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***Lectures in the course of
international relations
theories***

***Introduction for second year students of the
common core***

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Why does a political science student study international relations theories?

- Providing a survey of the paradigmatic discussions that the field of international relations has gone through, and simplifying its theoretical and methodological concepts and starting points.
- Removing the methodological and cognitive ambiguity about some common uses of some theoretical concepts in the field of international relations, including (theory, method, approach, cognitive model, approach).
- Knowing the extent of the effectiveness of Lakatosian and Kuhnian (Thomas Kuhn) research efforts in bringing about a radical transformation of the traditional approaches of the field that are unable to provide an explanation for the rapid global transformations.
- Attempting to narrow the cognitive gap between the theoretical and applied aspects of the political science student in linking the theory to the most important research presented in other scientific standards.
- Bringing the student closer to a consistent understanding of the role of theory as a testing tool to analyze and deconstruct some of the cognitive puzzles that the field has witnessed in its academic path.
- It should be noted to the political science student that there is no agreement here on a specific classification of theoretical approaches in the field of international relations. Reservations may even be expressed regarding the names themselves, and these are largely acceptable. We find that “Abdel Nour Ben Antar, for example, distinguishes between two bases for classification. The first base represents the philosophical and cognitive references/backgrounds that mostly go back to the philosophy of social sciences and epistemology in general, and he places within this category: structuralism/post-structuralism, modernism/post-modernism, positivism/post-positivism; while the second base represents the theoretical theories/approaches specific to the field, and he places within this category, for example, realism with its various tributaries, liberalism with its various tributaries, constructivism... This method of classification will play a role in distinguishing between “internal” discussions that take place among family members” and “external” discussions that take place within “society,” such as the third and fourth discussions to some extent: Abdel Nour Ben Antar,) Email submitted to Muhammad Hamshi, this reference was taken from the master’s thesis entitled: Theories of international relations between pluralism and hegemony, p 8).
- An attempt to distinguish between the level of analysis and the unit of analysis for political science students in deconstructing the puzzles of theorizing in the field of international relations.

Epistemological and methodological problems of theory building in the field of international relations

1. Cognitive construction of the theory

The term theory comes from "to conceive", "to believe" and "to think", so any attempt to look at a particular situation, any situation, is theorizing. It is noted that the absence of anxiety and disturbance in a particular situation will not lead to the process of theorizing, but any difficulty in the situation prompts a person to stop his work for a moment and immerse himself in thinking, even if it is for a short moment. When a person continues his work after that intellectual pause, he has reached a "good theory", and if he is unable to continue, he needs a theory.

Chris Brown believes that we theorize when we think deeply and in an abstract way about something because we may ask some questions that we do not find answers to without that thinking, and these questions may focus on "why things happen" or on "what we should do" in the sense of the tools that lead us to a particular result or the morally acceptable action. We turn to theory then when the answer to a certain question (that seems important to us) is ambiguous, and the answer may be clear but in fact wrong until something happens that directs our attention to the source of the error.

Pfaltzgraff & Dougherty say that the term theory in the social sciences, and especially in international relations, has a special meaning:

- 1- An inductive system that leads to the presentation of proposals (such as Morton Kaplan's models).
- 2- A classification division that enables the organization of information (for example: Easton's political systems, G. Almond's, or Snyder's model).
- 3- A set of proposals about political behavior that stem from comparative historical studies (such as Karl Deutsch's models of integration).
- 4- The development of a set of positions about rational behavior based on a single dominant factor such as power (for example: Hans Morgenthau's theory).
- 5- A set of values that shape political behavior (example: North/South gap studies).
- 6- A set of proposals for action presented to politicians (example: psychological studies of war).

2. Definition of the theory

Quincy Wright defines it by saying that it is:

A general theory of international relations means a comprehensive, comprehensible, coherent, and self-correcting body of knowledge contributing to the understanding, the prediction, the evaluation, and the control of relations between states and of the conditions of the world.¹

¹ بخلف، نظرية العلاقات الدولية، محاضرات مقدمة لطلبة السنة الثالثة علاقات دولية، جامعة منتوري قسنطينة، قسم العلوم السياسية والعلاقات الدولية، ص 01.

The general theory of international relations means a unit of comprehensive, clear, coherent, and self-correcting information that helps in understanding, predicting, evaluating, and monitoring relations between states and dealing with the international environment.

Stanley Hoffmann sees a theory as "a set of logically interconnected propositions designed to synthesize a more or less vast amount of data.

Theory refers to « logically interconnected propositions » designed to synthesize a more or less vast amount of data.

✓ Law and Theory

Kenneth Waltz says that students of international relations often use the term "theory" too freely to refer to works that are not far from mere description, while there are rarely works based on the rules of the philosophy of science.

Law establishes relations between variables, variables being concepts that can take different values.

If A then B, where A refers to a variable or set of independent variables and B to a dependent variable. This is the formal meaning of the law:

- 1- If the relationship between A and B is not Variable (invariant) then the law is absolute,
- 2- If the relationship between (A) and (B) is largely constant then the law is as follows:
if (A) then (B) with probability (C) (if A then B with probability X).

A law is based not simply on a relation that has been found, but on one that has been found repeatedly.¹

Philip Braillard defines the concept of theory as: "A conceptual framework that enables the organization of research and the formulation of hypotheses that will explain the phenomena studied." David Singer defines it as: "A large amount of descriptive, interconnected, and explanatory knowledge combined into a logical and coherent whole."²

The theory is also defined, according to Dr. Mohamed Shalaby, as: "A coherent set of concepts, definitions, and issues that form an organized vision of phenomena and their prediction." Based on this definition, the theory identifies the variables relied upon in analyzing and interpreting the phenomenon, and determines the relationship between them in approaching the phenomenon under study. The theory's scientific importance increases as it is characterized by: comprehensiveness and the ability to absorb multiple phenomena to understand and interpret them. It should be noted that the theory is influenced by and bears intellectual backgrounds and social, cultural, and historical contexts of those who formulated it because it aims either to explain the reality in which it was born, or to criticize and change it.³

Repetition leads to the possibility of prediction, that is, if (A) exists in the future and with a certain probability, I will also find (B). In the natural sciences, even probabilistic laws contain a large proportion of necessity, but in the social sciences, to say that a group of people with a

¹ المرجع نفسه، ص 02

² جندلي عبد الناصر، التنظير في العلاقات الدولية بين الاتجاهات التفسيرية والنظريات التكوينية، الجزائر: دار الخلدونية للنشر والتوزيع، ط 1، 2007، ص 16.

³ محمد شلبي، المنهجية في التحليل السياسي (المفاهيم، المناهج، والاقترابات)، الجزائر 1997، ص 17.

certain income will vote for the Democratic Party with some probability means making a law-like statement. The word "like" has a lighter meaning than the idea of necessity, but that statement can only be law-like if the discovery of that relationship in the past is equivalent to the possibility of predicting its occurrence in the future.

“A theory is a collection or set of laws pertaining to a particular behavior or phenomenon.”

“Theories are collections or sets of laws pertaining to a particular behavior or phenomenon.”

For example: It is possible to establish a relationship between the income of voters, their upbringing, their religion, and the political orientations of their parents, and the party for which they vote. If the probability laws are taken together, it is possible to establish important relationships between the characteristics of voters (the independent variables) and their choice of a particular party (the dependent variable). Theories are therefore more complex than laws, but only in the quantitative dimension, since there are no qualitative differences between them.

This definition supports the desire of social scientists who want to "build" a theory by collecting related hypotheses that have been verified.

The following story illustrates how political scientists think about the theory: The Greek historian Homer says that the walls of the city of Troy were two and a half meters wide. If this idea is correct, the remains of those walls can be found by careful excavation even after a thousand years. This is what the researcher Heinrich Schliemann thought of when he was a boy and then resorted to verifying the hypothesis when he became a man. Karl Deutsch cited this story as an example of the idea of verifying the validity of new theories.¹

3. Functions of theory

Theory is an organized effort to ask questions that will enable the researcher to organize his knowledge, direct his research, and interpret the results he arrives at. One of the tasks of theory is to help the researcher organize the data he collects, identify the basic factors and variables of the research field, and focus his interest and research on the most important issues. The theory may not provide the researcher with a key to understanding the meaning of international politics, but one of its tasks is to lead him to a logical understanding of the data.

The theory also refers to:

- 1- Terminological frameworks that are like questions (questions) that can direct the research.
- 2- Terminological frameworks that are like a system of working hypotheses (a system of working hypotheses) whose primary function is also to direct the research (such as systems theory, decision-making theories, etc).

An ambitious series of intertwined proposals that seek to explain a set of behaviors and understand the research field, whether partially or completely, and these proposals come from either hypotheses or from the answers that the researcher arrives at through a specific framework.

¹ المرجع نفسه، ص 17.

4.Types of theory

Stanley Hoffman believes that the types of theory can be divided into three types in terms of their objective:

- 1- The normative or value theory, which is based on ethical foundations such as those produced by political philosophy, including Immanuel Kant's theory of perpetual peace through a global federal system in which all republics participate.
- 2- The empirical or causal theory, which attempts to analyze contemporary political behavior and identify the basic variables, such as the balance of power theory, which was used to explain international relations in the 18th and 19th centuries.
- 3- The theory as a set of prescriptions for political action, i.e. "policy science" or advice in the field of managing state affairs. This theory contributes to understanding the needs that the moment aspires to, an example of which is research on psychological warfare or military strategy.

Michael Sullivan considers it necessary to distinguish between several types of theories:

- 1- Normative theories, which try to determine what a person should be and what things should be, usually according to moral standards. People should respect certain laws because that behavior is "just" or "right". The democratic system is the best political system because it allows for personal choice and stands in the way of the tyranny of a certain minority, and this is "good". States should rely on a balance of power system to balance other powers in order to prevent the dominance of a single state. By relying on axioms that it considers empirically reasonable, the normative theory is nevertheless based on describing what ought to be.
- 2- Intuitive theories, which rely on the general feeling about a particular issue. Most people have their own favorite theories about the causes of crime, such as "Every thief does it because he is evil, that's my theory", but they do not resort to verifying their intuitive theories by appealing to reality.
- 3- The causal theory is empirical and sees that every phenomenon is the result of another phenomenon and thus causes its emergence. All theories are in fact causal, but the empirical causal theory does not just present a certain idea, but goes beyond that to verify its validity by comparing it with reality. The concept of politics presented by James Caporaso and Alan Pelowski illustrates this well because the world of politics is like a detective of events, behind every process of legislation or process of change or political plan (and here comes the international political plan) there is speculation "¹

-As for the elements that must be available in building the theory, they can be mentioned as follows: First, defining the concepts in a precise manner that is consistent with the structure of the theory and its general assumptions.

-Secondly, the existence of an appropriate model for measurement so that the researcher can accurately know the relationship between the variables specified in the study.

¹ المرجع السابق، ص 17.

-Thirdly, determining the logical relationship between concepts in a way that leads to their total sum giving a coherent, solid and steadfast meaning in analyzing all the topics or phenomena presented for study.

-Fourth: Performing the procedural formulation of the various hypotheses and variables and determining the measurement indicators.

-Fifth: Determine the appropriate set of practical approaches based on the nature of the theory and the type of data collected.

Sixth: Analyze quantitative data and appropriate statistical processing and identify strong and weak correlations.¹

-Conducting qualitative interpretation of the results in a manner consistent with the nature of the research questions and assumptions.

Conducting a theoretical evaluation process in terms of empirical and theoretical competence in understanding and interpreting topics of political science and other branches of social knowledge.²

On the one hand, the professor in the field of political science and international relations, Saad Haqi Tawfiq, defines the elements of the theory in the following points

-First, the information, whether it is related to historical information, inductive information, or American information collected through observation, laboratory experimentation, or through social surveys.

Secondly, the tools that are usually employed to verify hypotheses and help collect information about the study variables, such as interviews, questionnaires, documentary surveys, history, or others, as confirmed by methodologists.

Thirdly, research methods related to scientific methods, both deductive and empirical, followed in research, treatment, and development of theoretical ideas that are chosen according to the nature of the subject or phenomenon being studied, the variables chosen by the researcher, the nature of the proposed assumptions, the questions raised, and finally the goals that the researcher or theorist wants to reach through formulating theoretical propositions that have purely theoretical goals and in order to treat a research problem or to review and evaluate the theory.³

Before we define what is meant by the theory of international relations, we try to define the concept of international relations first.

¹ عامر مصباح، عولمة علم السياسة، (المفاهيم، المناهج والمقاربات)، القاهرة، الطبعة الأولى، ص 77.

² المرجع نفسه، ص 78.

³ المرجع نفسه، ص 79.

5. Definition of international relations

The concept of international relations raises many theoretical and analytical problems regarding the definition of the concept and its overlap with many other similar concepts, as there is no agreed-upon definition of the concept. There is also a gap between the meaning of the term commonly used in the West (International Relations) and its literal translation “international relations” - and the common Arabic translation of this term, which is “international relations”. Relations between nations differ in their concept and content from relations between states. There are also other terms used as synonyms or alternatives to denote the same subject despite the clear differences between them. Among these terms are the term (International Affairs) and its common translation in Arabic is “international affairs”, the term (Intentional Politics) and its common translation is “international politics”; the term (Foreign Affairs) and its translation is “foreign affairs”; the term (World Politics) and its translation is “global politics”, and the term (Global Politics) and its translation is “universal politics” Within the framework of these terms, some believe that the disagreement among researchers about naming interactions that occur outside the borders of countries revolves around two axes: the first: relates to the nature of these interactions, and whether it is better to call them relations or affairs, and the second: revolves around the parties to these interactions, and whether it is better to attribute them to nations and peoples or to countries or to the world as a whole, and here the following arguments emerge: 1- Talking about “international affairs”, and not about “international” relations, may involve a desire to emphasize the existence of gaps or barriers between the different dimensions of international interactions, and the importance of distinguishing between them according to their nature and type. Hence, “international affairs” appear to relate to events that are separate in nature, and there is no connection between them. These events may be of a political, economic, social, cultural or sporting nature, and each has a special field and an independent arena in which it moves, and thus has its own mechanisms and rules. Subscribe to the financial news service¹

2- Talking about “international relations” may imply a desire to emphasize the dynamic nature of interactions that transcend the borders of countries, regardless of the type and subject of these interactions, as they are viewed as forming an interconnected system of components and dimensions, and all of its elements and units interact; where each component affects and is affected by the other.

3- The difference between the terms “international”, “national” and “global” reflects a difference in the nature of the actors who constitute the parties that create these interactions, “events”, “affairs” or “relations”. At a time when states or governments were the main parties present and active on the international stage, international interactions were viewed as the result of relations between states or between governments in the first place; that is, official relations of a general nature. As for other interactions between individuals and societies that cross borders and geographical and political barriers, they were not given attention at first, and were considered secondary and ineffective.

¹ Mark Webbe, *What is International Relations?* <https://www.bisa.ac.uk/articles/what-international-relations>, this article was published on 3 February 2020.

Over time, new forms of international actors began to emerge, and the role of these new actors and their influence on all international interactions became no less important and dangerous than the role and influence of governments. Indeed, individual and private initiatives, the movements of individuals and groups across borders, and tourist, cultural, migration, or other motivations have become increasingly effective and influential in international interactions. This explains the multiplicity of terms used to describe and frame the same phenomenon, because each has a content and framework that differs slightly or greatly from the other. Here, there have been many attempts to distinguish between the central and overlapping concepts raised by the definition of international relations, including the distinction between the international community and the international political system, and between international politics and international relations:

First: Distinguishing between the concepts of “international community” and “international system”:

The concept of international community refers to the group of individual political communities called nation-states, each of which consists of a people, a territory, a government, and an economy within the framework of a personality with its own distinctive national identity (national culture) that works to unify this community in the face of other competing national communities. The international community is achieved when it is possible for it to include these nation-states in its membership, and within this membership. As for the concept of the international system, Waltz defined it as a group of units that interact with each other. On the one hand, the system consists of a structure or structure and on the other hand, it consists of units that interact with it. Stanley Hoffman was more specific in his vision of the international system. He sees it as a pattern of relations between the basic international units. This pattern is determined by the structure of the world. Changes may occur in the system due to technological development, changes in the main objectives of the system units, or changes in the pattern and form of conflict between the various units that make up the system. As for Morton Kaplan, he defined it as “the existence of a set of interconnected rules, values, and standards that govern the work of relations between states and determine the manifestations of regularity and imbalance in them during a certain period of time.” The concept of the international political system differs from the concept of the international community in several respects. The international community is the community in which all states are members, which grants them recognition, and deals with them all on an equal footing without distinction or discrimination. It recognizes their full and unconditional national sovereignty over their territories, etc. The international political system is more specific in its concept and in the foundations on which its structure is built. International political interactions and activities result in different patterns and diverse models of relations that are centered around specific organizational frameworks and structures. These relations are governed and regulated by specific international behavioral rules and standards, which are the rules and standards that can develop over time according to what the realities of reality dictate and the changing circumstances impose. The international political system may also be global, continental, or regional. The international system took on its specific institutional character with the League of Nations first after the end of World War I, and then developed later with the establishment of the United Nations after World War II. However, the international political system is not synonymous with the United Nations, for example. It is much larger than that. In addition to the United Nations, there are many regional

international organizations that represent tributaries of this international political system. With the activities they contain and the roles they perform, they affect its performance and orientations. There are also many international relations that take place outside the framework of the United Nations and other regional international organizations, and they affect, in one way or another, the performance of the international political system. Second: Distinguishing between the concepts of “international politics” and “international relations”:¹

International politics focuses on trying to identify how the state deals with the foreign policies pursued by the powers and active parties in the international system, primarily states, whether related to positions of cooperation or conflict or regular routine dealings through channels of communication, coordination, consultation and negotiation using internationally recognized diplomatic means and tools.

As for international relations, its framework expands and extends to include all forms of relations, societies, peoples and groups present in the international arena or rather those included in the international community, as it is a group of transnational relations from political and non-political, from official and unofficial, etc.

In the context of this debate, six basic trends can be distinguished in defining international relations, which are:²

The first: sees international relations as “relations between states” and is interested in researching the types of states and patterns of relations between them, and the role of groups and individuals in making policy and taking decisions in these states.

Second: He believes that international relations are “relations between nations”, that is, between governments or between groups and individuals belonging to different nations that raise the issue of state power. This definition ignores some relations that do not necessarily raise the issue of state power, while international trade includes that dimension, it does not arise in another issue, such as postal communications, and this definition also denies the existence of international units other than nations.

Third: He believes that international relations are “relations between groups with power”, and this definition is characterized by its broad scope to the point that there is a need to distinguish between types of political, economic, and cultural relations..., and to more precisely define what is meant by a group with power.

Fourth: He believes that international relations are “transnational relations”, and this definition does not limit the subject of international relations to official relations between states, and thus it indicates the broad borders and scope of the field of study of international relations, and some believe that it is more appropriate to focus on the relations of power between political units in the world.

Fifth: He sees international relations as “the relations between all groups that concern the international community, but with a focus on the relations between groups that have real weight in influencing this community,” which raises the difficulty of defining what is meant by the international community and the hierarchical analysis of the societies that make it up.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

Sixth: He views international relations as “the relations between the basic groups into which the world is divided, especially those capable of independent action.”

Within the framework of these trends, it can be said that the definition of international relations revolves around two main axes: the types of relations, their scope and nature, and the basic units between which these relations fall, which raises the question of: the basic units in international relations studies, the levels of analysis of the international phenomenon, the scope of the extension of the field of international relations studies, and does it include all types of relations between all international units?”

New definitions appeared on this subject in the years 1950-1970, and the most prominent of these definitions were those contained in the ideas of Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Tomnes, Stanley Hoffman, John Berton, Georgi Shavnazarov, McClelland, Kaplan, Vitel, Frankel, Rose, and others. Hans Morgenthau, the famous professor of international political relations, believes that “the essence of international relations is international politics. The subject of international politics is the struggle between independent states for power.” Stanley Hoffman, whose ideas became popular in the sixties, says that “the field of knowledge of international relations means the factors and activities that influence foreign policies and the power of the basic units that make up our world.” Definitions of the subject of international political relations have varied. Holtsey believes that international relations arise within “every group of political entities, tribes, states, cities, nations, empires, linked by interactions characterized by a great deal of frequency and regularity.” While Martin sees it as “the group of exchanges that cross borders or attempt to cross them Based on These definitions, which confirm the political and border nature of each state, enable us to define international relations as “any relationship of a political nature or that is likely to cause political repercussions and effects that extend beyond the regional borders of a single state “All studies, especially in their beginnings, have sought to try to know the nature of these relations and their scope, especially in university studies, and this is completely clear when Alfred Zimmern points out that “the study of international relations extends from the natural sciences on the one hand to moral philosophy on the other hand” (8). (In fact, the nature of this study is viewed from a perspective that attempts to uncover the topics related to this study and the impact of those topics on the course of international political relations. It is natural that these topics include history, geography, international law, economics, psychology, and other sciences.¹

After defining the concept of international relations, we try to know the theory of international relations.

6. Concept of International Relations Theory

As for the definitions of James Doverty and Robert Bell Graff, Nasef Youssef summarized them even in the following points: "International relations theory is a deductive system consisting of a set of logically coherent hypotheses. Examples of this include the systems models of Martin Kaplan and George Model." Also, "International relations theory is a classification system or conceptual framework that allows for the arrangement and study of information and data in an organized manner." Examples of this include the industry of power and political systems. Also, "theory is a set of hypotheses about political behavior that have

¹. ناصيف يوسف حتي، النظرية في العلاقات الدولية، دار الكتاب العربي، بيروت، الطبعة الأولى، 1985، ص 8.

been reached by induction from an experimental study or a comparative study." And "International relations theory is a set of statements or statements about rational behavior based on important incentives such as power." Examples of this include the theory of power according to Morgenthau. Also, "the theory of international relations is a set of values, rules, behavior and principles that indicate what the behavior of political parties should be. This study also includes political philosophy and normative theory that sets a set of indicators to measure existing behavior and when we leave it and do not apply it to what is supposed to be behavior, the list and when we leave it or its non-compliance with what is supposed to be behavior, political values and moral principles. Among the international relations scholars who were interested in defining the theory in this field, we find Philip, who defines the theory in international relations as a coherent and organized group of articles aimed at clarifying the circle of social relations called international.¹

7. Theoretical and scientific debate on the construction of international relations theories

It should be noted that theories in the field of international relations were mostly an expression of the philosophical convictions and doctrinal principles of theorists, so their study and criticism are inseparable from philosophical thought. Rather, it can be said that theories of international relations are in fact universal visions and philosophical ideas based on the principles, ethics, experiences and convictions of political theorists and decision-makers. Therefore, they should not be dealt with as fixed and absolute facts or as revealed sanctities, but rather as ideas stemming from experiences subject to historical, geographical and national inevitabilities, philosophical tendencies and relative mental efforts. In general, many researchers tend to divide theories studying international relations into two sections: the first is the section of traditional theories or (positivist theories), and the second is the section of new theories or (post-positivist theories). The first section mostly deals with the major trends that dominate the interpretation of international relations, such as liberalism, Marxism, and realism.. while the second section mostly deals with radical trends, such as postmodernism, critical theory, constructivism, and feminism. There is another classification of international relations theories based on the duality of (rationalism) and (reflective theories), where the first includes approaches such as neorealism and neoliberalism, while the second includes the rest of the other approaches such as feminism and post-structuralism, "with the exception of two main theories, and these two exceptions may be between constructivism, normative theory, and the English school, which can all be understood as overlapping the dividing line between rationalism and reflectivity. The main difference between rational and reflective approaches, in general, is that rational considerations are positivist, while reflective methodologies oppose positivism." This is what launched what the academic elites in politics call the "fourth great debate" - or the fourth debate - by (Robert Keohane) in his presidential address to the International Studies Association (ISA) in 1988. The rational approach in politics is a causal approach that attempts to find the causes behind phenomena in order to limit them to a scientific law that can be generalized, so it is an interpretive approach. While the reflective approach is a non-causal approach that seeks to find meaning and significance from political phenomena, so it is an interpretive approach, the

¹ المرجع السابق، ص 18.

first is closer to the experimental approach while the second is closer to the formal logic approach.¹

"However, despite this, the classifications presented about the major debates framing the field of international relations intersect around:

- 1- The debate between idealism and realism.
- 2- The debate between traditionalism and behaviorism.
- 3- The debate between perspectives (between paradigms).
- 4- The debate between positivism/post-positivism.
- 5- The debate between constructivism/rationalism/reflectiveness."

