similar countries and which account for the observed political outcome .

Most different systems design (MDSD), on the other hand, compares countries that do not share any common features apart from the political outcome to be explained and one or two of the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome[1].

- ***Most Different Systems Design (MSDS):***

This approach follows the logic of Mill's method of agreement. The logic of Most Different Systems Design is to select cases that are different in most respects and only similar on the key explanatory variable of interest. Thus, rather than comparing countries that are very similar to each other, we compare countries that are very different from each other, hence the name. With this approach, the observed differences on important variables act as a control in order to test whether the crucial similarity that the countries share is associated with the dependent variable[2].

Most different design : economy and democracy

	USA(system)	**Sweden (system)**	
Dependent variable: Stability of democracy	high	**high**	**similar**
Independent variable: Economic development	high	**high**	**similar**
Other variables:			
- Political systems	Presidential	Constitutional monarchy	**different**
- Division of power	federation	unitary	**different**
- Level of social security	low	high	**different**
- Religion	Christian important	Christian little	**different**

• ***Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)***:

Following Mill's method of difference, **Most Similar Systems Design** suggests looking at countries that have a lot in common (that is, are 'most similar systems'), but do not show the same phenomenon or outcome we want to explain. The Most Similar Systems Design is based on selecting countries that share many (theoretically) important characteristics, but differ in one crucial respect (related to the hypothesis of interest)[3].

Most Similar design : economy and democracy:

[1] Todd Landman, **Opcit,** p 24

[2] Sandra Halperin and Oliver **Heath, Political Research Methods and Practical Skills**, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2012, p 221

[3] Ibid, p 219

	USA(system)	Brazil (system)	
Dependent variable: Stability of democracy	high	**Weak**	**different**
Independent variable: Economic development	high	**emerging**	**different**
Other variables:			
- Political systems	Presidential system	Presidential	**Similar**
- Division of power	federation	Federation	**Similar**
- Legal of social security	low	Low	**Similar**
- Religion	Christian	Christian	**similar**

What is comparable?

There are two levels of analysis: a Micro or individual level, Macro or system level[1]. The classical cases of comparative politics are *national political systems.* These are (still) the most important political units in the contemporary world. However, national systems are not the only cases that comparative politics analyses[2].

1. **non-national political systems can be compared:** ***sub-national regional political systems*** *:* (state level in the US or the German *Länder*) or *supranational units* such as (i) regions (Western Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, North America, Latin America, and so on); (ii) empires (Ottoman Habsburg, Russian, Chinese, Roman, etc.); and (iii) supranational organizations (European Union the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), etc.).

2. ***Types of political systems*** **can be compared** (e.g. a comparison between democratic and authoritarian regimes in terms of, say, economic performance).

3. **Comparative politics compares *single elements*** of the political system rather than the whole system. Researchers compare the structure of parliaments of different countries or cabinets, the policies (e.g. welfare state or environmental policies), the finances of parties or trade unions, and the presence or absence of direct democracy, institutions and electoral laws.

[1] Pushpa Singh and Chetna Sharma, **Methods and Approaches in Comparative Political Analysis**, Routledge : Routledge Publishers, 2025, p 13

[2] Daniele Caramani, **Opcit**, p5

Lecture 2: Approaches to the study of political regimes

Approaches meaning:

Approaches are tools by which the scholars of politics arrive at greater political understanding. They may be classified into three broad categories: **traditional, behaviouralism, post behaviouralism**

Traditional approach :

This is called the traditional or pre-behaviorist stage. It lasted from the late nineteenth century up to the1920s. it is distinguished by its emphasis on the state, its institutions, its constitutions, as well as its legal system. In this period, political science was considered the science of state. The state is the only political actor both nationally and internationally[1].

A study of state and government: Since political science is the science of the state and the government. It conducts the scientific study of both the state and government. It deals with the nature and formation of stat and tries to understand various forms and functions of the government, just as the scholars differ in regard to the definition of politcal science, so they differ in regard to its scope too.

On the other hand, Garris and others believe that the scope of political science is restricted to the study of the state alone,

for instance, ***Blutschli*** says " **political science is a science which concerned with the state, in its fundamental conditions, n its essential nature, in its various forms of manifestation, its development.**

Garner says **"politics begins and ends with the state**",

Paul Janet says "**politics is that part of social science which treats of the foundations of state and the principles of government"**

This stage also focused on a certain genre of governments, namely those of western European countries, the soviet union and the united states[2].

1. Philosophical Approach :

Philosophical approach is one of the oldest approach, its first features is that it made thinker to fly in the heighests of imaginations to find the truth and knowledge. Some of the topics of

[1] Nasr Arif, **The Reechantment of Political Science**, New York : University of America, 2001, P50

[2] J. Johari, **Comparative Politics**, New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1982, p 33

its interests are justice, equality, liberty, and idea of good, it is normative in character and believes in building norms. All thinkers who study a thing from philosophical point of view , tried to weave norms into theory, which thought could be realized in practice. For instance, Plato became philosopher of the ideal state, Hobbes of absolute monarchy, Marx of communism.

2.**Historical approach :**

The distinguishing feature of this approach is focused on the past or on a selected period of time as well as on a sequence events within a particular phase so as to find out an explanation of what institutions are, and are tending to be, more in the knowledge of what they have been , and how they came to be, what they are than that only through the study of historical background, they could have a better and close insight into the working of those institutions and forces that condition political phenomena, Machiavelli is one of the strongest proponents of this approach and he believes that laws of politics have to be based on the understanding of history, according to **Freeman** ,history has no roots without politics and politics has no fruits, history is a shoot and vice-versa. **Harold Laski** stated that no political idea is ever intelligible, save in the context of time[1].

2. Legal approach :

Traditionally, the study of constitutions have been an important area of inquiry in political studies and political scholars have focused on the laws and constitutions .

Here the students are exposed primarily to the study of the powers of the various branches of governmental agencies with reference to the legal and constitutional provisions, legal approach has dominated the field of the traditional political science and comparative politics in particular, **Formal-Legalism** For years, the study of comparative politics re- flected a preoccupation with formal structures and legal strictures. Emphasis was placed upon the organized and evident institutions of government, and studies concentrated almost exclusively upon constitutions, cabinets, parliaments, courts, and bureaucracies[2].

From the above, it is important to mention that The formal-legal approach treats rules in two ways. First, legal rules and procedures are the basic independent variable and the functioning and fate of democracies the dependent variable. For example, Duverger criticizes electoral laws on proportional representation because they fragment party systems[3].

3. Institutional approach:

The study of political institutions is central to the identity of the discipline of political science. Eckstein points out, ‘‘If there is any subject matter at all which political scientists can claim exclusively for their own, a subject matter that does not require acquisition of the

[1] J. Johari, **Opcit,** p 23-24

[2]James Bill and Robert Hardgrave, **Comparative Politics**, New York : University Press of America,1981, P3

[3] R. Rohdes, **Old Institutionalisms,** in R. Rhodes and Sarah Binder,**The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions**, Oxford : Oxford University press, p 94-95

analytical tools of sister-Welds and that sustains their claim to autonomous existence, it is, of course, formal-legal political structure.'' Similarly, Greenleaf argues that constitutional law, constitutional history, and the study of institutions form the ''traditional'' approach to political science, this approach is based on ''the study of public laws that concern formal governmental organizations.''[1]

The characteristics of traditional approach :

Essentially non- comparative:

The vast majority of publications in the field of comparative regimes deal either with one country or with parallel descriptions of the institutions of a number countries. The student is led through constitutional foundations, the organization of politcal power, and a description of the ways in which such powers are exercised. In each case 'problem areas" are discussed with reference to the country's institutional structure. The interest of the student is concentrated primarily on an analysis of the structure of the state, the location of sovereignty, the electoral system[2].

Essentially descriptive :

It may well be argued that description of the formal political institutions is vital for the understanding of the political process and that as such it leads to comparative study, but they describe various political institutions generally without attempting to compare them; what comparison is made is limited exclusively to the identification of differences between types of systems, such as federal vs unitary system, or parliamentary system vs. presidential system or the more elusive differences between democratic and totalitarian regime.

There are **two typical approaches** in the descriptive study of political institutions. The first is **historical** and the second is **legalistic.** The historical approach centers on the study of the origins and growth of certain institutions. We trace the origins of the British parliamentary system to **Magna Carta** and study its development through successive historical stages. It is assumed that parallel historical accounts of the evolution of the French parliament or the German representative assemblies will indicate similarities and differences.

The second most prevalent approach is what we might call "**the legalistic approach**".. here the student is exposed primarily to the study of the «powers" of the various branches of government and their relationships with reference to the existing constitutional and legal prescriptions.

[1] Ibid, 94-95

[2] Roy Macridis, **The Study of Comparative Goverment ; Studies in political Science**, New York : Random-House, 1955, p 7

This is almost exclusively the study of what can be done or what cannot be done by various governmental agencies with reference to legal and constitutional provisions. Again, this approach, like its historical approach with which it often goes hand in hand, describes the political system in a very narrow frame. It does not seek the forces that shape the legal forms, nor does it attempt to establish the causal relationships that account for the variety in constitutional prescriptions from one system to another or from one period to another[1].

Essentially parochial:

The great number of studies on foreign political systems has been addressed to the examination of western European institutions. contemporary studies. Parochialism Comparative political analysis in the past focused quite exclusively upon European government. But even within the study of comparative European politics, the scope was narrowed to consider again and again the same four societies: Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia[2].

Essential static:

In general, the traditional approach has ignored the dynamic factors that account the growth and change. It has concentrated on what we have called political anatomy. The question of sovereignty and its location occupied students of politics for a long time; the study of constitutional structures became a favorite pastime, though no particular effort was made to evaluate the effectiveness of constitutional forms in achieving posited goals or analyze the conditions underlying the success or failure of constitutionalism[3]

Essentially monographic :

The most important studies of foreign systems , aside from basic texts, have taken the form of monographs that have concentrated on the study of the political institutions of one system or on discussion of a particular institution in one system[4].

Class approach :

The Marxist approach is considered a radical theory of politics . This approach aims at a radical change of society through revolution. Marx wrote in his 'Theses on Feuerbach', "Philosophers have merely interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it."

Even though Marx did not write specifically on international relations, we can cull out Marxian views on international relations from his various views on politics and society. Later, many Marxist scholars built their ideas on politics including global politics based on the

[1] Ibid, P 8
[2] Roy Macridis, **Opcit,** p 9
[3] Ibid, p11
[4] Ibid, p 12

foundations provided by Marx. World system theory, dependency theory. the Basic Assumptions of Marxist Approach in politics:

• Economics is the basis to understand international relations and all other aspects like politics, culture, education, religion, etc. are the superstructures dependent on economic issues.

• The concept of historical class struggle is the framework to understand international relations.

• Capitalism is the root of all the problems of international relations.

• The nation-state is not the prime actor, but classes are prime actors.

• Economically dominant class, i.e., 'bourgeoisie class' exploits the poor working-class i.e., 'Proletarian class'. And these classes are in constant conflict.

• Exploitation reaches its ultimate peak in capitalism. he state is a tool of oppression and always tries to protect capitalism. After the establishment of a communist society, the state will wither away[1].

• In international relations wars and conflicts are the results of the capitalist system and their aspirations for colonies.

• Working-class people are facing the same problems all over the world and they have common interests. So, all the workers should unite beyond their national identities.

• Workers have no national identity as they are being exploited all over the world. So, they must go for an international revolution beyond national borders.

• Neo-Colonialism and neo-imperialism are the realities of International Politics.

• Revolution will bring a classless and stateless society. The peace that emerged out of this revolution will last long[2].

Elite approach :

The study of elites was established as part of political science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries largely as a result of the work of two Italian sociologists, vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, Roberto Michels , wright Mills.

The fundamental perspective of the elite approach is summarized by the assertion that all political systems are divided into two strata—those who rule and those who are ruled. The rulers are labeled the political elite^ and this elite is the most significant aspect of any political system. The political elite is that group which possesses most political power and which makes most important political decisions in a society. It is composed of that minority of

[1] Keerthiraj and Devaiah , **Quintessence of International Politics : Theoretical And Conceptual** Foundations, Bangalore : Blue Hill Publications, 2002, P 58
[2] Ibid, p59

individuals who are most active in political affairs. By focusing analysis upon this particular group within the political system, one can best understand the patterns and processes of political life[1].

Vilfredo Pareto says that people are always governed by elites except short period of time. according he to him, "**history of men is the history of the continues replacement of certain elites as one ascends another declines, such is the real phenomenon, though to us it may often appear under another form[2]**

Pareto in his book "mind and society" classifies social classes by taking elites as a **stickyard**. Elites represent the **higher stratum**, the others, namely non-elites are thought as the **lower stratum**. He further emphasizes and divides it into subgroups, because for him, there is no one **elite stratum**. There are various strata in it and all of them constitute the elite stratum. The main strata in elite stratum are :

governing elite, comprising individuals who directly or indirectly play some considerable part in government, and a non-governing élite, comprising the rest. .

two strata in a population : (1) a lower stratum, the non-élite, with whose possible influence on government we are not just here concerned; then (2) a higher stratum, the élite, which is divided into two: (a) a governing élite, (b) a non-governing élite.

Within this framework, Pareto sets forth and develops his fundamental idea of the "circulation of elites." By this, Pareto means two diverse processes operative in the perpetual continuity of elite rule: (1) the process in which individuals circulate between the elite and the non-elite, and (2) the process in which a whole elite is replaced by a new one[3].

law of circulation of elites :

Elites and non-elites are not stable, they are subject to change. New elites rise and takes old elite's place. This change is called the law of circulation of elites by Pareto. He says "elites" or aristocrats do not last. They live or take position in a certain time. "History" , he says, "**is a graveyard of aristocracies"** . In course of the time, elites undergo a change when elite member's composition change or their descendants do not have qualities to be elite; or, infiltration of extraneous elements from lower classes and another society, or, changes in legal rights in society like extension of right of citizenship that gives an opportunity for non-elites to move up

Rising and declining of the elites take place at the same time. Generally, there are two signs that show elites are declining:

(1) **declining elite** becomes softer, milder, more humane and less apt to defend its own power; and

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[1] Ibid, p 60

[2] Vilfredo Pareto, **Elites : An Application of theoretical sociology**, New Jersey : The Bedminister press, 1968, p, 9

[3] Berg Berberoglu, **Theory calssical and contemporary : A critical perspective**, Routledge : Routlege publishers, 2017, p42-43

(2) **elites loss** its rapacity and greed for the goods of others, but rather tends as much as possible to increase its unlawful appropriations and indulge in major usurpation of the national patrimony. In contrast new rising elites are active, stronger and dedicated in character.

Pareto divides political elites into two groups: (**1) "foxes"** who are strong in Class I residues and (2) **"lions"** who are strong in Class II residues. While foxes prefer to rule through cooperation, diplomatic intrigue, and deviousness, Hons prefer to rule through the use of force

Foxes and Hons live under any type of political structure, their attitudes are not affected or shaped by the form of government. He says "Whatever the form of government, men holding power have as a rule a certain inclination to use that power to keep themselves in the saddle, and, to abuse it to secure personal gains and advantages" .

In fact, all governments use force but no government can rule by depending solely on force. Theories designed by ruling class and derivations are used to convince the subject classes to obey the government, and, to justify government policies, and, to use visible force like army ,and, invisible force like political machine . In addition to these, sentiments of superiority and inferiority are used to keep ruled class in order.

Mosca : the ruling elite

The fundamental idea that Mosca wanted to develop in his major work, The Ruling Class, was a new political theory of power. like Pareto, Mosca divides people in all societies essentially into two distinct classes: the ruling class (the political elite) and the class that is ruled (the masses). The ruling class always enjoys a monopoly of political power over the masses and directs society according to its own interests : In all societies—from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled.

The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism[1].

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[1] Gaetano Mosca, **The Ruling Class**, New York : McGraw-Hillcompany, 1939, p 50

less arbitrary and violent. This is not merely so with every known society of the past and the present; all societies must be so divided[1].

Michels : The iron law of oligarchy :

To Michels organizations are the only means for the creation of a collective will and they work under the Iron Law of Oligarchy. He explicitly points out the indispensability of oligarchy from the organizations by saying that "It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over electors, of the mandatanes over the mandators, of the delegates over delegators, who says organization, says oligarchy".

Oligarchical tendencies in organizations is not related to ideology or ends of the organizations. Of course, it is evident that any organization which is set up for autocratic aims , it is oligarchic by nature. To Michels, regardless of any ideological concerns, all types of organizations have oligarchic tendencies. It was his major question in political parties that "how can oligarchic tendencies be explained in socialist and democratic parties, which they declared war against it ?

In contrast the leaders have a natural greed of power. To Michels, leadership itself is not compatible with the most essential postulates of democracy, but leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of society. He says "At the outset, leaders arise spontaneously, their functions are accessory and gratuitous. Soon however, they become professional leaders, and in this second stage of development they are stable and irremovable" .

As for as organization itself is considered as a source of oligarchy, Michels says that it is generally because of "**psychology of organization itself",** that is to say, upon the tactical and technical necessities which result from the consolidation of every disciplined political aggregate." Further as a particular type of organization bureaucracy and its features require an oligarchic structure.

At the societal level, although development in the democracy, oligarchy still exists. First of all he says by looking at the state as an organization, which needs a bureaucracy that is the source of enemy of individual freedom, the state represents a single gigantic oligarchy. An attempt to destroy this gigantic' oligarchy in fact brings a number of smaller oligarchies in society but does not eliminate it .Secondly he agrees with Jean Jack Rousseau on the idea that "it is always against the natural order of things that the majority rule and the minority ruled." [2] .

Group approach :

With the failure of the elitist approach, the attention of the political scientists was turned to a pluralist model in which power, instead of being concentrated in the hands of a group or class, is treated as diffused among many interest groups competing against each other for power.

[1] Berg Berberoglu,**Opcit**, p 44

[2] Mustafa Delican, **Elite Theories of Pareto, Mosca and Michels**, sosyal siyaset konferanslart, Istanbul University, 2000, Vol. 43, p. 329

Unlike the elite theory that divided society horizontally into classes, or elite and masses, group approach sees society as divided horizontally and vertically as well as into groups.

The group approach to the study of politics was first explicitly and systematically developed by Arthur F. Bentley in his ground breaking work, **The Process of Government, published in 1908**.Prior to this, important aspects of group analysis had been applied by political scholars through the centuries and throughout the world. James Madison and John C. Calhoun analyzed early American political processes through the lens of group cooperation and conflict. The great Arab political philosopher, Ibn Khaldun, developed a powerful explanation of the rise[1].

In this vein, **Gabriel Almond** identified four types of interest groups :

Anomic groups : are generally spontaneous groups with a collective response to a particular frustration. They tend to generally have poor political communications skills, for instance : crowds, mobs, demonstrating, rioting.

Non-associational groups:

Are rarely well-organized. And their activity is dependent on the specific issue. they differ from anomic groups in that members are usually similar to one another and have a common identity , for example: family ,kin group, tribe

Institutional groups;

Are mostly formal and have some other political or social function in addition to the particular interest , examples: parties, civil service, church, army,

Associational groups :

Are formed specifically to represent an issue of a particular group. The institutional category includes legislatures, political executives , as illustration , trade unions, business groups, mass media, farmers associations[2].

Behavioralism approach:

Bihaviouralism is one of the modern approaches of political science. This approach emerged in the 20th century. It focuses on the individual voter, leader, revolutionary, or party member, as well as the group or political system's impacts on the person's political behaviour.

The behavioral revolution represented an attack upon a tradition where government and politics were primarily understood in formal-legal institutional terms. The focus on formal government institutions, constitutional issues, and public law was seen as ''unpalatably formalistic and old-fashioned'', and a standard complaint was that this approach was ''relatively insensitive to the nonpolitical determinants of political behavior and hence to the nonpolitical bases of governmental institutions''[3].

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[1] James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave,**Opcit** , p117

[2] Gabriel Almond, **A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process**, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 ,1958, p 275

[3] James March and John Oslen, **Elaborating New Istitutionalism,** in R. Rhodes and Sarah Binder,The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford : Oxford University press, p 6

Behaviouralism according to **Robert Dahl** is " a protest movement within political science……associated with a number of scientists ,mainly Americans" who shared

1. A strong sense of dissatisfaction with the achievements of conventional political science, particularly through historical, philosophical and the descriptive institutional approaches".
2. A belief that the additional methods and approaches either existed or could be developed that would help to provide political science with empirical propositions and theories.
   He added that behaviouralism is a movement for "bringing political studies into closer affiliation with theories, methods, findings, and outlooks in modern psychology, sociology, anthropology and economics"[1]

The first turning point in the evolution of political science can be conveniently dated to the 1921publication of a manifesto for a new science of politics, which implied a departure from the historical approach embraced by many of the founders of political science in us, by the university of Chicago professor **"Charles Merriam",** this publication was followed by a series of national conferences on the science of politics, which were important events for the discipline in 1923,1924, and 1925.

it was also followed by the formation of the social science research council, Merriam exhorted political scientists to look at politcal behavior as one of the most essential objects of inquiry ,but its origins may traced back to the works of Graham Wallas (human nature in politics) and Arthur Bentley(the process of government) published in 1908, both wallas and Bentley were inclined to lay greater emphasis on the informal processes of politics and les[2]s on political institutions in isolation[3]

Characteristics of behavioural movement : Kikpatrick underlined four characteristics of the behavioural movement as:

1.rejection of political institutions as the basic conceptual units and a substitution of individual and group behavior

2. emphasis on the unity of social sciences, hence an increased willingness to cross-disciplinary lines.

3. greater attention to precision, measurement and quantification techniques, and

4. development of systematic political theory[4].

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[1] Radhey Shyam Chaurasia, **History of Political Thought**,New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2003, p 125

[2] Evron Kirkpatrick, **The Political Behavior Approach**, American Behavioral Scientist , Vol 2, N°2,1958, p10

[3] Gerardo Munk, **The Past and Present of Comparative Politics**, in Gerardo Munk and Richard Synder, Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007 ; p 41

[4] Evron Kirkpatrick, **Opcit,** p10

Characteristics of behaviouralism: David Easton has identified the following eight major assumptions of behaviouralism:

1.Regularities:

There are discoverable uniformities in political behavior. These can be expressed in generalizations or theories with explanatory and predictive value**.**

2. Verification:

The validity of such generalizations must be testable, in principle, by reference to relevant behavior**.**

3. Techniques:

Means for acquiring and interpreting data cannot be taken for granted. They are problematic and need to be examined self-consciously, refined, and validated so that rigorous means can be found for observing, recording, and an- alyzing behavior.

3. Quantification.

Precision in the recording of data and the statement of findings requires measurement and quantification, not for their own sake, but only where possible, rele- vant, and meaningful in the light of other objectives[1].

4. Values:

Ethical evaluation and empirical explanation involve two different kinds of propositions that, for the sake of clarity, should be kept analytically distinct. However, a student of political behavior is not prohibited from asserting proposi- tions of either kind separately or in combination as long as he does not mistake one for the other.

5. Systematization.

Research ought to be systematic, that is, theory and research are to be seen as closely intertwined parts of a coherent and orderly body of knowledge. Research untutored by theory may prove trivial, and theory unsupport- able by data, futile.

6. Pure science:

The application of knowledge is as much a part of the scientific enterprise as theoretical understanding. But the understanding and explanation of political behavior logically precede and provide the basis for efforts to utilize political knowledge in the solution of urgent practical prob- lems of society[2]**.**

Integration:

[1] David Easton, **The Current Meaning of Behavioralism**, In Bernard Susser, Approaches to The Study of Politics, New York : Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992, p 47

[2] Ibid, p 47

Because the social sciences deal with the whole human situation, political research can ignore the find- ings of other disciplines only at the peril of weakening the validity and undermining the generality of its own results. Recognition of this interrelationship will help to bring political science back to its status of earlier centuries and return it to the main fold of the social sciences[1].