It is worth noting that these discussions that were developed in the field of political science are not classified in a fixed classification, but rather they only help in understanding the chronological development that this science has gone through. While there is a great difference between political theorists in dividing this development and classifying its theories. "In this regard, we can refer to the various references and books that were written in the field of international relations theories (especially academic ones) to know the chronological classification of these theories, where we find them arranged (with some difference between these references regarding the mentioned theories and the order) as follows: idealism, then realism, then behaviorism (especially from a methodological perspective), then Marxism (a version of dependency), then pluralism (a version of liberalism), then neo-realism, then neo-liberalism, after which come the theories that are classified within the category of the contemplative trend represented by: critical theory, then constructivism, then feminism, then postmodernism." One can refer to the writings of those who have delved into the issue of classifying theories and discussions to learn about the historical path of this academic debate, such as the writings of (Kjell Goldman), (Milja Kurki), (Colin Wight), (Ole Waever), (Antje Weiner), as well as (Steve Smith) or (John S. Dryzek), who divided the development of the field of international relations into five cognitive and methodological revolutions represented by: the (statist) tendency, then the (pluralist) tendency, then the (behavioral) tendency, then the (post-behavioral) tendency, and then the (Perestroika of political science) movement in the twenty-first century, which calls for openness to methodological pluralism and the use of qualitative research to contribute to public issues. It appears from the various discussions that the field of international relations has reached the fifth debate, which was "led by social constructivism in the 1990s in order to bridge the gap left by the debate between rationalists and reflectives (or between positivism and post-positivism), so that constructivism tried to find a middle ground that could serve as a framework in which both meet. Steve Smith says that this debate represents the current state of international relations theory."²

The issue of controlling the accumulation of theoretical diversity represents a major problem in the field of international relations theories, as this enormous diversity appears in the different

¹ Tim Dayan, Melia Currie, and Steve Smith, *"International Relations Theory: Specialization and Diversity."*

² *Ibid.*

trends and theories within the field. To achieve this methodological goal, several main methodologies have been adopted:

- The first methodology relies on the epistemological determinant that distinguishes between three stages in the development of the theoretical field: the pre-positivist stage, the positivist stage, and the post-positivist stage.
- The second methodology focuses on the ontological determinant, which is the nature of the basic factors that affect international relations. This methodology assumes that there are three temporal stages: the stage of the dominance of security, political, and military factors, then the stage of the emergence of the economic factor as a major determinant, and finally the stage of the prominence of cultural and social factors. According to this vision, the influence of other factors is not excluded, but rather their relative importance changes according to the context.
- The most famous methodology is the theoretical dialogue methodology, which organizes the accumulation of theories through four main axes: ontological dialogue about the nature of the reality of international relations, methodological dialogue about study methods, epistemological dialogue about hidden cognitive frameworks, and axiological dialogue related to values and the rational, constructive and reflective view of international relations.
- The third problem: dealing with theoretical diversity

This problem deals with how to benefit from theories and employ them in international relations research, which is the central idea around which the article revolves. Specialists in this field relied on the most important contributions of philosophers of science, which provided diverse approaches to understanding and employing theories. These contributions include:

- Karl Popper's model of belief and falsification.
- Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm (cognitive model).
- The research program according to Imre Lakatos.
- Methodological chaos according to Fryeberger.

These contributions help guide researchers to understand and manage theoretical complexity in the field of international relations, whether from a methodological or theoretical perspective. However, what is extracted from them remains an individual effort that stems from a diverse reading of the general frameworks presented by each theorist.

✓ Karl Popper's model of belief and falsification

Karl Popper was influenced by his liberal background, which was clearly reflected in his epistemological contributions to the social and human sciences. Popper developed his own vision under the name of critical rationalism, focusing on freedom as a basic value for dealing with theories. One of the prominent features of his contributions was his development of a set of scientific controls for evaluating theories. Among his important works that highlight these points are: *The Logic of Scientific Research*, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, and *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*.

For Popper, the role of theory in science is not only evaluated according to its explanatory capacity, but also through the possibility of its falsification. If a theory proves to be a failure, it

must be excluded from the scientific system. However, Popper notes that the relative nature of the social sciences makes theories less compatible with the "rigorous" concept of traditional scientific theory.¹

With this perspective, Karl Popper offered a critical vision for classifying and developing scientific theories within a framework that makes them testable and constantly refuted to ensure renewed scientific authenticity.

****Independence of Theory Evaluation: ****

Karl Popper starts from his liberal background in emphasizing the importance of evaluating each theory independently without linking its contents to the contents of other theories. This means that the theory is evaluated based on what it contains only, and not by comparing it to the content provided by other theories.

- **Multiple levels of theory evaluation: **

Popper believes that the main goal of evaluating theories is to falsify them, but this falsification must be done through multiple levels. There is falsification known as "epistemic falsification", which is the contradiction of experimental experience with a certain hypothesis of the theory, and there is "methodological falsification", which is represented by the lack of compatibility between the nature of the phenomena studied and the nature of the methods used to understand them.

- **Ease of positive evaluation versus negative evaluation: **

Positive evaluation, which depends on collecting evidence that supports the theory, is easier from Popper's point of view compared to negative evaluation, which depends on obtaining evidence that refutes the theory. Therefore, Popper believes that the true criterion for judging a theory is its falsifiability and not proving its validity.

****Results of evaluating theories: ****

According to Popper, the natural result of falsifying a theory is its removal from the scientific system. Even if the supporters of the theory try to introduce additional hypotheses to defend it, this may protect it from immediate refutation, but it reduces its scientific value.

Some researchers question the usefulness of applying Popper's model to evaluate theories of international relations only because the latter belong to the fields of social sciences, which Popper strongly criticized for not rising to the level of scientific theories. However, there are several observations about the use of this model in this field, most notably:

1. The history of the accumulation of theories in international relations has not witnessed any case in which a particular theory was removed from the field based on its falsification in the sense intended by Popper. It is often limited to evaluating the explanatory capabilities of theories only.
2. No theory in international relations has been evaluated independently of other theories. Rather, comparisons have been relied upon as an essential part of understanding the theoretical value, which contradicts the principle of independence in thinking advocated by Popper.

¹ Karl Popper's Liberal Background: Karl Popper: *The Open Society and Its Enemies*.

3. The multiple levels of evaluation that Popper talked about seem difficult to apply within the simple theories of the structural structure of international relations theories.

4. Most international relations theories prove their value based on supporting evidence rather than searching for possibilities for falsification, which contradicts the logic that Popper established for evaluating scientific theories.¹

✓ The concept of the cognitive model according to Thomas Kuhn

Thomas Kuhn is known as a historian and sociologist of science more than a philosopher of science, and the concept of "scientific revolutions" is considered one of his most important contributions, which explains the way in which different sciences develop. As for understanding scientific theories within cognitive frameworks, Kuhn provided the following guidelines:

-Questioning the centrality of theory:

Kuhn believes that the concept of theory is very fragile, as it can be easily proven wrong, so it should not be relied upon as a basic unit of science. Instead, he presented the concept of the cognitive model, which is distinguished from theory by its flexibility and ability to organize different contributions easily.

-Worldview as a criterion for distinguishing between paradigms:

Instead of focusing on distinguishing between theories, Kuhn focused on distinguishing between paradigms using the term "worldview." He sees contributions, including theories, that share a single vision as being classified within a single cognitive paradigm, regardless of the analytical differences between them.

The property of incommensurability refers to the impossibility of measuring scientific theories with common equivalent standards, as each theory has its own conceptual framework in which it emerged. This means that dialogue between two theories that emerged in different temporal and social stages is considered an almost impossible task, as the construction of theories depends primarily on the social context in which they emerged. Because these contexts differ from one stage to another, comparison between theories becomes methodologically useless, as the parties involved in the comparison do not share any common basis.

In this context, Thomas Kuhn's concept of the cognitive model has been used in the field of international relations to analyze cognitive models and evaluate theoretical debates between them. Kuhn believes that the success of a cognitive model depends on the end of the debate about its basic assumptions, which allows the proponents of this model to develop research in more specialized fields away from reaffirming the basic principles. However, using Kuhn's contributions requires accurate evaluations and an awareness of the pros and cons of its application in this field.²

¹ Karl Popper, *the Logic of Scientific Research* Copyright, 2002.

² Thomas S. Kuhn, *the Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, 1962, 1970 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Published 1962. Second Edition, enlarged, 1970, p23.

****Advantages of employing the concept of cognitive model: ****

A- Reducing the problem of classification: The concept of cognitive model helped reduce the number of classifications required to organize the field of international relations by classifying theories that share a unified vision of the world within a single cognitive model. Given the theoretical overlap between many of these theories, organizing according to local models reduced the complexity of the classification process, which has long been a major challenge in academic theorizing within this field.

B- Simplifying the comparison between theories: Thanks to the less strict nature of the concept of cognitive model compared to theory, the differences between the theoretical propositions of different theories are no longer a major methodological obstacle. The worldview was presented as a specific criterion for comparing cognitive models, which facilitated comparisons from a procedural standpoint.

****Disadvantages of employing the concept of cognitive model: ****

1- Building models and scientific revolutions: Building a cognitive model, according to Thomas Kuhn, is often associated with a scientific revolution that eliminates all previous hypotheses. However, this concept does not align with the cumulative nature of the field of international relations, where theoretical debate has remained the most prominent element of its development. The field has not witnessed the dominance of a single cognitive model at any specific point in time.

2- The ambiguity of the concept of worldview and the complexity of theoretical comparison: Kuhn did not specify a precise definition of the concept of "worldview", which is used to distinguish models from each other. This ambiguity has led to great difficulties in comparing theoretical contributions within the field. For example, some believe that liberalism and realism can be included within a single cognitive model due to their shared assumption about the rationality of the behavior of actors and the influence of social elements. On the other hand, others believe that the difference in the analytical assumptions of each makes their classification into two independent models more accurate.

3. The unrealistic application of the property of incommensurability: Despite the different circumstances in which theories of international relations were developed, comparison between them remains necessary to understand their content and how to use them. The development of the field of international relations over time has produced multiple and diverse theories, and despite the differences in the social contexts of their emergence, researchers have continued to re-adapt and test these theories with developments in international reality. Thus, the influence of the incommensurability characteristic in this field is reduced to what Thomas Kuhn intended, as comparison between theories remains a fundamental axis for understanding and analyzing them.¹

¹ *Ibid*, p66.

✓ **The concept of the research program of Imre Lakatos:**

It is represented by his attempt to reconcile the ideas of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, which led to the formation of a new epistemological trend. This trend allowed Lakatos to overcome the negatives of previous perceptions and set new standards that became central to the study of the philosophy of science. The contributions made by Lakatos and the elements of his research program can be summarized as follows:

****Questioning the theory as a basic unit of science****

Lakatos shared with Thomas Kuhn a vision that goes beyond theory in its traditional sense as an independent unit. However, he presented an alternative to the concept of the "cognitive model" proposed by Kuhn, which is the "research program". This program is characterized by the precision of its construction, and includes three main parts:

- ****Hard core****: includes the hypotheses and general concepts that form the basis of the program.
- ****Protective belt****: contains the sub-hypotheses and non-central concepts that protect the hard core from external contradictions.
- ****Health assistant****: a methodological tool for testing the explanatory power of the program.

****Considering the internal and external history of theories****

Lakatos defined internal history as the development of the scientific field within which the theory falls, while external history is related to the influential factors outside the scientific system that affect the formulation of theoretical contributions. Through this perspective, he expanded the understanding of theories to include scientific knowledge in a comprehensive manner.

****The criterion of progress as a measure of comparison between research programs****

Lakatos set a new criterion for evaluating research programs, which is the "criterion of progress". A research program is considered advanced if its continuous development leads to enhancing its experimental content and providing evidence to support its hypotheses. In contrast, programs that modify their hypotheses randomly in order to keep up with the facts are considered "late" programs.¹

-The impact of the concept of the research program on international relations:

Lakatos's research program provided a practical framework for developing the field of international relations theories, as it provided important benefits, the most prominent of which are:

- ****Strengthening theoretical construction****: It focuses on creating integrated research structures instead of being satisfied with just individual theories.
- ****Raising the level of competitiveness****: by encouraging comparison between equal research programs.

¹ *IMRE LAKATOS, -The methodology of scientific research programmes, cambridge university press*
First published, 1978 pp 08-20.

- ****Providing an accurate standard for evaluating theories****: which helps improve the quality of theorizing and renewing ideas.

The application of the concept of the research program in international relations theories can be seen through the following points:

✓ **Structural similarity between international relations theories and Lakatos's program**

International relations theories share with the research program that they include three similar components: general hypotheses such as the concept of the "hard core", derived concepts such as the "protective belt", and finally a realistic testing method for the theory. The general hypotheses of these theories are often unchangeable, which is consistent with what Lakatos defined for his hard core. For example, this is evident in Kenneth Waltz's construction of the theory of "structural realism", which relies on general epistemological hypotheses of a comprehensive nature.

- ****The self-rigor of the research program and its impact on international theorizing****:

International relations theorists have adopted the self-rigor of the research program concept, reflecting Lakatos's strict approach to maintaining theoretical rigor and consistency. This is done by reducing reliance on random ideas and committing to developing a strong intellectual structure.

- ****The progress criterion as an effective measure of international theories****:

The progress criterion has contributed to strengthening the theorizing process and launching the challenges of improving the empirical (empirical confirmation) of international relations theories. Thus, the extent to which a particular theory has developed or declined can be judged based on the evidence supporting its basic assumptions, which has proven to be more effective than previous epistemological models.

Ultimately, Lakatos's concept of the research program represents a valuable tool for developing and critiquing theories in the field of international relations, as it provides a comprehensive framework for achieving a positive and conscious development of scientific theorizing.¹

-Freibend's Methodological Chaos

I have addressed a philosophical contribution to the field of philosophy of science that is surprising and exciting, as it questions the scientific system and the value of scientific theories. However, Freibend has developed a methodological framework that deals with dealing with scientific theories in a manner based on a set of guiding dimensions, including:

- ****The explanatory value of theories changes over time****:

Freibend believes that the decline in the explanatory value of a particular theory does not necessarily mean the disappearance of its scientific importance. That theory may regain its

¹ Nicolae Sketch, Imre Lakatos, *The methodology of scientific research programmes - An Overview*, Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical papers, volumul I*, editată de John Worrall și Gregory Currie, Cambridge University Press, 1995, ISBN 0-521-28031-1, paperback, 7februarie2019, pp 01-05.

position in future circumstances that are appropriate to its original concepts. Based on this concept, Freibund rejects the exclusion of any theory simply because its explanatory ability has declined, considering that the need for it may return at different stages. With this argument, Freibund opposes Karl Popper's thesis regarding the model of verification and falsification.

- ****The importance of theoretical pluralism****:

Freibund emphasizes that the existence of theoretical pluralism constitutes a vital element for any field of knowledge. Hence, he sees the necessity of constantly betting on the multiplicity of theories and not allowing any particular theory to become a dominant cognitive model. In this, he differs with Thomas Kuhn's view of the rise of the dominant cognitive model.

- ****Theories reflect prior beliefs****:

Freibund believes that the perceptions resulting from theories are linked to the beliefs adopted by their theorists, because theories represent different points of view of what exists in reality. In this context, Freibund challenges the concept of the Lakatos research program and its scientific rigor, indicating that this rigor is nothing but a reflection of a particular belief. Accordingly, he reduces the importance of comparing theories based on the idea that no belief is better than the other.¹ With regard to the application of this vision in the field of international relations, Freibund's conception has sparked clear controversy between its supporters and opponents, given that it presents advantages and disadvantages:

- ****Compatibility with the nature of theoretical debates****:

The approach he presented is consistent with the nature of theoretical discussions in international relations, as they usually end with the superiority of a particular direction without eliminating the other direction. For example, although realism prevailed after the first ontological dialogue with idealism, idealism later re-introduced itself during the post-Cold War period under the name of "new idealism", in line with the circumstances of that period, such as strengthening the role of the United Nations and reviving the idea of collective security.

- ****Conformity with the accumulation of theoretical diversity****:

Since the inception of the field of international relations, it has witnessed a great production of a variety of theories, despite the problems associated with classification and comparison between them. However, the field has continued to develop its theoretical frameworks, which enhances the value of theoretical pluralism that Freibund calls for and considers a basic criterion for the cognitive development of any field.

- ****The problem of the concept of beliefs in application****:

One of the controversial points relates to the concept of beliefs when applied in the field of international relations. If beliefs refer to the analytical assumptions of theories, they give theories an individual character. However, if they refer to the backgrounds of thinking shared by theorists, this may lead to a common classification between some theories. Thus, it is related to how beliefs are viewed in the face of different phenomena.

¹ Paul Karl Feyerabend, *est un philosophe des sciences d'origine autrichienne, (13 janvier 1924 – 11 février 1994)*.

LECTURES IN THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

Thanks to this conception, Freiburg presented a model that questions the foundations of dealing with scientific knowledge and theories, and put forward different visions for rethinking the foundations of cognitive concepts in various fields.

Deconstructing the puzzle of the first theoretical debate (realism versus idealism)**1 Assumptions of Realism in International Relations**

Realists in international relations highlight the limitations placed on political action by fundamental aspects of human nature, which they see as inherently self-serving, as well as by the lack of overarching global authority. Together, these conditions foster a system defined by conflict, where states are primary players and prioritize power and security above all else. Ethical considerations occupy only a marginal role in this framework. The central components of realism—state-centric politics, egoism, anarchy, the pursuit of power and security, and sidelined moral norms—are all discernible in Thucydides' work.

- The human condition serves as a foundational concept in classical realism. According to this perspective, human beings are innately self-centered and driven by their own interests, often at the expense of moral considerations. Thucydides captures this outlook vividly in Book I of his *History*, during the Athenian address at Sparta. Here, the Athenians candidly assert that self-interest inevitably outweighs morality, stating that questions of right and wrong have "never deterred people from exploiting opportunities for expansion rooted in superior strength".
- Realists, particularly modern neorealists, view the absence of a governing authority—essentially, anarchy—as the fundamental factor shaping international political dynamics. Without a universal system for establishing and enforcing rules, the international realm operates as a self-help system. Each state is accountable for its own survival, defining its interests independently and seeking power to secure them. Anarchy, therefore, creates a scenario where power becomes the primary force influencing interactions between states. As the Athenian envoys at Melos famously remarked, in the absence of overarching authority, only powerful independent states manage to endure.¹
- Since realists perceive the international system as anarchic, they place significant emphasis on security as a core concern for states. To achieve security, states pursue power accumulation and engage in power-balancing strategies to deter potential threats. Wars often arise from efforts to prevent rival nations from gaining military superiority. Thucydides, in analyzing the Peloponnesian War, differentiates between its immediate triggers and its deeper cause. He attributes the war not to singular events preceding its outbreak but to shifts in the distribution of power between two blocs: the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta. The Spartans, alarmed by Athens' growing power, acted out of fear for their security, leading to conflict). This dynamic has been described by Graham Allison as the "Thucydides trap," highlighting the perils when a rising power challenges a dominant one.
- Realists generally hold a skeptical stance toward the role of ethics in international politics. This skepticism often translates into the belief that morality has little relevance

¹ W. Julian, Korab-Karpowicz, *Political Realism in International Relations*, First published Mon, Jul 26, 2010; substantive revision Mon Oct 9, 202, p02.

in guiding state actions or that there exists an inherent tension between moral considerations and effective political strategy. Some argue that states operate under a distinct morality, separate from conventional ethical norms, while others see morality as a tool used opportunistically to rationalize state behavior. A stark example of ethical rejection in international relations is found in the "Melian Dialogue" which recounts Athens' siege of Melos in The Athenian envoys gave the Melians an ultimatum—destruction or submission—and dismissed appeals to justice, urging them instead to focus solely on survival. As they explained, "Justice only holds sway when both parties are equally subject to compulsion; when power is uneven, the stronger impose their will while the weaker accept it". Here, "equal compulsion" implies subjugation to a shared legal authority, which is absent in an anarchic international arena -. In this context, the Athenians equated might with right, openly excluding justice as a consideration in foreign relations.¹

2. The ontological debate between realism and idealism

In international relations (IR) scholarship, political realism is often contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which emphasizes international norms, state interdependence, and cooperation. The *Melian Dialogue*, one of the most extensively analyzed parts of Thucydides' *History*, encapsulates the enduring debate between idealism and realism: Is international politics governed by a moral order grounded in principles of justice, or is it an unfaltering battleground of competing national interests and power?

The Melians advocate for idealistic principles, facing a stark choice between war and submission. They demonstrate courage and patriotism, valuing their independence and freedom. Despite their weaker military position relative to Athens, they commit to defending themselves. Their arguments rest on appeals to justice, equating it with fairness, while portraying the Athenians as unjust. They express piety, believing the gods will support their just cause, and they rely on alliances, particularly the Spartans, who share ties of kinship with them. The Melians thus invoke elements of idealist or liberal thinking, such as the belief in a nation's right to political independence, mutual obligations among states, and the inherent injustice of aggressive wars. However, the Melians lack necessary resources and pragmatism. Their decision to resist is driven more by hope than by careful analysis or calculated judgment.

In contrast, the Athenians adopt an unapologetically realist approach centered on security and power, shaped by the world as it is rather than how it ought to be. They dismiss moral rhetoric and urge the Melians to confront practical realities—acknowledging their military disadvantage, weighing potential consequences, and prioritizing survival. The Athenians' argument unfolds with a compelling realist rationale rooted in self-interest, rationality, intelligence, and foresight. Yet, when scrutinized, their reasoning reveals significant flaws. Melos poses no actual threat to Athenian security, and its eventual destruction does little to alter the Peloponnesian War's trajectory—a conflict Athens ultimately loses.

Thucydides highlights throughout his *History* that power untempered by restraint or justice breeds an insatiable drive for expansion. Empires face no natural limitation to their growth. Consumed by promises of glory and profit after conquering Melos, the Athenians embark on a

¹ *Op cit*, p04.

disastrous campaign in Sicily. They disregard the Melians' warning that justice serves all in the long term. Ultimately, Athens overestimates its strength and suffers defeat in the same war it sought to dominate—showing that its shortsighted pursuit of self-interest backfires.

It is unrealistic to ignore power dynamics in international affairs, but equally perilous to rely solely on power. Thucydides seems to endorse neither the naive idealism of the Melians nor the stark cynicism of the Athenians. His work serves as a warning against both extremes—idealistic utopianism on one hand and ruthless cynicism on the other. If Thucydides can be described as a political realist, his vision diverges from modern interpretations like *realpolitik*, which dismisses ethical considerations outright, or contemporary scientific neorealism, which sidesteps moral questions altogether. Rather, Thucydides' realism aligns more closely with thinkers like Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron, among other twentieth-century classical realists who acknowledged national interest while maintaining that international actors remain answerable to moral scrutiny.¹

3. Machiavelli and the rejection of the principle of morality in political life

Idealism in international relations, much like realism, is rooted in a rich and enduring tradition. Dissatisfied with the imperfections of the world as they encountered it, idealists have consistently sought to address the question of "what ought to be" in politics. Thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were political idealists who argued for the existence of universal moral values that could underpin political life. Building on the work of his intellectual predecessors, Cicero advanced the notion of a natural moral law applicable to both domestic and international politics. His principles regarding justice in warfare were later refined by Christian scholars like St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. By the time Niccolò Machiavelli emerged in the late fifteenth century, the dominant perspective in political thought remained deeply entrenched in the belief that politics, including state relations and warfare, should be guided by virtue and ethical standards.

Machiavelli fundamentally disrupted this longstanding moral tradition, carving a niche for himself as an innovator in political theory. His approach stood out for its criticism of classical Western political philosophy as overly idealistic—aspiring toward an unattainable standard—and for its deliberate separation of politics from ethics. In doing so, Machiavelli laid the groundwork for modern statecraft centered on pragmatic self-interest. In chapter XV of *The Prince*, he famously declared his intent to pursue “the effectual truth of the matter rather than the imagined one.” For him, “effectual truth” represented the pragmatic realities necessary for securing both individual and state prosperity and strength. Rather than adhering to ancient concepts of virtue—moral traits like justice or moderation—Machiavelli introduced **virtù**, emphasizing capability, determination, and vigor. As a proponent of **virtù**, he envisioned leading individuals and nations toward earthly glory and dominance.²

Machiavellianism is widely recognized as an uncompromising form of political realism applied to both domestic governance and international relations. Often synonymous with *realpolitik*, it encapsulates the view that ethical considerations are irrelevant in politics, with morality subordinated to the pursuit of power and calculated outcomes. Although Machiavelli never

¹ Donnelly Jack, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 193.

² W. Julian, *Korab-Karpowicz*, *op cit*, p05.

explicitly used terms like **ragione di stato** or **raison d'état**, his central argument revolves around this idea: that the well-being of the state trumps adherence to moral principles or ethical norms.

While Machiavelli rationalized immoral actions within a political framework, he did not deny their inherent evil. His ideas remained tied to traditional moral structures even as he criticized them. It was his intellectual successors in the nineteenth century who pushed Machiavellian realism further by formulating a doctrine of dual ethics—one set for private life, another for public affairs. This development reached its zenith with figures like Hegel, who argued that "the state has no higher duty than maintaining itself." Hegel granted ethical justification to the pursuit of state interests at the expense of others, overturning conventional moral perspectives. He posited the state's self-preservation and extension of its power as the ultimate moral imperative. In alignment with these ideas, Heinrich von Treitschke asserted that power was the essence of the state, positioning it in competition with other independent entities. According to Treitschke, the state's supreme moral obligation was to expand its power, with international agreements being binding only when deemed advantageous. This further entrenched notions of an autonomous state-based ethics and *realpolitik*, rejecting conventional morality in favor of a purportedly "higher" moral framework rooted in political might. Tragically, such doctrines—combined with beliefs about the cultural supremacy of Germanic peoples—became tools for justifying policies of aggression and annihilation pursued by German statesmen from the eighteenth century through World War II.¹

Machiavelli receives frequent acclaim for his practical guidance to rulers, earning him recognition as one of the founders of modern political strategy and as a defender of republican governance. There are undoubtedly elements within his philosophy deserving such acknowledgment. Yet, it is equally plausible to see him as a central figure responsible for the erosion of morality in European political thought. Though similar ideas about divorcing ethics from politics can be traced to earlier figures such as the Athenian envoys' argument in Thucydides' **Melian Dialogue**, Thrasymachus in Plato's **Republic**, or Carneades as discussed by Cicero—none successfully mainstreamed amoral political reasoning. Before Machiavelli, such views had largely remained peripheral to Western thought. It was his influence—and the sharp pragmatism he championed—that drove these ideas to prominence through their forceful challenge to both ancient and Christian traditions intertwining politics with ethics.²

¹ Anglo Sydney, *Machiavelli: The First Century*, (Oxford-Warburg Studies), Oxford University Press, 2005.

² Baluch Faisal, "Machiavelli as Philosopher", and the *Review of Politics*, 80(2): 289–300, 2018, doi: 10.1017/S0034670517001097.

4. Thomas Hobbes and the logic of human selfishness for survival

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1683) played a pivotal role in an intellectual shift aimed at liberating modern science from the constraints of classical and scholastic traditions. Classical political philosophy, which forms the foundation of the idealist perspective, asserts that humans, guided by reason, can control their desires and act for the collective good, even at the expense of their own interests. According to this view, humans are rational, moral agents capable of distinguishing right from wrong, making ethical choices, and naturally inclined to social cooperation. Hobbes, however, challenges these ideas with remarkable precision. In his characterization, humans are fiercely individualistic rather than inherently moral or social, driven by what he calls a "perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceases only in death". This pursuit of power, he argues, inevitably leads to conflict. Through these ideas, Hobbes contributes significantly to core tenets of the realist tradition in international relations and informs the development of neorealism. Key elements of this perspective include a view of human nature as self-centered, the concept of international anarchy, and the assertion that politics—being rooted in power struggles—can be systematically studied.¹

One of Hobbes's most notable ideas is his depiction of the anarchic state of nature. He describes this condition as a state of war, where life is marked by a constant conflict—"a war of every man against every man. This notion stems from his interpretation of both human nature and the conditions individuals face when left without governing authority. In a state of nature without government, everyone holds equal status and enjoys unlimited freedom—there are no imposed restrictions on behavior. This lack of regulation means anyone can use force at any time, compelling individuals to be continuously prepared to defend themselves against others. Motivated by acquisitiveness and unrestrained by moral principles, individuals compete for scarce resources and often "invade" each other for personal gain. Additionally, out of fear and self-preservation, they may initiate preemptive attacks to ensure safety or security. Pride and a desire for glory further fuel such behavior, prompting individuals to seek domination for personal prestige. Whether spurred by greed, fear, or reputation, this relentless power-seeking compels individuals to "destroy or subdue one another. In such chaotic conditions where distrust prevails and aggression presents itself as a more viable survival strategy than peaceful cooperation, maintaining dominance becomes critical for ensuring one's survival.

Hobbes's primary focus lies in exploring the relationship between individuals and the state. However, his views on individuals in the state of nature can also be extrapolated to describe relations among states. Once states are established, the individual drive for power translates into a similar dynamic in state behavior. This often manifests in attempts to dominate other nations or expand influence. Hobbes notes that states act "for their own security," justifying territorial expansion under the pretense of perceived threats or potential invasions. They "endeavour as much as they can, to subdue and weaken their neighbors," reinforcing the idea that power struggles remain central to international relations. These themes resonate with later thinkers like Hans Morgenthau, who drew upon Hobbesian views of human nature in his model of international politics. Similarly, Kenneth Waltz incorporated Hobbes's concept of international

¹ Abizadeh, A, "Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory", *American Political Science Review*, 105 (2): 298–315, 2011.

anarchy—the absence of a higher sovereign authority over states—into his foundational work on neorealism.¹

For Hobbes, individuals escape the perpetual conflicts of the state of nature by submitting to a sovereign authority through a social contract. However, the dynamics he associates with individuals in this natural condition persist in relations among states. While this does not suggest constant warfare between states, it does imply an enduring predisposition toward conflict. With each state being its own judge on whether or not to resort to force, war always remains a possibility. The creation of domestic security through state formation parallels ongoing insecurity on the international level. One could argue that full consistency with Hobbes's logic would advocate for states relinquishing their sovereignty to form a global authority—much like individuals do within a nation-state—to transcend international anarchy. While some modern realists support the idea of a world state to mitigate insecurity among nations, Hobbes himself does not propose this solution. He does not advocate for an international social contract to resolve inter-state anarchy; instead, he accepts that this condition does not necessarily culminate in unceasing war but remains an enduring feature of international relations.²

The rejection of universal moral principles and norms in the realm of international relations aligns Hobbes with Machiavellian thinkers and proponents of the doctrine of **raison d'état**. Hobbes' perspective on international dynamics assumes that sovereign states, much like individuals in the state of nature, are inherently antagonistic, self-centered, and lack innate sociability. His assertion that no moral constraints guide state behavior poses a significant challenge to the ideals of political thought that rest on human sociability and to concepts of international jurisprudence rooted in these ideals. Yet, what differentiates Hobbes from Machiavelli—and aligns him more closely with classical realism—is his emphasis on the defensive nature of foreign policy. His political theory does not unreservedly endorse actions solely based on a state's self-interest. Rather, Hobbes advocates for prudent and peaceful international interactions; sovereign states, like rational individuals, should inherently strive for peace as guided by reason.³

Neorealist interpretations of Hobbes, such as those offered by Waltz, sometimes neglect the nuance that Hobbes does not envision international anarchy as entirely devoid of rules or order. On the contrary, Hobbes acknowledges that even in a state of nature, reason prescribes certain dictates that can foster more cooperative international relations. He does not dismiss the presence or potential effectiveness of international law, recognizing that sovereign states can create treaties to provide a legal framework for their interactions. However, Hobbes remains realistic about its limitations—international law often proves insufficient to curb power struggles as states selectively interpret and adhere to these rules based on their interests. Consequently, international politics remains precarious, an enduring feature central to Hobbes's realist outlook.⁴

¹ Armitage D, "Hobbes and the foundations of modern international thought", in *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

² "Slavery Discourse before the Restoration: The Barbary Coast, Justinian's Digest, and Hobbes's Political Theory", *History of European Ideas*, 36 (2): 412–418, 2010.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Donnelly, Jack, *op cit.*

In the twentieth century, classical realism emerged as a response to the idealist doctrines that gained prominence in the post-World War I era. The idealists, also known as liberal internationalists or utopians, aimed to prevent future global conflicts by fostering peace through establishing respected international laws and organizations. Their efforts led to projects like the League of Nations (1920) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which aimed to outlaw war and promote peaceful dispute resolution. Figures such as Woodrow Wilson and intellectuals like Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and Raymond B. Fosdick championed these initiatives. Rather than accepting conflict as an inevitable extension of human egoism, these idealists sought to address war through improved social conditions and political arrangements that they believed could unite humanity through shared rational and moral principles.¹

However, the idealist vision faced criticism even in its era. Scholars like Reinhold Niebuhr in the early 1930s and E. H. Carr soon after challenged their optimism. The failure of the League of Nations, notably its inability to prevent World War II—exacerbated by key withdrawals from Japan and Germany and the absence of the United States—dealt an undeniable blow to idealist aspirations. This failure likely advanced realist theory more effectively than any intellectual critique alone. Although institutions like the United Nations (founded in 1945) continued reflecting idealist aspirations, classical realists such as John H. Herz, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Raymond Aron dominated early post-war international relations discourse. By the mid-20th century, however, realism faced challenges from scholars advocating for more empirical and scientific methodologies in political studies. Over time, particularly in the 1980s, neorealism began supplanting classical realism as the dominant theoretical framework.

Given space constraints, this article focuses on two particularly influential figures associated with twentieth-century classical realism: E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Their insights significantly shaped the discipline's development during this period.

E. H. Carr's *Challenge to Utopian Idealism* examines a critical perspective on idealist views in international relations, articulated in his seminal work **The Twenty Years' Crisis,** published in 1939. Carr critiques the idealist position, which he labels as "utopianism," encompassing traits like faith in reason, belief in progress, moral righteousness, and the assumption of an inherent harmony of interests. Idealists view war as an abnormality, advocating for peace education and collective security systems such as the League of Nations or the modern United Nations as solutions. However, Carr fundamentally challenges these ideas, particularly their claim to moral universalism and the harmony of interests. He asserts that morality is relative rather than universal and accuses dominant groups of invoking the harmony of interests doctrine to legitimize their power and maintain their privilege.²

¹ W. Julian, *Korab-Karpowicz, op cit, p07.*

² *Op cit, p07.*

5. Hans Morgenthau and the Struggle for Power

Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) advanced realism into a detailed framework of international relations theory. Influenced by the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and philosopher Thomas Hobbes, Morgenthau placed selfishness and a lust for power at the core of human nature. He identified the universal and timeless human drive for dominance, which he labeled *animus dominandi*—the desire to dominate—as the primary source of conflict. In his seminal 1948 work **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace**, Morgenthau asserted that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power."

Morgenthau's realism is systematically structured around six principles included in the second edition of his book. As a traditionalist, he resisted the efforts of mid-20th-century behavioral scientists who sought to reduce international relations to pure scientific analysis. Nevertheless, his first principle hinges on the claim that realism is rooted in objective laws derived from an unchanging human nature. His aim was to develop realism not only as a theoretical approach to international politics but also as a practical art for guiding foreign policy.¹

At the heart of Morgenthau's realist theory is the concept of power—or "interest defined in terms of power." This idea, underpinning his second principle, assumes that political leaders act based on interests framed by power. This focus establishes the autonomy of politics, enabling the analysis of foreign policy independent of individual politicians' motives, preferences, or moral qualities. Thus, this principle forms the cornerstone for a rational understanding of politics.

In his third principle, Morgenthau emphasizes that the notion of interest as power is universal and central to political behavior. However, what constitutes interest or power evolves according to varying political and cultural contexts. Its meaning and applications are shaped by specific historical circumstances.

The fourth principle explores the link between realism and ethics. Morgenthau argues that while realists recognize the moral dimension of political actions, they must also acknowledge the tension between moral ideals and the practical demands of political success. He asserts that "universal moral principles" cannot be applied to state actions in their abstract form but must be filtered through the realities of time and place. Prudence—a critical capacity to consider the consequences of moral actions within a political context—is essential. Morgenthau cautions that without prudence, "There can be no political morality."²

Political decisions must rest on prudence rather than ideological or moral righteousness, a point he emphasizes in his fifth principle. He maintains that states should be viewed solely as political entities pursuing their interests defined in terms of power. By focusing purely on pragmatic interests and avoiding ideological confrontations, states can develop policies that respect mutual interests while safeguarding their own.

Morgenthau's sixth principle asserts that politics, defined by power, is an independent discipline. Politics cannot be subordinated to ethics; however, ethics is not irrelevant to political

¹ Morgenthau, Hans J, 1946. *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

² *Op cit.*

life. Morgenthau highlights the interplay between power and morality with his assertion that a person governed solely by politics would lack moral restraint, whereas one solely governed by morality would lack prudence. Political decisions require balancing these dimensions to navigate the complexities of statecraft successfully.

Despite repetitions and occasional contradictions in Morgenthau's six principles, they provide a coherent framework: politics centers on power or interest, making it an autonomous sphere distinct from other disciplines. Rational state actors prioritize their national interests, enabling the construction of a reasoned theory of international politics. Such a theory dismisses considerations like personal morality, ideology, or religious beliefs while advocating for diplomacy based on mutual interests rather than ideological confrontations or moral crusades.

Ultimately, Morgenthau conveys a nuanced vision—while politics operates independently from ethics, moral considerations cannot be entirely disregarded. Instead, achieving a balance between power dynamics and ethical maturity is vital for effective political action.¹

06. Neorealism and Security Maximization in International Relations

Despite its ambiguities and limitations, Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations** became a landmark textbook, shaping international political thought for a generation. During this period, efforts emerged to develop a more methodologically rigorous framework for analyzing international affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s, an influx of scholars from scientific disciplines entered the field of International Relations, seeking to replace the traditional "wisdom literature" of classical realists with scientific principles and analytical reasoning (Brown 35). This shift provoked a strong reaction from Morgenthau and proponents of the English School, such as Hedley Bull, who championed a more traditionalist approach.²

This intellectual debate split the field of International Relations into two dominant approaches: traditional or non-positivist, and scientific or positivist (sometimes referred to as neo-positivist). Later, a third approach emerged—post-positivism. Traditionalists focus on normative questions and draw upon history, philosophy, and law, whereas positivists prioritize descriptive and explanatory inquiry grounded in empirical methodologies. Positivists quickly gained prominence; by the mid-1960s, most American students in International Relations were trained in quantitative techniques, game theory, and other social science methods. These methodological advancements, along with changes in the global political landscape, deeply influenced the discipline.³

Despite their differing approaches, realists generally agree that the state is the central actor in international politics, and that competition and conflict among states lie at the heart of global relations. However, as the Cold War began to wane in the 1970s, new actors such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations started gaining significance. This shift prompted a resurgence of idealist perspectives, culminating in neoliberalism, also referred to as pluralism. Leading theorists like

¹ Morgenthau, *The Concept of the Political and 'Einige logische Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitt's Begriff des Politischen'*, 1934-1935, (Container 110, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC).

² Hedley Bull "International Theory: The Case for Traditional Approach," *World Politics*, 1962, 18(3): 361-377.

³ W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, *op cit*.

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Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argued that while adopting some realist assumptions, states could engage in meaningful cooperation for mutual benefit. Through their concept of complex interdependence, they presented a more nuanced understanding of global politics, asserting that progress in international relationships was achievable and that the future did not have to mirror the past.

■ Kenneth Waltz's International System

Kenneth N. Waltz offered a significant response to the liberal challenges of international relations by reformulating realism in a distinct and systematic way. His book, *Theory of International Politics* (1979), introduced a scientific approach to realism, departing from the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, which had centered on the struggle for power rooted in human nature. Waltz sought to avoid discussions of human nature altogether, instead constructing his theory around a model inspired by microeconomics. He argued that states in the international system resemble firms within a domestic economy, with survival as their primary interest. He emphasized that the international structure compels states to prioritize survival over other short-term objectives and act with relative efficiency to ensure that goal.¹

Waltz criticized both classical realists and traditional liberals for focusing too heavily on individual states and their ideological, moral, or economic concerns. In his view, this approach neglects to account for the broader international system. While he acknowledged that his abstracted perspective omitted many aspects valued in classical realism—such as the development of specific foreign policies—he argued that neorealism offered utility in understanding the fundamental determinants of international politics. Importantly, Waltz clarified that his theory does not apply to domestic politics or guide state policy in either domestic or international contexts. Instead, it explains why states tend to behave in similar ways, despite varying forms of governance and political ideologies, and why the overall dynamics of international relations remain relatively unchanged despite rising interdependence.

For Waltz, the consistent behavior of states over centuries is shaped by the structural constraints of the international system. He identified three key components of a system's structure: its organizing principle, the differentiation of its units, and the distribution of capabilities (or power) across those units. Anarchy—the absence of a central governing authority—is, for Waltz, the defining organizing principle of the international system. States are its primary units of operation. Although he acknowledged the existence of non-state actors, he deemed them largely insignificant. In an anarchic environment, where survival depends on self-help mechanisms, all states perform similar functions without differentiation based on labor or roles. Nevertheless, they are distinguished by their varying capabilities or relative power.²

This perspective marked a departure from how classical realists like Morgenthau understood power. Morgenthau viewed power as both a means and an end, with rational state behavior oriented toward accumulating as much power as possible. Neorealism, by contrast, frames security as the fundamental concern of states and focuses on how power is distributed within the system. Neorealism also distinguishes itself through methodological rigor and its scientific approach to studying international relations

¹ *Ibid.*

² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

. Waltz prioritized empirical testability and adhered to falsificationism as a methodological ideal—although he acknowledged its limited applicability in international relations.

Waltz argued that while the distribution of capabilities among states may shift over time, anarchy remains an enduring principle of international politics. Anarchy conditions state behavior toward a self-help logic that fosters insecurity and limits cooperation. In rebutting neoliberal arguments about interdependence's cooperative potential, Waltz identified two key obstacles: security concerns and unequal gains. Within an anarchic system, states cannot be certain of others' intentions and fear that cooperative benefits might disproportionately favor others, leading to dependency. Thus, "States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest."¹

Neorealism has gained significant influence within the field of international relations due to its theoretical clarity and methodological precision. It continues to shape debates on how states navigate the complexities of an anarchic global system.

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979).