Political regimes analysis before and after the 'behavioral revolution'

Dimensions of analysis	before	After
Unit	state	**Political system**
Subject matter	Regimes and their formal institutions	Expansion to all actors involved in the process of political-decision making
Cases	Major democracies	Objective extension of cases (decolonization) and subjective extension with the development of discipline in various countries: discovery of small and welfare democracies
Theory	normative	empirical
Method	Narrative accounts and juxtapositions between cases	Quasi-experimental comparative method,
Variables	Qualitative	Quantitative

Ref: Daniele Caramani, **Opcit, p 7**

System approach:

The word system has been used and defined differently by different writers belonging to different disciplines, According to **Kaplan** "system is a set of interrelated variables, as distinguished from the environment of the set, and the ways in which this set is maintained under the impact of environmental disturbances[2].

General features of system analysis :

1. A system is composed of elements all at a level of interdependence, they cannot exist in isolation. They are parts combined together to make a whole system, they are units having their goals and ways of achieving their objectives.
2. Parts interrelated and they interact but they may not be organically related together.
3. It operates in an environment. Input-output relations make the system functional and environment shows its existence by the mechanism of feed-back which is responded by the system through policies or decisions. Outputs is a response to the input which is in the form of demand. The survival of the system depends on support system of the members who take part in the system.

[1] David Easton, **Opcit**, 48
[2] Johari, **Opcit,** p 45

4. The major objective of the system is to maintain and preserve itself from the challenges thrown by the environment.

David Apter identifies three **characteristic features** for system they are :

A. Systems have boundaries within which there are functional interrelationships.
B. Systems are divided into sub-systems, with mutual exchanges between the sub-systems. When applied to politics this may be seen in the relationship between city and state organizations or a state and national government. Itself through
C. Systems have a capacity to take informational inputs, and translate inputs into some kind of output after understanding inputs[1].

In this vein, **David Easton** offers a definition with **three components** : 1. The political system allocates values(by means of policies) to some or all members of society, 2. Its allocations are authoritative, and 3. its authoritative allocations are binding on the society as whole, since the political system needs the obedience or acceptance of the members of society for the implementation of its policies.

Harold Lasswell , " **the study of politics is the study of influence and the influential".** Politics is "**who gets, what, when, how?".** According to **Laswell,** is concerned with the determination, by official governmental decision-making and action, of
1. Who in political society receives what benefits, rewards, and advantages and how much of them they receive,
2. When they receive the benefits, rewards, and advantages, and
3. The methods by which they receive them. Conversely,"politics" is also concerned with determining, by governmental decision-making and action, 1. Who in society is denied what benefits, rewards, and advantages, 2. When and how long they are denied them, and 3. The methods by which they are subjected to such deprivations[2].

Properties of identification*:* To distinguish a political system from other social systems, we must 'be able to identify it by describing its fundamental units and establishing the boundaries that demarcate it from units outside the system
(a) Units of a political system: The units are the elements of which we say a system is composed. In the case of a political system, they are political actions. Normally it is useful to look at these as they structure themselves in political roles and political groups .
(b) Boundaries: Some of the most significant questions with regard to the operation of political systems can be answered only if we bear in mind the obvious fact that a system does

[1] David Apter, **Introduction to Political Analysis**, New Delhi : Prentice Hall, p 257-258
[2] A Kwalefo Bernadette Djeudo, **Concepts that Shape Politics and Goverment in Cameroun**, UK : Author House, 2013, p37

not ' exist in a vacuum, It is always immersed in a specific setting or environment. The way in which a system works will be in part a function of its response to the total social, biological and physical environment[1] .

Inputs: demands / support

Among inputs of a political system there are two basic-kinds**: demands and support** These inputs give a political system its dynamic character They furnish it both with the raw material' or information that the system is called upon to process and with the energy to keep it going.

Demands are being made by persons or groups in the society that cannot all be fully satisfied. In 'all societies one fact dominates political life: scarcity prevails with regard to most of the valued things. There are generally three sources from where demands originate. a) Society b) Political elite c) International environment .

Inputs of demands alone are not enough to keep a political system operating. They are only the raw material out of which finished products called decisions are manufactured. Energy in the form of actions or orientations promoting and resisting a political system, the demands arising in it, and the decisions[2].

without support demands could not be satisfied or conflicts in goals composed. If demands are to be acted upon, the members of a system under taking to pilot the demands through to their transformation into binding decisions and those who seek to influence the relevant processes in any way must be able to count on support from others in the system. **Ex :** We may vote for a political candidate, or defend a decision by the highest court of the land. In these cases, support manifests, itself through overt action. Here are four sub-divisions of support input.

1- Material support Material support relates with the payment of taxes, levying the duties, the provisions of services. 2- Obedience to laws and regulations Such support intends to obey laws and regulations of the state and assure cooperation with the political elite. 3- Participatory support These supports focus on voting, political discussions and other forms of activity. 4- Manifestation of deference[3].

Conversion Box:

Therefore, if, conversion box is studied empirically, when the inputs (demands and support) go into the said box, parliament, bureaucracy (civil and military) act and make decisions on those inputs according to the capabilities of the political system.

Outputs :

An output of, a political system, it will be recalled, is a political decision or politics One of the major ways of strengthening the ties of the members to their system is through providing decisions that, tend to satisfy the day-to-day demands of these members[4].

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[1] David Easton, **An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems**, Vol 9, N°3, World Politics, 1957, p 385
[2] David Eston,**Opcit**, p 387
[3] Ibid ,390
[4]Ibid, p 395



Structural –functional theory :

The most comprehensive formulation of the **structural-functional approach** in politics are seen in the works of Gabriel almond, G.B. Powell and James. Coleman. On the first look, the structural-functional approach looks very similar to systems analysis: both focus on analyzing inputs and outputs and both talk about maintaining equilibrium and the crucial role of feedback. However, is a small but crucial difference between them.

While the systems analysis focused on the degree and nature of interactions between the environment and political system to explain the working of a political system, the structural-functional theory places emphasis on the specific nature of the structures and institutions and their functions in explaining political reality, and to compare the manner in which these functions were performed.(structures and functions)

There are **four characteristics** that all political systems have in common and can be compared on :

1. All political systems, including the simplest ones, have political structures. They may be compared to one another according to the degree and form of structural specialization.
2. The same functions are performed in all political systems, though these functions may be performed by different kinds of structures and with different frequencies. Systems may be compared on the basic of their functions, the frequency of such functions, and the kinds of structures performing them.
3. All political structures, no matter how specialized and regardless of whether found in primitive or modern societies, are multifunctional. Political systems may be compared according to the specificity of function of structure.

4. All political systems are “mixed” in a cultural sense. There are no all-modern or all-primitive societies based on their respective degrees of rationality. Comparison can be made by focusing on the dominance of one aspect over another[1].

According to **Almond**, a political system is "that system of interactions present in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation by means of the use of lawful physical compulsion."

According to **Almond and Powell**, "The Political System includes not only governmental institutions like legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies but all structures in their political aspect."

According to him, a political system is characterized, by three elements:

1. **Comprehensiveness**
2. **interdependence**
3. **existence of boundaries**

1. comprehensiveness :

Means all interactions-inputs as well outputs-which affect the use of the threat of use of physical coercion, we mean to include not just the structures based on law, like parliaments, executives,, bureaucracies, and courts, or informal organizations like parties, interest groups, and media of communications, but all of the structures in their political aspects including kinship, lineage, caste groups, as well as anomic phenomena like riots, street demonstrations.

2.interdependence :

we mean that a change in one subset of interactions produces changes in all the other subsets(the characteristics of the party system, the functions of parliaments and cabinet, and so forth).

It implies that the system functions as a whole and that any changes to one component will also affect and modify all the other components of the system For instance, the nature of political parties, the legislative and executive branches, and the electoral process have all changed [2] .

2. Existence of boundaries :

We mean that there are points where other systems end and the political system begins..

Political system functions : Input functions : include

Political Socialization: is the process of induction into the political culture, its end product is a set of attitudes- cognitions, values standards and feelings-toward the political system, its various roles, and role incumbents, it also includes knowledge of , values affecting , and feelings toward the inputs of demands and claims into the systems, and its authoritative outputs.

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[1] Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, **Politics in Developing Areas**, Princeton : Pricenton University Press, p 7

[2] Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, **Opcit**, p 8

Family, church, peer groups, school, work, media of communication, political parties, and governmental institutions all share in the function of political socialization[1].

Political recruitment : is concerned with the recruitment of citizens into the specialized role of the political system.

Interest articulation : is concerned with the formulation and expressions of interest claims and demands .four main types of structures may be involved in interest articulation :

1. Non-Institutional interest groups (legislatives, executives, churches),
2. associational interest groups,(kinship, lineage, ethnic , regional, religious groups)
3. Anomic interest groups(more or less spontaneous break-thoughts into the political system from the society ex: riots, demonstrations)
4. Non-associational groups (specialized structures ex : Trade unions, businessmen, ethnic association….)[2]

Interest aggregation : the function of converting demands into general policy it performed within all subsystems of the political system, legislatives, executives, interest groups, political parties , bureaucracies,

Political communication: all of the functions performed in political systems are performed by means of communications[3].

Output functions include :

Rule-making: it is exercised by the legislature or parliament

Rule –application: enforcement of rules made by the rule-making authority.

Rule adjudication: the role of judicial power is to interpret the laws and punish the guilty.it also resolves the conflict between government and citizen[4].

Communication approach :

Communications theory represents another model of political analysis derived from the concept of political system. **Karl Deutsch** ***(The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control)*** is the chief exponent of this approach. Deutsch sought to apply the concepts and methods of modern information technology as well as physiology of nervous system to an analysis of the political system. He particularly introduced the techniques of cybernetics to the sphere of political analysis.

In his book **The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control**, Deutsch argued that cybernetics, as the study of communication and control, offers a general perspective on all kinds of politics. Communications remain at the centre of politics, and form the 'nerves of government'.

Cybernetics is applicable to any system that possesses adequate organization, communication and control; any system where messages are frequently transferred, retrieved, stored, and

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[1] Ibid , p26
[2] Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, **Opcit**, p 33
[3] Ibid, p 38-45
[4] Ibid, p52

responded. The international political system fulfills these criteria, and hence the study of communication flows help to analyse international politics. Transmission of messages, whether through electronic machines, human interactions or nerve cells, are always significant to any system—electronic, biological or social. Communication flow is also very important in international politics, and a proper study of these communications may bring out of communication takes place[1]. These are: (1) information; (2) entropy; (3) load; (4) lag; (5) distortion; (6) gain; (7) lead; and (8) feedback. In order to understand the theory, a few words about these mechanisms of communication are necessary[2].

Post-behaviouralism:

David Easton coined the term **post-behaviouralism** in his presidential address at the 65th annual meeting of the American political science association in 1969. Post-behaviuoralism claimed despite the fact that behaviouralism claimed to be value free there was tendency in towards social preservation and status-quo rather than social change. Therefore, the new movement led stress on action and relevance. The **three tenets** of the post-behaviouralism movement were:

a) It challenged the view of behaviouralists that research has to be value neutral and stressed that values should not be totally neglected.
b) Post-behaviouralism claimed that behaviouralists stress on observable and measurable phenomena meant that too much emphasis was being placed on easily studies trivial issue.
c) Post-behaviouralism stressed that research should have relevance to the society and that intellectuals have a positive role to play.

Causes for the growth of post-behaviourism:

1. Failure of behaviouralism to look to the practical problems of the world
2. Over-emphasis of the behaviouralists on research methods and tools
3. The behaviouralists ignore the theoretical aspects on the subject and concern about techniques only
4. Human behavior cannot be generalized
5. The behaviouralists give attention only to statistics and not ideals.
6. Study of politics can never be value-free
7. The behaviouralists ignore the study of the institutions and emphasis unnecessarily the behaviouralist effect[3].

Basic characteristics of post- behaviouralism: the following are some of the basic characteristics of post-behaviouralism

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[1]Aneek Chatterjee, **International Relations Today: Concepts and Applications , 2010, New Delhi : Pearson, 2010,** P 43

[2] Ibid, p 43

[3] R.C Agarwal, **Political Theory : Principles of Political Science**, New Delhi : Chand and Company Publisher, 2000, p 47

1. **Movement of protest** : behaviouralism was a movement of protest against the traditional approach which lacked scientific rigor and was based on speculation.
2. **Focus on behaviour** : behaviouralism focused on the behaviour of actual actors in the political field including those who hold or seek power as well as the voters.
3. **Scientific outlook;** behaviouralism sought to explain the empirical aspects of political life through the use of theories and scientific methods[1].

Characteristics of post-behaviouralism : the chief characteristics of post-behaviouralism are described as the" **credo of relevance"** by David Easton or a "**distillation of the maximal image"**

1.Substance must precede technique:

If one must be sacri- ficed for the other—and this need not always be so—it is more important to be relevant and meaningful for contemporary urgent social problems than to be sophisticated in the tools of investigation. For the aphorism of science that it is better to be wrong than vague, post-behavioralism would substitute a new dictum, that it is better to be vague than non-relevantly precise.

2. Behavioral science conceals an ideology of empirical conservatism:

To confine oneself exclusively to the description and analysis of facts is to hamper the understanding of these same facts in their broadest context. As a result empirical po- litical science must lend its support to the maintenance of the very factual conditions it explores. It unwittingly purveys an ideology of social conservatism tempered by modest incremental change.

3. Behavioral research must lose touch with reality:

The heart of behavioral inquiry is abstraction and analysis and this serves to conceal the brute realities of politics. The task of post-behavioralism is to break the barriers of silence that behavioral language necessarily has created and to help polit- ical science reach out to the real needs of mankind in a time of crisis.

4. **Research about and constructive development of values are inextinguishable parts of the study of politics**;

Science can- not be and never has been evaluatively neutral despite protes- tations to the contrary. Hence to understand the limits of our knowledge we need to be aware of the value premises on which it stands and the alternatives for which this knowledge could be used[2].

5. Members of a learned discipline bear the responsibilities of all intellectuals:

The intellectuals' historical role has been and must be to protect the humane values of civiliza- tion. This is their unique task and obligation. Without this they become mere technicians, mechanics for tinkering with society.

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[1] R.C Agarwal, **Opcit**, p 47

[2] David Easton, **Tenets of Post- Behavioralism**, In Bernard Susser, **Approaches to The Study of Politics**, New York : Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992, p 47-48

They thereby abandon the special privileges they have come to claim for themselves in academia, such as freedom of inquiry and a quasi-extraterritorial protection from the onslaughts of society.

6. **To know is to bear the responsibility for acting and to act is to engage in reshaping society:**

The intellectual as scien- tist bears the special obligations to put his knowledge to work. Contemplative science was a product of the nineteenth century when a broader moral agreement was shared. Action science of necessity reflects the contemporary conflict in society over ideals and this must permeate and color the whole research enterprise itself[1].

7. **If the intellectual has the obligation to implement his knowledge**,

those organizations composed of intellectuals— the professional associations—and the universities themselves, cannot stand apart from the struggles of the day. Politicization of the professions is inescapable as well as desirable[2].

Political culture approach :

The political culture approach is markedly different from the legal-institutional approach in the sense that while the latter lays stress on the legal structure of political institutions and decision-making process according to the framework of the fundamental law of land, the former goes a step ahead by emphasizing that in addition to the formal institutions of the political organization, the researcher, as almond suggests"must take into account the parts played by family ties, mobs, electorates.

Almond and Verba claim **that "when we speak of the political culture of the society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population[3].**

as set of attitudes, beliefs, notion, faith, and understanding of political system, political issues, political ideology and political characters.

In this sense, political culture is understood by questioning the orientation of people toward political objects, i.e.: the system as general object, input object, output objects, and the self object.

The system object is the political system in general, including the roles or structures of political institutions such as the executive, legislature, and bureaucracy. Input object means the demands of society that become materials for the political process in that system. Output object refers to the authoritative policies which are implemented.

Finally, the **self object** is the involvement of individuals in both the political process and the policies' implementation. Almond and Verba categorize three kinds of political orientation:

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[1] David Easton, **Tenets of Post- Behavioralism, Opcit,** p49

[2] Ibid, p 50

[3] Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, **Civic Culture : Political Attitudes and Democracy**, Boston : Little Brown and Company, 1963, p 14

Orientation of political culture: refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships It includes

(1) "**cognitive orientation,"** that is, knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs;

(2) "affective orientation," or feeling about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance, and the feeling of attachment, involvement and rejection to a political system.

(3) "evaluational orientation," the judgments and opinion about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings[1].

Almond and Verba mention three **forms of political culture** based on these political orientations:

1. **parochial political culture**:

The term '**parochial**' describes the political culture of tribal societies and independent local communities.

Parochial political culture refers to those people who have no political orientations toward political objects. In these societies there are no specialized political roles: headmanship, chieftainship, "shamanship" are diffuse political-economic religious roles, and for members of these societies the political orientations to these roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations.. **In this type of political culture, people have no knowledge of input and input. They are not aware about their political system.**

A parochial orientation also implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system, The parochial expects nothing from the political system[2].

The subject political culture:

The term '**subject'** refers to political culture in societies characterized by a **passive relationship** between the citizens and the system that is, when people have a passive orientation towards a political system and conceive themselves as having minimum influence on the political process[3].

The Participant Political Culture:

The third major type of political culture the participant culture, the term 'participant' is used to describe the political culture of a society in which the citizenry is active both in terms of the input and output aspects of the political system.

Participant Political Culture is mainly found in the developed countries where people are fully aware and have the knowledge of both input and output Example: the USA, France and the European Countries[4].

Table 1: Types of Political Culture

	input	output	feedback	result	

[1] Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba,**Opcit**, p 14
[2] Ibid, p 16-17
[3] Ibid, p17
[4] Ibid, p18

Parochial	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	
Subject	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	
participant	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	

Ref: Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba,**Opcit**, p 14

Mixed political cultures: In addition to these types of Political Culture, there are other different types named mixed type of Political Culture found in Political System, which contains the features of more than one type of Political Culture.

(1) the parochial-subject culture, (2) the subject-participant culture, , and (3) the parochial- participant culture.

The Parochial-Subject Culture : This is a type of political culture in which a substantial portion of the population has rejected the exclusive claims of diffuse tribal, village, or feudal authority and has developed allegiance toward a more complex political system with specialized central governmental structures. This is the classic case of kingdom building out of relatively undifferentiated units.

The chronicles and histories of most nations include this early stage of the shift from local parochialism to centralized authority. But the shift may stabilize at a point that falls short of a fully developed subject culture. The loosely articulated African kingdoms, and even the Ottoman empire, are examples of stable, mixed subject-parochial cultures where the latter predominates and central authority takes the form of a primarily extractive, dimly cognized set of political objects. The problem of cultural change from parochial to subject[1]

T**he Subject-Participant Culture**. The way in which the shift from a parochial to a subject culture is solved greatly affects the way in which the shift from a subject to a participant culture takes place.

The Parochial-Participant Culture. In the parochial-participant culture we have the contemporary problem of cultural development in many of the emerging nations. In most of these countries the political culture is predominantly parochial. The structural norms that have been introduced are usually participant; for congruence[2] .

Civic Culture:

When all the three types of Political Culture Parochial, Subject and Participant Political Culture are found in one political system, it is considered as Civic Culture[3].

Role Culture:

There are certain role models prevalent in a political system that becomes the culture of the political system. A freedom fighter like Bhagat Singh can be the role model and role culture of both traditional and modern society.

[1] Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba,**Opcit**, p 22
[2] Ibid, p 24-26
[3] Ibid, p 29

Political Sub-Culture:

When the difference is found between one group and the other group then it is regarded as Political Sub-Culture. It is found in almost all types of political system[1].

Dependency theory:

Dependency theory suggests that third world countries cannot form their own institutions and systems without regard to the effects of international variables with historical roots. The capitalist west played a role in shaping the international division of labor. This contributed to shaping the history of the south under the influence of mercantilism, followed by free trade, then capitalism, and finally the hegemony of multinational corporations. Throughout these stages, the west created an economic system that integrated the world by invasion. Hence the problem of the third world is a natural product of the development of the first world. Poverty, inflation, and poor growth are extensions of imperialism.

Here dependency converges with the international relations. The main concept of dependency theory is a dual economy. It sees that external influences have produced historically doomed situation of dual economy. Side by side with the traditional economy there emerged a modern externally oriented economy. The latter bled societal resources and energies. It pushed towards non-integration of society. This duality extends to other aspects of the society such as culture, sociology, and politics[2].

Corporatism approach:

Corporatism is a system of social and political organization(interest representation) in which major societal groups or interests (labor, business, farmers, military, ethnic, clan or patronage groups, and religious bodies) are integrated into the governmental system, often on a monopolistic basis or under state guidance, tutelage, and control, to achieve coordinated national development. Even During the past fifty years-ever since World War II-there have been two great, rival, alternative approaches in the field of comparative politics and in development studies and the social sciences more generally.

These two approaches, or paradigms, are: **(1) liberal-pluralism** and **(2) Marxism**, **Liberal-pluralism** was largely found in the Western, democratic nations (the United States and Western Europe), and in the approaches scholars in these countries used to study comparative politics; while Marxism,

otherwise known as *scientific socialism,* although not entirely absent in the Western tradition, remained a distinctly minority strain there and was concentrated more in the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc countries, and a number of developing nations-for example, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea. It is obvious even from these opening comments that not only did

[1] Ibid, p 29

[2] Nasr Arif, **Opcit**, p 206

Liberal-pluralism, Marxism, and corporatism have for a long time offered competing perspectives on society, governance, and state-society.[1]

In liberal-pluralism, which is often considered to be the dominant reality as well as the main political ideology and approach to studying politics in the United States and Western Europe, interest groups are free, unfettered, and completely independent from the state. Interest groups can organize on any issue; in the modern liberal state there are few if any restrictions on interest-group activities.

As a result, there are thousands of interest groups in the United States, at the local, state, and national levels, all competing in the political arena. Such free and vigorous interest group.

Under **Marxism** and especially in its Leninist form, the opposite characteristics apply: the state is powerful ("the *dictatorship* of the proletariat," as Marx put it , while interest groups are subordinated. There are also democratic and parliamentary versions of socialism or social democracy (such as in Scandinavia and other Western European countries) in which interest groups are also free, but here we are talking about the totalitarian version of Marxism as it was long practiced in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other Marxist-Leninist states[2].

The word "**totalitarian"** itself implies total control: no groups or associations are allowed to exist freely or apart from the state. Under totalitarian Marxism (fascism, too, as practiced in Nazi Germany) the state may create its own, *official* interest groups, but such groups have no independence or autonomy apart from the totalitarian behemoth.

Quite unlike liberal pluralism, under totalitarianism it is the state that makes all the important decisions, while the "interest groups" serve as window dressing to the regime in power, at times also helping to implement the state's policies. It is one of the hallmarks of such totalitarianism that there is no grassroots participation from below in decision making (through public opinion, elections, interest groups, or in any other way), only top-down authority (from the state or all-powerful government)[3].

Corporatism occupies an intermediary position between liberal-pluralism and Marxian-totalitarianism or fascism. Corporatism's advocates like to say that they represent **"the third way,"** an alternative route to modernization that avoids the disadvantages of the other two. On the one hand, corporatism advocates a strong, guiding, directing state but not one that is totalitarian. On the other, corporatism is usually characterized by state-structured and regulated interest groups, but not by total control as in Marxism-Leninism nor the completely unfettered interest-group struggle (which corporatists argue produces chaos and often paralysis) of liberal- pluralism.

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[1] Howard Wiarda, **Comparative Politics : Approaches and Issues**, New York : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007, p 85

[2] Howard Wiarda,**Opcit**, p87

[3] Ibid, p87

At the same time, corporatism advocates class and interest group harmony over conflict and seeks to accomplish this by incorporating interest groups representing all sectors of society into the decision-making structure of the state. So under corporatism we have (1) a strong but not totalitarian state, (2) structured (neither totally controlled nor fully free) interest groups that are usually limited in number and functions, and (3) interest groups that are part of the state-as distinct from completely independent, as found under liberal-pluralism. Whenever we see government control, structuring, or licensing of interest groups, we are likely to see corporatism .