The second theoretical debate: behaviorism versus realism**1. Cognitive and methodological foundations of behavioral theory**

After nearly half a century of dominance of the statist paradigm and the failure of the pluralist paradigm to shift the research agenda in political science from its ontological concerns, which led to the emergence of behaviorists who focused on the methodological level and were the main weakness of the previous paradigms, it falls within the second theoretical debate in an attempt to overcome the methodological bankruptcy of traditional realism. The second debate is considered a polarization between those who believe in the possibility of using the methods of the natural sciences, or at least the methods described by positivist philosophers of science, in the study of international politics, versus those who are cautious about the ability of the social world of the state to use the empirical methods of the natural sciences.¹

It came in the mid-fifties of the twentieth century as a criticism and rejection of traditional approaches, relying on the quantitative approach in the field of statistics and computer technology in analyzing political phenomena. Robert Dahl also confirms that behaviorism came as a reaction and from the desire of its supporters to build scientific political theories based on the experimental scientific approach. On the philosophical and epistemological level, behaviorism adopted a number of scientific assumptions regarding the nature of science, as it rejected the distinction between natural sciences and social sciences, and rejected historical analysis because it considers it illogical to search in the past for explanations, narratives, and ideas about political affairs when observation is the most reliable method for reaching knowledge. Therefore, the debate that brought together traditionalism and behaviorism, which some summarize as the debate between the historical approach and the scientific approach, the first seeks approximate patterns whose effectiveness depends on historical patterns, while the second believes in the existence of general and universal laws that govern the behavior of all states; the first is deductive and relies on historical research, and the second is inductive and relies on collecting data. The dialogue between traditionalism and science is part of a broader and older dialogue, and it represents one of many aspects of what Thomas Sowell called the conflict of visions between the possibility of absolute knowledge and relative knowledge, as behaviorism is based on positivist epistemology, according to which knowledge is acquired from what cannot be observed in the world around us. The scientific approach assumes that knowledge is possible through searching for regularity in actions.² The debate between Stanley Hoffman, representing the traditional approach, and Morton Kaplan, representing the scientific approach, represents that while Hoffman calls for historical research and deductive generalizations, Kaplan sees the adoption of rational induction methods to study international relations. Kaplan sees a set of criticisms of the traditionalists that can be summarized as follows:

1. The traditionalists' view that human purpose can be understood using non-scientific methods is an unsound opinion.

¹ Eulau, H, *the Behavioural movement in Political Science: A Personal Document*», *Social Research*, 24-25, 1973.

² Marsh D. and Stoker, G, *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 3rd Ed. (Palgrave Macmillan); 2010, P. 15.

2. Behaviorism does not exclude philosophy from its analysis, and there are philosophical questions that concern systems theory, which is originally a branch of the scientific behavioral approach.

3. The scientific approach is based on the assumption that international relations are a social activity like any other activity, and can be analyzed by analyzing the behavior of its participants.

As for the roots and extensions of this theoretical approach, Graham Wallace's attempt in his book "Human Nature in Politics", published in 1908, is considered a prominent attempt to focus on the importance of human nature and behavior amidst the dominance of studies that focus on the institutional and legal dimension of politics. In the same year, Arthur Bentley's book "The Process of Government" appeared, which is considered the most important author in the field of behavioral political studies. Some date the beginning of the behavioral trend to 1913: when the American scientist John Watson published his article "Psychology as Seen by the Behaviorist". As for institutional work, the "Chicago School" emerged in the 1920s, and the "Research Committee" of the "American Political Science Association" (APSA), which was headed by Charles Merriam, took the initiative to call for the establishment of the "Social Science Research Council". Charles Merriam was among the most important advocates of transforming political science to focus on studying human behavior instead of analyzing institutions and the opinions of philosophers. In the period preceding World War II, Harold Lasswell presented in his book "Power and personality" is an attempt to add a psychological perspective to the field of political studies. As for the goal of behaviorists, it is an attempt to find an integrated, organized formulation of scientific principles and assumptions. Therefore, behaviorists aim to reach a scientific formula for political science, the center of interest of which is the behavior of the individual, not the political system or institution. It uses psychological concepts and specialized pretexts as means of analysis.¹

"Easton" defines the systematic characteristics of behaviorists as follows:

- 1) Regularity: that is, the behavior and political activities of individuals and groups proceed in a regular manner similar to natural phenomena, and can be expressed by generalization and theory;
- 2) Proof: that is, examining those generalizations and theories in principle based on the behavior to which they relate;
- 3) Technical methods: which are precise means of observing, recording, and interpreting political activities, such as statistics, mathematics, and computers;
- 4) Quantification and measurement: because they seek to make research more scientific and avoid subjective judgments, and they must be adapted to the scientific purposes of research;
- 5) Values: i.e. defining values and separating them from events in order to distinguish between issues related to moral interpretation and those related to empirical interpretation to achieve objectivity;

¹ Delh R, "The Behavioural Approach to Political Science: Epitaph to a movement for a successful protest". *American Political Science Review*, 55: 70, 1961.

6) Consistency: i.e. the coherence and homogeneity of the research parts, and they must be based on theory;

7) Research science: means searching for knowledge and revealing facts for themselves first before employing them to develop policies to solve society's problems;

8) Integration: i.e. the integration of political research with other social sciences, because their subject is one, which is man, so they must be integrated to achieve understanding and generalize the interpretation.¹

Behaviorism has kept pace with pluralists in its aspect related to interests, not values, i.e. that pluralism that lies under the umbrella of agreement on the starting points and foundations between conflicting economic interests, and with the sixties, many writings appeared praising the victory of behaviorism, and this gave the impression that behaviorism was a revolution that satisfied academics, by transferring its success in reformulating the research agenda.²

However, we have the right to ask, if behaviorism is a cognitive revolution, then against whom was this revolution declared? The revolutionaries' discourse was talking about directing their cognitive revolution against traditional political science, which relies on the historical approach and exaggerates its reality, borrowing the description of "David Stone." But who are the researchers whose works were characterized as traditional? That question was not answered by the behaviorists, who remained silent about the identity of their opponents. The book "Garceau (1953) is devoid of any negative or positive reference to the identity of the opponents (the opponents of behaviorism). However, the most violent revolutionary scientific attack on the status quo in the field of political science was launched by "Easton" in (1953) through his book entitled "The Political System." Much later, in (1984), Easton issued another book in which he talked about traditional political science and considered that it prevailed during the twenties of the twentieth century and said that it was overly concerned with parties and pressure groups at the expense of the state. As a model to confirm his claims, he referred to "Bentley" (1908) and "Pendleton Herring." (1929) ignoring the fact that Bentley disappeared from the academic scene in (1953) and before that happened, Bentley himself had become one of those interested in behaviorism. As for Herring, he did not oppose the behaviorists, but rather contributed effectively in (1949) to establishing the "Political Behavior Committee" under the umbrella of the "Social Science Research Council." Easton also focused his objections to the traditionalists, raising their confusion of facts and values and their elaboration in describing political phenomena without providing adequate explanations. As long as "behavior, science, pluralism, and order" are the most important features of behaviorism, there is no justification for the traditionalists to object to it, since research that dealt with behavior at the individual level became widespread during the thirties and forties, and was led by Herring, Fosnell, and Lasswell. The scientific tendency existed even before the advent of the behaviorists. Among the conflicts, pluralism was an empirical reality approved by the declared theory of the traditionalists. So what new thing did behaviorism bring? Even the concept of the political system that Easton came up with introduced new terms (inputs, outputs, and feedback) but did not provide us with a new comprehensive theory of political science. What made behaviorism a

¹ Delh, R, "The Behavioural Approach to Political Science: Epitaph to a movement for a successful protest". *American Political Science Review*, 55: 70, 1961.

² Ibid.

revolution then? The answer is that behaviorism made radical changes in pre-existing trends in the field of political science. These selected fields are behavior, scientific, pluralism, description versus explanation in the theoretical aspects, starting with behavior, where behaviorists relied on survey studies based on a broader statistical community. They also worked to increase the seed of quantitative studies that topped the pages of the main scientific journals in the specialty. On the other hand, the control of behaviorists over the specialty contributed to the decline of studies dedicated to analyzing public policy of the government. In addition to the shift in areas of interest, the new thing that behaviorism brought as a revolution is represented in its reformulation of the concept of pluralism from the pluralism of (value systems) to the pluralism of interests. Behaviorism gradually dominated the discipline, but that did not make it immune to criticism that escalated in the early 1960s. The source of the criticism was not from traditionalists with a historical bent, but rather from researchers demanding a positive role for political science and directing researchers' attention toward societal issues, on the grounds that behaviorists were involved, through what they called "value neutrality," in reinforcing the status quo in American politics.¹

2. Dr. The first paradigm challenge: The advocates of the Conference for a New Political Science versus the behaviorists

The criticisms that the leftists directed at behaviorism resulted in the emergence of what was called the "Conference for a New Political Science", which attempted to define the features of the next stage in political science and reorient it. The conference was organized in (1967) during the annual meeting of APSA and was led by "Peter Bakratz, Christian B., Theodore Lowy, Michael Brent, Sheldon Wolin", and the list also included a prominent figure in the field of international relations "Hans Morgenthau", among the opponents of the war in Vietnam, among the members of the conference were a number of political theorists determined to bring discussions and criticisms about American liberal democracy to the heart of academic discussions after they had been isolated in the circle of the field of political science, and to market their proposal, the members of this conference sought to cover up what they saw as shortcomings in the behavioral approach; They turned towards focusing on the social issues and political crises of that period, and they also demanded that political science take a unified position on controversial political issues such as the Vietnam War, racial discrimination, and poverty, in addition to environmental and women's issues. Although the conference participants did not unanimously reject the scientific trend, they saw the need to rearrange priorities so that scientific science would come second after commitment to community issues and the validity of research results to address these issues. They justified their position by saying that the issue of interpreting political behavior does not really constitute the cognitive center of gravity of political science.² Thus, it seems clear that the "Conference for a New Political Science," like the three trends that preceded it, combined intellectual and political goals, even though its political goals were weaker compared to the two behaviors.³ The conference members devoted their efforts to the effort to reform APSA and presented candidates for the position of president and membership in the association's council, but they failed to obtain the presidency despite

¹ Johns Dryzek, *Revolutions without enemies: Key transformation in political science, American political science, Review, 2006, P487.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

their success in acquiring some seats in the council. Resistance from the two behaviors intensified, especially among APSA, which they almost completely dominate. In 1968, they froze the work of all the working committees that the conference members had called for, but David Easton worked to ease the tension between the behaviorists and the conference attendees. During his speech before APSA in 1969, as president of the association, he spoke about a new revolution in political science that could make the techniques developed by the behaviorists and his theory of the system equally serve societal problems. Easton did not succeed in bridging the gap between the two tendencies, but he succeeded in establishing a secondary specialization in political science, which is public policy. Thus, the conference, instead of heading towards building links with social and political movements that carry a culture hostile to it, devoted its efforts to the professional level, which prompted Lowi to name it "The Conference for a New Political Science Association." With his failure to obtain the presidency of the association, the ambition of the conference members declined and their organization became just a regular section within the sections of APSA. As for the scientific journal that the conference sponsored, "New Political Science," its circulation remained limited, and its name did not appear in the ranking of the 115 most prominent scientific journals in the specialty.¹

Therefore, the failure of the conference revolution for a new political science was not a complete failure, but it must be acknowledged that their failure does not mean, in return, the success of behaviorism. Although it continued, it lost its identity, especially with its claim of the possibility of establishing the foundations of a neutral science or a science devoid of values. It made several concessions by adopting a new academic journal after the conference revolution in (1967) called "Politics and Political Science", and thus it was a blow to the American Journal of Political Science.

This new journal provided the opportunity to publish and address the problems of society and the urgent issues in the internal and external public policy of the state. The strength of the currents calling for a review of the reality of the situation in the cognitive field of political science was confirmed after hundreds of American political scientists morally supported the electronic message that was drafted and sent by an anonymous person calling himself Mr. "Perestroika"; In it, he calls for reforming the internal house of political science by ensuring the field's openness to methodological pluralism and lifting the guardianship imposed on it by the quants. As usual, APSA worked to contain the emerging qualitative methodological revolution by creating new research departments and by establishing another academic journal under its auspices, Perspectives on Politics, to publish the scientific works of these dissident researchers. The following graphs also illustrate the rise and decline of quantitative and empirical studies by behavioralists and post-behavioralists.²

¹ See, for instance, David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc, 1965, p 7.

² David Easton, *Continuities in Political Research: Behavioralism and Post-Behavioralism*, paper presented at the eighth World Congress of Political Science, Munich, 1970, p. 9-12.

Relevance and Action as the Two Hallmarks of Post-Behaviouralism

Two main pillars of Post-Behaviouralism have been “**Relevance**” and “**Action**.” That the research and theory building must be relevant to actual social conditions and the brute realities of politics, and those political scientists have a practical role to play in society. Knowledge of politics has to be put to use for helping the society to preserve and protect human science --- a sense of commitment and action must characterize entire research in political science. We can say Post-Behaviouralism is not a reversion to traditionalism, on the other hand it is a reform movement, a future oriented intellectual tendency among the behaviouralists.

▪ **An Active and Essential Role of the Professional associations and Universities in Actual Process of Politics**

“If the individual has the obligation to implement his knowledge, those organizations composed of intellectuals - the professional associations and the universities themselves cannot stand apart from the struggles of the day. Politicalisation of the profession is inescapable as well as desirable.” Summing up the characteristics of Post-behaviouralism, David Easton observed: “No one Post-behaviouralist could share all these views. I have presented only a distillation of the maximal image. It represents perhaps a Weberian ideal type of the challenge of features of the Post-behavioural revolution as it appears to be taking shape today.”

Substance oriented, relevant to social phenomena and action oriented. To quote David Easton again, “It (Post behaviouralism) pleads for a more relevant research. It pleads for an orientation to the work that will encourage political scientists even in political life according to human criteria.” Post-Behaviouralism rejects the thoroughgoing empiricism, value- neutralism and technique obsession of the Behaviouralists. It attacks the craze or obsession for a scientific research and seeks to offer an integrated view, combining in a subtle way behavioural advocacy of empiricism with normativism of the traditionalists.¹

3. Critical Evaluation

Post-behaviouralism involves a bold attempt to reform some of the weakness of Behaviouralism by advocating primacy of substance over technique socially relevant research over pure science, political action over academic neutrality and social change over social conservatism. Post-behaviouralism definitely tries to come out of orthodox scientism of the Behaviouralists support for value studies with behaviouralists advocacy of thoroughgoing empiricism. As Dr. Shriram Maheswari has observed, “As a result of Post- Science, The methods of science have come to stay in Politics, but they are tempered with an appreciation of their limitations, and what is more, theory are to be combined with a sensitivity towards political values and an application of political knowledge.”

Post-behaviouralism cannot be regarded as a reversion to traditionalism, though such a charge is preferred against it but strict some reforms. The Post-behaviouralists do not deny the importance of technical proficiency but they do not agree that scientists in the society. Values cannot and should be kept out of scientific research. Since it was the responsibility of the social

¹ George T Haokip, *Study Material Only Behaviouralism and Post- Behaviouralism: Reason for Growth, Definitions, Characteristics, Limitation and other Issues* Paper – 202 Contemporary Political Theory Political Science & Human Rights, Indira Gandhi National Tribal University, p16.

scientists to analyse social problems with a view to find solutions, it was an imperative necessity that they should keep in mind and help the society to reserve the human values of civilization.¹

¹ *Ipid, p17.*

▪ **Features or Characteristics of Post-Behaviouralism**

David Easton, who had earlier drawn up a list of eight characteristic features of behaviouralism and called them the “intellectual foundation stones” of the movement, now came out with seven major characteristics of Post-behaviouralism. He described them as the “Credo of Relevance” or “a distillation of the maximal image.” These are given below:

▪ **Due and Primary Importance to Substance of Study alongwith the Techniques**

Substance must precede technique – if one must be sacrificed for the other – and this need not always be so; it is more important to be relevant and meaningful for contemporary urgent problems than to be sophisticated in the tools of investigation. For the aphorism of science is that it is better to be “vague than non-relevantly precise”. In Political Science, substance must come before techniques.

▪ **Emphasis upon Change**

Political Science should place its main emphasis upon social change and not on social conservatism as behaviouralists seem to be doing. “Behavioural science conceals an ideology of empirical conservatism. To confine oneself exclusively to the description and analysis of facts is to hamper the understanding of these facts in their broadest context. As a result, empirical political science must lend its support to the maintenance of very factual conditions it explores. It unwillingly purveys an ideology of social conservatism tempered by modest incremental change.”

▪ **Study of all Facts/Realities of Politics**

Behavioural research has been guilty of ignoring the study of the brute realities of politics. The needs, however, is that the political scientists should always concern themselves with the realities of political life, including the social stress, social strains, social conflict and crises. “Behavioural inquiry is abstractions and analysis and this serves to conceal the brute realities of politics. The task of Post-behaviouralism is to break the barriers of silence that behavioural language has necessarily created and to help political, science reach out to the real needs of mankind in a time of crisis.”

▪ **Protection of Human Value as the Major Role of Intellectuals**

“Members of a learned discipline bear the responsibilities of all intellectuals. The intellectual’s historical role has been and must be to protect the human values of civilization. This is their unique task and obligation. Without this, they become mere technicians, mechanics for tinkering with society. They thereby abandon the special privileges they have come to claim for themselves in the academic sphere, such as freedom of inquiry and a quasi-extra-territorial protection from the onslaughts of society.”

▪ **Values cannot be totally eliminated from Political Science**

Post-Behaviouralists advocate a rejection of complete value neutralism, as advocated by the behaviouralists. The total emphasis on scientism and empiricism was an unhappy and unworkable stand “Research about and constructive development of values are inextinguishable parts of the study of politics. Science cannot be, and never has been evaluatively neutral despite protestations to the contrary. Hence to understand the limits of our knowledge, we need to be

aware of the value premises on which it stands and the alternatives for which this knowledge could be used.”

- **Political Science is to be developed as an Action Science and Contemplative Science**

“To Know is to bear the responsibility for acting and to act is to engage in re-shaping society. The intellectual as scientist, bears the social obligation to put his knowledge to work. Contemplative science was a product of the nineteenth century when a broader moral agreement was shared. Action Science of necessity reflects the contemporary conflicts in society over ideals and this must permeate and colour the whole research enterprise.¹

¹ *Ibid*, p17.

Alternative view of the second debate: English school versus neorealism**1. The English School of International Relations: Between Theoretical Concepts and Practical Difficulties.**

The English School of international relations theory (sometimes also referred to as liberal realism, the International Society School or the British institutionalists) maintains that there is a 'society of states' at the international level, despite the condition of anarchy (that is, the lack of a global ruler or world state). The English school stands for the conviction that ideas, rather than simply material capabilities, shape the conduct of international politics, and therefore deserve analysis and critique. In this sense it is similar to constructivism, though the English School has its roots more in world history, international law and political theory, and is more open to normative approaches than is generally the case with constructivism.

2. Institutionalizing theory and research in cognitive identity

It is necessary to first discuss the difficulties associated with naming the English school. Taking the name literally misleads the reader to the greatest extent, as a number of the founders of this school were not specifically English. Those belonging to the English school often live outside England: in Australia, Wales, Canada, Norway, Germany, and even in the United States ⁽¹⁾, and South Africa.

Some date the emergence of the English School to 1959, specifically when the "British Committee on International Relations Theories" met. However, the term "English School" did not appear until 1981, when Roy Jones used it in a statement of his findings. The term was later used by those outside the English School in international relations - especially realists - to criticize the theory, saying that the English School is a misnomer. The English School also focused on the "history and theory of the global level" of international relations, and had no interest in British foreign policy.²

Thus, we find that the English School is the name of a group of European international relations analysts who advocated the idea that relations between state actors are shaped according to a set of patterns, rules, and practices that have been consolidated over hundreds of years of human history. These patterns, rules, and practices constitute an informal set of general guidelines for acceptable behavior between states and non-state actors. The actors who accept this behavior are part of an international community whose rules, patterns and behavior are formed from cooperation and integration among its members.³

Unlike the behavioral school, the English school presents a mixture or complex of stereotypical and rational approaches, and in short, it focuses on the moral, political and social characteristics of the international community. The term international community means that regardless of the absence of a central authority "the supreme authority", states behave legally and morally. Therefore, international relations cannot be understood according to power politics, as realists claim.⁴

¹ Tim Dunn et al, *International Relations Theories: Specialization and Diversity*, p 449.

² Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Social Approach*, Polity, Cambridge, 2014, p.6.

³ Michael Cox and Campanaro, R., *Introduction to International Relations*, London School of Economic and Political Science, University of London, 2016, p.84.

⁴ Griffiths, M, and Others, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, 2ed Edition, Routledge, New York, 2009, p.211.

Those who are associated with the English school today see it as occupying a middle position in the specialization of international relations alongside constructivism, and this position of the theory gives a set of different concepts and ideas, and avoids the traditional thinking style of "either this or that". Hedley Bull wrote what contributed to the development of the English school, saying that:

- The subject of international relations: is not "relations between states" or interactions between other "units". Rather, the subject of international relations revolves around the creation of a general entity that is a "global political system". So that it includes states, as well as regions, institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational groups, and even individuals and all human groups. By tracing the relationships between the actors and the patterns that result from these interactions, Bull placed on the theory of international relations the task of defining concepts and theorizing the pattern of signs of these concepts.
- The importance of historical understanding: Academic knowledge undoubtedly needs a historical background, and Bull gave the example of the United States and its superiority over its competitors. It is important to understand "why" and "how" America has achieved exceptional power. It is necessary to understand the institutions of international society "such as international law and the balance of power" with a historical understanding and to place these institutions in their historical context.
- The importance of values: There is no escape from values, as values provide correct information about which topics should be given attention and studied.¹

Barry Buzan suggested in his book "From International to World Society?" that the English school still needs to be developed and that it lacks an analytical framework that explains the typical and structural characteristics of the international system.²

It is worth noting Hedley Bull's book: "The Anarchic Society" (1977), in which he focused on the concept of order in international relations. He defined order in general as: "The image of activity that subjugates some basic social goals in society, such as achieving security in the face of unorganized violence "terrorism", while maintaining the concepts of sovereignty and peace as they are the natural or original state between states." Bull used these goals and adapted them to clarify the characteristics of the international society, where sovereign states are members of this society, and peace is the natural state of their joint existence. Bull made an important distinction between the international society and the international system. The international society is characterized by the consensus of states that they have common public interests and that they are linked to each other by common rules and institutions. Despite the lack of complete sovereignty of the international society - according to Bull - international relations are more than just a group of states competing for their own interests. Institutions are defined as: "sets of customs and practices that are formed to achieve general goals and include the balance of power, international law, diplomacy and war." With the presence of great powers and the role they play, these institutions and patterns such as sovereignty and non-interference were the "guarantors" of the existing order and its continuity. Bull was skeptical about the possibility of

¹ Tim Dunn et al, *op cit*, p 340.

² Tim Dunne, *English School in: "Tim Dunne and Others, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 139.*

“changing” this order as long as these patterns remained in place, but “human rights” came to balance the effect of sovereignty and non-interference.