In Liberal-Pluralism weak states and, usually, strong interest groups. At the other, Marxist-Leninist or fascist, end of the spectrum we have a totalitarian state and weak, totally controlled interest groups. In between, where corporatism lies, we have a strong (but not total) state and structured interest groups (partly free, partly controlled) that are limited in number. Different regimes may be strung out at various points on this spectrum, including some that may involve varying degrees or combinations of these features[1].

State-society relations approach:

The state-society approach deals with the interrelations between the cen¬ tral state and the various units (classes, interest groups, private associations) that make up a society. This approach arose from the fact that in much of social science, both Marxian and non-Marxian, the state was not viewed as a major actor.

In Marxian theory the state is seen as part of the "superstructure," which is determined by economic and class factors. In non-Marxian interest group theory, the state is a kind of neutral referee that umpires the interest group struggle but is not itself a major player. In both ofthese conceptions the state is a minor player, relegated to the position of being a "dependent vari¬ able"—dependent, that is, on the classes or the interest group struggle.

By contrast, the state-society relations focus seeks to "bring the state back in" as a major factor.18 The state is seen as being a key regulator of interest group activity, of political parties, and ofthe policy-making process. The state is now viewed as being an "independent variable," or at least mostly so. The state is pictured as having varying degrees of autonomy from the society and as having a dynamic relationship with that society[2].

The **four patterns of state-society relations**:

1. Strong state and strong society, which is not real.
2. Strong state and weak society
3. Weak state and strong society
4. Weak state and weak society[3]

New institutionalism Approach :

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[1] Howard Wiarda, **Opcit**, p 88

[2] Howard Wiarda, **Introduction to Comparative Politics**, EarlMcPeek , 2000, P 92

[3] Nasr Arif,**Opcit**, p87

New institutionalism' began in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the desire by a wide range of scholars to bring the institutions of the state back into the explanation of political action. It was less focused on rejecting the '**old institutionalism'**,

New institutionalism' was a response to the absence of institutional analysis, of considering collective action qua collective – through composite or institutional actors – rather than reducing political action to its methodological individualist parts. it rejected the proposition that observable behaviour was the basic datum of political analysis and argued instead that behaviour cannot be understood without reference to the 'institutions' within which such behaviour occurs[1].

Old institutionalism emphasised the role of law in governing, the role of structures, holism and historicism , Apart from these, old institutionalism had a strong normative objective with a concern for 'good governance' ; it also focused on assessing formal institutions and how they are responsible to the government .

Old institutionalists were particularly interested in the role of institutions in maintaining political stability and preserving democratic norms. Overall, old institutionalism was not about theory building as it was rather a descriptive approach instead of a theory development platform. The primary distinguishing feature of the old institutionalism is its focus on the law and its essential function in governance.

Law serves as both the foundation for the public sector and a primary tool via which the government can influence the conduct of its constituents. Thus, to be concerned about legal matters was also to be worried about political institutions. The idea that structure matters was another important tenet of the old institutionalism, which tended to concentrate on the main institutional characteristics of political systems, such as whether they were unitary or federal, presidential or parliamentary and so on. Moreover, traditional institutionalism tended to be formal and constitutional[2].

Whereas new institutionalism emerged as a response to the shortcomings of the earlier institutionalist approach, emphasizing different aspects of institutional behaviour and development. NI is a theoretical stance that enables the analysis of organisational behaviour by focusing on how organisations, both formal and informal, interact among one another and with a wider society, and more importantly, how organisations change under the influence of wider processes – in other words, contextual factors that influence these organisations and are, in turn, influenced by them[3]. The main characteristics of new-istitutionalism are :

1. Shifting the Emphasis from Organisations to Rules.

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[1] Vivien Schmidt, **Institutionalism,** in Colin Hay Michael Lister and David Marsh, **The State : Theories and Issues**, New York : Palagrave Macmillan, 2006, p 101

[2] Pushpa Singh and Chetna Sharma , **Methods and Approaches in Comparative Political Analysis**, Routledge : Routledge Publishers, 2025, p70

[3] Iryna Kushnir and Nuve Yazgan, **European Cooperation in Higher Education** : Shaping the Future of Europe,

2. Shifting from a Formal to an Informal Understanding of Institutions.
3. Transforming the Idea of Institutions from Static to Dynamic.
4. Moving from Values That Are Submerged to a Value-Critical Position.
5. Changing from a Comprehensive to a Specialised Understanding of institutions.
6. Transitioning from Autonomy to Embeddedness.[1]

Lecture03 : Classical Classification of political regimes :

Political regimes:

Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter stated that the ensemble of patterns, explicit or not, that determines the forms and channels of access to principal governmental positions, the characteristics of the actors… and the resources and strategies that they can use to gain access"[2].

Political regimes are sets of political procedures — sometimes called the "rules of the political game" — that determine the oA of power. These rules prescribe who may engage in politics and how[3].

If we need to explain to someone a distinction between, say , chess and tennis , first : there is a distinction between those who play in the games, including differences in their resources and strategies.

Second: there is a distinction between the sets of rules of these games. Regardless of whether game consists of moving players on the board or applying blows to the adversary shed with the chessboard, a game can be clearly identified only if information is available about the players and the rules of the game(the structural elements of a game),as well as about the chess pieces and their moves (the functional elements of a game), translated into the language of social science , a political regime can be described as certain state of political process(a game in general) at one or another stage of political development (in a concrete "game") with the help of four independent variables: 1. Actors("players"; 2. Institutions("rules"); 3. Resources("pieces"); and strategies("moves")[4].

These variables allow us to define a political regime s a complex of the actors in the political process, the political institutions, the resources, , and the strategies available in the struggle for the achievement and /or retention of power. In other words, , "**political regime**", as a distinctive kind of political game, is & set of 1. Political actors with their resources and strategies, and 2. Political institutions as a set of both formal and informal rules and norms .

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[1] Ibid, P74-76

[2] Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe Schmitter, **Transitions from Authoritarian Rule : Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies** , Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 , p3.

[3] Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle , **Democratic Experiments in Africa：Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective,** 1997, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, p9

[4] Vladimir Gel'man, Sergei Ryzhenkov, **The Comparative Politics of Russia's Regions**, London : Rowman and. Littlefield Publishers, 2003,p 12-13

Actors :

It is clear that not every one who plays chess is able to lead the game. There are at least three very major limitations.

First: the game assumes that the goal is the achievements of victory or the avoidance of loss.

Second, a player should be capable of achieving the goal.

Finally: a player should not only know the "moves" set out by the rules of a concrete game, but also know how to apply them within the general logic of a chess game; otherwise, the player soon loses. Translating these limitations into the language of the social sciences, we can speak of the attributes of actors as "**goals", "resources", and ""strategies".**

Types of actors within political regime[1]:

The first type assumes the presence of a dominant actor. None of other actors in the political system is capable for a relatively long period of time of preventing this actor from achieving his goals , while the dominant actor is regularly able to prevent all or most actor (whether it is a mafia boss, totalitarian leader, or a dominant party) can be characterized as monocentric. The other type assumes a number of actors , none of whom is able to regularly block the rest. A political regime with any number of such actors greater than can be considered polycentric[2].

Table Actors composition and political regimes

Actors composition	**Political regime**
Dominant actor	Monocentric regime
Lack of dominant actor	Polycentric regime

Ref: Vladimir Gel'man, Sergei Ryzhenkov,**Opcit,** p 14

Institutions :

In this study institutions are not seen s organizations or offices, but as a composition of the norms and rules of a political game. Which, together with the actors, are the major structural element of the political regime, in essence, the rules determine the character of a game, fixing the ways in which actors interact and introducing limitations on the use of resources and strategies in the struggle for the acquisition/ and/or retention of power. Institutions are established and transformed as a result of some constellation of political actors.

The constellation can be the product of a previously written set of formal directions(constitutions and laws) or of informal decisions, affected by a situations or based on traditions(verbal agreements between political leaders). In other words, we can speak of formal and informal institutions as ideal types, while in practice there are combinations and mixtures of them[3].

Political regimes compositions of actors and institutions:

Composition of actors/ composition of political regime	**Political regime**

[1] Vladimir Gel'man, Sergei Ryzhenkov,**Opcit**, , p 13

[2] Ibid, p 13

[3] Ibid , p15

Dominant actor/ monocentric regime	Dominance of informal institutions
Lack of dominant actor / polycentric regime	Possible dominance of either formal and informal institutions

Ref: Vladimir Gel'man, Sergei Ryzhenkov,**Opcit,** p 17

Resources :

"resources " are understood as any good, which increases the ability of its owner tinfluence other actors. Drawing a further parallel with a chess game , we compare resources to pieces: if one player possesses them and another lacks them, the odds are in favor of the former. The clear dominance of one actor's resources suggests power over the rest of actors, in political life, resources are not always a simple set of units, one actor may have significant electoral support; another may control the use of force, yet another may accumulate money and property[1].

Classification of resources :

There are administrative (control over force or other means of compulsion of actors), economic(control over financial flows and property), and political(influence on other actors actions and the functioning of institutions) resources. Political resources also include authoritative powers- that is , control over positions of status(formal and informal)that influence decision-making and(in mass politics)mass support, at least partially in the form of votes.

Strategies :

The actor's strategies shape their actions toward other actors. The set of strategies available depends on the composition of actors and resources, as well as on the characteristics of political institutions. These factors explain the actors choice of concrete decisions, or, using 'chess' analogy, concrete moves in the game: whether to struggle until disappearance of all pieces or to achieve a quick draw; whether to attack the adversary's position or to continue maneuvering; whether to smash the chessboard on the adversary's head or just raise a hand in his direction. At the same time, the general characteristics of political strategies depend on the actors varying approaches to political activity itself.

On a, the theoretical level, the approaches of Max Weber and Carl Schmitt are dramatically different. Weber considered political activity an "enterprise" where actors strategies are reduced to a kind of management of a company. In contrast, Schmitt, who describes the concept of 'political " in terms of interactions between friends and foes, assumes that the meaning of actors actions lies in a constant struggle to destroy the enemy.

In this respect, Giovani Sartori, describes two types of interactions among political actors 1. Unlimited in zero-sum game, "politics as war"; 2. Limited political competition in a positive sum game, "politics as bargaining". In the following we will refer to these ideal strategies as force and compromise[2],

[1] Vladimir Gel'man, Sergei Ryzhenkov,**Opcit**, p17

[2] Ibid, p18

The classical classification of Political Regimes:

a classification of regimes highlights similarities and dissimilarities between them and by doing so it deepens our understanding of them .

There is no end to the classification of political system. Since every regime is at once unique and, all classifications are, therefore, at best partial and temporary.

According to **Baily**, classification is a general process, as well as the result, of grouping cases in terms of similarity. In establishing groups and classes. We want to minimize differences within each group while maximizing differences between groups . the similarity element defines which objects belong to the same class, whereas the difference element defines what distinguishes classes(species and subspecies)

Classifications are based on explicit criteria for the **creation of groups**. Groups can based on a single dimension or property(one- dimensional) or based on a number of dimensions (multidimensional). The term typology is used for multidimensional classifications in which categories are distinguished conceptually rather than empirically[1].

Plato's classification of political regimes:

The history of the classification of political systems dates back to the days of ancient Greeks,. Plato had presented a classification of his " politicus' or "statesman". Plato's six –fold classification can be put in the form of following table:

Number of rulers	Law abiding states	Lawless states
one	Monarchy	tyranny
Few	Aristocracy	oligarchy
The many	Democracy	Extreme democracy

Plato distinguishes law-abiding from lawless state and each type he mentioned three forms, rule of one, rule of few and rule of many. The rule of one , he called, as monarchy, when the state was law-abiding. When it was lawless he called it as tyranny. The rule of a few was termed by him as aristocracy , when it was law-abiding and oligarchy when lawless . the rule of many was termed as moderate democracy if it was law-abiding and extreme democracy if it was lawless. Plato further pointed out "since a law abiding state is always better than a lawless one, moderate democracy, which is law-abiding, must always be ranked superior to oligarchy.

According to Plato the democracy was the worst of law-abiding but the best of lawless forms and in either case it stood higher than oligarchy

[1] Daniele Caramani, **Introduction to Comparative Method**,**Opcit,** p 31

Aristotle was the father of comparative political analysis and classification. His classification of regimes based on the number of people who participated in governing, on the ethical quality of their rule depending on whether it was in their personal or the general interest, and on their socioeconomic status. Those regimes which served interests of the ruling group only were perversions of the true constitutional forms[1].

Aristotle clearly preferred the aristocratic form because the mean, philosophic and otherwise, was desirable. Other classic theorists, particularly cierco and Polybius, thought that simple forms of government would degenerate so that monarchy would become tyrannical and aristocracy become oligarchic. Stability depended on the existence of a "mixed state", made up of all the social classes participating or being represented to some degree.

Number of rulers	Rule in the general interest	Self-interest rule	Social group
one	Monarchy	tyranny	king
few	Aristocracy	oligarchy	The wealthy
many	Polity or democracy	ochlocracy	The poor

Polybius classification :

Another classical classification of political regimes was given by Polybius, he took over from Plato and Aristotle their six –fold classification of regimes as well as the theory that governments pass through a cycle of changes. He also learnt from the study of history two inevitable laws- of growth and decay. He had applied these laws to the classification of regimes given by Plato and Aristotle, Polybius was interested in determining the reasons of the success of the republic.

By success he meant " the ability to conquer most of the world within a relatively short period of time and of equal importance, he found the key to that success c in the balance of the constitution. Moreover, he ascribed in the great stability of the roman government to its mixed character.

According to him, roman polity did not rest on one species of power. It was a happy blend : the monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements. According to Polybius the roman polity had a monarchic and a despotic aspect in the consuls, an aristocratic element in the senate, and a popular one in the commitias .

Cicero's classification:

According to him, the constitution of Rome was the most stable and perfect form of government that political experience had evolved, he distinguished three primary forms of regimes-monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. He emphasized that each of them would tend to degenerate into its corresponding corrupt form. This tendency according to him could be kept in check only when the elements of the three were combined in a mixed form. He seemed

[1] Vidya Bhushan, **Comparative Politics**, : New Delhi : Atlantic Publishers,2006, p54-55

to have accepted Polybius view of the roman constitution as the best example of mixed constitution[1].

Niccolo Machiavelli's classification :

His classification of the forms of government follows the same old Aristotelian classification of governments into monarchy, aristocracy and constitutional democracy with their perversions tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. He agrees with Polybius and Cicero that a mixed type of constitution with proper checks and balances is the best and most suitable A A republican system led to more uniform and universal material prosperity and ensured greater equality of opportunity than other forms of government. People collectively show better qualities of prudence and judgment and can select offices of a better type than a prince who is subject to court influences.

An aristocracy, particularly a landed 'aristocracy, led to quarrels and civil disorder. He, however, was not totally for either the republican form or for a monarchy. His chief concern was for efficiency in the state. He recognised that different forms of government suited different times and places[2].

Jean Bodin's classification:

His classification of government depended upon the manner and system in which sovereignty was exercised. He pointed out, "if the sovereign authority resides in one individual, the state is said to be a monarchy, if it is possessed by a small number of individuals, it is known as aristocratic, and if it vests in the mass of citizens as a whole, the state is called democratic. He further stressed that in an aristocratic political systems the honours and offices were bestowed upon members of small and narrow class and the masses excluded from the benefits thereof.

In a democratic state on the other hand honours and offices were to be conferred upon all alike on the basis of merit irrespective of class, out of three forms of state-monarchy, aristocracy and democracy bodin regarded monarchy of the French type which enlisted the cooperation of all sections of the people worked for larger social happiness and provided political stability to the society, was the best. He said that the vesting of the supreme power of the state in a minority of citizens or in the whole body of citizens would lead to anarchy and the ruin of the subjects. According to him, the monarchy would have three sub-divisions, despotism, royal Monarchy and Tyranny.

Montesquieu's classification :

According to him, when political power is shared between the few or the many, the regime is republican one. In other words, republics can be either aristocratic or democratic and which

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[1] Vidya Bhushan,**Opcit,** p 57

[2] *N. Jayapalan,* Comprehensive History of Political Thought, New Delhi :Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2001, p 90.

are more likely to be either aristocratic or democratic and which are more likely to be endowed with charity, the monarchy regimes are those in which the rulers are subject to restrains of custom, local privileges or his own law. In other words, where power rests in the hands of a single person motivated by wide social interests it is monarchy. The despotic regimes are those in which the sovereign was unrestrained. It is the worst form of government for in it power vests in one individual who acts arbitrarily and in his own interest.

Lecture 4:Modern classification of political Regimes :

Despotism vs tyranny :

Despotism is derived from Greek word "**despotes"** which means **"the master of household**" or **"oikos**" who held complete power over his family and slaves or "**the master of slaves"** using this concept allows one to distinguish analytically that style of autocratic and absolute government from other more moderate forms of rule[1].

Despotic rule first appeared as a political concept during the wars between , the Helens and the Persian empire, they used by Greeks to denigrate their Asian enemy.

Aristotle mentioned that despotism is related to human nature "barbarians are by nature (slaves by nature) more slavish in character than Greeks , and those in Asia more so than those in Europe, that they endure despotic rule without distrate"[2]

it signifies a form of legitimate rule specifically over subjects who are in effect slaves .Strictly speaking, Aristotelian *political* life cannot be despotic since politics is by definition rule over a community of free men; despotism on the other hand is more like paternal power, the power of a father over his wife and children and of a master over his slaves. In other words, it intrudes into the individual or private sphere[3].

Tyranny : is derived from Greek word "**tyrannus**", which means **"absolute power**" or "**unlimited power".**

The tyrant is the ruler who rules **as one against all**, and the all he oppresses are all equal namely equally powerless . the classical political theory used to rule the tyrant out of mankind to call him a "**wolf in human shape"** because of this position of one against all [4]. tyrant—a lawless ruler who governed an unwilling population and whose rule was not in the general interest [5].

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[1] Michael Curtis, **Orientalism and Islam : European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in Middle East and India** , Cambridge : Cambridge University press, 2009, P1

[2] Mario Turchetti, **Despotism and Tyranny : Unmaking a tenacious Confusion**, European Journal of Politics, Vol 7, N°2, p160,

[3] Thomas Osborne, **Power Degree Zero : Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Despotism**,Journal of Political Power, Vol 15,N°2, 2002 ; p 245

[4] Hannath Arendt, **Authority in the Twentieth Century,** the Review of Politics, Vol 18, N°4, 1956, p 411

[5] Roger Boersche , **Theories of Tyranny : from Plato to Arendt**, Pennsylvania : Pennsylvania University Press PP 8

The difference between tyranny and authoritarian government has always been that tyrant rules in accordance with his own will and interest, and even the most draconic authoritarian government is bound by laws [1].

Despotism is a form of government which , while being **authoritarian and arbitrary**, is legitimate if not legal, in some countries, **whereas tyranny** , in most rigorous sense, is a form of government which is authoritarian and arbitrary and which is illegitimate and illegal , because exercised not only without , but against the will of citizens, and also scorns fundamental human rights[2]. Tyrants frequently ruled by fear instead of law. Although some tyrants, Tyrants came to power with violence, and most ruled with military and paramilitary forces that, when necessary and sometimes when not, did not hesitate to murder and exile rivals, instill fear in the population, and sack neighboring cities.'[3]

Dictatorship :

The word dictator comes from the Latin language word **dictatura**, which means to say, to dictate ,In Latin use, a dictator was a judge in the Roman Republic temporarily invested with absolute power[4].

dictatorship had a very distinct and specific meaning: rule by a leader who was selected by the Consul in Rome to govern during periods of emergency when external war or internal rebellion threatened the existence of the polity.

The term of the dictator was to last no more than six months, and he could not remain in power after the Consul that appointed him stepped down. So, he was nominated by one of the consuls under exceptional circumstances such as the conduct of a war or the suppression of a revolt, and because of exceptional situation he was given extraordinary powers[5].

These consisted above all in the decreasing distinction between the *imperium domi*, which was the sovereign command exercised within the city walls and consequently subject to such constitutional limits as *provacatio ad populum,* and the *imperium militiae,* which was the military power exercised outside the walls and as such was not subject to constitutional limits.The excessive power of the dictator was counterbalanced by its temporary nature: the dictator was nominated only for the duration of the extraordinary task entrusted to him, for a maximum period of six months, and never beyond the tenure of office of the consul who appointed him.

The dictator, therefore, was an extraordinary magistrate but a legitimate one because his existence was foreseen by the constitution and his power justified by the state of necessity

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[1] Hannath Arendt, **Opcit**, p 411

[2] Mario Turchetti, **Opcit**, p160

[3] Roger Boersche, **Opcit**, P 8-9

[4] Michael Hillyard, **Cinnanatus Citizen Servant Ideal the Roman Legends Life Times and Legacy**, USA : Library , 2001, p 448

[5] Jennifer Ghandi, **Political Institutions under Dictatorship**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008, p 3

(the state of necessity is a normative fact according to lawyers; that is, a fact suitable for suspending an existing legal state and putting into action a new legal situation).

In short, the characteristics of the Roman dictatorship were: **(a) a legitimating state** of necessity; **(b) full powers of command; (c) one person alone invested with this command; (d)** short duration of the office.

In so far as it was a monocratic magistrate with extraordinary but limited and temporary powers, dictatorship is always distinct from tyranny and despotism with which, in current usage, it is often confused. The tyrant is a monocrat who exercises absolute power but is neither legitimate nor necessarily temporary[1].

Difference between dictatorship, tyranny and despotism

The despot is a monocrat who exercises absolute power and is legitimate but not temporary (it may even be a long-term regime as demonstrated by the classic example of oriental despotism). What is common to these three forms is that they are filled by monocrats with absolute power; tyranny and dictatorship differ because, whilst the latter is legitimate, the former is not; despotism and dictatorship differ because, although they are both legitimate, the legitimacy of the first has a historico-geographical foundation while the second is legitimated by a state of necessity. Dictatorship differs from both tyranny and despotism by being temporary.

The Dictator was made to be temporary and not permanent and only in order to remedy the reason for his creation; and his authority included the power to decide for himself remedies to that pressing danger, to act without consultation and to punish without appeal; but he could not do anything that would diminish the state or that would reduce the authority of the Senate or the People, to unmake the old orders of the city and make new ones[2].

During his term, the dictator was authorized to use whatever power was deemed necessary to deal with the crisis at hand with the goal of restoring the old constitutional order.

In classical Rome where it found its first institutional form, the dictator was always regarded as exceptional, irregular type whose function was to grapple with such emergencies as war, sedition, or constitutional deadlock.

The normal processes of government would replace the temporary ruler as soon as the emergency was over. The possession of unlimited power by one man was accepted by the citizens because of this temporary character of his control.”the man of the moment”-real or presumed superman-would disappear just as quickly as he had made his appearance on the political scene.

When the task was finished(or his incompetence exposed) his power ended. Cinnatus returned to the plow.goach in his essay on dictatorship describes the function of the roman magistrate: “like a strong cordial or subcutaneous injection administrated to a sick man, his function was

[1] Norberto Bobbio, **Democracy and Dictatorship : the Nature and Limits of Stare Power**, Minnesota : Minnesota Press, p 159-160

[2] Ibid, p 160

to grapple with a major emergency, to restore tone to the system at the moment of confusion, to steady the nerves after a formidable shock.

One may even go far as to define as the very aim of the dictatorial office in the roman republic the preservation of the constitution as a whole by suspension of some constitutional features. The extraordinary magistrate in the roman commonwealth. The provision of dictatorship is equally present in contemporary democratic republics; when a state of emergency requires the quick and vigorous concentration of the means of power of the state and the energies of the people, separation of powers and democratic procedures are temporarily suspended and the president or premier is given special authority[1].

In fact can well be regarded a forerunner of "**constitutional dictatorship**" which is provided as a "safety valve" in emergency articles of certain modern democratic constitutions[2].

Until most recent times the concept of "**dictatorship "** as a temporary emergency rule prevailed. In this sense, it is compatible with democratic government. In emergencies, democracies may in fact be compelled to suspend temporarily their dependency on the consent of the governed. If in the process they can preserve their constitutional fiber and an open road to normalcy, they do not lose their essential nature.

Since the end of the first world war, however, dictatorship has seemed to convey a very different meaning. It is often identified with autocracy and absolutism. It is not the Romans"six month rule but at least the "millennium" that the modern dictator aims to establish.

First, regular institutions of the state, such as magistrates or the Senate, determined whether the situation at hand required the nomination of a dictator for a resolution.

Yet those who decided on the necessity of a dictatorship were not allowed to nominate themselves for the position.

Second : the position of dictator was explicitly designed to be occupied by one man; collective leadership might stymie attempts to resolve the crisis.

Third : the dictatorship had a broad range of power but not the authority to abolish other state institutions

Fourth: the dictator was never chosen by the people. Finally, the goal of dictatorial rule was restoration of the old political order[3].

Up until modern time the term dictatorship did not necessarily have negative connotations. For Machiavelli and Rousseau dictatorship is justified under extraordinary circumstances. In Machiavelli's works, a system that has negative connotation is tyranny – unlimited personal ruling. For Marx Engels and Lenin, dictatorship of the proletariat is a system that should end

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[1] Norberto Bobbio, **Opcit**, p 61

[2] Sigmund Neumann, **Permanent Revolution : The Total State in a world at war**, New York : Harper Brothers Publishers, 1942, p 2

[3] Sigmund Neumann, **The Rise of Modern Dictatorships,** In Rubinstein and Thuman, the challenge of Politics : Ideas and Issues, Prentice Hall, 1961, p 210

the exploitation of the working class Today, however, dictatorship is usually a synonym for an illegitimate government That the concept of dictatorship was already corrupted by Sulla and Caesar was often forgotten by later advocates.

Dictatorship is the government of one man, who has not primarily obtained his position by inheritance, but either force or consent and normally by a combination of both ,he must possess absolute sovereignty, that is, all political power must ultimately emanate from his will, and it must be unlimited in scope. It must be exercised, more or less frequently, in an arbitrary manner, by decree rather than by law, and ,finally, it must not limited in duration to any given term of office; nor must the dictator be responsible to any other authority, for such restrictions would be incompatible with absolute rule[1].

Types of dictatorship :

According to **franz Neumann**, dictatorship is rule of a person or a group of persons who arrogate to themselves and monopolize power in the state, exercising it without restraint[2].

There are two types of dictatorships : **totalitarianism/authoritarianism**..

Totalitarianism :

The word 'totalitarian' appears to have originated in Italy(according to some authorities it came into the Italian language, from the French, though the French philological dictionaries claim that it reached the French language from the Italian). Mussolini's first use of the word was in a speech on]une ,1925 in which, in attacking the remnants of the opposition in the Chamber, he spoke of '**la rostra feroce volunta totalitaria**'. ('Our'-scilicet the Fascists ' --'**fierce totalitarian will**'.)

But Mussolini did not invent the word. The philosopher Giovanni Gentile, who was to become the official philosopher of Fascist theory, had also spoken of Fascism as '**a total conception of life**' in a speech of March 8 of the same year , On the other hand, liberal opponents of Fascism, around the same time, were using the word as a term of opprobrium for dictatorial and dishonest political practices.

the word became a favorite term in Mussolini's vocabulary, used to describe the system which he claimed to have created, and which he usually called '**lo state totalitarian**', the '**totalitarian state**'. In the official exposition of Fascist doctrine, written as to the first part by Gentile, and as to the second by Mussolini, the word appears in each part--the first part applies it to 'Fascism', the second to the way of government pursued by the Fascist Party.

In political science, the term "**totalitarianism**" **(from the Latin "totalis," entire, whole)** is used to describe control over the entire social system including all of its elements, such as people and their minds system, the term was applied, hence, above all, to the three radical

[1] Alfred Cobban, **Dictatorship : Its History and Theory**, London : Jonathan Cape, 1939, p 26

[2] Herbert Marcuse, **The Democratic and Authoritarian State :Essays in Political and Legal Theory**, London : The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957, p 233

dictatorial governmental systems of the interwar period: Italian fascism, German national socialism, and Stalinism in the soviet union[1].

Totalitarianism is an extreme form of dictatorship which is characterized by the unlimited and unrestrained power of the rulers, the suppression of all forms of autonomous opposition, and the atomization of society in such a way that virtually every phase of life becomes public and therefore subject to control by the state.[2]

Totalitarianism is … A new form of government falling into the general classification of dictatorship…asystem in which technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution[3] .

A totalitarian government is one in which the government controls almost all aspects of a citizen's life, when a totalitarian government gains control, existing laws, government systems, and traditions are replaced or destroyed.

Franz Neumann

What distinguishes totalitarianism from other types of regime is the destruction of the line between state and society and total politization of society by the device of the monopolistic party. The first aim of totalitarianism is to perpetuate and to institutionalize revolution[4].

David Apter :

The essence of totalitarianism, then, is that it annihilates all boundaries between the state and the groupings of society; even the state and the individual personality.

Hannath ardent

Total terror destroys the space between (men)……. Total terror is the essence of totalitarianism.

Raymond Aron : the five main elements of totalitarianism are:

1. The totalitarian phenomena occurs in a regime which gives to one party the monopoly of political activity.
2. The monopolistic party is animated or armed with an ideology on which it confers absolute authority and which consequently becomes the official truth of the state.
3. To impose this official truth, the state reserves for itself in turn a double monopoly, the monopoly of the means of coercion and those of the means of persuasion.
4. The means of communication, radio, television, press, are directed and commanded by the state and its representatives. monopoly of communications also facilitates the political education of the mass[5] .

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[1] Natalia Gronskaya and Valery Zusman, **Totalitarianism : language Reflections of power**(Russia, **German, Italy),** 2012, p 278

[2] Carl Fredrich and Zbigniew Brezenski, **Totalitarianism Dictatorship and Autocracy**, New York : Frederick Praeger, 1965, p 98

[3] Carl Fredrich and Zbigniew Brezenski,**Opcit**, p98

[4] Franz Neumann, **The Democratic and Authoritarian State, Opcit** ,p 244

[5] Raymond Aron, **Opcit,** p 284-285

5. Most economic and professional activities are subject to the state and become, in a way, part of state itself. As the state in inseparable from its ideology, most economic and professional activities are colored by the official truth .

6.As all activity is state activity and subject to ideology an error in economic or professional activity is by the same token an ideological fault[1].

Juan linz:

1. There is monistic but not monolithic center of power, and whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives it legitimacy from that center.
2. There is elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders, identity and which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimize them.
3. Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party[2].

[1] Ibid, p 285

[2] Juan Linz, **Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes**,

Lecture 5 : Totalitarian Ideologies

Ideologies :

The term « ideology » combines two greek roots, Eiddos for « word », and « logos » for « knowledge, ethmyologically, ideology defined as « words of knowledge ». it is generally believed that the term ideology was first used by the french philosopher count « Antoine Desttut de Tracey, in the aftermath of french revolution in his « element d'ideologie »(1817-1818) briefly, ideology refers to a new « science of ideas » ; the study of the origins, evolution, and nature of ideas [1].

The broadest sense of ideology is a set of closel related beliefs, or ideas or even attitudes , characteristic of a group or community and a value or belief system accepted as fact or truth by some group [2] as put it by Jews thinker **Hannath Ardent** an ideology is the logic of an idea, which makes the history its main subject matter[3] , for instance, the communism stated that human history is shaped by struggle between classes especially between the capitalists and proletariats, and nazism assumed that the human history is characterized by struggle between superior and inferior races .

According to **Roy Macridis**, there are four main criteria for distinguishing ideologies from ideas:

1. **Ideologies are comprehensive** : an ideology includes ideas about many great matters, such as the place of human beings in the world, their relationship to god or history, the highest goals of society and government, the basic nature of human beings, these ideas are more or less tied to one another logically, and there is often a major organization (such as the communist party in the soviet union or in china) that believes in these ideas and is committed to realizing them.
2. **Ideologies are pervasive:** the set of ideas associated with ideology has not only been known for a long time but has shaped the political beliefs and actions of many people. Thus, people have been talking about democracy, oligarchy, and autocracy since the fifth

[1]James john Guy, **people, politics,goverment : political science A canadian perspective**, canada : prentice Hall, 1995, p83

[2] John Petrov plamentz, **ideology**, new york : Praeger, 1970, p 4

[3] Hannah Ardent, **the origins of totalitarianism**, london :1986, p469.

century before Christ, and the great movements mobilizing millions have fought over those ideologies for over 2.000 years[1].

3. **Ideologies are extensive:** as stated above, ideologies are directed towards the masses. Therefore, the set of ideas is held by a large number of people and plays a significant role in the political affairs of nations.
4. **Ideologies are intensive:** the set of ideas commands a strong commitment from many of its adherents and significantly influences political beliefs and actions[2].

The concept of ideology embraces five(5) important dimensions

Cognitive dimension: refers to an ideology's "world view", its outlook on society and politics, its perception of social and political reality. The world view of an ideology contains certain elements of belief, knowledge is subject to the rules of logic.

All ideologies have certain elements of distortion, illusion, or myth(big or small) for example **:** have the myths of the a classless society, and the unity of the working class, the Nazis had the myths of the super race, and the superhuman leader, myth simplifies any system of thought depends on simplification and interpretation of reality, mobilizes the masses and channel them into a course of action . Simplification takes place, through the use of symbols, all political ideologies-all systems of thought engage in symbolic perception and symbolic communication, symbols take two forms: linguistic, non-linguistic, linguistic symbols: rely on words and speech in order to convey a message in a quick and efficient manner, linguistic symbols such as national momentary, national holidays[3] .

Affective dimension: its emotive (emotion-laden) content, this component is rather self-explanatory and does not require extended elaboration. Political ideologies must appeal to people's emotions, in any ideology there are elements of emotionality alongside elements of rationality, it is the balance between the two that varies from ideology to ideology, the ideology of fascism, Nazism is an emotional ideology, the ideology of communism is a rational ideology[4].

The evaluative dimension: ideologies make value judgments in two ways: negatively, by denouncing an existing system of social and political relationships; positively, by putting forth a set of norms according to which social and political reconstruction is to take place. At least in the beginning, as they start to emerge, ideologies denounce the existing society as corrupt, immoral, and beyond reform, the attack against the existing society in presented rationalized, justified, and dignified[5] .

The programmatic dimension: the values, goals, and objectives of an ideology are embodied in a more or less comprehensive program of activities, ideologies , as many have

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[1] Roy Macridis, **Contemporary Political Ideologies : Movements and Regimes**, Harper Collins Publishers, 1992, p 17-18

[2] Roy Macridis, **Contemporary Political Ideologies** , **Opcit,**p 17-18

[3] Mostafa Rejai, **Comparative Political Ideologies**, New York : St Martin's Press , 1984, p 3

[4] Ibid, P 4

[5] Ibid, p 6

pointed out, are action-related systems of beliefs, norms, and ideas, and only do the posit a set of values, they also seek to relate specific patterns.

The program of an ideology may be directed toward the maintenance and perpetuation of the status quo, or more characteristically, toward changing the existing social order, the needed change, in turn, may be either reformist or radical in nature, reformist, peaceful, or gradual change is the way of democratic ideologies of Nazism and communism, for example: stressing national greatness, radial supremacy, and the infallible leader, the Nazis abroOpcitgated the treaty of Versailles and launched a policy of conquest across Europe, promising "land, peace, and bread" the communists set out, quite consciously, to put an absolute end to three centuries of Roman rule in Russia , the communist ideology, in fact, included a statement of priorities specifying immediate, and ultimate goals , the immediate goal was the overthrow of the bourgeois regime, the intermediate goal social and economic reconstruction, the ultimate goal , a classless society[1]

The social-base dimension :

ideologies are necessarily associated with social groups, classes, collectiveness, or nations, ideology, to be ideology must have a mass base. It must be presented to the populace, in such a way as ideologies are mobilized beliefs systems, in this context, one may wish to make a distinction between personal ideology and political ideology. The mobilization function of ideology is impossible without organization; indeed, organization is the link between belief and action, it is necessary to draw a distinction between ideology of the elites and ideology of the masses, briefly, the belief system of the elites and ideology of the masses, briefly, the belief system of the elites will tend to be comprehensive, articulate, and coherent that of the masses, partial, inarticulate[2].

fascism and Nazism comparative study :

Fascism and Nazism are reactionary ideologies, because they reject the most fundamental contemporary features of western civilization. Adolf Hitler articulated his ideology before, he came to power, whereas, Mussolini fashioned his ideology after taking power.

The official ideology has three identifiable components: **first,** it begins by criticizing and rejecting the existing order as corrupt, immoral, unjust,, beyond hope, and beyond repair. The existing society must be smashed. The slate must be wiped clean. We must seek a new beginning.

Second: the denunciation of the existing system appeals to "higher «takes place through appeals to higher norms and principles. the totalitarian ideology proposes an alternative vision for a better, superior society. The alternative typically embodies a utopian vision or a grand myth- for example, the super race, or classless society-that becomes a rallying cry for the masses.

[1] Mostafa Rejai, **Opcit**, p 7

[2] Ibid, p 8

Third : totalitarian ideology incorporates a statement of plans and programs intended to realize the alternative order. It seeks to relate specific patterns of action-both violent and non-violent- to the realization of values and visions.

Both of them systematically downgraded the role of reason, logic, and intelligence in human behavior, stressing instead its irrational and emotional components. The idea of irrationalism and activism drew heavily on a school of thought known as "social Darwinism", Charles

Racism and purity of blood :

'the fundamental unit of analysis in nazis mis '*race*' and history is infinite struggle between races and each of them strive to survive as Adolf Hitler says ' those who want to live, let them fight, and those who do not want to fight in this world of eternal struggle do not deserve to live .

Hitler draw his assumption of racism from Darwenism, Charles Darwin in his prominent work' on the origins of spicies' confirmed that there is a constant and endless struggle for existence and survival for long time, humanity itself is divided into various spacies, and only species which are capable or have specific abilities to adapt are able to survive trough subjugating inferior races[1].

The same idea was found in Gobineau writings, Hitler inspired by those theorists of human nature, for Gobineau the world is split up into diffrent races, white, yellow, and black races, they arenot equal in value,some of them are stronger ,have extraordinary abilities, where others are inferiors without any skills or abilities, and the vehicle of the rise and fall of human civilizations is determined in the first place by 'race', for him the superior cultures are created mainly by 'Aryans', this race was in sharp decline as soon as it bred with the inferior races[2].

So the survival of Aryan race depends on the elimination of inferior races, and the Aryan races are the only who have the right and potentialities to build the civilizations, in the same fashion, Houston Stewart Chamberlain,in his 'the foundations of the ninetieth century, called 'the Aryans' races 'nordic'and pointed out that Aryan race had created everything, he called them' cultural creators' and he considered the jewish race cultural destroys .

Ernest Haeckel from his part introduced the idea of 'Monism' in his influential work 'the history of natural creation', he argued that the Aryans European races are more successfull, developed psysically, intelectually than the others, and the world will dominate by these races in near future[3].

Similar assumptions were found in the writings of Wilhem Schallmeyar n his siminal work' heredity and selection in life of nations' : A study in political science on the basis of new biology, he argued that the state is primary responsible for preserving the racial character of nation. later, Alfred Ploetz in his writing' the efficiency of our race and the protection of the

[1] Dan Cohn-Sherbok, **understanding the Holocaust :An introduction**, New York : Casell, 1999, p48
[2] Ibid, p 48
[3] Ibid, p 48

weak, he mentioned that the Aryan Germans are the strongest race in the world and the state must protect it .

For that reason, Hitler frequently dehummanized the other races by using ugliest terms like'Bacilli', 'spougies', 'parasites', 'poisonous', 'mushrooms'and 'rats'Cotz Aly notes'Nazi ideology conceived of racial conflict as an antidote to class conflict'[1].

Hilter repeatedly argued that the nordic race comprising the Germanic people was the purest stock of the Aryan race[2]and for race to flourish, the state must eliminate the danger posed to racial purity by the Jews[3]. The state must take all necessary actions and urgent measures to safeguard the existence and reproduction of race.

While, the Nazism makes racism, social Darwinism, and the German nationalism its main core of Nazi ideology by confirming the superiority of Aryan races, the Fascism couldn't believe in the idea of race simply because Italy was a country made up of individuals of myriad racial backgrounds, racism was not an integral part of the original fascist doctrine only under the pressure from its Nazi allies were racial laws introduced into Italian Fascist practice[4]. Mussolini repeatedly said that race is a feeling, not a relality, national pride has no need. Even after 1936 when Italy officially proclaimed their total commitment and announced itself as 'racist society' although Mussolini has spoken the superiority of the Italian race its potential for greatness[5].

Despite the fact that Mussolini influenced by the thought of Gobineau's in his seminal work '**Essay on the inequality of human races'** . he didn't believe the idea of white race supremacy, Mussolini was not racist at all,what Mussolni drew from **Gobineau** not the idea of white supremacy but the idea that power must be rely on the collectiveness as principle, not on universal human values such as honor, freedom, human dignity, but biological factors of collective or social nature, race, nation or caste, Fascism would justify its aspiration to total control by biological inperatives considerations[6].

The basic idea of a fascist movement is to create strong state as the only protector of italian people and the main savior of nation, for that fascism did not portray the myth of pure racemethods maybe used such the formation of parliamentary units as Mussolini's blackshirts and Hitler (storm-tropper division) and (elite guard and special police force).

Totalitarian societies are strictly hierarchical, compartmentalized, organized from top to bottom, dominated usually by one man ,political organization(the party) reaches out from

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[1] Aly, **Hitler's beneficaries, plunder, racial war and the Nazi welfare state**, New York :Metro Politan Books,p 23-24

[2] Davis Harris and Anne Lise Halvorsen, **Reasoning with Democratic values : Ethical issues in American History,** New York : Teachers college press, 2018, p 42

[3] Mathew Festenstein and Michael Kenny, **Political ideologies**, Oxford : Oxford university press, 2005, p382

[4] Bernard Susser, **Political Ideology in the Modern World**, USA :Steve Hall,1995, p 142

[5] Inger Soll David, **Communism, Fascism and democracy, the origin and development of three ideologies**,

[6] Weber Eugen Joseph, **varieties of fascism : doctrines of revolution in the Twentieth century**, New York : Van Nostrand Reinhold company, 1964, p64

Post totalitarian regime : the term "post-totalitarian itself indicates that this is a type of regime which has evolved from totalitarian. Unlike tyranny, despotism, dictatorship and authoritarianism, totalitarianism derived from **Italian totalitario**, meaning complete, absolute, and was linked initially with Italian fascism an Mussolini's rise to power.

Post- totalitarianism refers to the situation after the end of totalitarian rule, however, the term post-totalitarian are generally used in at least two different senses: historical and political[1].

In the first sense, a post-totalitarian regime is the regime of a post-totalitarian society, the regime of any nation would adopt after that, even if it became democratic on the contrary, a post-totalitarian regime in the second sense is not or not just a historical category describing regime of a nation after its totalitarian phase, more precisely, it is a political category representing a particular type of political regime which still seeks after total control over its citizens even after having collapsed from losing some indispensable foundations and features of totalitarianism, such as the attraction of its official ideology, legitimacy of its power, and charisma of its leader[2].

Dimensions	Totalitarian regime	Post totalitarian regime
p. pluralism	No significant economic, social, culture, political pluralism A single party has monopoly of power Party in power has eliminated almost all pre totalitarian pluralism, no space for second economy or parallel society	Limited but not responsible social and economic and even institutional pluralism official party still formally has monopoly of power. May have second economy but state control still overwhelming. May have second culture and parallel society
Ideology	Elaborate guiding ideology that articulates reachable utopia	Guiding ideology still officially exists and is still part of the social reality but weakened commitment to utopia and weakened faith to ideology itself.
Leadership	Often charismatic, totalitarian leadership rules with undefined limits. Leaders rule with undefined limits	Top leaders are seldom charismatic. Check on top leadership via party structures, procedures, or internal democracy
Mobilization	Extensive and extensive mobilization into a vast array	Progressive loss of interests by leaders and non leaders involved in organizing mobilization

Ref : Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes,

[2] Jia Peijuan, **Democratizing a Post-Totalitarian Regime in a Globalized Context**, Anomative Perspective, Vol 23, N°4, 2012, p 33

Lecture6 : Authoritarian regimes :

Auctoritas (authority) comes from Latin word "augure' which means augmenter or to add something. The holders of power add something.

Authoritarianism today refers to two related but distinct fields :First, in a broader sense, it is a social science concept that refers to traits of the individual in this, the term is closely related to a seminal study conducted by Adorno Trying to explain how the horrors of the Nazi regime could occur, their main explanatory variable was the nature and behavior of the individual, for which their concept of the authoritarian personality remains a landmark in social psychology. The present contribution, however, focuses on the understanding of the term in political science In this latter context, authoritarianism is understood as a form of political rule or a distinct type of political regime[1].

The term authoritarian introduced by **"juan josé linz**" in his prominent article titled " an authoritarian regime : Spain model " 1964,he described the franco regime in spain , he ruled spain between 1936 until 1975 .

Definition of juan linz :

Authoritarian regimes are political systems with **limited**, **not responsible**, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding **ideology** (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive **political mobilization**(except some points in their developments); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group)exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones[2].

The pillars of authoritarian regime :

- ✓ **Presence of `limited, not responsible, political pluralism**:

Linz viewed this limited political pluralism as the most distinctive feature of authoritarianism The limits may be (a) severe or moderate, (b) legal or de facto, and (c) applied only to parties and political groups or to interest groups as well. But the crucial point is that there are groups which are independent of the regime and have some political influence. At one extreme is General Franco's absolutist regime in Spain allowing independence and influence

[1] Oliver Schlumberger and Tasha Schedler, **Authoritarianisms and Authoritarianization**, the Sage Handbook of Political Science, p 713

[2] Juan Linz, **Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes**, London : Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002, p 159

to the Catholic Church; at the other extreme is the officially liberal-democratic party dictatorship in Mexico actually encouraging some degree of political participation by a limited number of independently existing parties and groups[1].

- ✓ **Absence of `elaborate and guiding ideology' and instead_ distinctive mentalities**: Mentalities are apparently more emotional than rational and are not as future-oriented as the utopianism of ideologies, But Linz acknowledged that ideologies, were by no means unknown among authoritarian regimes (though more commonly found among party than military dictatorships), and that in fact an ideology may be loudly proclaimed by an authoritarian regime.
- ✓ **Absence of intensive or extensive `political mobilization':**
  throughout most of a regime's history Political mobilization is the exception rather than the rule in the case of authoritarian dictatorships The exception occurs – in the early stages of some authoritarian regimes during which there may be considerable and even very intensive (controlled) popular participation[2].
- ✓ **leader (or occasionally a small group)** :

exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones' [3]

cooptation :

In authoritarian regimes the men who come to power reflecting the views of various groups and institutions do not derive their position from **the support of these groups alone**, but from the **trust placed in them by the leader**, monarch or "junta," who certainly takes into account their prestige and influence.

They have a kind of constituency, but this is not solely or even principally the source of their power. The co-optation of leaders is a constant process by which different sectors or institutions become participants in the system.

Raymond Aron : authoritarian regimes do not develop an official ideology, and which not shape all their activities through ideology. There exist one-party regimes in which the state does not absorb the society and in which ideology does not take this insane expansion which can seen in the soviet union[4].

Types of Authoritarian regimes :

Praetorian regime :

The **praetorian guard** was an elite unit of soldiers, these men were responsible for the safety of the roman emperor and his family, and were well-paid rewarded for their loyalty, they received a higher rate of pay than the rest of the army, they had better living and working conditions, because they were based in **Rome**, and their close relationship with the emperor, after that the praetorian guard moved to preserve the legitimacy of the empire by defending

[1] Ibid,p 161
[2] Juan Linz, **Opcit,** p161
[3] Ibid , p 166
[4] Raymond Aron, **Democratie et totalitarianisme**, Paris: Gallinard, p 286

the senate against the encroachment of triumphant or rebellious military garrisons marching on the capital . The influence of the **roman Praetorian Guard** was based on three factors: its monopoly of local military power, the absence of definitive rules of succession, and the prestige of the roman senate, and the Praetorian Guard was able to impose its candidate. After the term has long been applied by political scientists to describe chronic military intervention in politics or the military's exercise of political power.