3. The cognitive and methodological structure of the English school

We note first that the basic concept of the English School is the international community, i.e. a group of international actors who share public institutions. Some emphasize that the English School answers two questions: Who is the member of the international community being studied? And how are the members related to each other? To answer these questions, some start from the ideas of the English School, which revolve around three basic concepts: the international system, the international community, and the global community. The definition and characteristics of each differ from the other, and in some writings of the English School we find that these concepts are nothing but a reflection of Hobbes and Machiavelli on the one hand, Grotius on the other hand, and Kant on the third hand. Some link them to Wight's three traditions in international relations: realism, rationalism, and revolution. The following is a detailed explanation of the three main concepts in the English School.¹

First, the International System:

The idea of the international system is linked to Hobbes, Machiavelli and realism, and revolves around "power politics" between countries, and places the structure and process at the heart of international relations, which are in turn characterized by chaos. This is certainly parallel to what came in realism and neo-realism, and thus we find that most of these concepts are studied outside the English school. It is ultimately concerned with positivism, materialism, rationalism and structural theories. Hedley Bull says that contemporary international society is still chaotic so far, as long as there is no global government that can resolve disputes between sovereign states.²

Second, International Society:

The term international society is associated in the writings of the English School with Grotius and rationalism. Some call it State-System or Interstate Society or Society of States. It is about the institutional transformation of common interests and identities between states and the reform of shared norms, rules and institutions and making them the heart of international relations. The basic idea of international society is that just as humans and individuals live in societies that they influence and are influenced by at the same time (i.e. they shape them and are constrained by them), states also live in an international society that they shape and are influenced by.³

According to Bull's definition, the international community emerges when "a group of states that perceive the existence of a certain corporate interests and values among them, form a community. That is, they see themselves bound by a set of common rules in their relations with each other, and share in the work of common institutions. It is worth noting that this definition has multiple uses within the English school itself. Some see this definition as a set of ideas in the minds of statesmen. Others see it as a set of ideas in the minds of political theorists, or as the third group sees it, it is a set of concepts imposed from outside that define the material and social structures of the international system. Thus, the international community owes a debt to

¹ Griffiths, *Op, Cit*, p 224.

² Hedley Bull, *Does Order Exist in World Politics*, in "Paul R. Viotti, Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory, Fifth Edition*, Pearson, 2014, p26.

³ Michael Cox, *Op, Cit*, p.87.

the formal and informal institutions that regulate the behavior of actors and allow for international cooperation.¹

Bull argues that this system can exist among states that do not feel that they belong to a common civilization, but rather the pragmatic need is sufficient to produce "diplomatic culture", that is, that Treaties and institutions that maintain order among nations divided by culture and ideology, he adds, will be stronger if they are based on an "international political culture," that is, if nations share the same general way of life. An example of this is the European community of states in the nineteenth century, which was based on an international political culture, but as this community expanded to include all parts of the world, the sense of belonging to a common civilization declined. Nevertheless, the basic rules of international society, which developed initially in Europe, were accepted by many former colonies, which are now equal sovereign members of the first global community of nations. This is the only example of diplomatic culture at the present time.²

Wight says that international society is a "social contract" between "societies" that in turn have emerged from their social contract. But because states are entities that are fundamentally different from human individuals, this "international society" does not correspond to—or is not the same as—internal society. Bull believes that international society must be studied differently. This view is somewhat consistent with realism about international chaos and the image of the international system and its mechanism of operation. However, adding the "social element" gives states a perception of the image of the system, which gives them their behavior or how they interact. If units share a common identity ("religion, system of government, language") or even a common set of norms and rules (such as diplomatic behavior), then the common self-understanding ("intersubjective understanding") shapes their behavior and identities, and defines the links in the social system.

It was legitimately denied equal membership in the international community, and so was denied equal membership. If the West and China did not recognize each other as equal members, how could we describe their relations? Although there was much "interaction" between China and the West, it was driven by strategic and economic reasons. But more importantly, neither side saw itself as part of the same shared values and institutions. For a long time, China resisted the presence of European diplomats on its soil, and rejected their extraterritorial jurisdiction, despite the fact that such control had long existed among European powers. Thus, until 1942, China was part of the system of states but not a member of the international community.³

(2) Non-state actors: Sovereign states are not the only element in the international community. Historical observation indicates the existence of diplomatic networks similar to the Catholic Church and the powers granted to some non-state actors, which had the right to wage wars or occupy territories, which were handed over to commercial companies belonging to the imperial era. In addition to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), some of which have political influence and participate with the United Nations in drafting multilateral international treaties.⁴

(3) Common interests: such as trade exchange or freedom of movement, or simply the need for stability. The higher the levels of dependence, the more likely states are to establish institutions

¹ Barry Buzan, *An Introduction, Op Cit*, p12.

²Michael Cox, *Op, Cit*, p.84.

³ *Ibid*, p. 12.

⁴ *ibid*. p. 12.

with the aim of achieving future interests and goals. However, the independence of sovereign states remains a limiting factor in achieving common goals. For example, the Treaty of Westphalia established rules that would maintain an international system of sovereign states. However, the outbreak of war meant the collapse of this “order.” Bull believes that despite the First and Second World Wars, certain laws of war were respected, and even after the war, an attempt was made to build a new world order based largely on the same rules and institutions that were in effect during the pre-war era, which is evidence that the element of “society” has always been present in the modern state system. Some academics criticize all of these views.¹

State societies exist because most societies wish to restrict the use of force and to civilize their foreign relations. Here the question arises: Are some countries more inclined than others to achieve the values of the international community and protect its institutions, or is the advantage reserved for countries that seek to impose their will on others? The English School writers believe that the international community can be multi-sectarian and include countries with radically different cultures and systems of government, and this is the central task of diplomacy from their point of view. The English School writers were not convinced that members of the international community should have the same ideology. The issue here is related to the extent to which the “inside” influences the “outside”, meaning to what extent the constraints of the state of chaos can overcome these preferences, i.e. how the inside influences the outside and vice versa. An example of this is how the principles of international legitimacy have changed over the centuries. The principles of monarchical government were replaced by the idea that the people - or the nation - are the true owners of the power of sovereignty, and in the process the rules governing membership in the international community changed. These principles of legitimacy determine the area of convergence between international and domestic policies. They are the prevailing principles - or at least the declared ones - within the majority of the states that make up the international community, as well as the relations of these states with each other. It is worth noting that this point in particular explains the American claims that legitimate members of the international community must respect human rights and adhere to democracy.²

- International community measurement levels

International societies have two types, namely pluralism and solidarism, and they are specifically linked to the debate about order and justice, where Bull coined these two terms, and they have become two central concepts of the typical debate in the English school.

▪ Pluralism:

The term refers to the societal disagreement regarding the centrality of the concept of the state, where sovereignty and non-interference are elevated in order to contain and support the continuity of cultural and political diversity. This means maintaining the status quo and preserving the system. Bull says that pluralism emphasizes that an unjust system does not achieve stability and therefore the system constitutes the state of justice in this case.³

The institutional framework of a pluralist international society is oriented toward the freedom of states and the maintenance of order among them. Rules are complied with because, like traffic rules, they are relatively inexpensive to follow, but the collective benefits are great. Pluralist

¹ Paul Keal, *International Society and European Expansion*, in: *Richard Devetak and Others, an Introduction to International Relations*, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 246.

² Barry Buzan, *an Introduction*, Op, Cit, p 13.

³ Paul Keal, *Op Cit*, p 145.

rules and norms provide a structure for coexistence, based on mutual recognition of states as independent and equal members of society, on self-help, and on the freedom of states to pursue their own goals subject to minimal constraints. In other words, the English School saw great powers, limited wars, and the balance of power as “institutions.” By this term, Bull and others were referring to practices that helped maintain international public order, practices that had evolved over centuries. For example, if a balance of power is necessary to preserve state freedom, then status quo powers should be prepared to intervene to check the growing power of a state that threatens the general balance.¹

▪ **Solidarity:**

Multilateralism has been accused by critics of failing to deliver on its promises. The continuity of interstate wars throughout the twentieth century suggests that the norms of sovereignty were insufficient to deter ambitious states. Moreover, the norm of non-intervention—which was central to multilateralism—entitled international elites to mistreat their own citizens. Some have thus moved toward a different conception of international society in which universal values, such as human rights, place limits on the exercise of state sovereignty. This idea is summed up in the term “solidarism,” in which the ties that bind individuals to the larger human community run deeper than the pluralistic rules and institutions that divide them.²

What does this term refer to? Bull defines solidarity as: “the collective force of international law and the guardianship of the principle of human rights.” Solidarity differs from cosmopolitanism in that the latter is merely institutional arrangements for the production or generation of universal values; they believe that global government is the best form. Conversely, solidarity is merely an extension of an international community, not a transformation of it. Like pluralism, solidarity is defined by shared values and institutions and is established through legitimate rules and laws, but it differs in the content of these values and the type of rules and institutions. In the international community of solidarity, values are the cornerstone of basic rights. This in turn requires updating patterns of sovereignty so that members of the international community bear the duty and mission of intervening to preserve and protect these rights. However, Bull was hesitant about examples of solidarity, saying that imposing human rights by force constitutes a danger to the “international order” and thus reaching a state of global solidarism constitutes a threat rather than a benefit.³

- Levels of the international community and its institutions:⁴

▪ **Power Politics inter-state Society**

It is defined as signs of hostility in the first place “which is the origin of international relations” and the possibility of war, and thus it gives little or no space to primary institutions. Survival is the primary goal of states “and there are no common values”. There are no secondary institutions in this society. The power politics society needs authoritative means of communication even if it is to “make” enemies, as well as in diplomacy. Historical experience indicates the existence of some institutions such as “monarchy”.⁵

¹ Martine Griffithes, *Op., Cit*, p. 216.

² Tim Dunne, *Op, Cit*, p255.

³ *Ibid*, p255.

⁴ *Ibid*, p257.

⁵ Paul Keal, *Op, Cit*, p142.

▪ **Coexistence interstate Society**

It is defined on the basis of the Westphalian model of the balance of power system where the latter is an organizational principle accepted by the great powers, war and international law. All of the above are basic institutions of the international community. This is Bull's pluralistic society, and it approximates the experience of modern European history up to 1945. In "functional" terms, these classical institutions cover sophisticated means of "formal" authority communication (i.e., "diplomacy"), membership (i.e., sovereign states), limits on the use of force (i.e., war, balance of power, and great power management), property (i.e., territory), and agreements (i.e., international law). In the context of "membership", colonialism is an option for such a society, providing a venue for expansion outside the "core". Regional international societies can thus exist as a smaller global society, characterized by a less dense network of patterns, rules, and institutions.¹

▪ **A Cooperative Interstate Society**

A cooperative society is defined as: developments that follow the society of coexistence, and this model goes beyond the society of coexistence, and thus contains a rich set of secondary institutions. It is not difficult to imagine that sovereignty, "territorial" property, nationalism, diplomacy, and international law continue to be important, despite some modifications and interpretations, or in other words, "reconsiderations of the nature of these institutions." Consider the United Nations, the European Union, and the debate over unilateralism and multilateralism, and we find that the administration of great states continues to be considered. Cooperative societies are characterized by an evolution in membership, in institutions concerned with agreements, and by stronger restrictions on the use of force. Such societies reduce the incidence of war "as an institution."

▪ **A convergence interstate society**

It is based on the development of a wide range of "common values" present in the group of states, which leads them to adopt similar policies, legal and economic forms. This not only employs strong institutions that cover all functions, but also precisely defines the conditions of membership. It is worth noting that what determines the type of this society is the Model of political economy agreed upon by the member states: liberal democracy, Islamic theocracy, hereditary monarchy, empire, totalitarian communism, and so on. This choice determines the practices and legal systems that define the institutions. Some pluralistic institutions may remain in operation, although some institutions are no less important, such as war and the balance of power. Third, World Society:

It is the third element in the English school trilogy, and the concept of world society is parallel to the concept of international society, except that there is one basic difference, which is that it "refers to the common interests and values that bind all parts of the common human homeland, human community. The definition of world society includes everything outside the international community, such as: the demands of individuals for human rights, the demands of indigenous peoples for self-rule and the need for transnational institutions to penetrate the sovereignty of states, in short, it is the cosmopolitan culture. One of the indicators of this is the increasing importance of transnational values rooted in liberal concepts of rights and justice. Transnational identities can be based on ideas characterized by hatred and fanaticism. An example of this is in

¹ *Ibid.*

a large group of global public opinion polls that showed that the strongest prevailing loyalties are to religious beliefs and not to the state.¹

If the international community focuses on states as members, the world community reaches beyond the state towards the image of global citizenship, and although the idea of the community The global community poses a challenge to the idea of international society, but the latter is better and clearer from the point of view of many. The global community represents confusion and even an obstacle to thinking about the social structure of the international system. The main reason for this is the failure of the English school to differentiate between a stereotype theory and a theory of patterns. Therefore, the English school follows Wendt's structural interpretation because the latter took both: the social structural readings of international society and the rejection of traditional models in international relations.⁽²⁾

Many believe that the concept of world society was the least fortunate in the English school, as it did not receive sufficient attention or appropriate conceptual development. Buzan believes that:

(1) The English school needs to clarify the idea of world society in relation to other concepts.

(2) The English school will not develop unless the idea of world society, which is one of the pillars of this school, is strengthened and clarified.

(3) The concept of world society can be used to enrich the concept of globalization. Little believes that the concept of world society is one of the: "most ambiguous concepts in the English school." We find that there is a conceptual agreement in linking the international system to realism and Hobbes, as well as in linking international society to rationalism and Grotius, and there are no difficulties in understanding this. However, linking world society to revolutionism and Kant rings many bells: revolutionism is outside the scope and far from everything that can be explained about international society. It is not clear how Kant's ideas fit into this picture. For example, we find concepts that come together to form the idea of the global community, such as transnationalism or global ideologies. However, this is not available in the global community, and worse than that, the global community lacks a global system that distinguishes it and completes it, unlike both the international community and the international system, which form a clear and distinct group that distinguishes between "physical-material systems" and "social-non-material systems".³

Some try to explain the meaning of the term global community, saying that it is an idea that is concerned with individuals, non-governmental organizations, and the global population as a whole, and considers them the focus of global social identities. The revolution associated with the name global community means: forms of global citizenship, and some believe that this may include the communist idea, but Wæver confirms that today it only means liberalism. This interpretation is linked to Halliday's statement that the English school does not pay enough attention to revolution. This view is close to the idea of transnationalism. The global community does not focus on the nature of the state, but gives importance to the transnational element, and does not rely entirely on individuals.⁴

¹ Barry Buzan, *Op Cit*, p. 16.

² Tim Dunne, *Op Cit*, p 270.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

Hence, it can be said that the global community clearly aims at a "non-" international system - socially constructed, but what is the material part? Some see that transnationalism is linked to the global community as it is linked to the international community and to the same degree, and this does not add anything and does not clarify anything, and Bull proposes the idea of a world political system to play the role of the material component of the global community, so that it consists of the interaction of states in addition to non-state actors. Bull did not go beyond this idea and said that there is no need to add any complications. The theorists of the English school left all the concepts that they did not want to delve into in the global community as if this concept is a place for unspoken ideas.¹

Another problem facing the global community is the disagreement over the nature of the relationship between the global community and the international community. A return to the history of this relationship confirms that the world community "in the form of a common culture" is a prerequisite for the international community. Wight says in this regard: "We must assume that a system of states-systems – such as the international community – will not actually begin unless there is a degree of cultural unity among its members. Bull accepted the existence of a general common aspect for the basic historical cases of international communities: "the existence of these international communities on a common cultural background or a common civilization." Most historical examples recorded from ancient Greece to modern Europe support this idea, meaning the necessity of a common culture to reach the stage of the international community. In the case of the expansion of the "European" international community, countries of a different culture may join this community, which raises questions about how the internal patterns, rules and institutions existing in different civilizations "interact," whether they are different, and whether international norms are permanent under these conditions or not."²

International community from the global community is the levels of state and non-state actors, and the extent of the difference between them. The difference between "material" and "social" concepts is in line with the basic lines of both the international system and the global community, and these "material and social" concepts must differentiate between the world system and the world society. In addition, there is an increasing need to clarify the "social" differences between the international community and the global community, as well as the applications of these concepts in order to understand "pluralism" versus "solidarity". Finally, the units of analysis that define the "global community" are individuals and transnational actors, and whether they can be considered to interact with each other or are merely theoretical concepts, it is necessary to keep them separate from each other.³

• First- and second-level societies:

First-level societies are human beings, and they represent the first building block or raw material in sociology. Everything that falls under the name of world society is a first-level society. As for second-level societies, they are not individuals, but rather continuous groups of humans, such as states, which in turn consist of identities and actors that are more than just a numerical sum of their parts. As previously mentioned, the English school rejects the analogy between what is "inside" the state and the international community⁴, as it sees it differently. The term first- and second-level societies is not common, but the idea of an international

¹ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social structure of Globalization*, Cambridge, 2004, p190, 191.

² Ibid.

³ Michael Cox, *Op., Cit.*, p. 85.

⁴ Tim Dunne, *Op., Cit.*, p.370.

community requires accepting something like second-level societies. From the perspective of the English school, international relations is concerned with second-level groups, a subject neglected by sociology.

• Primary institutions and secondary institutions:

This term represents the heart of the idea of international society. It is linked to the common use of the institution, which can be understood either in

- (1) a specific context as an organization or facility that specializes in certain things. Or
- (2) in a general context as a set of norms, laws and patterns of relations in a given society.

- Primary institutions: This refers to norms, laws or patterns of relations in a given society. They are deep and interconnected practices that appear to have "emerged" and not been "designed" - the idea of mechanism or spontaneity - these practices are not only shared by members of the international community but are considered legitimate behavior among them. Primary institutions relate to the common identity of members of the international community by which they are known not only as the basic character but also as patterns of legitimate behavior in their relations with each other. ⁽¹⁾

For example, we find that the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and ownership, the balance of power, war and diplomacy, international law and the management of the system by great powers in addition to nationalism, market forces are all primary institutions. Primary institutions can be found wherever states exist.

- Secondary institutions: These are those that concern liberal institutions and are related to the organizational use of the term. This in turn produces specific forms of international society, "mostly liberal," which are arrangements between governments designed and formed by states to serve specific functional goals, including: the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Secondary institutions emerged as part of industrial modernity in the last decades of the nineteenth century. ²

3. The Basic Assumptions of the English School

There is no doubt that the English school sets basic assumptions that form its theoretical framework. The following is a detailed explanation of these assumptions: ³

▪ The first assumption:

The world can be understood as an anarchic or international society, as it consists of "states" and "non-state" actors at the same time. The emphasis here is on the concept of "Society", which is not accepted by realists, as they emphasize anarchy.

The concept of "order" in an anarchic society plays an important role in the theory. The order does not simply result from power and the balance of power, but rather arises from the acceptance of rules, laws, and institutional arrangements that are characterized as rational interests, whether for states or for other actors. Similar to classical realists, supporters of the

¹ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social structure of Globalization*, Cambridge, 2004, p. 190, 191.

² *Op cit.*

³ Michael Cox, *Op, Cit*, p. 85.

English school realize the importance of both power "the material component" and ideas, values, and patterns.

As we can see, realists, liberals and neoliberal founders use the concept of rationality as a basic assumption in their theories. However, the English school looks at rationality differently. As Groitius, the father of international law, says, the rationality of the English school means the rules, laws and institutional arrangements that states create to provide a degree of order in an anarchic international society. Contrary to what realists assert about defining structure according to the degree of polarity or distribution of power, the structure of the English school approaches the institutional framework based on agreed-upon rules.

▪ The third assumption:

The English school recognizes Kantian ethics and moral understanding, but this is balanced by the pragmatic view of an anarchic society in which power and interest remain important.

Some say that the English school is thus a "middle way" as it differs from realism and idealism in that it recognizes the importance of institutions and their ability to moderate modernization and contain the risks present in chaotic international life. However, a reading of the literature of the English school indicates that it is close to idealism.¹

We conclude from the above that the English school is a school of international relations that views the world as composed of international actors who have agreed on common standards that make their behavior predictable. Thus, actors share public institutions that represent the patterns, rules and practices that govern the behavior of members of society. In addition, members who violate civil society institutions are punished by other members, with punishment ranging from verbal warnings to direct military intervention.²

The following is a detailed explanation of the basic ideas in the English school, which revolve around Martin Wight's idea of the three traditions and Hedley Bull's idea of the basic concepts of the English school. Wight says that through the history of the modern state system, we notice the existence of three competing traditions:

1- Hobbesian or realist tradition, which describes international relations as a state of war of all against all, a state of complete conflict between states and in order to achieve the interest that is characterized as a zero-sum game, meaning that what one party gains, the other party loses completely. International activity from Hobbes' point of view is only war and peace is only the times in which there is no war, as war is the origin of international relations.

2- Kantian or universalist tradition, which goes to the opposite and takes international politics not to the conflict between states but to transnational ties that link individuals to each other, those individuals who are citizens of states. The most important topic in international relations from Kant's point of view is the relationship "between" states, which in turn focuses on the relationship between individuals in every meeting of the human species. In a society that includes all of humanity "all humans", the interest between them is one and constant, and therefore international politics - according to this perspective - is not a zero-sum game as Hobbes claims, but rather a complete and perfect cooperation between humans.

3- Gratian or internationalist tradition: It is a vision that stands in the middle of the distance between Hobbesianism and Kantianism, as Gratianism describes international politics in the

¹ Tim Dunne, *Op, Cit*, p.370.

² Barry Buzan, *From International, Op Cit*, p 17.

form of a society of states "Society of States". That is, unlike Hobbesian culture, we find that Gratianism does not involve states in armed conflicts, but their conflicts are limited and regulated by common rules and institutions, and unlike Kantianism, we find that it accepts the Hobbesian claim that states or sovereigns are the reality and basic entities in international politics and not individuals. States are members of the international community and not individuals of the human community. Grotius understands international politics as neither a complete struggle between states and their interests nor as completely identical interests, but rather as a game of chance and loss. The main international activity for Grotius is not war between states nor a horizontal "transnational" struggle between states but trade, or, let us say, economic and social intercourse. According to the Grotian view of international behavior, states are bound in their dealings with each other by the rules and institutions of the society of which they are a part. Adherence to the law is part of the Grotian doctrine as is acceptance of and cooperation with the other.

4. Criticisms of the English School

The English School faces many criticisms, some of which can be listed as follows:

- 1- The basic assumptions of the English School dilute the concept of sovereignty in international relations.
- 2- While most international relations theories recognize the state as the primary actor in international relations, we find that the English School elevates the status of non-state actors such as civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations. Through human rights laws and patterns, it elevates individuals and places them above the state.
- 3- The English School is a purely European conception, as the state emerged in Europe and then the idea of the nation-state was exported to the entire world. It is therefore a European success story, and it ignores the events of control, colonialism, and even failure in the international arena. It places the world "against" the West. All of this raises the question: How will non-European countries join the international community, and how will Europe accept non-European countries as members of the international community?¹
- 4- How can we build the foundations of a pattern of "patterns" for an international community made up of countries with many cultures, including Islamic, Hindu, Confucian, and African, alongside Western civilization and values?² However, some argue that the English school allows comparisons to be made between different regional international communities that may differ significantly in actors and institutions³.

¹ Barry Buzan, *From International, Op Cit*, p 27- 28.

² *ibid*, p28.

³ *Ibid*.