Types of Military Rule :

Arbitrator

- Time limit for military rule: willing to return to the barracks after disputes are settled
- Goals of the military: to settle disputes
- View of professionalism : concerned with professional improvement
- Level of political organization: no independent political organization
- Confidence in existing social order and civilian rule: accepts the existing social order
- Relationship with civilians: civilian-oriented, fears civilian retribution. [1]

Ruler

- Time limit for military rule: no desire to return to the barracks
- Goals of the military: wants to maximize time in power, convinced that military rule is the only alternative to political disorder
- View of professionalism : politicizes professionalism
- Level of political organization : high, has a strong political organization
- Confidence in existing social order and civilian rule: no confidence in existing order, challenges civilian rule
- Relationships with civilians: not civilian oriented, little fear of civilian retribution[2]

Bureaucratic-authoritarian regime :

Bureaucratic central actors in these systems, which are excluding and emphatically non-democratic, include high-level technocrats-military and civilian, within and outside the state-working in close association within foreign capital, this new elites eliminates electoral competition and controls the political participation of the popular sector[3].

It is system of political exclusion of a previously activated popular sector, which is subjected to strict controls designed to eliminate its earlier presence in the political arena. This achieved by coercion, as well as by the destruction or strict governmental control of the resources. Such

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[1] Natasha Ezrow and Erica Franz, **Dictators and Dictatorships**, New York : Blommsburry Publishing, 2011, p 168

[2] Ibid, p 168-169

[3] David Collier, **Industrial Modernization and Political Change : A Latin America Perspective**, World Politics, Vol 30, N°4, 1978, p 597.

exclusion is guided by the determination to impose "order" on society and to ensure its future viability[1] .

This exclusion brings with it suppression of citizenship and political democracy. The suppression of the institutional roles and channels of access to the government characteristic of political democracy is aimed at the elimination of the roles and organizations (political parties among them).

These channels are considered incompatible with the reimposition of order. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state is an "exclusionary" system in that it attempts to **deactivate** or "**encapsulate"** sectors of a mobilized populace which seek greater access to the political and economic decision-making structures of society[2].

Personalistic regime :

Personalist dictatorships are regimes in which a single individual controls politics. In personalist dictatorships, one person "dominates the military state apparatus and ruling party (if one exists)." No autonomous institutions exist independent of the leader. Though the leader may ally with or create a political party, it is merely a tool of the leader. Personalist dictators are often current or former members of the military; once in power,

However, this type characterized by the absence of effective political institutions results in the predominance of a personal authority and power that is limited more by countervailing power than by institutions.

Personal rule is a system of personal relations centered on the ruler's relations with his associates, clients, supporters and rivals. Where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual, where power is concentrated in the hands of an individual rather than a political party, royal family, or military junta[3].

Definition of Personalist Dictatorship

- One-man rule ; power is exclusively in the hands of a single individual.
- No autonomous institutions.
- Military is subordinate to the leader.
- Political parties, if they exist, have no de facto power.
- Policy choices are determined by the leader.
- No checks on the leader's power.
- A clique of the leader's friends and/or family members assists in governing.

Sultanism

[1] Guillermo O'Donnell, **Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism : Argentina 1966-1973 in Comparative Perspective**, California : University of California Press, p 31

[2] Guillermo O'Donnell***,Opcit, p33***

[3] Natasha Ezrow and Erica Franz, **Opcit**, p 215-216

Sultanism is a regime type that H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz examine in depth. The term "sultanism" was originally coined by Max Weber.
Sultanist regimes are essentially a subset of personalist dictatorships. They are an extreme form of patrimonialism characterized by personal rule and constitutional hypocrisy, "where loyalty to the ruler is motivated by a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. Sultanist regimes are not based on any particular ideology, nor on the leader's personal mission or charismatic legitimacy[1].

Characteristics of sultnistic Regimes : as follows:

1. **the blurring of the line between regime and state**:

Juan linz sultanistic stated that rulers typically maintain an atmosphere of distrust among various branches of the military and encourage mutual espionage to protect themselves from a military coup, and some even use militias to sustain their control of society, often there is no unified command and the commanders of force report directly to the rulers. The normal criteria for promotion are disregarded or subverted, creating resentment, the armed forces are thus deprofessionalized as the rulers aim at converting them into their private instruments for power[2].

2. **Personalism:**

Personalism is the second salient feature of sultanism , personalistic regimes are regimes in which a single individual controls politics. One person «dominates the military, state apparatus, and ruling party. No autonomous institutions exist independent of the leader Moreover, personalists dictators rule with extreme freedom, allowing for eccentric politics. The aim of the ruler is to use power to private ends that can be enjoyed by him and distributed among his protégés[3].

3. Constitutional Hypocresiy, sultanistic regimes lack an ideological basis for their institutions oftern govern with constitutions[4]
4. The narrow social bases, sultanistic rulers come to power with the support of clearly recognizable groups [5].

[1] Juan Linz and Houchang Chihabi, **Sultanistic Regimes**, Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, p 4
[2] Juan Linz and Houchang Chihabi,**Opcit**, p10
[3] Ezrow and Frantz, **Opcit**, p 215
[4]Juan linz and Houchag Chihabi, **Opcit,** p 17
[5] Ibid, p 19

Lecture07 :**<u>Survival strategies of Authoritarian regimes :</u>**

All authoritarian regimes face two problems of governance: first, how to thwart rebellion and second, how to obtain cooperation. Leaders want to survive in office either to reap the benefits of being in power or implement policies.

Authoritarian regimes are threatened by popular revolution (whether peaceful or violent) or by a coup led by the military or other elites. A large literature has identified and substantiated how dictators survive in the face of these threats. "**<u>Toolbox"</u>** that dictators rely on to stay in power. This toolbox contains the following instruments: cooptation, repression, coup proofing, and legitimation.

cooptation as the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors **(or a group of actors**) to the regime elite. In Bueno de Mesquita's terms, members of the **"selectorate"** need to be bound to the **"winning coalition"[1].**

Co-optation needs to be exerted so that the actor is "persuaded not to exercise his power to obstruct" and instead to use the resources in line with the ruling elite's demands The "**players"** in this autocratic sub game" are on the intra-elite level. Military and business elites of strategic importance need to be co-opted. The function of co-optation can be characterized as inclusionary. It works as a transmission belt to ensure both the intra-elite cohesion and the steering capacity of the political elite. The ability of the political elite to maintain the balance between competing subordinate actors and to avoid a situation in which one actor grows too strong by simultaneously tying all relevant actors to the regime is crucial for the stability of autocracies[2].

<u>Co-optation</u> can be defined as **<u>strategic measures</u>** of an authoritarian ruler directed at forming sustainable connections of the regime with the elites and social groups with the aim of preserving their loyalty. This strategy is a key one in terms of forming an empowered coalition. Cooptation tackles survival from a different vantage point, offering rewards rather than punishment as an incentive for backing the dictator. Cooptation is the intentional distribution of benefits to potential challengers in exchange for their loyalty. Patronage is

[1] Johannes Gerschewski, **The Three Pillars of Stability, Legitimation, Repression,and Cooptation** in **Autocratic Regimes**, Democratization, Vol 20, N°1,2013, pn 22

[2] Ibid, , pn 22

perhaps the most common way that dictators use cooptation, but they often use institutions to do so too, by – for example – enabling those whose support their need to hold local office or legalizing legislatures.

Cooptation includes Actions aimed at controlling, absorbing, or deflecting pressures and demands made on the executive. These actions include coopting key figures and social groups, preempting the maneuvers of political opponents, balancing key power centers against one another, and creating institutions to control—if not mobilize—the population.

Cooptation is mainstay of authoritarian survival strategy, aimed at buying off potential opposition with either rents or policy of concessions, in exchange for political support, the regime makes a payout, often in the form of material benefits or political offices. As a matter of fact, political selection is frequently used as a vehicle for cooptation, as political offices are a credible way of distributing rents. In short, this type of cooptation is based on an immediate transfer of socioeconomic gains to the recipients, this cooptation sets up. It structures inequality in the regime to heavily favor political elites, it maintains a personnel system with regular retirements and promotions in order to create opportunities for non-elites[1].

forms of cooptation : As with repression, there are many forms of cooptation including :

1. **Elections :** for example, are seen as a tool for cooptation in dictatorships and most dictatorships hold them. Elections in authoritarian regimes vary in terms of how frequently they are held, whether the electoral cycle is fixed, how competitive they are, and the types [2]of positions that are up for grabs.

Elections serve a cooptative role because they give both regime supporters and opponents an opportunity to participate in the political process, even if in a limited capacity Elections create obvious risks for dictators, of course, given the very real possibility things. could go wrong and they lose them, but authoritarians have a variety of resources at their disposal to ensure that they come out on top. These include flooding the media environment with pro-regime campaigns, harassing opponents, and of course fraud. Research suggests that despite the short-term risks that elections could topple authoritarians, in the long term they prolong their survival.

2. **Political parties**:

are another institutional form of cooptation in dictatorships. They help authoritarian leaders mobilize popular support and give members a vested interest in the regime's survival. This

[1] Hanzhang Liu, **Meritocracy as Authoritarian Cooptation, political Upward Mobility in China**, American Political Science Review, Vol 18, N°4, 2024, p 1858

[2] Erica Frantz, **Authoritarian Survival**, in Natasha Lindsaedt and Jeron Den Boesh, Resarch Handbook on Authoritarianism UK : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024, p 235-236

reduces the chance that party members will align with opposition coalitions or otherwise seek the regime's ouster. Political parties may also enable authoritarians to more credibly commit to power sharing with regime actors.

Legislatures :

are an additional mode of institutional cooptation in authoritarian regimes. they create a venue in which potential members of the opposition can be incorporated in the system, thereby decreasing the chance they will devote time and effort toward toppling the regime. They also are a forum that authoritarian governments can use to collect information about citizen demands and solidify power-sharing deals via information sharing and monitoring .

But once incumbent autocrats establish these institutions, another challenge emerges : how do autocrats ensure elected legislators cooperate with the ruling coalition.

Gandhi and Przeworski propose two distinct mechanisms through which rulers induce cooperation: **rents (direct payments to rival elites)** and **policy concessions**[1].

Repression:

In political science, repressions are most often understood as "actions or threats to apply physical sanctions against certain persons or organizations within the framework of territorial jurisdiction with the aim of increasing the price of political activities, as well as to suppress oppositional actions or convictions".

Davenport, repression can be defined as the "actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities" .

Repression is a classic feature of authoritarian governance and an obvious strategy for securing political control in such contexts. Referred to as the "Law of Coercive Responsiveness, the basic logic behind repression is that it can prevent, counter, and eliminate threats to authoritarian rule. Repression is an effective strategy for survival for authoritarian leaders because it makes opposing their rule more costly, both in terms of individual acts of disloyalty and broader efforts at anti-regime collective action. Ordinary citizens are far less likely to hit the streets and protest if they assess that others are unlikely to do the same, In this way, by making individuals grow more fearful of making their true preferences about the regime public, repression hinders the ability of the opposition to mobilize and pressure the regime[2].

For these reasons, we tend to see fewer acts of civil disobedience where repression is high than in other more tolerant environments.

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[1] Daniel Tavana and Erin York, **legislative cooptation in Authoritarian regimes : policy cooperation in the Kuwait national assembly**, British Journal of political science, N°25, 2025, p 4

[2] Erica Frantz, **Opcit,** p 232

Repression is not a risk-free strategy, however, and its use comes with costs, Repressive acts can trigger a backlash against authoritarian governments particularly where they are indiscriminate, severe, and easily observable .

They can fuel the flame of popular discontent, lessening the dictator's legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens, and increasing the chance that small and dispersed acts of defiance will spiral into broader destabilizing movements for the regime. Repression can also be costly for authoritarian leaders because it can limit their access to information about levels of dissent. As repression grows more intense, citizens will be less likely to express discontent with the regime, and regime supporters will grow more fearful of relaying information about levels of societal anger. The shrinking of information channels available to the dictator make responding to and preempting threats to their rule far more difficult[1].

Lastly, repression also brings with it direct risks to the dictator: providing resources to the security sector to apply repression creates the very real possibility these same resources will be competent and efficient in its ability to implement repression, its ability to turn against (rather than protect) the dictator increases as well. For these reasons, while repression is an obvious survival tool for authoritarians, they must be strategic in how they use it.

Repression alone is a risky strategy for an authoritarian leader to depend on, and for this reason most authoritarians also incorporate cooptation in their survival toolkit. At the most basic level, cooptation entails giving out perks to select individuals in exchange for loyalty.

It involves "**encapsulating" members of the population into the regime via the distribution of benefits**". The individuals targeted are often framed as "potential challengers" in most academic work, yet who these individuals are varies quite a bit, not only from one authoritarian context to the next, but also in terms of the specific form of cooptation under analysis[2].

It is also involves the use of actual or threatened violence, coercion, or the curtailment of civil liberties to establish political control and it is most commonly associated with acts of political torture or killings and can also introduce strategies that undermine civil liberties by limiting freedom of expression, assembly or movement[3]

From the above, repression seeks to eliminate threats to the political regime, dictators use repression to constrain the behavior of individuals and groups and to obtain information to

[1] Erica Frantz, **Opcit** , p 233
[2] Ibid, p 235
[3] Wooseok Kim and Eugenia Nazrulla Eva, **Strategies of Political Control and Regime Survival in Autocracies,** Democratization, Vol 33, N°1, 2026, p 3

prevent challenges.the repression has two main forms: First: the threat and of physical violence and Second: the restriction of citizens civil and political rights[1]

Legitimation :

legitimation to be the most important support of the modern authoritarianism forms, integrating this strategy (alongside with co-optation and repressions) into an analytical framework developed by him to research authoritarian sustainability. Following his methodological provisions, legitimation can be defined as the incumbent's mechanisms directed at structuring connections between the authorities and the society with the aim of forming active support, complying with the established regulations, passive obedience or mere tolerance towards the authorities on the part of elites and wide social strata.[2]

Coup-proofing :

According to **Luttwak,** "A coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder." The aim of a coup is not only to remove the existing government, but to seize power for the perpetrators. In this focus on the seizure of power, a coup is much more ambitious than the assassination of a regime's leader. As Luttwak makes clear, the essence of a successful coup is the rapid seizure of power by a small group followed by the speedy acceptance of the new authorities by the remaining portions of the government and the population[3].

"coup-proofing" as the set of actions a regime takes to prevent elements, they do share some common characteristics, including: (1) the effective exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for coup-critical positions balanced with wider participation and less restrictive loyalty standards for the regime as a whole;

(2) the creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; (3) the development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor the loyalty of the military and one another with independent paths of communication to critical leaders; (4) the fostering of expertness in the regular military; and (5) the financing of such measures[4].

[1] Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph George Wright, **Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival**, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2015, p 51

[2] Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph George Wright,**Opcit,** P 208

[3] James T.Quinlivan , **Coup-Proofing : Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East** ,International Security ,Vol 24, N°2 ,1999, P 133

[4] Ibid, p 132

Lecture08 :Hybrid regimes :

Introduction :

The democratization literature uses different terms for conceptualizing hybrid regimes. It describes those models that are located in the broad gray zone between full autocracies and full democracies. Some scholars believe that imperfect democracies and imperfect autocracies can be considered as examples of hybrid regimes, while others believe that hybrids combine the characteristics of both democratic and authoritarian regimes, fueling a broad debate about conceptual subtypes.

Huntington describes hybrid regimes as: "**Diminished types of autocracy or corrupted democracies, i.e., fragile (halfway-houses) that have stalled in their democratic transitions**."[1]

Morlino defined the hybrid regime: "**A set of institutions that have been persistent, be they stable or unstable, for about a decade, have been preceded by authoritarianism, a traditional regime (possibly with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy and are characterized by the break-up of limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous participation, but the absence of at. least one of the four aspects of a minimal democracy**."[2]

Henry E. Hale defined hybrid regimes as: "A hybrid regime is a political regime that combines some democratic and some autocratic elements in a significant manner. It is not, however, a mere half-way category: hybrid regimes have their own distinct Dynamics that do not simply amount to half of what we would see in a democracy plus half of what we would see in an autocracy."

Syndromes of hybrid regimes:

The first syndrome is feckless pluralism :

Countries whose political life is marked by feckless pluralism tend to have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings. Despite these positive features, however, democracy remains

[1] Samuel Huntigton, **The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century**, Norman : University of Ocklahoma Press, 1991, p 598

[2] Leonardo Morlino, **Are There Hybrid Regimes ? Are they just an optical Illusion ?**European Political Science Review, N°2, 2009

shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective.

The alternation of power seems only to trade the country's problems back and forth from one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country. Overall, politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and commands equally little respect. And the state remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad or even calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous, and successive governments are unable to make headway on most of the major problems facing the country, from crime and corruption to health, education, and public welfare generally There are many variations of feckless pluralism[1].

Dominant-Power Politics :

*The most common other political syndrome in the gray zone is dominant-power politics. Countries with this syndrome have limited but still real political space, some political contestation by opposition groups, and at least most of the basic institutional forms of democracy. Yet one political grouping—whether it is a movement, a party, an extended family, or a single leader—dominates the system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future. Unlike in countries beset with feckless pluralism, a key political problem in dominant-power countries is the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party (or ruling political forces).

As in feckless-pluralist systems, the citizens of dominant-power systems tend to be disaffected from politics and cut off from significant political participation beyond voting. Since there is no alternation of power, however, they are less apt to evince the "a pox on all your houses" political outlook pervasive in feckless-pluralist systems. Yet those opposition political parties that do exist generally are hard put to gain much public credibility due to their perennial status as outsiders to the main halls of power [2].

Types of hybrid regimes :

Competitive authoritarian regimes :

are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not

[1] Thomas Carothers, **The end of transition Paradugm**, in Larry Diamond and Mark Plattner, Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, 82-83

[2] Ibid, p 83-84

democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair.

Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime type, with important characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism. scholars have converged around a "procedural minimum" definition of democracy that includes four key attributes:

(1) free, fair, and competitive elections.

(2full adult suffrage;

(3) broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association ; and

(4) the absence of nonelected "tutelary" authorities (e.g., militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that limit elected officials' power to govern[1].

Difference between competitive and noncompetitive authoritarianism :

We define full authoritarianism as a regime in which no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive power. This category includes closed regimes in which national-level democratic institutions do not exist (e.g., China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia) and hegemonic regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist on paper but are reduced to fac¸ade status in practice.

Whereas In hegemonic regimes, elections are so marred by repression, candidate restrictions, and/or fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome. Much of the opposition is forced underground and leading critics are often imprisoned or exiled. .

Difference between Competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished from full authoritarianism :

They differ in that constitutional channels exist through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power. Elections are held regularly and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them. Opposition activity is above ground: Opposition parties can open offices, recruit candidates, and organize campaigns, and politicians are rarely exiled or imprisoned.

In short, democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power. What distinguishes competitive authoritarianism from democracy, however, is the fact that incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy : (1) free elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level playing field.

In democracies, elections are free, in the sense that there is virtually no fraud or intimidation of voters, and fair, in the sense that opposition parties campaign on relatively even footing:

[1] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, **Competitive Authoritarianism : Hybrid Regimes**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010, p7

They are not subject to repression or harassment, and they are not systematically denied access to the media or other critical resources.

In fully authoritarian regimes, multiparty elections are either nonexistent or noncompetitive. Elections may be considered noncompetitive when (1) major candidates are formally barred or effectively excluded on a regular basis ; (2) repression or legal controls effectively prevent opposition parties from running public campaigns; or (3) fraud is so massive that there is virtually no observable relationship between voter preferences and official electoral results.

Competitive authoritarian regimes fall in between these extremes. On the one hand, elections are competitive in that major opposition candidates are rarely excluded, opposition parties are able to campaign publicly, and there is no massive fraud. On the other hand, elections are often unfree and almost always unfair. In some cases, elections are marred by the manipulation of voter lists, ballot-box stuffing, and/or falsification of results (e.g., the Dominican Republic in 1994 and Ukraine in 2004). Although such fraud may alter the outcome of elections, it is not so severe as to make the act of voting meaningless.

Elections also may be marred by intimidation of opposition activists, voters, and poll watchers, and even the establishment of opposition "no-go" areas (e.g., Cambodia and Zimbabwe). However, such abuse is not sufficiently severe or systematic to prevent the opposition from running a national campaign. In other cases (e.g., Botswana), voting and vote-counting processes are reasonably clean but an uneven playing field renders the overall electoral process manifestly unfair. In these cases, unequal access to finance and the media as well as incumbent abuse of state institutions make elections unfair even in the absence of violence or fraud[1].

Civil Liberties : In democracies, civil liberties – including the rights of free speech, press, and association – are protected. Although these rights may be violated periodically, such violations are infrequent and do not seriously hinder the oppositions capacity to challenge incumbents. In fully authoritarian regimes, basic civil liberties are often violated so, systematically that opposition parties, civic groups, and the media are not even minimally protected (e.g., Egypt and Ouzbékistan).

As a result, much opposition activity takes place underground or in exile. In competitive authoritarian regimes, civil liberties are nominally guaranteed and at least partially respected. Independent media exist and civic and opposition groups operate above ground: Most of the time, they can meet freely and even protest against the government. Yet, civil liberties are frequently violated. Opposition politicians, independent judges, journalists, human-rights activists, and other government critics are subject to harassment, arrest, and . In some regimes, overt repression – including the arrest of opposition leaders, the killing of opposition activists,

[1] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, **Opcit,** p 8

and the violent repression of protest – is widespread, pushing regimes to the brink of full authoritarianism. For example, vote fraud[1] .

An Uneven Playing Field :

Finally, nearly all competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by **an uneven playing field**. Obviously, a degree of incumbent advantage exists in all democracies. Indeed, many new democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America are characterized by extensive clientelism and politicization of state bureaucracies.

To distinguish such cases from those of unfair competition, we set a high threshold for unfairness. We consider the playing field uneven when (1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends, (2) incumbents are systematically favored at the expense of the opposition, and (3) the opposition's ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped. Three aspects of an uneven playing field are of particular importance: access to resources, media, and the law[2].

Access to resources :.

Access to resources is uneven when incumbents use the state to create or maintain resource disparities that seriously hinder the opposition's ability to compete. This may occur in several ways. For example incumbents may make direct partisan use of state resources. In a few cases, this funding is legal.

They also may use the state to monopolize access to private-sector finance. Governing Incumbents also may use the state to monopolize access to private-sector finance. Governing parties may use discretionary control over credit, licenses, state contracts, and other resources to enrich themselves via party-owned enterprises (e.g., Taiwan), benefit crony- or proxy-owned firms that then contribute money back into party coffers (e.g., Malaysia), or corner the market in privatesector donations (e.g., Mexico and Russia). In Malaysia and Taiwan, for example, governing parties used control of the state to build multibillion-dollar business empires[3].

Access to media :.

When opposition parties lack access to media that reaches most of the population, there is no possibility of fair competition. Media access may be denied in several ways. Frequently, the most important disparities exist in access to broadcast media, combined with biased and partisan coverage. In many competitive authoritarian regimes, the state controls all television and most – if not all – radio broadcasting. Although independent newspapers and magazines may circulate freely, they generally reach only a small urban elite. In such cases, if radio and television are state-run and state-run channels are biased in favor of the governing party, opposition forces are effectively denied access to the media. Thus, even after the Banda

[1] Ibid, p 8

[2] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way**, Opcit**, p 9

[3] Ibid , p 10

dictatorship in Malawi gave way to elected President Bakili Muluzi, incumbent control of the media was such that one journalist complained, "Before it was Banda, Banda, Banda – every day. Now it is Muluzi, Muluzi, Muluzi."[1]

biased referees:

uneven access to the law. In many competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbents pack judiciaries, electoral commissions, and other nominally independent arbiters and manipulate them via blackmail, bribery, and/or intimidation. As a result, legal and other state agencies that are designed to act as referees rule systematically in favor of incumbents. This allows incumbents to engage in illicit acts – including violations of democratic procedure – with impunity. It also ensures that critical electoral, legal, or other disputes will be resolved in the incumbent's favor[2]

table 1.1. Comparing Democratic, Competitive Authoritarian, and Closed Regimes :

	democracy	Competitive authoritarian	Full authoritarianism
Status of Core Democratic Institutions (Elections, Civil Liberties)	Systematically respected. Widely viewed as only route to power	Exist and are meaningful, but systematically violated in favor of incumbent. Widely viewed as primary route to power	Nonexistent or reduced to fac¸ade status. Not viewed as a viable route to power
Status of Opposition	Competes on more or less equal footing with incumbent.	Major opposition is legal and can compete openly, but is significantly disadvantaged by incumbent abuse.	Major opposition banned, or largely underground or in exile
Level of Uncertainty	High	Lower than democracy but higher than full authoritarianism	lower

Ref : Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, **Opcit**, **P 12**

Electoral authoritarian regimes :

Electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular elections for the chief executive and a national legislative assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than "instruments of democracy".

Under electoral authoritarian rule, elections are broadly inclusive (they are held under universal suffrage) as well as minimally pluralistic (opposition parties are allowed to run), minimally competitive (opposition parties, while denied victory, are allowed to win votes and seats), and minimally open (opposition parties are not subject to massive repression, although they may experience repressive treatment in selective and intermittent ways Overall, however, electoral contests are subject to state manipulation so severe, widespread, and systematic that they do not qualify as democratic [3] .

[1] Ibid, p 11

[2] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way**, Opcit**, p 12

[3] Andreas Schedler, **The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism**,in Andreas Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism : The Dynamics of Unfree competition, London : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, P 3

is a regime defined by 'a largely functioning democratic electoral regime for the selection of rulers that, however, through disruptions in the operating logic of one or more of the other components, loses the complementary buttresses which in a functioning democracy are indispensable for securing freedom, equality and control'[1].

Types of Defective Democracy :

There are four types of defective democracy : exclusive democracy, domain democracy, illiberal democracy and delegative democracy.

Exclusive Democracy :

Sovereignty of the people is the basic concept of democracy and has to be guaranteed by universal electoral rights and their fair execution. This is not the case if one or more segments of all adult citizens are excluded from the civil right of universal suffrage.

Domain Democracy : If '**veto powers'** – such as the military, guerrillas, militia, entrepreneurs, landlords or multi-national corporations – take certain political domains out of the hands of democratically elected representatives, the result is domain democracy.

The creation of such political domains can occur by constitutional and extra-constitutional means. Although the latter has to be seen as inflicting more severe damage to a constitutional democracy, the former also represents a type of defective democracy. Domain democracy is a regionally specific type occurring in Latin America and southeast Asia, where the military often takes over a political (veto) role. In Eastern Europe or central Asia, domain democracies are rare.

Illiberal Democracy : In intact democracies, legitimate representatives are bound to constitutional principles. In an illiberal democracy, with its incomplete and damaged constitutional state, the executive and legislative control of the state are only weakly limited by the judiciary.

Additionally, constitutional norms have little binding impact on government actions and individual civil rights are either partially suspended or not yet established. In illiberal democracies, the principle of the rule of law is damaged, affecting the actual core of liberal self-understanding, namely the equal freedom of all individuals. This is the most common type of 'defective democracy', and it can be found all over the world.

Delegative Democracy : the legislature and the judiciary have only limited control over the executive branch. Actions of government are seldom committed to constitutional norms.

The checks and balances that functioning democracies need in order to maintain a balanced political representation are undermined. Governments, usually led by charismatic presidents,

[1] Matthijis Bogaards, **How to classify Hybrid Regimes§ Defective Democracy and electoral authoritarianism,** Democratization, Vol 16,N°2, 2009, p 403

circumvent parliament, influence the judiciary, damage the principle of legality, undermine checks and balances, and shift the equilibrium of the balance of power unilaterally in favour of the (presidential) executive[1].

Lecture09 : The regime transition :

A regime transition according to **O'donnell and Schmitter** is the "interval between one political regime and another"[2]. A democratic transition is therefore the interval between an authoritarian polity and a democratic one. In defining the process of democratic transition, the **transfer of power** is a key element, in addition to political authority being derived from the **free decision of an electorate**.

To put it in another way, "transition" in democratic regime change denote an undefined period in the interval between "the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime," at the outset, and "the installation of some form of democracy, or the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative" at the end.

Transition begins with the breakdown of the formal authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime, Transition results in the creation of new regime, consolidation results in the stability and persistence of that regime[3].

Within this period of incremental changes and qualitative alteration of the old political regime, there exists a more defined interlude characterized by the rule of an interim government that has committed itself to hold free and competitive elections of one sort or another within a relatively short span of time[4].

A regime transition is a shift from one set of political procedures to another, from an old pattern of rule to a new one. It is an interval of intense political uncertainty during which the shape of the new institutional dispensation is up for grabs by incumbent and opposition contenders. For this reason, a regime transition can be depicted as a struggle between

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[1] Wolfgang Merkel, **Embedded and Defective Democracies**, Democratization, vol 11, N°5, 2004,p 49-50

[2] Guillermo O'Donnell and Karl Schmitter, **Transitions from Authoritarianism**, 1986, p6

[3] Richard Gunther and Hans-Jurgen Puhle**, Introduction**, In Richard Gunther and Nikiforos Diamondorous, The Politics of Democratic Transion : Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, 1995, p 3

[4] Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, **Between states : interim goverments and democratic transitions**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995, p 7

competing political forces over the rules of the political game and for the resources with which the game is played.

Regime transition may occur by means of a short, sharp transformation — for example, when a coercive autocracy collapses and gives way to an elected democracy. Or a transition may unfold incrementally, as when a personal dictatorship gradually relaxes controls on its political opponents and introduces a softer, more liberalized form of authoritarian rule. The direction of transitions is nonetheless multivalent, potentially unfolding toward harder, more authoritarian regime types. It is also reversible, as when new regimes are installed but political innovations fail to take root, and older forms of rule reassert themselves[1].

Transition refers to the **intermediate phase** that begins with the dissolution of an old regime and ends with the establishment of a new one .

Democratic transitions consist of two simultaneous but to some extent autonomous processes: a process of dissolution of the authoritarian regime and a process of emergence of democratic institutions democratic transitions, which are an integral part of the democratization process. The process of democratization consists of three significant areas: (1) why ? (why do states become democratic; what are the necessary preconditions for democratic government); (2) how ? (how do states become democratic; the actual process of transition); and (3) endurance (how long do states stay democratic; the essence of consolidation[2].

Democratic consolidation refers to the years that follow the installation of democracy, when all relevant institutions have been set up[3].

Steps to democratization :

Preconditions :

The first step of democratization is the diverse preconditions that cause authoritarian polities to seek democracy. Authoritarian breakdown is often associated with regime failure, frequently due to economic collapse.

Economic factors :

Lipset emphasized the significance of social conditions conducive to democracy and related democracy to the level of economic development and wealth. According to his generalization, ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ . When he tested this hypothesis by empirical evidence, he found that the average wealth, degree of

[1] Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, **Democratic Experiments in Africa**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997, p 1.
[2] Sujian Guo and Gary Straditto, **Democratic Transitions : Modes and Outcomes**, Routledge : Routeledge Publishers, 2014, p 16
[3] Leonardo Morlino, **Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis : Parties, Groups, and Citizens** in **Southern Europe**, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1998, p 13

industrialization and urbanization, and the level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries than for the less democratic ones[1].

Daniel Lerner pointed out that the process of modernization follows a similar pattern in different countries. It starts from urbanization, and is followed by increased literacy and rising media participation. Finally, modernization produces democracy: 'Democratic governance comes late, historically, and typically appears as a crowning institution of the participant society.[2]

Social factors :

In *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore argued that when peasant majorities were able to participate in social revolutions at an early stage in economic development, democratic rights became secured early; when such revolutions had not taken place, economic development tended to produce two kinds of political outcome, neither of which boded well for democracy. In the first path, industrialization supported the interests of narrow agrarian elites and the highly conservative authoritarian states they favored (a variant of which led down the road to fascism).

An alternate second path led to twentieth-century communist revolutions from below as revolutionary parties succeeded in mobilizing the large numbers of those left out from the benefits of economic growth. It was only the early opening up of the political system by revolution that avoided both options and laid the groundwork for democracy. And he mentioned that the middle class as a necessary condition: "No bourgeoisie, no democracy". Needless to say, the bourgeoisie is most pronounced in capitalist societies. Democratic, the fascist, and the communist, each of which is derived from the timing of industrialization and the social structure at the time of transition[3]

Political factors:

O'Donnell & Schmitter, a democratic transition is predominantly caused by internal, domestic factors and "there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage **between hard-liners and soft-liners"[4].**

Hard-liners (duros) believe that perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible and desirable, they reject all democratic forms then they establish some facade behind or window dressing, which they can maintain authoritarian regime. These hard-liners consist of several factions.

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[1] Tatu Vanhanen, **Democratization : A comparative Analysis of 170 countries,** New York : Routledge Publishers, 2003, , P7

[2] Tatu Vanhanen, **Opcit** , P7

[3] John Markoff , **Democratic Transition**, in Thomas Janoski and Robert Alford, The Handbook of Political Sociology, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2005, P 384

[4] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, **Opcit,** p 15

The main core of the hard-liners is formed by those who reject the 'cancers' and' disorders' of democracy and who believe they have a mission to eliminate all traces of such pathologies from political life, and once the transition has begun they remain stubborn, they attempted coups and conspiracies.

The soft-liners (blandos): soft-liners are different from hard-liners, they have increasing awarness that the regime they helped to implant, and in which usually occupy important positions, will have to make use, in the foreseeable future, of some degrees or some form of electoral legitimation, furthermore, the soft-liners hope that the regime's effectiveness will be transferred into popular support of the regime[1].

The opposition is regarded as being most clearly divided between "**radicals" and "moderates".** What unites the opposition is the desire for change and political opening and what divides the radicals from the moderates is their view of how to reach this end. The radicals reject any notion of compromise with the incumbent authoritarian regime and instead support a quick and substantial governmental reform. The moderates on the other hand, are more open to the notion of compromise, especially with the soft-liners of the authoritarian regimes, in order to move the process forward.

External Factors :

Laurence Whitehead. Whitehead acknowledges that internal factors often play a decisive role in democratizations. But, he adds, the international context must be included in the equation, whether we are to understand democratic breakthroughs or democratic breakdowns. Against this background, he distinguishes between three categories of international factors :

1. **Contagion :** This factor refers to how countries tend to carry out regime changes in 'neighboring clusters'.In the course of the third wave of democratization, we have seen this first in Southern Europe, subsequently in Latin America, then in Central and Eastern Europe, and finally in Sub-Saharan Africa. The most significant mechanism is the transfer of information about the development in the (neighboring) countries with which the population (and often also the elites) identifies.

2. Control : The point here is that external forces can realize ends-oriented regime change by relying on good old-fashioned power politics. This has been seen in Germany and Japan after World War II, in a more moderate version in the course of the de-colonization of the British colonies, and, most recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

3. Consent : When consent is operating, there is a mutually accepted interplay between the internal and external actors, which can help contribute to democratization[2].

[1] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, **Opcit,** p16
[2] Jorgen Moller and Svend-Eric Skaaning, **Opcit**, p 144

According **to Przeworski** , "The strategic problem of transition is to get to democracy without being either killed by those who have arms or starved by those who control productive resources ... the final destination depends on the path"[1] **. The path is the nature and characteristics of the transition that leads to democratic success or failure. According to scholars who advocate a path dependency analysis of democratization**

The process of transition :

The second step of democratization is the transition itself and the focus of this research. Through what method do states become democratic, and how does this affect the quality and duration of democracy? A transition process is ". ..the movement from a nondemocratic to a democratic regime" .

transition starts when the authoritarian regime begins to liberalize and that the transitional phase is complete once the first free, open and fair national election is held.**O'Donnell and Schmitter** , argue that "the typical sign that the transition has begun comes when ... authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reason, begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups"[2] .

Transitional modes :

Pacted transition :

pacted transitions represent just one mode of regime transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. It represents an elite-driven model of change involving bargains between the leaders of major political factions [3]. the pact itself must be formulated. Pacts are bargained agreements that require participants to accept mutual, and often distasteful, compromises but also mutually binding guarantees for their vital interests[4].

According to **O'Donnell and Schmitter** « a pact is an "explicit, but not always explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it".

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[1] Adam Przewoski, **Democracy and The Market : Political and Economic in Eastern Europe,** Cambridge : Cambrige University Press, 1991, p

[2] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, **Opcit,** p

[3] Hicham Alaoui, **Pacted Democracy in the Middle East : Tunisia and Egypt in Comparative Politics**, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2022 P 64

[4] P 66

For purposes of our argument, we define a pact more generally as: A process involving a negotiating unit comprised of incumbent and opposition groups attempting to peacefully bargain the transition away from authoritarian rule to democracy[1].

The merits of the pact : According to O'Donnell and Schmitter"Pacts . . . are desirable [and] enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy" . Similarly, pacts "are meant to accommodate 'vital interests' and, therefore, facilitate the installation of democracy" . O'Donnell and Schmitter point out that, "with the exception of Costa Rica, all of the unpacted democracies existing at different times in other Latin American countries were destroyed by authoritarian reversals" .

Conversion :

Conversion :

when the elites in power take the lead in democratization and the government is stronger than the opposition. The incumbent elites seek reform, and lead the reform process. Sometimes a faction of the ruling elite prompts an opening to reform from above, or elites agree upon a multilateral compromise.

In certain cases, incumbents transition (or convert) the state with no input from opposition groups; however, opposition groups often play some role in the transition even though they are weaker than incumbents. As a result, incumbent-led negotiated pacts can be viewed as a sub-category of regime conversion. Examples of countries that have transitioned to democracy by conversion include Taiwan, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria and Chile. Similar categorizations by other scholars are Transformation (Huntington); Transaction (Share/Mainwaring); Reforma (Linz); Pact (Karl and Schmitter); and Reform through Extrication/Revolution from Above[2] .

Cooperative :

Within the government, there is a balance between reformers and standpatters such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of regime . Viewing regime cooperation as an opposition-led negotiated pact reflects the advantage of the opposition. Among the countries that have had a cooperative transition are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Nicaragua, South Korea, and Bolivia. Other scholars classify these as Transplacement (Huntington); Extrication (Share/Mainwaring); Reform through Transaction (Munck and Leff); Pact (Karl and Schmitter); and Reform from below

Collapse :

Opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown. Collapse encompasses transition by revolution or coup d'état

[1] Guillermo O'Donnell, **Opcit,** p 37

[2] Sujian Guo and Gary A. Stradiotto, **Democratic Transitions : Modes and outcomes,** New York : Routledge Publishers, 2014 P24

where the masses overthrow their rulers . The opposition dictates the transition with little or no control asserted by the incumbent elite, who are too weak to control the process, such as when the masses rise up in arms and overthrow the government through violence[1].

Foreign Intervention :

foreign military interference is used to remove the authoritarian regime and occurs when a dominant external power topples the ancien régime. Interventions by foreign military invaders share many of the same traits as replacement: incumbent reformers are virtually non-existent and the current regime is opposed to change, as evident in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Foreign intervention has been used in countries such as Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan and Iraq, and similarly referred to by other scholars as Intervention (Huntington); and Imposition (Karl and Schmitter). Saddam Hussein's regime held a tight grip on power for over Saddam Hussein's regime held a tight grip on power for over 30 years[2].

Democratic consolidation :

The third and final step of democratization is sustainability, Consolidation suggests that According to Larry Diamond, it is "the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine."[3]

In the same fashion **Andreas Schedler** pointed out that democratic consolidation [is] a process that makes new democracies secure, extends their life expectancy beyond the short term, [and] makes them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression[4] .

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that democratic transition is a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become "the only game in town."it is defined as follow :

Behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state. When this situation obtains, the behavior of the newly elected gov-ernment that has emerged from the democratic transition is no longer dominated by the problem of how to avoid democratic breakdown.

Attitudinally, democracy becomes the only game in town when, even in the face of severe political and eco-nomic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas. **Constitutionally,** democracy becomes the only game in town when all the actors in the polity

[1] Ibid, P25
[2] Sujian Guo and Gary A. Stradiotto,**Opcit**, p 26
[3] Larry Diamond, "**Is the Third Wave Over?**' Journal of Democracy , Vol 7, N°3, p33
[4] Andreas Schedler, '**What is Democratic Consolidation?"** Journal of Democracy, Vol 9, N°2 ,1998 p

become habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to the established norms and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly. In short, with consolidation, democracy be-comes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psy-chological life, as well as in calculations for achieving success. Our working definition of a consolidated democracy then follows: "[1] .

Lecture 10: Democractic Regimes :

Scholars define democracy in a number of ways, we can generally separate these definitions into two camps. The first is a 'thin' or 'minimalist approach , which emphasizes the procedural side of democratic politics and generates a minimal list of requirement s that countries must satisfy to be deemed democratic.

Joseph schumpter was one of the most influential voices advocating for a minimalist definition. Schumpter defined democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people vote" .

Today minimalist definitions of democracy most closely resemble Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchy, a term he developed to distinguish between democracy as he viewed it in practice and democracy as an ideal. The two most central components of polyarchy are inclusion, or the widespread right of citizens to participate in elections and run for office

Dahl defined polyrchy as the set of institutional arrangements that permits public opposition and establishes citizens rights to participate in politics[2].

Inclusion: or the widespread right of citizens to participate in elections and run for office, is a distinct attribute of democracy

Contestation : requires that voters have at least two alternatives to choose from and that elections are free and fair, those countries that hold elections in which a voters are presented with a single list.as adam przeworski notes to be democratic, not only do voters need to have more than one choice, but the opposition must have some chance of winning office as a result of the election.

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[1] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan , **Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation**, Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p6

[2] Andrea Kendall Taylor and Natasha Lindstaedt, **Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes**, Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2019, P 17-18

Maximalist (thick) definitions of democracy:

Maximalist definitions of democracy start from the premise that a democracy must hold contested elections, but do not consider the presence of elections as sufficient to call a state democratic. Put differently, maximalist definitions assert that no democracy can exist in the absence of contested elections, but not all systems that are based on contested elections may be called democratic. In addition, to repeated, competitive elections, supporters of a maximalist approach include a variety of other attributes in their definitions of democracy . some of criteria are procedural (the rule of law, participation, and accountability), while others are substantive(equality and political and civil liberties) .[1]

Types of democracy : there are several types including :

Protective democracy:

For the protective democrats, the goal of democracy is to defend the rights of citizens from an intrusive state and other citizens, the major theorists contributing to conceptions of protective democracy, including John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stewart Mill, viewed individuals as self-interested, and ultimately determined to maximize their own utility and satisfaction, individual's pursuit of their own self-interest ultimately puts people in conflict with one another.

Elected officials, also guided by the same self-interest, are motivated to use corruption and other abuses of office to maximize their own power .this view of democracy sees government, and especially separation of powers and accountable institutions, as serving to protect citizens rights and liberty from leader's despotic use of power. A government's role is to create the conditionsthat allow individuals to pursue their own interests. politics is regarded as distinct and separate from the economy, culture, family life. For protective democrats, limiting the government's scope and power in these spheres enhances social cohesion by reducing the number of issues subject to political conflict[2].

Pluralist democracy:

Like all theories of democracy, pluralist democracy starts from the premise that meaningful elections are the primary distinguishing factor between democracy and dictatorship, pluralists, however, view this minimalist definition as partial and incomplete. Instead, this model of democracy focuses on the role played by the myriad groups that mediate between voters and elected leaders and sustain a continued political presence between elections. Pluralist hold that society is composed of individuals with assorted concerns.

In contrast to participatory and deliberative democracy, pluralist democracy does not require active and widespread citizen engagement or participation in politics. Pluralists accept the

[1] Ibid, p19

[2] Andrea Kendall Taylor and Natasha Lindstaedt, **Opcit**, p 30

claim that the electorate is generally disinterested and less well informed that many democratic theories assume. Instead, this model views most citizens as having little if any, direct influence on the political process, not only do pluralists accept disengagement, but they also view a degree of inaction as beneficial to the stability of the political system. According to some pluralists, extensive participation can readily lead to increased social conflict[1].

Participatory democracy:

According to Held participatory democracy besides representative democracy is one of the "broad types" into which all models of democracy can be subdivided. The specific difference between the **participatory** and the **representative** mode is that, in the former, citizens are directly involved in political decisions while, in the latter, they are indirectly involved through representatives elected by the people[2]. There is an extensive consensus within democratic theory in regard to this simple differentiation . The adjectives "**direct" and "participatory**" are used almost synonymously: "**Participatory democracy […] denotes the form [of democracy] in which the people literally rule themselves, directly and participatorily**" . In the same text but a few lines later, Barber offers an even more precise definition: To its advocates, however, **participatory democracy involves extensive and active engagement of citizens in the self-governing process; it means government not just for but by and of the people.** From this perspective, direct or participatory democracy is democracy itself, properly understood[3].

Participatory democracy is a primary subtype of democracy in which all public affairs are regulated through the counselling and decision-making of the entire demos . All citizens share equal power in counselling and decision-making.

The most important criterion for differentiation between participatory democracy and representative democracy consists is in the way citizens are involved in political decisions. In a representative democracy this only takes place indirectly via elected representatives, while in a participatory democracy citizens are directly involved. The subtypes of participatory democracy have to keep the criterion of direct participation but at the same time they have to be appropriate for the conditions in modern societies.

Barber specifies a type of democracy, which he calls "**strong democracy**" , and which meets both aspects. While he understands participatory democracy as a form of government in which all of the people govern themselves in all public matters all of the time, he defines strong democracy as "a form of government in which all of the people govern themselves in at least some public matters at least some of the time" . The question of how many public matters have to be decided by direct participation of the citizens and how many citizens have

[1] Ibid p 31

[2] Dieter Fuchs, **Participatory Democracy, i**n Aaron Alan Delwiche and Jennifer Henderson, The Participatory Cultures Handbook, Routledge : Routledge Publishers, p165

[3] Dieter Fuchs, **Opcit,** p 167

to participate at all in order to be a participatory democracy, however, isn't answered by Barber.

In his book Barber makes suggestions about "**Institutionalizing Strong Democracy in the Modern World."** Essential elements in these "**strong democracies**" include referenda and initiatives as well as other institutional avenues for participation, such as for neighbourhood assemblies assemblies and electronic balloting. Barber emphasizes that, for "**strong democracy**" to occur, multiple avenues of citizen participation must be implemented at the same time. In comparison with strong democracy, the direct participation of citizens in political decisions in the so-called **semi-direct democracy** of Switzerland rests (at least on the national level) solely on referenda and initiatives.

Most political decisions in Switzerland, however, are made by the elected representatives in representative organs. Therefore, Switzerland represents a hybrid type of democracy that contains elements of both participatory and representative democracy. In the typology of it is considered a subtype of participatory democracy as the possibility and reality of referenda and initiatives in Switzerland change the character of the political decisionmaking and politics in general .