The third theoretical debate: post-positivist formation versus interpretive positivism

- **Debate between liberalism and structuralism**

The debate between the liberal school and the structural school crystallized around the nature of the international system and the nature of the interactions that take place between its various units. The two schools share belonging to the field of international political economy, which is one of the fields branching from the field of international relations, and is concerned with studying the patterns of the relationship between political and economic factors in international affairs. However, unlike the first debate between the idealist school and the realist school, which took place within the framework of the same intellectual perspective, which is the traditional perspective, the debate between the liberal and structural schools began from two different intellectual perspectives in the field of international relations, namely the pluralistic perspective from which the liberal school emerged, and the radical global perspective from which the structural school emerged.

The pluralist perspective began to crystallize starting from the sixth decade of the twentieth century, heralding a perspective revolution in international relations in the sense indicated by Thomas Kuhn. This perspective is sometimes called the "cobweb model", indicating the intertwining of international units like a spider's web, and distinguishing it from the traditional perspective called the "billiard ball paradigm", in which countries collide like balls collide on a billiard table. The pluralist perspective presents a different concept of international relations, based on the fact that world politics is a highly intertwined and interconnected policy, and it is based on a perception of human nature as including components of good and evil, and that human behavior is essentially a result of the environment surrounding the human being, who adapts his behavior to the data of that environment. Hence, the central question in this perspective revolves around the nature of the environmental conditions that push the individual to adopt cooperative or conflictual behaviors with others. It follows from this that the state is not the only one that determines the conditions of peace and security in the international system, as many units participate in this.

Others that play an important role alongside the state, such as multinational corporations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Thus, international relations consist of a very complex and intertwined fabric of units in which the state is one element. The world community perspective also sees the state as a pluralistic entity, where those who act in the name of the state are human beings organized within the framework of diverse political groups (interest groups, political parties, the government), and these groups may not necessarily agree with each other on the concept of the national interest, but rather the decision is taken based on the process of push and pull, agreement and discord between these different groups. Accordingly, the world community perspective emphasizes the diminishing importance of international war as a direct result of the global nuclear balance and the gradual diminishing importance of military power in the international system after the importance of economic and cultural power increased, as well as the transformation of international relations into a zero-sum game in light of the intertwining of international economic relations, which transforms international relations into a type of mutual dependence based on negotiation, bargaining, exchange and compromise instead of wars.

This debate took place between two main perspectives in international relations, the positivist perspective and the post-positivist perspective, and focused explicitly on the issue of science in the history of international relations, in addition to the nature of the horizons of international relations theory. The positivist school dominated the study of international relations for several decades, based on the theory of experimental knowledge or the empirical theory of knowledge, which is the theory that was based on the similarity between the natural sciences and the social sciences in terms of the unity of the method and tools of analysis, and adopted the concept of sensory experience as the only legitimate source of knowledge in the field of social sciences. The positivist school represented the philosophical framework from which the traditional theories in international relations and their branches emerged, such as the realist theory, the liberal theory, and the Marxist theory. The positivist school also started from the main hypotheses of the behavioral school, but in a deeper and more comprehensive way. These hypotheses can be summarized in the following points: A. Systematic observation as the basis of science: The goal of the philosophy of science is to produce strict logical rules regarding the methodological tools and standards used in the study of social phenomena, which are the standards that link knowledge to the principle of observation. These rules are what allow us to distinguish between scientific knowledge and knowledge based on belief. B. Unity of science: Social sciences, like natural sciences, aim to arrive at theories or general laws that organize social phenomena, as the process of collecting data on social phenomena through repeated observations of these phenomena leads to the discovery of regular behavioral patterns, which results in arriving at general laws to explain social phenomena. Therefore, general laws are nothing but an expression of the relationships between patterns of events that can be observed. C. Distinguishing between facts and values: Science does not take into account phenomena or variables that cannot be observed, which means that the positivist school neglects to attempt to build deep ontological conceptual frameworks.

for variables or entities that cannot be directly observed, such as ideas, perceptions, discourses, and intentions. Psychological and factors But with the advent of the eighth decade of the twentieth century, a group of writings began to appear that criticized the methodological foundations based on positivism as a basis for the philosophy of science, which paved the way for the emergence of the post-positivist movement and the beginning of the crystallization of the debate between the positivist school and the post-positivist school. Several factors combined to create the intellectual basis on which the debate between the positivist school and the post-positivist school was based. The third technological revolution led to a massive industrial and military expansion that in turn resulted in the deterioration of the environment and the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, which threatened the fate of humanity itself, especially with the connection of that revolution to the issue of discovering the secret of the cell code and the possibility of cloning and genetic engineering, i.e. controlling the biological composition of humans. This revolution also led to the expansion of the global market and the increase in global communications, which in turn resulted in a broader movement of interaction between cultures, especially since some of those were able to produce Special models of development within the framework of traditional cultural values, which posed a challenge to the Western model of development. In addition, the clarity of some of the negative effects of globalization in the economic field, such as the negative impact of trade liberalization on the lower social classes, led rationalists to realize that reason may be the source of the problem, not the solution. Also, traditional

theories in international relations have all failed to predict the end of the Cold War, indicating that there is a major gap in these theories that made them unable to anticipate major events at this level of importance. Finally, the state of dissatisfaction in the academic field has increased with the issue of focusing on the method more than the content. This type of scientific research neglects human nature and makes people feel a high degree of misunderstanding and frustration. These factors combined led to the crystallization of the postmodern perspective, which is a comprehensive intellectual perspective that appeared in various social sciences and was expressed in the context of international relations as a post-positivist or post-international relations perspective. Postmodernism is an intellectual movement that presents new visions of existence, as well as the values that man seeks to achieve. The basis of this movement is the call to create a new civilizational awareness that is based on the concept of "civilizational diversity" and "the relativity of knowledge", and the rejection of traditional concepts of science, rationality and objectivity on the basis that they are illusory or unachievable in the best of circumstances. It also calls for respecting the differences between human formations, considering them to be of an essential nature, and focusing on the fine details that science neglects in the context of its call to reach a general theory, or laws and generalizations. This intellectual movement also calls for giving the elements of self-esteem and intuition the role they lost as a result of the dominance of the concept of "rationality". The ultimate goals are left to the imagination, and the mind cannot set any restrictions on the possibility of changing the goals and the type of knowledge required. It also asserts that there is no type of knowledge that is better than another because there are no criteria for distinguishing between knowledges. In short, it is a movement that drops criteria, and leaves diversity and distinction.¹

¹ The third theoretical discussion was analyzed based on the books used in the study.

Liberal Theory in International Relations**1. The intellectual and cognitive structure of classical liberal theory**

The term "liberal" acquired its explicitly political connotation during the early 19th century with the formation of liberal parliamentary groups in countries like Sweden and Spain, subsequently spreading across Europe. These emerging political parties adopted the label "liberal" to convey their support for evolving democratic systems such as those in Britain and, particularly, the United States. Their stance contrasted sharply with conservative opponents advocating a return to pre-revolutionary governance. Nevertheless, the term is frequently associated with a much older tradition, tracing back to the works of John Locke, who, in the late 17th century, philosophically and theologically defended principles like popular sovereignty and religious tolerance. Due to its long history and varied interpretations over time, "liberalism" has become a somewhat ambiguous concept. Its meaning shifts significantly depending on temporal and regional contexts. One entry in a reference text captures this complexity succinctly, highlighting the difficulties faced by lexicographers in defining such an evolving term.¹

The issue is further complicated by the tendency to use "liberalism" as a broad term of either praise or condemnation in political discourse. Many liberals themselves have attempted to define liberalism in such a way that only the profoundly misguided or malevolent could oppose it. Furthermore, various liberal parties, politicians, and philosophers often disagree on what constitutes the "original" or "true" meaning of liberalism. This divergence is particularly evident when economic liberals conflict with proponents of "social liberalism" over fundamental debates about the state's role and extent of involvement.

However, it is possible to identify some key strands within liberal thought. A commonly recognized distinction is made between "classical" and "modern" liberalism. According to Ryan, classical liberalism is associated with figures like John Locke and Adam Smith, as well as later thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Friedrich von Hayek. This tradition typically advocates for a minimal state, limiting government responsibilities primarily to security, law enforcement, and public goods that cannot be easily privatized—commonly described as a "night-watchman state." For thinkers like Locke, the state is seen as a freely established agreement among individuals, justifiable only as long as it respects its original mandate. Any overreach risks legitimizing rebellion. Classical liberalism therefore often overlaps with what is referred to as "economic liberalism" and supports laissez-faire policies, which align it closely with what critics and supporters alike label neoliberalism.²

¹ Dag Einar Thorsen and Amund Lie, *What is Neoliberalism?*, Department of Political Science University of Oslo, p02.

² Ibid, pp 02-03.

Modern liberalism, by contrast, endorses a more active role for the state in both regulating markets and ensuring the provision of essential services and goods to all citizens. This represents a significant departure from traditional economic liberalism, redefining liberal values in light of societal and economic inequalities. While classical liberals advocate for minimal interference based on the belief that such policies maximize freedom and democracy, modern liberals argue that such an approach overlooks structural inequities and fails to uphold liberal ideals. The state, they contend, must intervene to achieve equitable outcomes.¹

This perspective has roots in figures such as Benjamin Constant and John Stuart Mill from the nineteenth century. More contemporary proponents include John Dewey, William Beveridge, and John Rawls, who emphasized principles like wealth redistribution to foster fairness and decency in society. Politically, modern liberalism leans leftward compared to its classical counterpart due to its endorsement of state-led efforts to create a more just social order.

Another division within liberal thought involves the ongoing debate between "liberal egalitarianism" and "libertarianism." While this dimension partly overlaps with the classical-modern divide, there are notable differences. Libertarianism can be seen as an intensified form of classical liberalism, emphasizing individual liberty—particularly economic freedom—above all else. Thinkers such as Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard represent this school of thought. In contrast, liberal egalitarianism offers a more systematic evolution of modern liberal ideas, with key contributions from figures like John Rawls and Bruce Ackerman.²

Libertarianism is marked by an unwavering prioritization of liberty, often downplaying other traditional liberal concepts such as social justice or democratic governance. This distinguishes libertarians from earlier classical liberals like Adam Smith or Tocqueville, who acknowledged the importance of these other values alongside economic freedoms. However, some later classical liberals like Friedrich von Hayek exhibit considerable affinity with libertarian thought, blurring the distinctions between these two perspectives.³

Ryan's introductory essay on liberalism offers an exploration of some fundamental principles categorized under what he refers to as three "liberal antipathies" and three "liberal prescriptions.", the core liberal antipathies include opposition to political absolutism, theocracy, and unrestricted capitalism. While the critique of unrestricted capitalism may seem unexpected, especially considering classical liberals' emphasis on commercial liberty, Ryan illustrates a critical distinction. Classical liberals like Adam Smith provided a balanced endorsement of the market economy, whereas modern libertarians often advocate for unrestrained markets, a stance Ryan subtly distances from "true" liberalism.⁴

On the other hand, the "liberal prescriptions" presented by Ryan are more recognizably aligned with common liberal principles. Liberalism, he explains, is a set of political theories emphasizing three key aspects. First, individuals should have the freedom to choose between diverse and meaningful options when making life-defining decisions. Second, society should

¹ *Op cit*, p04.

² Ryan Alan, *Liberalism*; pp. 291-311 in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.): *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ Dag einar thorsen and amund lie, *Op cit*, p06.

be governed by the rule of law and uphold democratic principles. Finally, state power must be exercised judiciously within constitutional limits, as envisioned by earlier liberals such as Locke and Montesquieu, through frameworks like the separation of powers.¹

The term "liberalism" itself is undoubtedly broad and highly debated. It typically denotes an inclination toward individual liberty and democracy, characteristics that could shape a person's political perspective or influence a nation's political culture, rather than representing a strictly defined set of doctrines. As a working concept, we propose understanding liberalism as a political ideology devoted to fostering, sustaining, and protecting constitutional democracy, limited government, individual freedoms, and those fundamental human and civil rights essential to a dignified existence.

This perspective partly draws inspiration from Giovanni Sartori, who emphasizes that liberalism is best understood as a practical theory for building and maintaining democratic systems and safeguarding individual liberties, rather than as an abstract or metaphysical view of humanity and society. Thus, liberalism transcends partisan ideology to serve as a shared tradition among those committed to ideals such as democracy and freedom. We contend that this definition surpasses many others offered over time by spotlighting the pragmatic dimensions of liberal politics and its central objectives. By avoiding metaphysical abstractions, this definition is perhaps more contentious than Gray's proposition but ultimately more politically relevant. After all, liberalism embodies what has long been regarded as an "essentially contested concept," as noted by scholars like Abbey (2005) and Gallie (1956).²

2. Methodological and theoretical assumptions of neoliberalism

Saad-Filho and Johnston assert that we are living in what they call "the age of neoliberalism." Alongside other contributors to *Neoliberalism – A Critical Reader*, they present a perspective that has gained considerable traction: the belief that the concentration of power and wealth within transnational corporations and elite groups is an outcome of implementing an economic and political ideology they term "neoliberalism." The publisher, in promoting the volume, goes a step further, describing neoliberalism as "the dominant ideology shaping our world today." Despite the emphasis on neoliberalism's apparent significance, Saad-Filho and Johnston acknowledge its elusiveness, stating it is "impossible to define neoliberalism purely theoretically".³

The issues surrounding neoliberalism's origin are equally complex. According to Clarke (2005), its emergence cannot be precisely dated, though its roots are traceable to classical liberalism, particularly the ideas of Adam Smith. Smith's economic theories, based on specific views of human nature and societal organization, laid the groundwork for what neoliberalism would later build upon. In this interpretation, neoliberalism serves as both a new paradigm in economic thought and policymaking—the guiding ideology of contemporary capitalism—and a revival of Smith's foundational principles from the 19th century.

¹ *Op cit*, p06.

² Sartori Giovanni, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987.

³ *Ibid*.

This trajectory is further detailed by Palley, who describes a "great reversal" wherein neoliberalism supplanted the Keynesian economic theories dominant between 1945 and 1970. Keynesianism, derived from John Maynard Keynes's work (1936), emphasized goals such as full employment and poverty alleviation, aiming for state-led stabilization of economies. However, by the 1970s, these priorities began to lose favor, making way for monetarist approaches, as championed by Milton Friedman. Since then, neoliberal principles—associated with monetarism and related theories—have prioritized limited state intervention in economies and placed greater emphasis on stability over social welfare initiatives.¹

Munck (2005) highlights the central assumption neoliberalism inherited from classical liberalism: belief in a self-regulating market. Neoliberal theory posits markets as the most efficient mechanism for allocating resources, while government interventions are often viewed as detrimental to this efficiency. Munck asserts that neoliberalism's influence extends across key contemporary discussions, shaping reforms in both international trade and the public sector. Its sway is such that one is compelled either to challenge neoliberal policies outright or assist in enshrining them further.²

3. Chronological development of neoliberal theory

While the recent surge in critical discourse portrays neoliberalism as novel, historical usage reveals its origins toward the end of the 19th century. The term first appeared in an article by Charles Gide (1898; 1922), a prominent French economist and leading figure in the cooperative movement. Gide's critique targeted the Italian economist Maffeo Pantaleoni, whose ideas he labeled "neoliberal." Gide used this term to describe what he perceived as a resurgence of classical liberalism rooted in Adam Smith's economic theories.

Despite Gide's introduction of the term, its usage remained sporadic and inconsistent for much of the early 20th century. This reflects its complex evolution and the varying interpretations it has undergone over time.

In contemporary critical literature, David Harvey distinguishes himself as one of the few scholars attempting a comprehensive definition of neoliberalism. His book, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism**, reflects influences from earlier analyses by Cros, Nawroth, and ver Eecke. Harvey's definition provides clarity on the nature of neoliberalism, describing it as a theory of political-economic practices that emphasizes advancing human well-being by creating conditions that foster individual entrepreneurial freedom and skills. This occurs within a framework marked by strong private property rights, free markets, and open trade.³

According to Harvey, the role of the state is pivotal in establishing and maintaining these institutional frameworks. For instance, the state must ensure the integrity of money and create structures such as military, defense, police, and legal systems to protect private property rights and uphold market functionality, even by force if necessary. In areas where markets do not naturally exist—such as land, water, education, healthcare, social security, and pollution—

¹ Palley Thomas I, *From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Shifting Paradigms*"; pp. 20-29 in Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston: *Neoliberalism – A Critical Reader*. London: Pluto Press.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dag einar thorsen and amund lie, *op cit*, p07.

they must be actively created through state intervention when needed. However, once markets are established, state involvement should be kept to an absolute minimum. This is based on the belief that the state lacks sufficient information to outperform market mechanisms and risks being manipulated by powerful interest groups within democratic processes for their own gain

Harvey's definition aligns strongly with his analysis that the world has experienced a shift towards neoliberalism in political and economic practices since the 1970s. His interpretation suggests that neoliberalism is not merely a revival of classical liberalism but represents a distinct economic theory that has taken the place of more moderated, Keynesian-inspired governance approaches labeled as "embedded liberalism." Neo-liberalism, in Harvey's view, diverges from traditional liberal values and functions independently. Notably, he highlights figures like Deng Xiaoping and Augusto Pinochet—who are not conventionally associated with liberalism—as influential figures in advancing neoliberal ideas. At the same time, other proponents of neoliberalism, such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, along with political leaders like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, advocate for it from explicitly liberal or conservative perspectives.¹

By encompassing a range of practices from Thatcherite policies to "socialism with Chinese characteristics," Harvey positions neoliberalism primarily as a theory of political-economic practices rather than a cohesive political ideology. Importantly, there appears to be no inherent connection between supporting neoliberal economics and adhering to classical liberalism.

4. Neoliberal Political Philosophy

Another perspective on neoliberalism is offered by Anna-Maria Blomgren (1997), who approaches it through normative political theory. In her critique of the political philosophies of Friedman, Hayek, and Robert Nozick, Blomgren categorizes their contributions under the umbrella of "neoliberal political philosophy." Her characterization overlaps with Harvey's definition but places greater emphasis on the internal diversity within neoliberal thought.

Blomgren identifies neoliberalism as a political philosophy prioritizing individual freedom and private property rights but notes its considerable variation in ethical underpinnings and normative outcomes. On one end of this spectrum lies "anarcho-liberalism," which advocates for complete laissez-faire policies and the abolition of government. On the other end is "classical liberalism," which supports a state whose functions exceed merely maintaining law and order. Neoliberalism is commonly perceived as a political philosophy prioritizing individual freedom and the right to private property. However, it is neither as simple nor as uniform as it may initially seem. It spans a broad spectrum in terms of ethical foundations and normative outcomes. On one end lies anarcho-liberalism, which advocates for complete laissez-faire approaches and the elimination of all forms of government. On the other end is classical liberalism, which supports a government with responsibilities beyond those of a minimalistic night-watchman state.²

¹ *Ibid*, p08.

² Blomgren, Anna-Maria, *Nyliberal politisk filosofi. En kritisk analys av Milton Friedman, Robert Nozick och F. A. Hayek*. Nora: Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 1997.

According to Blomgren, thinkers like Hayek, Friedman, and Nozick each provide distinct theoretical grounds for neoliberal policies and evaluations. For instance, Friedman initially appears to represent consequentialist neoliberalism, supporting deregulation, privatization, and significant tax cuts due to their assumed positive economic repercussions. However, upon closer examination, Blomgren argues that Friedman's policy recommendations are ultimately rooted in a conception of natural law. He believes these neoliberal measures align with human beings' inherently social nature, emphasizing the principle of allowing individuals the freedom to choose.

Similarly, Hayek is portrayed as a more conservative type of neoliberal. While his arguments occasionally align with utilitarian reasoning, his political thought also finds its foundation in natural law. A key element of Hayek's theory is the concept of a spontaneous social order—an organically emerging structure that he argues is more effective than artificial constructs in promoting individual freedom and collective well-being.¹

Nozick, on the other hand, represents a deontological branch of neoliberalism in his earlier works. He advocates for similar policies as Friedman and Hayek but grounds them in the belief that immutable natural rights are inherent to all individuals. This framework limits the state's legitimate role significantly. Nonetheless, Nozick does allow for state intervention to rectify historical injustices, even if such actions lead to substantial government involvement in the economy. Unlike Friedman and Hayek, Nozick focuses less on the practical outcomes of neoliberal policies and instead argues for them as ethically justifiable measures aligned with his views on justice and natural rights.

Blomgren's categorization of these neoliberal strands is not without challenges. Alternative interpretations suggest that Friedman's and Hayek's ideas may rest on indirect utilitarian foundations rather than natural law. Despite this complexity, Blomgren poses an overarching question: Is it meaningful to view neoliberalism as a unified tradition of political thought when it encompasses such diverse theoretical justifications? Or is it more appropriate to treat it as an umbrella term for a fluid set of political theories?

These theories span a wide spectrum—from Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism, which favors abolishing the state entirely, to the classical liberalism of figures like Mises and Hayek, who argue that a strong yet minimally invasive state is essential for social life and economic freedom. While these perspectives often converge in advocating for decreased state intervention and market-driven governance, their fundamental differences highlight the need for nuanced critiques rather than viewing neoliberalism as a strictly cohesive ideology.²

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Dag einar thorsen and amund lie, op cit, p13.*

6.Principles of liberalism

Drawing from the partially presented literature above, along with insights from other parts of this study, a definition of neoliberalism is proposed here—constructed chiefly on the moderate perspectives of critics such as Blomgren and Harvey. This definition aims to be more direct and effective, offering a perspective suited to a balanced and analytical understanding of neoliberalism and its role in the political landscape of contemporary society.

Neoliberalism can be described as a loosely defined collection of political ideologies, characterized primarily by the belief that the sole legitimate purpose of the state is to safeguard individual—particularly commercial—freedom, as well as strong property rights). This core conviction often leads to the conclusion that the state's role should be minimal or drastically scaled down, with any state activity beyond this limited scope being deemed unacceptable or overreaching (ibid.). On an international scale, this belief extends to promoting free markets and global free trade, with the only permissible regulations being those necessary to protect commercial liberties and property rights on a global as well as a national level.¹

Additionally, neoliberalism proposes that free-market mechanisms represent the optimal method for organizing the exchange of goods and services. Advocates argue that free markets unleash entrepreneurial creativity and individual potential inherent in human societies' "spontaneous order." They believe such systems enhance personal freedom, increase societal well-being, and ensure more efficient resource allocation.