The third subtype of participatory democracy is "**deliberative democracy**." **Deliberative democracy** is the most prominent normative model discussed as the alternative or complement to representative democracy. Bohman slightly effusively, speaks of "**the coming age of deliberative democracy."** There's a multitude of variants of deliberative democracy but central ideas can be identified that are shared by all, namely, that citizens have to be directly involved in political decisions. However, the crucial point for them is that a debate must precede the decisions of the citizens and this debate must meet special requirements — those of "**deliberation.**" The central idea of all deliberations is that, via a regulated exchange of arguments for different positions on a controversial issue, consent can be achieved that the participants can agree with for good reasons[1]

Participatory democracy provides a bottom-up model of democratic governance as most likely to thrive when citizens engage in public life. Participate in a broad range of community activities, and learn how to cooperate to achieve collective goals.through engagement and participation, people can construct a community ethos, or an evolving framework of shared values, which all subcultures will be expected to endorse and support, without losing their distinct identities and subculture.when people come together in common projects, in other words, they construct a strong civic sense that they can use in their local settings and bring to national debates.
Constructing this community ethos requires a large reservoir of social capital built through an active and robust civil society.the primary site of democracy, therefore, is not an government,

[1] Dieter Fuchs, **Opcit,** p 168

but in towns and neighborhoods, and conventionally non-political areas of social life like the workplace, schools, and families, although, representative government
is important, citizens must seek to participte in and shape decision-making . in the words of political scientist Robert Putnam'citizenship is not a spectator sport'.
Proponents of the participatory model of democracy view community development as keyto safeguarding and strengthening democracy, including through building strong civil societies, educating citizens, and equipping people with the kind of knowledge and information that facilitates collective action, participation, and engagement[1].

Deliberative democracy:

deliberation can be definrd as mutual communication that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of common concern. Defining it this way minimizes the positive valence that attaches to the word "deliberation" itself, so that we can then speak of "good" and "bad" deliberation without "bad deliberation" being a contradiction in terms. We define deliberative democracy as any practice of democracy that gives deliberation a central place[2].

Because it involves mutual reason-giving and reciprocity. The former refers to the exchange of reasons, which seeks to change judgements, preferences, and views of participants through persuasions instead of coercion, manipulation, or deception. Reciprocity – i.e., mutual respect

In many ways deliberative and participatory democracy are similar, given their strong emphasis on the role of citizens in driving democracy. They differ, however, in that deliberative democracy assumes that citizens invest their time and energy in deliberating social issues and legislation.
The deliberative process aims to reach a reasoned consensus, achieved through rational persuasion by strong argument, among those affected by a decision. Decisions are legitimate when they are ideas that everyone can accept, or at least not reasonably reject, participatory democracy, by contrast, has a less intellectual emphasis and instead emphasizes the participatory element-citizens are involved in community projects and drive the general direction of policies and decision-making, but they do not necessarily have to engage with the specifics of political decisions[3].

Participatory democracy channels:

1.Mini-Publics:

The term '**mini-public'** stems from Dahl's discussion of a **deliberative 'minipopulus'**. In his seminal work **Democracy and its Critics** , he asks us to suppose an advanced democratic country were to create a 'minipopulus' consisting of:

[1] Ibid, p 169
[2] André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, **Handbook of deliberative democracy,** Oxford : Oxford Unversity Press, 2018, P3
[3] Andrea Kendall Taylor and Natasha Lindstaedt , **Opcit,** p33

perhaps a thousand citizens randomly selected out of the entire demos. Its task would be to deliberate, for a year perhaps, on an issue and then to announce its choices... One minipopulus could exist for each major issue on the agenda. A minipopulus could exist at any level of government – national, state or local.

It could be attended ...by an advisory committee of scholars and specialists and by an administrative staff. It could hold hearings, commission research, and engage in debate and discussion... In these ways...the democratic process could be adapted once again to a world that little resembles the world in which democratic ideas and practices first came to light[1]' .

Mini-publics have been described by Elstub as 'the most advocated method to institutionalise deliberative democracy'.

Types of mini-publics : are Citizens' assemblies, citizens' juries, consensus conferences, DOPs, and planning cells .

Where deliberative democracy, is a theory of political legitimacy that argues that citizens should be given a more 'central role' in political processes It contends that a political decision can be deemed legitimate if it can withstand scrutiny by those bound by it, and involves equal participation, mutual respect, and reasoned argument .

Deliberations are inclusive to the extent that they are open to those affected by a decision, and should not advantage the politically engaged, the more educated, and the better off. It is also argued that participants should have equal opportunities, and resources to influence the process and exercise popular contro.

Another defining feature of deliberative democratic processes is the focus on 'reasonableness', where participants justify their positions in a truthful and respectful manner, and are open to changing their preferences when faced with the 'forceless force of the better argument' . Finally, these processes should be conducted publicly. The focus on public 'reasonableness' by participants is what differentiates deliberative democracy from other forms of democratic practice, such as party competition, participatory democracy, and elite deliberation by political representatives and policy experts.

Deliberative democratic theory focuses on 'how people arrive at the "right" preferences and conceptions of interest – preferences, that is, that are adequately considered and have passed the test of controversial argument and dialogue .

It requires ordinary citizens to consider the arguments of differently situated and opinionated others, to present reasons for their own preferences, weigh up the arguments in 'a context of good information' , and to be 'amenable to changing their minds and their preferences as a

[1] Clodagh Harris, **Mini-Publics : Design Choices and Legitimacy**, in Stephan Elstub and Oliver Escobar, Handbook of Democratic Innovation and Governance, Chetenham : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, p 45

result of reflection induced by deliberation' Arguably, mini-publics are not exclusively deliberative; rather, they endeavour to blend participatory and deliberative approaches to democracy, as reflected in their efforts to ensure inclusion, equality of voice, and 'reasonableness'.

Both participatory and deliberative norms are captured in analyses of input, throughput and output legitimacy where:

• input legitimacy is determined by who deliberates, what they deliberate on, and epistemic completeness (access to information)[1];

• through put legitimacy is influenced by the processes of participation, the decision-making rules and contextual independence; and

• output legitimacy hinges on the link between the mini- and maxi-publics. It examines: political uptake of the recommendation(s); feedback loops between the 'empowered space' and the mini-public; and social uptake of the process[2].

referendum refers to all kinds of ballot measures pertaining to individual issues. In this respect, referendums are distinguishable from **elections and recalls which have to do with political office-holders**. However, the English usage of the term 'referendum'is different from how the term is used in the Swiss context, where it is used to refer specifically to **those votes that are organised to repeal a law passed by the parliament** . In the Swiss context, the term popular vote is used whenever the ballot issue is proposed by a number of citizens[3].

Binding referendums allow a (simple, qualified or double) majority of voters to make a policy decision, whereas advisory referendums leave the power to make an actual decision to some other decision-making body (such as the parliamentary majority) [4].

Participatory budgeting :

The Participatory Budget process was implemented in 1990s had, as one of its key principles, if not the key principle, the fundamental rule of 'meetings open to anyone', without any privileging of existing associations or movements. Any citizen, associated or not, could come to the meeting and have an equal voice.

This was counter to the proposal made by civil society in Porto Alegre, which was based on associations. If we return to the original document from the federation of neighbourhood associations , it called for a system 'where the investment priorities of each district would be discussed with popular leaders of each district', where there would be 'Popular Councils throughout with proportional representation of the community movement to discuss the municipal budget'The (associational democracy)proposal was one in which representation

[1] Clodagh Harris ,**Opcit**, p48

[2] Clodagh Harris ,**Opcit**, p48

[3] Maija Jäske and Maija Setälä, **Referendums and citizens' initiatives**, In Handbook of Democratic Innovations, p90

[4] Ibid, p91

of associations was central. In it, representatives of clubs, churches, associations, and others would come together in a forum to debate proposals[1].

Citizens' juries :

are composed of randomly selected participants representing demographic and sometimes attitudinal quotas, with the aim of reflecting a microcosm of society. As in the case of legal juries, participants are ordinary citizens with no special training. The only qualification necessary is their willingness to engage in deliberations on matters of public interest. Citizens' juries are designed for participants to learn and deliberate on the charge given to them over four to five days before they arrive at recommendations. For Ned Crosby, the founder of citizens' juries, the charge should be 'short, direct, and clear', while the process, he adds, 'works better on value questions than technical issues'. Part of their tasks as jurors is to scrutinize information from 'witnesses' expressing different points of view. A facilitator ensures the fairness of the process. Jurors have the option to deliberate in private[2].

Planning cells are also composed of randomly selected participants assigned to 'cells' tasked with developing solutions to concrete problems. This DMP is commissioned by state bodies. Over four to five days, citizens listen to experts and lobbyists, reflect on divergent positions, and exchange arguments in small-group discussions.

Often, there are four to 12 planning cells of five people, each working in parallel, with a changing composition. After small-group deliberations, planning cells create an assembly to assess, assign points or vote on proposals. The output takes the form of a 'citizens' report' handed over to the body that commissioned the planning cell, usually in a public ceremony Consensus conferences can be described as a combination of a citizens' jury plus a townhall meeting . Originally consensus conferences were based not on random selection, but on open invitation and stratification[3].

Citizens' Initiative Reviews (CIRs) :

share many of the design features of the citizens' jury: a random selection of a small number of citizens (though, on the whole, CIRs tend to be slightly larger) deliberate for three to five days, assisted by a facilitator. The principal difference is that CIRs are established with the expressed purpose of providing the recommendations of ordinary citizens on ballot measures (or referendums) that are being held.

Deliberative polls :

[1] Ernesto Ganuza and Gianpaolo Baiocchi, **The long journey of participatory budgeting**, in Handbook of Democratic Innovations, p78

[2] Nicole Curato and David Farrel, **Deliberative-Mini-Publics : Core Design Features**, Bristol : Bristol University Press,2021, p 7

[3] Ibid, p8

are large DMPs with up to 500 participants. As its founder James Fishkin puts it, deliberative polls demonstrate what the public would think 'if they were effectively motivated to pay attention and enabled to get information about competing arguments and if they could discuss those issues with their fellow citizens in moderated, civil discussions'. Polling takes place before and after deliberation. The results of these polls often demonstrate transformations in preferences after deliberation. To extend the learning that takes place in the forum, deliberative polls usually partner up with television companies to broadcast segments of the process.

• Citizens' assemblies are large-scale DMPs that sometimes meet for 20 or more days, ununfolding over several months. Among the pioneering examples are the British Columbia Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform (see Warren and Pearse, 2008), the Irish Citizens' Assembly (see Farrell and Suiter, 2019) and the French Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change (Landemore, 2020). Like many DMPs, citizens' assemblies combine elements of learning, deliberation and writing up a report that can be put forward to policymakers or the wider citizenry to inform their decisions on a referendum. One distinctiveness of this DMP[1].

Majoritarian and consensus Democracy:

A second set of differences among democratic systems involves the distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies.

This classification originates in the work of **Arend Lijphart**, who argues that some democratic regimes are organized to facilitate majority rule, while others are designed to protect minorities (and thus promote decision-making by consensus). Such different conceptions of the democratic process effectively translate into unique constitutional features. For example, **majoritarian democracies** have several features that typically produce government by a single party (rather than a coalition), and limited autonomy for local governments (rather than federalism)[2].

Majoritarian democracies adopt a disproportional electoral system for the election of legislators. Voters in the UK or in the US, for instance, elect only one legislator (the candidate with the largest number of votes) to represent each district. Such an electoral system discourages voters from supporting smaller parties, and it makes it easier for the largest party to win a majority of seats in the parliament or congress, even when the largest party does not win a majority, For example, in the 2015 British election, the Conservative Party obtained 37 per cent of the national vote and 51 per cent of the seats in parliament. Unwilling to waste' their votes on smaller parties with little chance of winning, voters will concentrate their support on the two largest parties, sustaining a **two-party system.**

[1] Nicole Curato and David Farrel,**Opcit** ,p 9

[2] Daniele Caramani, **Opcit**, p 92-93

Under a **two-party system**, it is very likely that the party winning the election will have a majority in the legislature. Moreover, if the country has a parliamentary constitution, the majority party will have no need to form a coalition in order to appoint the new government. Therefore, governments in majoritarian democracies are typically run by single-party cabinets If the executive branch is controlled by a single party which also has a majority in parliament (or congress), and if the head of the government is the main leader of this party, it is likely that the executive branch will dominate the legislature due to the influence of party leadership on most legislators[1].

The ten differences are formulated below in terms of dichotomous contrasts between the majoritarian and consensus models but they are all variables on which particular countries may be at either end of the continuum or anywhere in between. The majoritarian characteristic is listed first in each case. The five differences on the executives-parties dimension are as follows:

1. **Concentration of executive power in single-party majority** cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions.
2. **Executive-legislative relationships** in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative balance of power[2]
3. **Two-party versus multiparty systems**.
4. **Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems** versus proportional representation.
5. **Pluralist interest group systems** with free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and "corporatist" interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation[3].

The five differences on the federal-unitary dimension are the following:

1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized government.
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.

Majoritarian and consensus democracies :

	majoritarian	**consensus**

[1] Ibid, 93

[2] Arend Lijphart, **Patterns of Democracy : Goverment Forms and Performance in 36 countries** :New York : Yale University Press, 1994, p3

[3] Ibid, p4

Electoral system	Disproportional	Proportional representation
Party system	Two-party	Multiparty
Government	Single-party	Coalitions
Inter-branch balance	Executive dominance	Balanced power
Interest representation	Pluralism	Corporatism
Local government	Unitary	Federal
Legislature	Unicameral	Bicameral
Constitution	Flexible	Rigid
Judiciary	Weak or no judicial review	Strong judicial review
Optimal for	Homogeneous societies	Plural societies

Ref: Daniel Caramani, **Opcit**, P94

Presidential systems

A great many **presidential systems** are modelled on the USA, and they reproduce many features of the American system, though not in every detail, The main point about a presidential system is that its president is directly elected and his or her executive power is balanced by a legislature that is independent of the president because it, too, is popularly elected. The president, alone among all the officials of state, has general responsibility for public affairs. He or she may appoint ministers or cabinet members. But they are responsible only for their own department business and they are accountable to the president, not the legislature. To ensure a real separation of powers , neither the president nor members of the cabinet can be members of the legislature[1].

Presidential government is marked by four main features:

1. *Head of state and government* Presidents perform the ceremonial duties of head of state and are also in charge of the executive branch of government: they are usually chief of the armed forces and head of the national, civil service, and responsible for both foreign policy and for initiating domestic legislation.

2**. *The execution of policy*** Presidents appoint cabinets to advise them and run the main state bureaucracies.

3. ***Dependence on the legislative branch:*** Presidents initiate legislation but depend on the legislature to pass it into law.

4. ***Fixed tenure***

Presidents are directly elected for a fixed term and are normally secure in office unless, in exceptional circumstances, they are removed from it by the legislature.

The separation of executive and legislative, each with its independent authority derived from popular election, is a deliberate part of the system of checks and balances. In theory, both have powers and are independent of each other, but in practice presidents and assemblies usually have to share power.

[1] Kenneth Newton and Jan Van Deth, **Foundations of Comparative Politics**,Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2016 p92

They must cooperate to get things done, and the result is not so much a separation of powers as a complex mix of them, consisting of a separation of institutions but a mix of powers in the daily give-and-take of their political relations.

The executive branch (president, vice-presidents and ministers in the Government Council) has the power to tax and spend according to law, but the legislative branch (the Legislative Assembly) has the power to amend the president's budget, and appoints a Comptroller General to check public expenditure and prevent overspending[1].

• The president has the duty to maintain order and tranquility in the nation and to safeguard public liberties, but the Assembly has the power to suspend (provided it has a two-thirds majority) individual rights if it believes there is a public need to do so.

• The president has the power to enter into agreements, public treaties and accords, and to enact and execute them according to the constitution, but the Assembly has the right to approve or disapprove international conventions, public treaties and concordats.

• The Legislative Assembly appoints members of the Supreme Court, which has used its right to enforce constitutional checks on presidential power.

• The Legislative Assembly appoints a powerful and independent Special Electoral Tribunal to oversee elections and ensure their free and fair conduct.

The Perils of Presidentialism : [2]

Juan Linz listed the main perils of presidentialism

1. **Democratic legitimacy:**

Both the president, who controls the executive and is elected by the people (or an electoral college elected by the people for that sole purpose), and an elected legislature (unicameral or bicameral) enjoy democratic legitimacy[3]. A presidential system gives the incumbent, who combines the qualities of head of state representing the nation and the powers of the executive, a very different aura and self-image and creates very different popular expectations than those redounding to a prime minister with whatever popularity he might enjoy after receiving the same number of votes[4].

2. **Rigidity :**

The second main institutional characteristic of presidential systems is the fact that presidents are elected for a period of time that, under normal circumstances cannot be modified: not shortened and sometimes, due to provisions preventing reelection, not prolonged. The political process therefore becomes broken into dis- continuous, rigidly determined periods without the possibility of continuous read- justments as political, social, and economic events might require. The duration of the mandate of a president becomes an essential political factor

[1] Ibid, p 93

[2] Juan Linz, **Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference**? , in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential System, Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University, 1994 p6-7

[3] Ibid, p 8

[4] Ibid, p8

to which all actors in the political process have to adjust, and this has many important consequences.

Winner-takes all thesis :

All In a presidential election whatever the plurality gained the victorious candidate takes over the whole executive branch, while a leader aspiring to be prime minister whose party gains less than 51 percent of the seats might be forced to share power with another party or to constitute a minority government. With some 30 percent of the seats he could not form a noncoalition government, while a president with the same vote could . The control of the executive in presidential systems is in prin-ciple "winner take all." ." In addition it is "loser loses all" for defeated presidential candidates, who might end without any public office after the election[1].

Parliamentary systems:

In **parliamentary systems** the executive is not directly elected but usually emerges or is drawn from the elected legislature (the parliament or assembly) and, unlike a directly elected president, is often an integral part of it .

This form of parliamentary executive usually consists of a prime minister (sometimes called chancellor or premier) and a cabinet or a council of ministers. The cabinet or council is the collective executive body.

Unlike presidents, who are the only officials with general responsibilities for government affairs, parliamentary executives are supposed to share responsibilities among their members. This means that the cabinet, including the prime minister, is jointly responsible for all the actions of government, and the prime minister, therefore, is only *primus inter pares* (first among equals). In fact, prime ministers in many countries have acquired more power than this, Whereas the executive and legislative branches in presidential systems are separated, this is not so clearly the case in parliamentary systems where[2]:

1. The leader of the party or coalition of parties with most support in parliament becomes the prime minister or chancellor.
2. The prime minister or chancellor forms a cabinet usually chosen from members of parliament, and the cabinet then forms the core of government.
3. The government is dependent upon the support of parliament, which may remove the executive from power with a vote of no confidence.

The executive (government) is also dependent upon the legislature (parliament), because the latter can reject, accept, or amend legislation initiated by the government. Equally, the executive can dissolve the legislature and call an election[3].

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[1] Ibid, p 14
[2] Kenneth Newton and Jan Van Deth, **Opcit**, p 94
[3] Ibid, p 95

Since the executive has **collective responsibility** for government (unlike a president), it must stick together because public disagreement within the cabinet or council on a major political matter will almost certainly result in its being seriously weakened[1].

Semi-presidential systems :

In a popular context the term **'semi-presidential system'** was first used by the journalist and founder of the Le Monde newspaper, Hubert Beuve-Mery, in 1959. At this time, the meaning of the term still remained rather vague and undefined. In an academic context the concept of semi-presidentialism was first elaborated by the French political scientist, **Maurice Duverger**.

Duverger first employed the term in the llth edition of his textbook on political institutions and constitutional law which appeared in 1970. He treated the subject in slightly more detail in 1974 and his first full-scale work on this theme appeared in 1978 In France, then, the term was in regular use and was the subject of fierce debate by the end of the 1970s. In 1970 Duverger provided the first definition of semi-presidentialism[2].

He stated that a semi-presidential regime was 'characterized by the fact that the head of state is directly elected by universal suffrage and that he possesses certain powers which exceed those of a head of state in a normal parliamentary regime. However, the government still consists of a cabinet formed by a prime minister and ministers who can be dismissed by a parliamentary vote'[3]

At this time, according to Duverger, the list of semi-presidential regimes comprised three Western democracies, Austria, Finland, and France, to which a fourth, Ireland, was added in the 12th edition of his textbook in 1971 In 1974, though, Duverger altered the definition of semipresidentialism somewhat, now stating that a semi-presidential regime exhibited three characteristics:

'(1) the president is elected by universal suffrage ...

(2) opposite him, there is a prime minister and ministers who can only govern with the confidence of parliament...

(3) the president can dissolve parliament. . At the same time Duverger also revised the list of semi-presidential regimes by both including Iceland and casting some doubt as to whether or not Ireland should in fact be classified as an example of such a regime. It is apparent, therefore, that up to this point at least there was a certain degree of confusion in Duverger's own mind concerning the concept of semi-presidentialism[4].

Sartori reframed the concept, stating that a system was semi presidential if: the following properties or characteristics jointly apply:

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[1] Ibid, p 95

[2] Robert Elgie, **The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism** , in Robert Elgie, **Semi-Presidentialism in Europe**, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999, p 1

[3] Ibid**,** p 2

[4] Ibid**,** p 3

(i) The head of state (president) is elected by popular vote – either directly or indirectly – for a fixed term of office.
(ii) The head of state shares the executive power with a prime minister, thus entering a dual authority structure whose three defining criteria are:
(iii) The president is independent from parliament, but is not entitled to govern alone or directly and therefore his will must be conveyed and processed via his government[1].
(iv) Conversely, the prime minister and his cabinet are president-independent in that they are parliament-dependent : they are subject to either parliamentary confidence or no-confidence (or both), and in either case need the support of a parliamentary majority.
(v) The dual authority structure of semi-presidentialism allows for different balances and also for shifting prevalences of power within the executive, under the strict condition that the 'autonomy potential' of each component unit of the executive does subsist.

The French Fourth Republic suffered from chronic instability caused by party fragmentation and deadlock in the assembly, running through twenty-seven governments in thirteen years. To overcome this problem the French Fifth Republic (1958–) created a **semi-presidential system** with a strong, directly elected president with substantial powers to act as a stable centre for government. The president was given powers to:
• appoint the prime minister from the elected assembly, and to dismiss him.
• dissolve parliament and call a referendum.
• call emergency and substantial powers to deal with it.
The prime minister, in turn, appoints a cabinet from the assembly (the president) may do this if he is from the same party as the prime minister) which is then accountable to the assembly. In this way, the French system of semi-presidential government combines the strong president of a presidential system with a prime minister and the fused executive and legislative of parliamentary systems[2].
Semi-presidential Government consists of a directly elected president, who is accountable to the electorate, and a prime minister, who is appointed by the president from the elected legislature and accountable to it. The president and prime minister share executive power.

The perils of Semi- Presidentialism :

1. Dual executive power:

Linz argues that '**instability and inefficiency'** are present under semi-presidentialism even during the most favourable political circumstances, meaning when the president, prime minister, and ministers are all from the same party and when that party has a majority in the legislature. He worries both that the president will develop policies that are different from those of the prime minister and that ministers will appeal to the president when they have not received what they consider to be favourable treatment from the prime minister. The

[1] Ibid**,** p 3
[2] Robert Elgie, **Opcit**, p 4

inevitable result, Linz argues 'is a lot of politicking and intrigues that may delay decision making and lead to contradictory policies due to the struggle between the president and the prime minister'.

In addition, Linz points to a very specific problem that may result from the dual nature of the semi-presidential executive. He is concerned that there will be no clear lines of political control over the military .

Under semi-presidentialism, he states there are likely to be 'at least three major actors and very often four: the president, the prime minister, the minister of defense, and generally a joint chief of staff who has the immediate command of the forces. The hierarchical line that is so central to military thinking acquires a new complexity'.

Whereas the general nature of the dual executive leads Linz to believe that decision-making may be inefficient, this element, he states , 'has room for constitutional ambiguities regarding one of the central issues of many democ-racies: the subordination of the military to the democratically elected authorities and hopefully to civilian supremacy [1].

The second criticism of semi-presidentialism is a variant of the dual legitimacy problem that was encountered under presidentialism. As in presidential systems, The first is the problem of cohabitation, meaning the situation where the president and prime minister are from opposing parties and where the president's party is not represented in the cabinet. Given the prime minister and cabinet are responsible to the legislature in semi-presidential countries, if the legislative majority is opposed to the president, then that majority can approve a prime minister and cabinet that are equally opposed.

in semi-presidential countries both the president and the legislature are directly elected. When the president fails to enjoy majority support in the legislature, there is the potential for institutional conflict. Under semi-presidentialism, the dual legitimacy problem takes two forms.