Neoliberalism further incorporates a view on moral virtue. From this perspective, a virtuous individual demonstrates their ability to navigate market systems effectively, embracing market-related risks and adapting to their inherent volatility. In this worldview, individuals bear full responsibility for the outcomes of their choices: social inequalities or injustices are deemed morally permissible if they result from freely made decisions. Calls for state intervention to regulate market forces or address disparities are often dismissed as evidence of moral weakness or underdevelopment. Advocates might argue that such demands mirror the logic of totalitarianism.²

In this sense, neoliberalism operates not as a comprehensive political philosophy or ideology but as a set of loosely connected ideas about the state's ideal relationship with its surroundings. It offers no systematic theory regarding the organization of political processes—for example, it does not take a clear stance on democratic governance or the exchange of political ideas. As Harvey (2005) suggests, neoliberal policies can be effectively implemented within both autocratic regimes and liberal democracies. The central claim is that decisions should be left to market forces or individual agency wherever possible, reducing reliance on political processes to a minimum. Consequently, democracy itself might be sidelined if it obstructs neoliberal reforms or threatens commercial or individual freedoms. In such cases, neoliberals tend to advocate for governance by experts or legal instruments designed to bypass democratic resistance.

¹ Norberg, Johan (2001): *Till världskapitalismens forever*, Stockholm: Timbro. <http://www.timbro.se/bokhandel/pdf/9175664917.pdf>

² Dag einar thorsen and amund lie, op cit, p15.

As discussed earlier, neoliberalism is not simply a recent revival of liberalism, as its name might suggest. Instead, it can be understood as a radical reinterpretation of traditional liberalism. In this revised form, the classic liberal principle of "equality of liberty" has been reshaped into a call for unbounded freedom for the ambitious and their enterprises. In this sense, neoliberalism mirrors its counterpart, neoconservatism—a modern, distinct, and more uncompromising deviation from classic conservatism.¹

The title of the project associated with this discussion, **Politics in the Age of Neoliberalism**, implies that we have transitioned—or are in the process of transitioning—from a previous political and economic framework to an era dominated by neoliberalism. This perspective aligns with interpretations found in works like **The Critical Reader** and David Harvey's **A Brief History of Neoliberalism**. These analyses suggest a shift away from societies with significant space for democratic governance and political authority to ones where the conditions for politics have been drastically constricted by neoliberal reforms.

This claim invites several questions, especially regarding whether neoliberalism indeed defines the dominant ideology of our time. Is our world truly reshaped by neoliberal governance, creating societies structured around this ideology? Can we meaningfully describe our present era as "the age of neoliberalism"? Further inquiries arise about the trajectory and strength of neoliberal-driven reforms affecting public sectors, economies, and international trade. Are these reforms gaining momentum or showing signs of slowing down, potentially stalling altogether?

On a more conceptual level, these reflections call for scrutiny around the utility of "neoliberalism" as an analytical tool. Does invoking this concept help us better understand contemporary global developments, or does it risk distorting reality by emphasizing certain trends while neglecting others? Could it obscure counteracting forces that neutralize the influence of neoliberal-inspired reforms?

Thus, the core question persists: Is it accurate to describe today's world as living under "the age of neoliberalism"? Are the values and attitudes associated with neoliberal ideals as widespread and impactful as suggested? Perhaps it would be wiser to avoid drawing definitive conclusions. Instead, one might view this period as characterized by complexity, unpredictability, and fluidity rather than by any singular ideological dominance. Neoliberalism, while politically influential in recent decades, remains an inherently radical set of ideas—its global consistency and dominance open to debate.

Whether neoliberalism constitutes today's defining trend or represents merely a significant ideological moment with limited reach remains an open question. What appears clear is the need to further investigate purported neoliberal trends alongside other frameworks that might more precisely capture current societal and political transformations.²

¹ *Ibid*, p15.

² *Ibid*, p17.

Table 1: Shows the difference between liberalism and neoliberalism

Neoliberalism	Liberalism
Economic Focus Neoliberalism emphasises free market principles, limited government intervention, and privatisation of industries. It promotes deregulation and reducing barriers to trade.	Economic Focus Liberalism, on the other hand, supports a mixed economy with a balance of free market principles and government intervention to address social issues and promote equality.
Role of Government Neoliberalism advocates for a minimal role of government in the economy, believing that market forces should drive economic growth and efficiency.	Role of Government Liberalism, while supporting free markets, also sees a role for government in regulating markets, providing social safety nets, and addressing inequality.
Social Policies Neoliberalism often focuses on individual responsibility and meritocracy, advocating for limited social welfare programs.	Social Policies Liberalism, on the other hand, supports social welfare programs, healthcare, education, and other social services to address inequality and provide a safety net for citizens.
Income Inequality Neoliberalism may accept income inequality as a result of market forces, believing it can drive economic growth.	Income Inequality Liberalism is more concerned with reducing income inequality through progressive taxation, social programs, and policies that support a more equitable distribution of wealth.

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Source : www.economicsonline.co.uk.

The fourth theoretical debate: Constructivism as a bridge between positivism and post-positivism

1. Consistency problem: one or multiple constructs

Before analyzing the role of social constructivism as a mediating theory between contemplatives and rationalists, we try to unravel some of the puzzles of the theory at its epistemological, axiological and methodological levels.

Constructivism is a method for studying social relations, as indicated by one of its most important pioneers. While it overlaps with some other theories and approaches, it is a system or independent approach consisting of a set of concepts and assumptions that help the researcher study the relations between a group of actors in a specific system or structure. But it is not a theory in the positivist sense of the term, meaning that it does not provide general explanations for the behavior of individuals, or why one society differs from another. Nor does it provide an explanation or prediction of change in the world or the international system. What constructivism offers is to make it possible for the researcher to establish theoretical foundations related to things or phenomena that appear to be different, separate and unrelated, because the concepts used about these phenomena are usually separate, distant and incomplete. Constructivism is modern in the social sciences in general and international relations in particular. Since constructivism entered international relations at the end of the eighties of the last century, it quickly took up a large space in the literature of this science to be a strong competitor to traditional theories.

Although constructivism as a theory in the social sciences has become one of the basic theories that has become one of the most important theories in sociology, it did not enter international relations until the end of the eighties of the twentieth century. Many writings have emerged in this field, such as the writings of Alexander Wundt, Niklas Onoff, and Frederick Krutschwell, which contributed - to a large extent - to laying the foundations for this theory. The book by Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.¹

is one of the most important books that many academics see as a reference for constructivist theory. It clearly presented the basic assumptions of constructivism and the process of identity formation through the relationship and interaction between the agent and the structure. As for the Arabic language, it is not available. There is no study or even an article other than some excerpts in some simple international relations books. Hence, we see that this research constitutes an addition to what Basic assumptions of constructivism Paul Viotti and Mark Coby indicate that there are four assumptions from which constructivism in international relations² proceeds:

1 - Constructivism takes a position that differs from the position of positivist theories regarding basic concepts in international relations such as (national interest, identity, and national security), as constructivists refuse to accept these concepts as they are given. Constructivists are interested in non-state actors, such as international organizations and non-governmental organizations. In addition, constructivists focus on the cognitive and subjective factors that result from the interaction of these actors in their interrelations.

¹ Wendt, A, *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

2- Constructivists see the structure of the international system as a social structure that includes a set of values, rules, and laws. This structure affects identity and the interest of the actors.

3 - Constructivism, as its name suggests, views the international system as a permanent, ongoing process of construction resulting from the interaction between the actors and the construction itself. For constructivists, the world is always Of course - a different position from an renewed position, not something that has been It's over and we have to accept it as it is. This is what realists, liberals and even radicals see as building.

4- Followers of the constructivist theory have made serious contributions to the epistemological and ontological dialogue and debate in international relations. Constructivists reject the positivist assumptions of the existence of laws and quasi-laws that govern the social and political phenomenon, far from the will of the actor and his ability to influence his environment. Constructivism also rejects the positivist assumptions of the possibility of objectivity, i.e. the separation of the subject from the object. The starting point of constructivism is its basic assumption that man is a social being. In other words, we cannot be human beings without our social relations. That is, social relations are what have formed people as they are now. In contrast, we shape the world around us by what we do with the resources nature provides, and by what we say to one another. And sometimes, words are just as important as actions. What we say to one another becomes an important part of the makeup of the world around us.¹

In this direction, Nicholas Onuf wrote his book "Making our of World" which is considered one of the first beginnings of constructivism in international relations. For Onuf, states, societies and the world are nothing but the creation of people through their interactions between them and with the structure. The essence of constructivism is that people "individuals" create society and society creates people. This two-way street or this reciprocal process between society and people is the focus of constructivism.

Constructivists believe that in order to study this process, i.e. the mutual influence between the individual and society, we must start in the middle, i.e. from the mechanism of influence between the two parties. Therefore, constructivists present the concept of the rule in the sense of the controller, which in their view connects and links the individual and society. For structuralists, a rule is the statement that teaches us what we should do. Here, the word "what" constitutes the standard, measure, or model that people should do in similar circumstances

. 4 As for the word "should," it tells us that we must adhere to the rule, otherwise we will bear the consequences. Another rule applies to us, specifically for such a situation, of not adhering to the first rule.

All the methods that people take, whether by following the rules or violating them, by preserving them or changing them, are called practices. Those who actually carry out these practices are called agents, i.e. units within society, and society is the structure. In international relations, the agent is the state and the structure is the international system. Some constructivists believe that international organizations and some non-state actors can also be (an agent such as the state) and part of the process of interaction in international relations.

¹ Paul R. Viotti, *International Relations Theory*, 5th ed, London, Pearson, 2012, p.278.

However, no actor can be an actor in all situations and in all cases, but rather in some cases through which the interaction takes place between this actor and the structure in the course of this actor's behavior. From the above, we conclude that structuralism attempts to shed light on what Anthony Giddens called Duality, i.e. the mutual relationship between the two parties, so there is no behavior. The agent takes priority and the structure does not overwhelm the agent, society both are important to understand between the Process of Interaction but rather the process of exchange and interaction. and study it. Thus, Giddens has taken a middle position between the tradition founded by Max Weber, which takes the action of the unit (Theory) (Action) or the individual as its starting point in the study of society, which is called In the theory of action. On the other hand, the tradition that goes back to the works of Emil Durkheim, which focuses on society as an independent system in itself, its influence becomes great and direct on individuals. In 1984, Anthony Giddens' writings appeared, in which he referred to what he called the structural theory or the process of construction, through which the individual influences the construction of society, symbols, and norms. The construction influences the behavior of the individual, and the mechanism that links the two parties is the rules and institutions that individuals build. ⁵ This means that constructivists see the structure as a social construction resulting from the practices of the actors, which in turn are affected by this structure. One of the pioneers of this theory, Frederick Crouchwell, points out that values and rules not only establish a standard for us to behave, but also help us as actors to define our pursuits and goals through these rules and values and establish meanings for these values to become a basis that guides actors.¹

2. Constructivism in Alexander Wendt's research

One of the most important contributions in this direction was Wendt's article (Anarchy – as made or understood by states) through which Wendt indicated that anarchy (the absence of central authority from the international system) or the state of self-reliance in security is a vision resulting from a process of social interaction produced by the practices carried out by the actors in The international system, which has affected and been affected at the same time in the structure of this system. In other words, the vision of states of the nature of the international system and the consequences of this nature are the product of social processes and relations between the active units, which are states and their interaction with the structure of the international system. Social

Alexander Wendt's theory in its entirety was put in his book (Social Theory in Before we review this theory, we would like to point out an important point in the study of international relations, which is that when we read the title of the aforementioned book by Wendt, we must remember Kenneth Waltz's book (International Politics of Theory). This calls us to compare the two theories, and we believe that this comparison it is necessary because it summarizes the most important points that both the positivist and social constructivist trends focus on. ⁸

Waltz's book represents the positivist trend in the study of international relations, with its epistemological and methodological assumptions derived from the natural sciences. Waltz's book came in the second half of the seventh decade of the twentieth century at the height of what was known as the third debate in international relations, which is a debate between new

¹ Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism: a User's Manual" in Nicholas Onuf, Vandulka Kabalkuva, *International Relations in a Constructed World*, London, Sharp, 1999, p 38.

realism and new liberalism. It is worth mentioning that the two parties to this debate are from the positivist currents that believe in the possibility of studying the political phenomenon scientifically based on observation and experimentation, and in the possibility of separating the self from the subject (free value or objective), while Alexander Wundt's book came to respond to the new realism represented by Wiltzer's book *Theory of International Politics*, which is considered an example of positivist studies. Therefore, Wundt titled his book *A Social Theory of International Politics*, and did not title it *A Social Theory of International Relations*, or anything else, indicating that his theory, which he explained in his book, is equal to Waltz's theory, but adds many things, including the issue of identity and the relationship between the actor and the structure, which has become known in the literature of international relations as a controversy.

Here it must be noted that Alexander Wundt had benefited from the writings of Anthony Giddens in the field of structuralism in sociology. We must not forget that the situation that has prevailed since the eighties until now in the field of studying international relations is characterized by multiple visions and approaches that have given and provided the opportunity to look at more than one direction in international relations. Returning to Alexander Wundt's contribution to constructivism, it was clear from the beginning to Wundt that the fundamental challenge facing the researcher in particular and man in general is to find a correct understanding of the world around us which is independent of our will as we believe we assume that there is a world of it, a part of it, and we are contributing to it. Its construction The positivists, but this vision, says Wundt: It is specific and is affected by our interpretations and multiple visions that came as a result of the interaction between us as actors and the world around us as a construct and our ontological and epistemological positions about this world. Two important points stand out in Wundt's contribution, according to Paul Viotti and Marc Cobbe. The first is Wundt's view that the structure of human relations is determined to a greater extent by ideas than by material things. 10 The second point in Alexander Wundt's.¹

- **contribution is his statement:**

The interest or identity of the agent, whether an individual, a group or a state, is built or formed through these shared ideas and mutual interactions more than it is formed through material matters or nature. It is clear that Wundt's view of the being of international relations as social is the result of ideas, values, practices and rules that govern the relations between the units Agents and the structure, and they are more important than the material structure or material factors. More clearly, Alexander Wundt sees that states or individuals as actors in the name of states, over the course of days, make international relations in the form they are. Wundt's focus on the social aspect of the structure does not mean that he denies or eliminates the importance of the role of the material aspect of the structure in determining the behavior of states. On the contrary, he sees that this aspect is important and distinguishes between three types of visions of the concept of anarchism or the absence of central authority from the international system: 1 - The "Hobbesian" view, attributed to Thomas Hobbes 2 - The second view is called "Lockian" after Jean Locke 3 - The third view is "Kantian" after Immanuel Kantian

¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York Cambridge University Press, 1999.

✓ **Hobbesian View**

This view is characterized by being consistent and identical with the new realistic view of the structure of the international system, which sees that the absence of central authority from the international system makes States live in a state of uncertainty and fear of the increasing power of any other state; therefore, each state seeks to increase its own power, which leads to a system of "self-help", which leads to a kind of arms race and a series of successive measures of "self-help" policies that lead to a conflict of all against all.

✓ **The Lockean View**

This view occupies a middle position between the three views, as it is based on the political philosophy of Jean Locke, which in turn relies on the ideas of Hugo Grotius, who considers the state an independent, effective unit in the absence of central authority from the international system, and these states compete and struggle to achieve their interests. But this competition is through a set of rules agreed upon between countries.

✓ **Kantian View**

This view is based on the ideas of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who believes that the international system constitutes a society or a global system in which there are common values accepted by all units. The entire world is a home for humanity, as he does not believe that the absence of central authority means conflict and living by the law of the jungle. It is clear that if the actor or state adopts the first vision, which is closer to the new realism, the strong do what their power gives them.

States view the international system as chaos governed by the law of the jungle, and the weak accept what other powers impose on them.

On the other hand, if the actor adopts the second vision, which relies on John Locke's liberal thought, this means that the actor believes that the structure of the international system leads to cooperation and respect for international law and international legitimacy, and that it is in the interest of states to apply international law and cooperate to solve common challenges. Therefore, the owners of One of the most important assumptions is that it is not an international system, and this idea This vision is that there is an international community.

As for the third view, which views international relations as global and sees the necessity of The existence of a global government, like a local government, does not agree with the realistic view of the inevitability of conflict between states. However, Alexander Wundt rejects these views that see the "chaotic" nature of the international system as having an inevitably impact on the behavior of actors, without addressing the mechanism of forming the vision from a process of interaction through which actors contributed to forming this idea. In other words, Wundt says: Anarchy (the absence of central authority) means what the actors see, and this vision is not fixed and given, whether positive or negative, but rather it is a result of social relations and the processes of interaction between units with each other and units and construction. In addition, Wundt was interested in the relationship between ideas and material factors in social relations. And social interaction. His interest in this came because he was seeking to understand how material factors and ideas interact with each other in nature in general and human relations in particular. Wundt wonders about the relationship between

(mind and body) and the issue of human consciousness in this relationship. In this field, Wundt rejects the claim that the mind is always dominated by external material factors that it goes back to the assumption that the individual's view, due to this material dominance, is that the truth and reality around us are nothing but a material environment or world. In the formation of consciousness, the material "social life" Consciousness, as Wundt sees it, is the basis and the intellectual (Ideas), and it (consciousness) is not separate from human action, but on the contrary, it is part of this Action. In response to the followers of the "Rational Choice Theory" who exclude the role of personal and intellectual factors and their impact on the behavior of the agent or individual, and believe that material factors are the prior and determine the thoughts of the individual; this means that awareness comes in second place for the followers of the Rational Choice Theory. But Wundt believes that this view is - to some extent - incorrect, and he believes that in the formation of consciousness, ideas and material factors play a dual role in a process in which one does not cancel out the other.¹

3. The most important concepts in the constructivist theory

The basics of international relations as seen by the followers of the constructivist theory.

Each theory has analytical tools and concepts that it relies on in its vision and understanding of a particular phenomenon. For example, realism has concepts such as national security, power, interest, etc., while interdependence, integration, the liberal theory relies on the concepts of Such as international cooperation, Her vision of international relations employs the constructivist theory some concepts shared with other theories, even if its vision differs in the meaning and role of these concepts.

✓ The concept of the state and power among constructivists:

For the followers of constructivism, international politics cannot be analyzed and understood by focusing only on the structure of the international system, as the new realists believe. Those who see that the structure of the international system (the distribution of power in the international system) in an automatic and mechanical way affects the behavior of states. Rather, the constructivists reject this generalization in the effect of the international system on the behavior of states. In contrast, the constructivists see that states behave in this way as a result of social relations and their interaction with the structure of the international system, which constitutes a framework. Socially, it is one of the rules and values by which countries behave. From this we conclude that the constructivists insist that international politics is not necessarily governed by force and interest alone, as there are principles, values and concepts such as sovereignty and non-interference that have become part of the Sometimes --some of these units, even if they are penetrating the social control of the behavior of states.

factors that contribute to the ability of states such as (land, population, economy, as well as military). Although there is no unified definition of the concept of power even among realists themselves, the most common definition is that of Robert Dahl, who He says: Power is the ability of the agent (A) to force the agent (B) to do something or refrain from doing something that (B) would not have done had it not been for the ability of (A). As for the constructivists, the concept of power is a social construction in itself, the meaning and effect

¹ خالد المصري، النظرية البنائية في العلاقات الدولية، مجلة جامعة دمشق للعلوم الاقتصادية والقانونية - المجلد - 30 العدد الثاني، 2014، ص ص 322-324.

of which are determined through the interaction between the active units in the international system and the construction that contains it. This interaction. The main actor As for the state, for the constructivists it is a social structure and a political unit But it is not the only one in international relations.¹

✓ **The national interest in the constructivist theory:**

Another concept in international relations that is considered one of the most important and most ambiguous concepts is the concept of the national interest. The concept of national interest is considered one of the central concepts of realism, as it is viewed as something owned by countries, built over time, and based on some foundations, the most important of which are the geographical location of the country, the resources it contains, the population, the strategic goals of the country, and other factors. Critical trends in international relations raise many questions about the concept of national interest and do not consider it as something given or predetermined, but rather point to a set of points and questions such as whose interest? Because the followers of critical theories do not believe that the state is an integrated unit that acts with one voice (Actor Unit), but rather there are many classes, groups, and power centers that contribute to defining the national interest. As for constructivism, the national interest is not something objectively defined, but rather it is a project that is constantly being formed and differs with The difference in time and social relations of the actor. Constructivists are very interested in the relationship between interest and identity, and how ideas determine interest, or vice versa. In simple terms, the followers of constructivism believe that identity, ideas, and interest are concepts that cannot be discussed without one another.²

✓ **The importance of identity in the constructivist theory:**

The concept of Identity is an important concept for constructivist theory followers, not only because it helps to determine the interest of the actor, but it is also important for the making of public policy of the state. Constructivists assume that identity grants or defines the actor a role in international relations; thus, the actor will always act in a way that he sees fit for this role. For example, a group of studies have shown that belief The prevailing view among Germans after World War II of the Europeanization of Germany and the importance of European integration led to different policies than before. Likewise, the British belief and identification with Atlantic relations determined Britain's role in relations with the United States of America. In addition, structuralists focus on the factors and methods that determine the identity of the actor and how this identity changes. They are thus somewhat close to post-modernists; by describing what is called the Other and employing this approach to analyze and describe identity. This method is based on the fact that every identity has an opposite or different standard. The absence of the other negates the existence of the ego and identity. However, constructivists are distinguished from postmodernists in that they do not start from linguistic or philosophical foundations, but rather from social psychology. Numerous studies of human groups or communities have shown that these groups differentiate between those

¹ المرجع السابق، ص 324.

² المرجع نفسه، ص 326.

who belong to the group and those who are outside this group (Insiders and Outsiders) and they acquire their identity from this distinction.¹

4. Constructivism as a bridge between positivism and post-positivism

As we have seen in this research, the development of the study of international relations has been through debates between various currents, as the recent debate or what is called the current debate in international relations has witnessed a great debate between theories during the crystallization of this debate, which began to crystallize positivism on the one hand and post-positivism on the other. On the other hand, The possibility of following positivist theories from the following hypothesis: The eighties of the last century. It has studying international relations using scientific methods used in the natural sciences. We have also seen that positivist theories focus on observation and experimentation in obtaining knowledge and on objectivity in research. As for what is later sometimes these trends are rationalist trends.

In some scientific and away from values. It is called positivism, criticizing the epistemological assumptions of positivism and giving great importance to the social forces and factors that positivist trends have neglected. These trends also focused on culture, history and ideas as factors that play a major role in international relations. As for constructivism, it takes from positivism its interest in the state as a basic actor in international relations and that the national interest and national security are determinants of the actor's behavior. But it also takes from post-positivism trends the focus on identity, ideas and values. The national interest for constructivism is not, as the positivists believe, always defined by national security or a fixed given, but rather it is the result of the process of interaction between the actor and the structure, and here comes the role of ideas and identity, and this is what the followers of critical trends (post-positivism) focus on. At the end of this research, we can summarize briefly the basic points of the constructivist theory: Its followers consider it a group of

1 - Constructivism does not constitute a single theory in the positivist sense, but rather refers to the different approaches that share several points, the most important of which is that it questions any assumption that stems from the fact that there are facts and things that exist. And it is specific and far from our will, as it sees that our world is a process or a project that continues to be built through the interaction between the agent and the structure.