The second form of the dual legitimacy problem under semi-presidentialism is a divided minority government. Whereas the problem of cohabitation focuses on the conflict within the executive between the president and the prime minister, the problem of divided minority government stresses the conflict between the execu-tive and the legislature[2].

[1] Robert Elgiep, **Semi- Presidentialism : Sub-Types and Democratic Performance**, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p 11-12

[2] Ibid,P 13

Lecture11 : Political parties :

"Party" derives from Latin, from the verb partire, which means to divide. However, it does not enter in any significant way the vocabulary of politics until the seventeenth century - which implies that it does not enter the political discourse directly from Latin.

Its longstanding predecessor with very much the same etymological con¬notation is **"sect**," a term derived from the Latin secare, which means to sever, to cut, and thereby to divide. Since "sect" was already avail¬ able and established for rendering the strict meaning of partire, "party'" lent itself to being used in a looser and more blunted meaning. "Party" basically conveyed, then, the idea of part; and part is not, in and by itself, a derogatory term: "part" becomes "party'," the derivation from partire, to divide, on the one hand, and the association with taking part, and thereby with sharing, on the other[1].

James Madison

defined political parties as a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community[2].

According to Franz Neumann political party the articulate organisation of society's active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views. As such, it is the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relates them to political action within the larger political community[3].

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[1] Giovani Sartori, **Parties and Party Systems : A Framework for Analysis**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1976,p4

[2] James Madison, **The Federalist**, New York: Modern Library, 1941, p 54

[3] Franz Neumann,**Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties'**, in H.Eckstein and D.E.Apter (eds) Comparative Politics: A Reader, New York: The Free Press, p 352

Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner : suggest that political parties are endemic to "modern and modernizing political systems": A political party will emerge once a "political system reaches a certain degree of complexity, or whenever the notion of political power comes to include the idea that the mass public must participate" [1].

Political parties and cleavages :

Jane-Erik Lane and Svante Errson defined cleavage as a division of individuals, groups or organizations among whom conflict may arise. cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by conflict. A division of individuals, groups or organizations constitutes a cleavage if there is some probability of a conflict.

Cleavages occur in society, in party systems and in government. They operate in the social structure, dividing it into various collectivities ; sometimes such structural cleavages become the target of conscious orientation and a variety of interests are defined. Political parties may organize themselves on the basis of identification of cleavages.

Cleavages crop up in the political system as issues to be dealt with by the decision-making structures of government. Interest organizations tend to identify themselves along cleavage lines[2].

The most common cleavages can be classified as **territorial and functional.**

Territorial cleavages :

The conflict leads local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national élites and their bureaucracies: the typical reactions of peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing, and 'rationalizing' machinery of the nationstate.

Essentially, we find conflicts not between territorial units within the system but over the control, the organization, the goals, and the policy options of the system as a whole. might be nothing more than direct struggles among competing élites for central power, but they might also reflect deeper differences in conceptions of nationhood, over domestic priorities and over external strategies[3].

Functional cleavages

In this type of cleavages,Territorial units of the nation produce alliances of similarly situated or similarly oriented subjects and households over wide ranges of localities and tend to undermine the inherited solidarity of the established territorial communities. typically the

[1] Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Weiner, **the origin and development of political parties**, in Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Weiner, Political parties and political development, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1966, p 3

[2] Jane-Erik Lane and Svante Errsonn, **Politics and Society in Western Europe**, London : Sage Publications, 1999, p41

[3] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, **Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments** , in Peter Mair ,'The West European Systems' Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1990, P95

conflict over short-term or long-term allocations of resources, products, and benefits in the economy: conflicts between producers and buyers, between workers and employers, between borrowers and lenders, between tenants and owners, between contributors and beneficiaries. At this end the alignments are specific and the conflicts tend to be solved through rational bargaining and the establishment of universalistic rules of allocation[1].

Together, these constitute the four critical lines of cleavage that Lipset and Rokkan suggest explain the variance in many modern competitive party systems.

First, the threshold of legitimation:

Are all protests rejected as conspiratorial, or is there some recognition of the right of petition, criticism, and opposition?

Second, the threshold of incorporation: Are all or most of the supporters of the movement denied status as participants in the choice of representatives or are they given political citizenship rights on a par with their opponents?.[2]

Third, the threshold of representation: Must the new movement join larger and older movements to ensure access to representative organs or can it gain representation on its own?

Fourth, the threshold of majority power: Are there built-in checks and counterforces against numerical majority rule in the system or will a victory at the polls give a party or an alliance power to bring about major structural changes in the national system?[3]

Types of political parties :

Liberal parties :

first emerged in England in the 1700s and in France after 1830. In many cases, they were the first parties to form in representative democracies. Over time, they have become smaller parties in many political systems. Though smaller, liberal parties such as the Free Democratic Party of Germany often govern as part of a ruling coalition. Conservative parties developed alongside liberal parties, often as a response to liberal parties.

The conservative :

ideal is the preservation of historical continuity, with a belief in the divine, valuation of traditional forms of life, and recognition of private property and freedom . Conservative parties serve as a buffer to liberal parties because conservative parties oppose rapid change, which is presumed to threaten the social order. Conservative parties tend to be in more

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, **Opcit**,P96

[2] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan**, Opcit**,P 113

[3] Ibid,P114

secularized political systems. England's Conservative Party is one of the most well-known conservative parties[1].

In contrast, **socialist parties** were the first parties to form outside representative bodies of government, often at the same time in which the franchise was extended to all.

According to **Beyme socialists** were aiming for revolutionary reversal rather than maintenance of the "principles of 1789": liberty, equality, and fraternity. Socialist parties tended to mobilize the newly enfranchised working classes. Mostly worker based and highly unionized, socialist parties sought better conditionsfor workers and demanded more state intervention in the economy. The constituency for socialist parties has largely stayed the same, as can be seen in cases such as the French Socialist Party.

This communist movement :

was much more ideological than other parties were, resulting in an outlook that was more international than national. Within older democratic systems, such as in France and Italy, communist parties have retained some influence, although their significance has waned in many other countries. In post-Communist states, the personnel of former Communist parties has remained in politics, although the parties themselves have undergone some changes, especially name changes. The former East German Communist Party became the Party of Democratic Socialism after unification and more recently transformed itself into the Left Party[2].

Christian democratic parties

also originated before World War I. As some nations democratized, in some of the more religious nations, the established church found itself at odds with the secularizing tendencies of liberal reformers. Christian political parties were "generally formed as a defense counter reaction to liberal or secular legislations by which ardent believers felt threatened" . Only after the excesses of the national socialist era did established churches begin to realize the importance of democratic forms of government .

Regional or ethnic parties :

also reflect a carryover from the nation-building process, and representation issues tothis day still divide the regional or ethnic minorities from the larger society. Most advocate for self-determination or autonomy in their own affairs. The most famous of these are the Basque Nationalist Party, in Spain, and the Scottish Nationalist Party, in Scotland. These parties

[1] Alexandra Cole, **Comparative Political Parties, : Systems Organizations**, In John Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, 21st Century : A reference Handbook, UK : Sage publications, 2011, p 150-151

[2] Alexandra Cole, **Opcit**, 2011, p 150-151

advocate for the independence of the Basque and Scottish peoples from Spain and the United Kingdom, respectively. The second half of the 20th century witnessed the emergence of political parties not traceable to the cleavages of national or industrial revolutions.

Cadre vs Mass Parties :

The most common distinction is that between cadre parties and mass parties. The term cadre party originally meant a 'party of notables', dominated by an informal group of leaders who saw little point in building up a mass organization. Such parties invariably developed out of parliamentary factions or cliques at a time when the franchise was limited.

However, the term 'cadre' is now more commonly used (as in communist parties) to denote trained and professional party members who are expected to exhibit a high level of political commitment and doctrinal discipline. In this sense, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Nazi Party in Germany, and the Fascist Party in Italy were cadre parties, as are the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, in certain respects, the Indian Congress Party in the modern period. The distinguishing feature of cadre parties is their reliance on a politically active elite (usually subject to quasimilitary discipline) that is capable of offering ideological leadership to the masses.

A mass party, on the other hand, places a heavy emphasis on broadening member ship and constructing a wide electoral base. Although the extension of the franchise forced liberal and conservative parties to seek a mass appeal, the earliest examples of mass parties were European socialist parties, such as the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the UK Labour Party, which constructed organizations specifically designed to mobilize working-class support.

The key feature of such parties is that they place heavier stress on recruitment and organization than on ideology and political conviction. Although such parties often have formally democratic organizations, except for a minority of activists, membership usually entails little in the way of participation and only general agreement about principles and goals[1].

Why patrties emerged ?

The newfound prominence of political parties in much of 19th-century Europe seems clearly linked to two distinct but interrelated developments: **the transfer of political power to legislatures, and the expansion of the electorate**. Many authors have emphasized the temporal and causal priority of parliamentarization in this process: 'First there is the creation of parliamentary groups, then the appearance of electoral committees, and finally the establishment of a permanent connection between these two elements' .

[1] Andrew Heywood, **Politics**, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p 223

Sartori described a similar sequence: legislatures became more responsible, then parties became more important, then party competition led parties to try to gain an electoral edge by enfranchising new, and presumably grateful, voters. Finally, the need to mobilize a larger electorate stimulated the parties to develop more formal organizations. The sequential models proposed by Duverger and Sartori apply well to Britain, but they seem less useful for understanding countries such as Denmark, where large expansions of the franchise preceded the emergence of legislative parties[1].

Party organizations :

Political parties tend to differ in their organization on the basis of three factors: **competition, institutionalization, and resource factors** :

Competition refers to ideological differences, as well as the way in which the party was formed.

Institutionalization refers to the power relations both between parties and within parties.

Resources refers to how the party perpetuates itself. Each of these factors is affected by the specific time in which a party emerges elected representatives. The earliest political parties,

There are also well-known classifications, such as Duverger's distinction between cadre and mass political parties, or **Neumann's** distinction between **parties of individual representation and parties of democratic (mass) integration**.

The party of individual representation is characterisitic of a society with a restricted political domain and only a limited degree of participation. Its membership activity is, for all practical purposes, limited to balloting and the party organization is dormant between elections periods. Its main functions is the selection of representatives, who once chosen, are possessed od an absolutely free mandate and are in every respect responsible only to their own consciences.

Whereas in **the party of integration**, the party itself approaches its adherents, it demands not only permanent dues- paying and an increasing influence over all spheres of the individual's daily life[2].

From the above, it is appeared that Parties have differed greatly in the extent to which they have succeeded in integrating particular sections of a given population. There is a considerable range from what Sigmund Neumann called older "parties of individual

[1] Susan Scarrow, **the Nineteenth- century Origins of Modern Political Parties** : **the Unwanted Emergence of party-based politics**, In Richard Katz and William Crottry, Handbook of party politics, London : Sage Publications, 2006, p17

[2] Sigmund Neumann, **The party of Democratic Integration**, p 47

representation," to "parties of social integration," to the ultimate logic of "parties of total integration.".

In parties of individual representation, both leaders and voters may move relatively freely over a political space (as is somewhat true to this day of American parties). This is not the case for parties of integration, where both leaders and followers remain within specific bonds of class, religion, or ethnicity, having to operate in relatively closed electoral markets with lasting divides, in relatively tightly organized party universes buttressed by all kinds of ancillary organizations[1].

Parties of Mass Integration, Catch-All Parties,

Kirchheimer's argued that a major transformation of Western European parties and party systems was under way: parties of mass integration were transforming themselves into ideologically bland catch-all parties. Bowing to the law of the political market, parties were abandoning previous efforts at the 'the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses', downplaying or abandoning ideology, bidding for the support of interest groups, emphasizing the qualities of their leaders, and seeking support wherever it could be found[2].

Kirchheimer's catch-all party entered our vocabulary in the 1960s. More recently, **Panebianco** has proposed the **electoral-professional party**, a variant more precisely defined in organizational terms,,

According to **Otto Kirchheimer** mass parties themselves would also begin to fade after World War II as the societal cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan described lost some of their relevance. The political and economic development of the modern state made distinctions based solely on class or denomination less divisive[3].

the cartel party :

in their article entitled '**Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party'published in 1995,**
Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair examine the phenomenon of the birth of a new party known as the party of the cartel. Katz and Mair saw that through in the middle of 20th century, the development of democracy in the West not only provide impact real in terms of social change, but it extends to the political sphere, especially with regard to the problems faced by a political party.

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[1] Hans Daalder, **The Rise of parties in western democracies,** in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, Baltimore : the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001,45-46

[2] Steven Wolinetz, **The Transformation of Western Europe Party System Revisited**, Western European Politics, Vol 2, 1979n p4

[3] Alexandra Cole, **Opcit**, p 153

The issue often faced by political parties can never be separated from matters of state, this then lead to changes in the relationship between political parties and the state. Where, before political parties and individual countries to perform its role without having a strong bond and tend to serve the interests of the community, but now the relations that present among the political parties and the country more to the pattern of the symbiotic relationship that cannot be separated between them mainly by the party cartel[1].

The idea of a party cartel is derived from the idea of a cartel of producers in the economic market. Within that context, the nature of those producers, whether individual proprietors, partnerships, closed corporations, or publicly traded corporations (or, as in the case of OPEC, sovereign states) makes no difference; what identifies them as a cartel is only that they act in concert to dominate the market[2]

Panebianco :

tries to resolve ambiguities in the specification of the catch-all party by translating Kirchheimer's characterization into organizational terms. The crucial transformation becomes a change from the mass-bureaucratic party to an electoral-professional party. Both are defined as ideal-types. The mass-bureaucratic party, equivalent to Duverger's mass party or Neumann's party of mass integration, is characterized by the central role of a representative or elected bureaucracy, emphases on membership, collegial internal leadership, financing through interest groups, and stress on ideology. In contrast, the electoral-professional party is characterized by the centrality of professionals, its electoral orientation and weak vertical ties to its membership, the prominent role of elected representatives, financing

New Bases for Classification? Vote-Seeking, Office-Seeking, and Policy-Seeking Parties :

In the literature on coalition formation, distinctions among policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking parties have been introduced to account for coalitions not readily explained by previous models .

A policyseeking party is one which gives primary emphasis to pursuit of policy goals, a vote-seeking party is one whose principal aim is to maximize votes and winelections, while an office-seeking party is primarily interested in securing the benefits of office—getting its leaders into government, enjoying access to patronage, etc.—even if this means sharing power with others or pursuing strategies which fail to maximize its share of the vote.

Although in practice no party will be exclusively policy-seeking, voteseeking, or office-seeking, the scheme pinpoints orientations which can be related to other characteristics of parties and the social, economic, geographical, and institutional environments in which they

[1] Yeni Sri Listrari, **Cartel Party : An Analysis Study**,Advances in Social science,Vol 81, 2017, p 272

[2] Richard Katz and Peter Mair, **Democracy and Cartelization of Political Parties**, Oxford :Oxford University Press, 2008, 134

operate. This scheme also provides us with categories which are widely applicable and not tied to any one geographic area or subset of parties. The distinction between policy-seeking[1],

vote-seeking, and office-seeking parties :

it is borrowed from **Strøm's** analyses of the circumstances under which parties enter or support minority governments. Although they have been used by **Harmel and Janda** to analyse party change, these categories are more common in formal modeling and theories of coalition formation and have only recently been used in empirical research. Each orientation is a separate dimension on which parties can either be high or low. However, the dimensions are neither mutually exclusive nor entirely independent of each other.

Policy-seeking parties :

The first model of party behavior is that of the policy-seeking party, which seeks to maximize its impact on public policy. De Swaan, a leading proponent, puts the assumption this way: "considerations of policy are foremost in the minds of the actors . . . the parliamentary game is, in fact, about the determination of major government policy".

The policy-seeking model of party behavior derives mainly from coalition theory. And it was developed in response to the "policy-blind" assumptions of the first generation of game theoretic studies of government formation. It specifically challenges the assumption that all parties are equally feasible coalition partners, that is to say, that parties are indiscriminate with respect to their coalition partners. Policy-based coalition theory instead assumes that coalitions are made by parties that are congenial in policy terms. If we represent policy positions along a single dimension on which we rank-order the parties, then policy-based theory suggests that successful coalitions should consist of parties that are spatially "connected" [2] .

The main characteristic would be that the party more often than not gave greater priority to articulation or defence of its policies than to either the maximization of votes or securing office[3].

The Vote-Seeking Party :

In Downs's seminal work on electoral competition, parties are "teams of men" seeking to maximize their electoral support to control government.

He stated that, "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies ‘’. From this insight, Downs developed the argument that politicians .. . are motivated by the desire for power, prestige, and income. . . their primary

[1] Steven Wolinetz, **Opcit**, p 150

[2] Kaare Strom and Wolfgang C. Miller, **Political Parties and Hard Choices**, In Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Storm, Policy, Office, or votes ? : How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999, p5

[3] Steven Wolinetz, **Opcit**, p 150

objective is to be elected [to public office]. This in turn implies that each party seeks to receive more votes than any other. The attentive reader might observe that this assumption seems particularly applicable to two-party systems. Despite some recognition of the complexities of multiparty competition[1]

This type of parties different from a policy-seeking party. Here, the primary emphasis is on winning elections: policies and positions are not locked in. Instead, they are regularly manipulated in order to maximize support.

Office-seeking parties :

Office-seeking parties maximize their control over political office benefits, that is, private goods bestowed on recipients of politically discretionary governmental or subgovernmental appointments. The office-seeking party derives mainly from the study of government coalitions in parliamentary democracy, In Riker's view, what parties fundamentally seek is to win, and in parliamentary democracies, winning means controlling the executive branch, or as much of that branch as possible[2].

This type of parties seek either to hold power alone, or more realistically (in the context of the systems in which they operate) to share power with others—either for the purposes of survival (one implication of the cartel party model), or to act as a stabilizer or balance within the system or, more likely, to gain access to patronage. An office-seeking party should avoid policy commitments which might make it undesirable as a coalition partner and eschew electoral strategies, such as attacking prospective partners too fiercely, which would make coalitions impossible.

Office-seeking parties can exist in different forms. One would be a party, large or small, built atop patron–client networks, whose operation required it to maintain a continuous flow of benefits. Another might be a small party in a multi-party system, anxious to be included in coalitions for the prestige[3] .

Table : Policy-, Vote-, and Office-Seeking Parties: Operational Measures

Possible indicators	Parties		
	Policy-seeking	Vote-seeking	Office-seeking
Internal policy debate % of time spent at party meetings	High	Low	Low
character of debate	Intense, protracted, issuefocused	Pro forma, diffuse, unfocused	Pro forma, diffuse, unfocused
extent and level of involvement	Extensive; most levels of party involved	Confined to leadership or policy committee; compartmentalized	Confined to leadership or policy committee; compartmentalized

[1] Kaare Strom and Wolfgang C. Miller,**Opcit,** p8
[2] Kaare Strom and Wolfgang C. Miller,**Opcit** ,p9
[3] Steven Wolinetz**, Opcit**, p 152

Consistency of policy positions assumed	High	Medium to low, prone to change depending on leader's directions, electoral opportunity structure	Medium to low
prominence of policy	High	Varies	Low
determination of strategy	Follows from policies	Policies developed to fit strategy, maximize votes	Varies, preference for lowrisk strategies
use of new electoral techniques	Low to medium	High	Low to medium
Infrastructure to support policies (e.g research bureaux, think-tanks, affiliated organizations)	Present	Either minimal or at disposal of leaders, officeholders	Either minimal or at disposal of leaders, officeholders

Ref : Steven Wolinetz**, Opcit** P 155

Party system :

The meaning of party system is related to number of political parties in a country. Based on the numbers of parties present in political system, party systems generally can be categorized as single party system, two-party system or multiparty system.

A party system can, therefore, be defined as a particular pattern of competitive and/or cooperative interactions displayed by a given set of political parties. System party is related to one question How do parties compete and cooperate in a system? The answer depends on which political arena one is talking about, because parties interact in at least three different major arenas :

In the electoral arena, parties compete and cooperate in the hunt for voter support and representative offices. The ways in which parties compete here is obvious – by standing candidates against each other in elections for places in parliaments, assemblies or political executives. But sometimes they cooperate when they deem it in their strategic or tactical interest to do so.

In the legislative arena : parties compete in very obvious ways, by debating issues and proposals and voting against each other in what the British call parliamentary 'divisions'. But more often than might be realized by casual observers, parties cooperate by voting together for reasons of tactical advantage or because they manage to find common ground on certain issues[1].

In the executive arena : parties compete and cooperate in the business of controlling governmental offices and the public policies which go with such incumbency[2].

Both the competition and the prospects for cooperation between political parties in an electoral system constitute a party system. **Party systems** may differ on the basis of the types of parties within a system (both ideological and organizational) and the number of parties

[1] Paul Weeb, **Advanced introduction to Party Systems**, Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024, p 5
[2]Paul Weeb,**Opcit**, P6

within a system. Which parties are included as part of a party system is decided on the basis of what Giovanni Sartori terms **coalition potential and blackmail potential**[1].

Coalition potential :

refers to whether a party can be considered an acceptable coalition partner in order to control government. This definition does not imply that a party has to be in government to be considered a party of the party system, but rather that it has the potential to be part of a governing coalition.

Blackmail potential

refers to whether a party can affect the tactics of party competition of the parties that have coalition potential. This definition does not imply that a party must be part of a coalition, or have any chance of being part of a coalition, but that it can influence the political parties that do have coalition potential.

Early observers of political party systems such as **Maurice Duverger held that the number of parties within a** system should be the main criterion for defining a party system. The number of political parties within a party system is largely dependent on the specific election rules of that political system.

By election rules, Duverger meant the barriers to representation, or what percentage of the vote a party must secure in order to be represented in the national legislative body.

The main difference is between systems following **majoritarian representation** rules and those following a **proportional representation rule**[2].

A majoritarian system

is one in which a party (or its candidate) must secure more than 50% of the popular vote. This type of system is also commonly referred to as a first past the post system, with the post referring to 50% of the vote: The party that first gets 50% of the vote gets representation.

Majoritarian systems

tend to limit the number of parties that compete in these systems because the parties must necessarily appeal to the widest range of voters. Were a party to appeal only to one or the other side of the political spectrum, it would only have the votes of a minority of voters. Thus, Durverger held that majoritarian systems tended to be twoparty systems, with the parties themselves more moderate in their political ideologies because of the necessity of having to appeal to a wider group of voters.

Two-party systems tend not to have cooperation between the major parties, given that one party necessarily has a majority of the seats in the legislative branch and thus does not need

[1] Alexandra Cole, **Opcit,** p 154
[2] Alexandra Cole, **Comparative Political Parties**, **Opcit**, p 154

the opposing party to form policies. The United States is one of the most notable two-party systems[1].

Political systems that follow **proportional representation** tend to have a greater number of political parties because parties will win seats in the national legislature based on their percentage of the popular vote. Some systems, such as Germany, have instituted minimum-vote percentages, which lower the probability of extremist parties' gaining representation because parties must win at least a specific percentage of the vote to gain seats. In political systems in which there is a minimum-vote threshold, the mean number of political parties tends to be lower than in systems in which there is no minimum-vote threshold. Even so, there is no standard number of parties within a multiparty system.

Two and a half party systems are systems :

In this type there are three parties, with the third party much smaller than the other two. Australia and Canada are notable two-and-ahalf-party systems. The third party tends to alternate as a coalition partner between the larger parties, although a grand coalition between the larger parties is not unheard of. In a system with one large party and several smaller parties, the larger party tends to be in power for long periods, with a coalition of the remaining parties necessary to unseat the larger party.

Finally, even **multiparty systems consist** of a broad category of multiparty systems that can range from systems in which there is complete cooperation between the parties to polarized and volatile party systems .Italy in the postwar era was long the main example of this type of system. The number of parties in a system is not sufficient in itself to describe the nature of the party system; the nature of party competition is an important component in the classification of party systems[2].

[1]Ibid**,** p 154
[2]Ibid, p 154

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