2 - In the view of many, constructivism is the bridge between the positivist currents, or what are sometimes called rational trends on the one hand, and the critical or post-positivist trends on the other hand.

3- Constructivism derives its approach from social theories; therefore, we find it focusing on the social aspect of international relations, in contrast to the mechanical material approach to the international system followed by the new realism that gives priority to social factors.

4- Constructivism focuses on the role of values, norms, culture, and identity, and this is what distinguishes it from theories that take interest as the basis for analyzing international relations, such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism.

5- Values, rules and institutions play an important role in the interactions between units, and they contribute to creating the societal environment in which individuals interact and feel that

¹ المرجع السابق، ص 328.

they belong to a society. For constructivists, states, like individuals, interact with each other and with the structure as well, and from this interaction a society arises, the rules and values of which form its social structure.

6 - The constructivists believe that the concept of national interest needs to be explained and studied instead of considering it as something given as it exists without any question about the nature of this concept, how it is formed, and who defines it. Therefore, constructivists seek to study and demonstrate the mechanism through which national interest, values, and rules interact and identity is determined, and thus the behavior of the state or actor on the external level is determined.

7- One of the most important pioneers of constructivism is Alexander Wendt, as his contribution to the study of the idea of matter and its impact on explaining the change in the nature of the international system is one of the most important things that constructivism has provided in this field.

8- From a methodological standpoint, the followers of constructivism rely on social theories and the employment of historical processes to explain the interaction between the actor and the structure. It is worth mentioning the distinction between multiple entrances within the building. As previously mentioned, Alexander Wendt focused heavily in his study on the epistemological foundations of the actor and the structure, while the studies of Nicholas Onuf came to highlight the social ontological aspect of international relations, as Onuf gives importance to the role of Language and the impact of discourse on the structure of building and organizing international relations. This is what makes some thinkers believe that Ono intersects with the ideas of Ma Post-modernism and critical theory¹.

¹ Nicholas Onuf, Vendulka Kubalkouva, *International Relations in a Constructed World*, Sharp, London, 1998 P 65.

From Social Constructivism to Postmodern**1. Theories Postmodernists and the demolition of the cognitive and theoretical systems of positivist trends****✓ Cognitive perspectives to control and define the etymology of the concept:**

Robert Swan asserts that although there is no agreement on its roots, the use of the concept of postmodernism dates back to the late nineteenth century, while Jamil Hamdawi points out the confusion in attributing the term to its first use. Some attribute the use of the term to the British historian Arnold Toynbee in 1954, while others link it to the American poet and critic Charles Olson in the late 1950s, while they refer it to the cultural critic Leslie Fiedler in 1965. However, research into the origins of the term has revealed its use long before these dates. John Whitaker Chagman used the term postmodern painting in the 1870s, and Rudolf Bangis used the term in 1917. Postmodernism first appeared in the field of painting, sculpture, architecture, and civil engineering, and then moved to philosophy, literature, art, and technology, reaching the field of international relations in the late 1980s, and it came in the context of complexity. Political circumstances such as the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the spread of nuclear weapons, the declaration of the birth of human rights, and the emergence of irrational philosophies such as existential surrealism, Freudianism, and nihilism. The deconstructionist philosophy introduced by Jacques Derrida represented a bridge for transition and crossing from the philosophy of modernity to the philosophy of postmodernity.

As a philosophical movement, it can be considered a broad reaction to the philosophical assumptions, values, and intellectual point of view that characterized the modern stage of Western European history¹, that is, in the period extending from the emergence of the scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries until the middle of the twentieth century. As a concept, Richard Denitack argues that defining the meaning of postmodernity is a controversial issue through the different terminology of this trend, as there are those who use the term post-structuralism. Post-structuralism, and sometimes we find the term deconstruction, defined by "Stephen Smith" as being primarily concerned with deconstruction and refusing to trust any description of human life that argues that it possesses the truth, while "Ian Cribb" sees it as a group of developments in modern philosophy that emerged directly from what has become known as the linguistic turn, while "Jean-François Lyotard" defines it by saying very simply, "I know postmodernism as a tendency to doubt the direction of beyond narratives"². Prominent thinkers in various disciplines have contributed to strengthening and enriching the intellectual trend represented by postmodernism, as we find the pioneer of post-structuralist philosophy "Michel Foucault" who was very interested in the concept of "discourse, authority and power", while "Jacques Derrida", the pioneer of deconstruction in modern philosophy, was interested in deconstructing alien culture and

¹ Smith, S, *New Approaches to International Theory*. Oxford University Press. University Press, 1997, p 34.

² Wendt, Alexander, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics'. In *Der Derian, James (ed). International Relations Theory; Critical Investigations*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995.

undermining its central categories through criticism and dissection in order to expose the dominant Western institutions.¹

There are those who approached the concept of postmodernism from four perspectives:

- ✓ The philosophical perspective: which sees postmodernism as evidence of the void in the absence of modernity itself;
- ✓ The historical perspective: which sees postmodernism as a movement away from modernity or a rejection of some of its aspects;
- ✓ The ideological and political perspective: which sees postmodernism as an exposure of Western ideological illusions;
- ✓ The strategic perspective: which sees that approaching postmodern texts is not bound by methodological standards and that there is not a single reading but rather multiple and open readings.²

2. Postmodernism: an extension or a reaction to the advocates of postmodernism

To understand the intellectual foundations of postmodernism, we must rely on what modernity has provided in its cultural and historical view of the world, which implicitly assumes positive progress based on the elevation of objective truth and individual values. Modernity, in the view of most philosophers and thinkers, is based on two basic ideas, which were the main motive and driver for the development of both Western thought and society, starting from the Enlightenment era and up to the present day. They were represented in the idea of revolution against tradition or heritage and the idea of the centrality of the mind, the form of man and his individual value as the center of this modernity. Therefore, modernity was considered a conscious moment based on the regularity of rationality, individualism, secularism and free values in the civilizational impulse capable of bringing about profound transformations in the social and structural environment of society. Although modernity was created to liberate man, in the context of its general development, it placed him in new forms of slavery, the slavery of the mind, and this self was alienated. From its human components.

In the name of modernity, man became a machine, and this task was undertaken by thinkers who were resentful and rejected modernist thought, as they sought to undermine individual foundations and demolish the central categories that dominated Western thought such as language, identity, origin and reason, so they tried to break away from logos, tradition and what is known, and open up to others through dialogue, interaction and intertextuality. Jean-François Lyotard presented in his famous book "The Postmodern Condition" a report on knowledge that was published in (1979) and announced the fall of the major theories and ideologies and expressed through it the reading or interpretation of reality; because these intellectual systems suffer from stagnation and closure, so it opened a new door or starting

¹Smith Steve, *Epistemology Postmodernism and International Relations Theory: A Reply to Osterud*. *Journal of Peace Research*, 1997 vol.34 (3) p.330-336.

² Anthony Burke, *Postmodernism*, Published: 02 September 2009, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0021> , P359–377.

ground to establish a new concept, which is the postmodern concept, and its assumptions were manifested in the following:¹

- Demolishing rigid intellectual systems and closed major ideologies and replacing them;
- Working to remove the modern contradiction between the self and the subject, and between the rational side and the spiritual side of man, based on the absence of such a metaphysical duality;
- Rejecting the natural and historical determinism that prevailed in the modern era, especially the concept of linear development that recorded its presence in the social systems of postmodern thought.

Jamil Al-Hamdawi excelled in collecting and presenting them as follows:

- Undermining: Postmodernism aims either to undermine the foundations of Western thought and destroy its central foundations using deconstruction mechanisms;
- Skepticism: The most important thing that postmodern philosophy does is to question the knowledge that claims to be certain, and even questions the possibility and ability to reach knowledge that can be described as certain;
- Nihilism: One may contemplate the essence of postmodern philosophies and find them nihilistic and chaotic, based on the absence of meaning and the undermining of reason, and do not offer practical and realistic alternatives; ⁽²⁾
- Disintegration and harmony: Unlike the philosophy of modernity, which adopted order and harmony and aimed to unify texts and discourses, postmodernism opposes the idea of universality and, in contrast, calls for difference, disorder, and the dismantling of what is organized and familiar;
- Dismantling the major central categories: Postmodernism aimed to refute and invalidate the dualities on which the modern Western mind was based.
- Openness: While modern structuralism tended toward internal closure and lack of openness to meaning, external context, and reference, postmodern philosophy adopted openness as a means of interaction and understanding;
- The power of liberation: Postmodern philosophies work to liberate man from the oppression of institutions that own discourse, knowledge, and power, and to liberate him from the illusions of ideology and the philosophy of the center;
- Beyond truth: Postmodern thinkers deny the existence of a certain and fixed truth;
- Getting rid of standards and rules: Foucault believes that the text or discourse has multiple meanings and is open to different readings.¹

¹ Tipps Dean C, "Modernization theory and the comparative study of national societies: A critical perspective", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 15 (2): 199–226, 1997.

² Smith Steve, and others (eds). *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.

3. Epistemological and methodological foundations of postmodernists

Postmodern thinkers declare their complete rejection of positivist epistemology and the emancipatory approaches presented by modernist philosophers and take a hostile position towards the claim of the existence of an absolute or universal truth. They drop the traditional distinction established by positivism between theory and practice on the grounds of the existence of philosophies that separate the subject from the subject, which make objectivity and neutrality possible. But do postmodernists absolutely destroy any possibility of knowledge? The answer is no because they advocate a relative, pluralistic and historical knowledge that is subject to criticism and review.

As a theoretical approach, reflexivity or contemplation starts from the radical opposition to positivism when it rejected the idea of the existence of objective standards independent of human thought and practice. In short, it can be said that ideas, words and language are not advantages that reflect or give an exact copy of the real or objective world as positivism envisions them, but rather they are tools by which we create and develop our knowledge.

As for the methodological level, postmodernists raised questions that reflect their epistemological concern about positivism's claims about truth, summarized by "Juan Elias" as follows:

- To what extent can we really have empirical facts that can be proven about world politics?
- Is it really possible to reach a general theory in a neutral scientific way?
- Does the claim of neutrality devoid of values obscure the fact that theories serve the interests of powerful groups in society?

Postmodern philosophy has added to the displacement of epistemological concern at the same time to methodological changes and transformations, as it began to focus on the concepts of cultural relativism and move away from the concept of "grand theories" with a total tendency.²

4. Deconstruction in Jacques Derrida's research:

Jacques Derrida presented his theory by criticizing structuralist thought, and the term deconstruction that Derrida came up with was not intended to destroy and sabotage, but rather to rearrange the elements of discourse, and the term deconstruction at its deep semantic level indicates the deconstruction of discourses and intellectual systems and reconsidering them according to their elements. Deconstruction, as Derrida expresses it, is a structural and anti-structural movement at the same time,³ We deconstruct a structure or an artificial event to highlight its structure, sides and structure, but we deconstruct at the same time the structure that does not explain anything, as it is not a center, principle or force. Deconstruction; It is a method of confinement or analysis that goes beyond the critical decision. Among the most important concepts that deconstruction worked to demolish are the centrality of language, the centrality of reason, and the centrality of truth, which until recently constituted guiding

¹ جميل حمداوي، مدخل إلى مفهوم ما بعد الحداثة، نقلا عن www.alukah.net، تم تصفح الموقع يوم 2024/11/28.

² see encyclopedia, Britannica article of postmodernism, [http www.britanica.com/ebchecked](http://www.britanica.com/ebchecked).

³ Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority' in Cornell et al (eds) *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, Routledge, 1992.

models that dominated the Western mind. ⁽¹⁾ Deconstruction first starts from the distinction between what is written and what is spoken, as the spoken has a prior priority over the written. Hence, the written is the load of the spoken. The linguistic words that we pronounce do not have any external existence or subjective influence, but rather are merely auditory images that we represent when we conjure up concepts. In its analysis of discourse or text, deconstruction aims to deconstruct the text as it is incoherent and as it produces meanings that cannot be assembled. Thus, the deconstructive reading of the text reveals the ambiguity of the linguistic sign between the referential meaning and the metaphorical meaning. Deconstruction examines the contradictions that the text or discourse carries, those contradictions that are hidden behind the stability that the text suggests.²

5. The most important cognitive assumptions of postmodernists in the field of political science

✓ The contradiction in understanding international reality

Postmodernism starts from the set of ontological foundations, the doctrine of contradiction in its tripartite study (the author, the text, and the reader), on the basis that the author dies as soon as he writes the text and his role ends and the burden falls on the reader through his interpretation of the text, and there is no single idea that dominates the text and thus its interpretations are multiple, so employing intertextuality in understanding the text gives a fundamental role to language in understanding and perceiving the social world, as language is what plays the fundamental role in constructing reality.

✓ Postmodernists acknowledge that

Despite all these contributions of the advocates of postmodernism, such as its position against political totalitarianism and intellectual monism and the call for open intellectual and methodological systems, its contribution to the crystallization of a new vision in the field of political science and international relations is modest because it has remained centered around the epistemological and methodological criticism of traditional theoretical trends based primarily on positivism and rational empiricism. In this regard, the American Marxist thinker "Frederick Jameson" sees in his book "Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Capitalism in its Current Stage" that the ideas advocated by postmodern theory are a superstructure and its critical vision of traditional interpretive theories is an expression of the bankruptcy of this theory and its cognitive starting points through its quest to reconsider many concepts and epistemological analytical tools such as knowledge, reality, reason, and truth, which are difficult to subject to international reality. Despite this, it represents one of the most important intellectual and methodological approaches that are expected to establish a qualitative shift in the study of the field of international relations.³

¹ Jacques Derrida and John D Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida* (Fordham, 1997).

² Jacques Derrida, *Letter to a Japanese Friend* in Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth G Rottenberg (eds) *Psyche: Interventions of the Other Volume III*, Stanford University Press, 2008.

³ عبد الناصر جندلي، التنظير في العلاقات الدولية بين الاتجاهات التفسيرية والنظريات التكوينية، دار الخلدونية، الجزائر، الجزائر العاصمة، الطبعة الأولى، 2007، ص 331-335

From Traditional Marxism to Neo-Marxism**1. Traditional Marxism: Research into the Foundations and Epistemological Starting Points**

The Marxist approach to theorizing international relations is rooted in a profound philosophical foundation, primarily represented by dialectical materialism. This concept is largely associated with the work of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and, to a lesser extent, Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), who collaborated with Marx on works like the *Communist Manifesto*. However, dialectical materialism was not an entirely new creation of Marx; rather, it emerged as a significant adaptation of the intellectual legacy of his predecessor and teacher, Georg Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831).

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) served as the intellectual bridge between Hegel and Marx. Feuerbach was the first to reinterpret Hegel's idealist dialectic through a materialist lens, proposing that world history should be seen as the unfolding of matter, rather than the development of spirit or mind, as Hegel posited. While Marx was deeply influenced by Feuerbach's reinterpretation, he also embraced the scientific materialism prevalent in his era. This dual influence shaped Marx's enthusiasm for science, his belief in progress, and his alignment with evolutionary ideas such as those presented by figures like Karl Dettoun.¹

Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) later expanded the ideas of Marx and Engels into what became known as Marxism-Leninism—a cohesive ideological system that gained prominence as the official doctrine of the Soviet Communist Party during the latter half of the 20th century. Under Joseph Stalin, Marxism-Leninism was elevated to an almost sacred status, becoming the unchallenged intellectual framework for Soviet philosophy. Philosophical discussions in Russia during this time remained tightly bound to this ideological paradigm, with little room for deviation. Indeed, historical accounts of philosophy from this period rarely mention individual philosophers or writers contributing to Marxist philosophy, as their work primarily consisted of reiterating and reaffirming the ideas of Marx and Lenin.²

✓ **The foundational principles of dialectical materialism:**

Dialectical materialism is constructed on several foundational principles that shape its understanding of social reality:

1. ****Naturalism****: Humanity is viewed as merely a part of the broader entity of nature. This perspective rejects the notion of human beings as fundamentally distinct from other natural entities.
2. ****Empiricism****: Emphasis is placed on the supremacy of the scientific method, which is seen as the sole means to apprehend reality. Anything beyond the scope of these methods is dismissed as a meaningless or illusory problem devoid of significance.

¹ Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, London, 1971, p. 1.

² Marx, *Preface to a Critique of Political Economy*, in *Selected Works*, vol. 1 Moscow, 1969, p. 503.

3. **Rationalism**: This philosophy firmly adheres to rationality and analytical methodologies, upholding their value and importance as irrefutable.¹

✓ **Understanding dialectical materialism:**

Dialectical materialism serves as a critical advancement on traditional materialist ideas within the context of European philosophy. It posits that the material world is the single, tangible reality deserving of contemplation, and views the human mind as a derivative product of material existence—material in origin and tied to the physical brain. It dismisses any substantive divide between "matter" and "consciousness," asserting such distinctions only hold relevance in theoretical frameworks of knowledge. In existential terms, however, matter is all-encompassing. While not inherently contradictory to traditional materialism, dialectical materialism critiques it for neglecting the dialectical aspect of reality, which results in an inadequate understanding of development and change.

✓ **Core concepts of dialectical materialism:**

1. **Dialectical development**:

Dialectical materialism interprets matter as perpetually undergoing transformation and evolution. Through this continuous process, newer, more complex forms emerge. Change occurs through a gradual accumulation of incremental quantitative modifications within an existing entity. At a certain threshold, these accumulated changes disrupt the entity's equilibrium, leading to a qualitative shift that establishes a new state. According to this framework, conflict serves as the engine of progress—a driving force that propels development through systemic shifts and transformations.

2. **Monism**:

Dialectical materialism advocates for perceiving the world as an interconnected and unified whole, rejecting metaphysical notions that posit multiple unrelated entities. This monistic view also asserts that the world functions according to consistent causal laws. Consequently, it denies the existence of anything beyond material reality—such as God or immutable principles like morality or ideals. The eternal element in this worldview is matter itself, governed by its intrinsic, unchanging laws of development throughout time and space.

3. **Determinism**:

Development, according to dialectical materialism, occurs without any preordained purpose or teleological goal. Instead, it results from the interplay of purely causal forces manifesting through constant clashes and conflicts. These interactions unfold systematically, following permanent, consistent, and measurable laws governing change and progression.

Dialectical materialism posits that in the dynamic relationship between consciousness and matter, matter is fundamentally primary, while consciousness (or the mind) is secondary, arising as a result of material conditions. This perspective leads to the conclusion that consciousness does not govern or shape matter directly; instead, it is matter that influences and directs consciousness. The materialistic and deterministic elements of this view are central to dialectical materialism. However, Marx presents a more nuanced approach, arguing

¹*Ibid.*

that matter doesn't directly control consciousness but does so indirectly through the intermediary role of society, linking the individual to the material world.¹

Marx's intensive analysis of this interplay between matter and consciousness underpins the foundation of what is termed "historical materialism." He identifies humans fundamentally as social beings, unable to sustain themselves outside the context of societal collaboration. Within this collective framework, the means and methods of production play a pivotal role in shaping human relations—connections forged around production activities and reliant upon them. Consequently, these productive forces extend their influence to condition human consciousness itself. Economic needs dictate the forms of production and the resulting social relations which, in turn, reflect and modify human awareness. As modes of production continuously evolve—and even conflict—society becomes subject to the principles of dialectical change, which manifest in class struggles.

In essence, human consciousness is socially constructed, undergoing alteration and diversification alongside economic development.

✓ On Realism

By asserting that matter shapes consciousness, dialectical materialism insists upon a realist theory of knowledge grounded in objective facts. It contends that the process of knowing involves independent objects of knowledge existing outside and apart from the knowing subject. Knowledge arises as reflections or representations of these objective realities within the consciousness of the subject; in this view, knowledge mirrors material existence rather than fabricating it.

Traditional Marxist Theories

**1. Karl Marx and the Theorization of International Relations

Marx's critiques of capitalism emerge from key philosophical propositions rooted in his interpretation of social history. He views history as a continuous progression aimed at achieving greater human liberation. For Marx, every societal transformation is driven by one primary mechanism: class struggle. This notion is encapsulated in his assertion from the *Communist Manifesto*—"The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles." Furthermore, Marx correlates social relations between classes directly with the characteristics of productive forces at any given historical stage.²

A significant portion of Marx's intellectual career focused on uncovering the underlying structures and dynamics fueling the capitalist mode of production. He meticulously analyzed the historical conditions leading to capitalism's rise in Europe, along with the class relations that define its functioning and historical trajectory. From his investigations, Marx concluded that capitalism contains an inherent structural flaw preventing its long-term sustainability. Rather than representing a permanent system, capitalism constitutes merely a transitional phase toward a "more stable, rational, and humane" socio-economic order.

¹ Kolakowski Leszek. *Main Currents of Marxism*, 3 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

² بيليس (جون) وسميث (ستيف)، عولمة السياسة العالمية، ترجمة: مركز الخليج للأبحاث، دبي: مركز الخليج للأبحاث، ط1، 2004، ص 268

The theoretical value of Marxist principles lies in their capacity for broader application; they offer insights into uncovering the specific historical laws governing the emergence, progression, and eventual disintegration of different societal systems. Moreover, these principles suggest dialectical inevitability—a more advanced social system will emerge from the contradictions within existing structures to better organize productive forces and relations.

However, Karl Marx himself did not extend his dialectical framework to systematically study non-European societies or trace capitalist expansion on a global scale. This gap set the stage for Vladimir Lenin's contributions, which built upon Marx's ideas to explore these unexamined dimensions. Over time, this synthesis became known as Marxism-Leninism, a framework later adopted as an official state philosophy by the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union for decades.

he theory of imperialism, as outlined primarily by Lenin, extends from Marxist philosophy concerning the development of the capitalist system. Simultaneously, Lenin's work serves as a theoretical response to revisionist currents, particularly those led by Edward Bernstein, which questioned Marx's assertions about the historical trajectory of capitalism. Lenin asserted that capitalism was progressing towards a new historical phase—monopoly capitalism or imperialism—which, rather than diverging from Marx's analysis, reinforced and ultimately validated his predictions about capitalism's path to eventual collapse. According to Lenin, imperialism represents the highest stage of capitalism.¹

Following in Marx's footsteps, Lenin aimed to construct a comprehensive framework to explain the rise of monopoly capitalism and to identify the internal forces and laws that drive its evolution. He observed that capitalist competition had reached an advanced stage characterized by the emergence of monopolies. This shift transformed competition into international rivalries, fostering "imperialist" wars and creating conditions ripe for a proletarian revolution that could dismantle the capitalist structure. Paradoxically, however, much of the foundational work in imperialism theory stemmed from John A. Hobson, a liberal English economist. During his tenure as a journalist for

The Manchester Guardian covering the Boer War in South Africa, Hobson became critical of capitalism after witnessing diamond monopolies' role in intensifying and prolonging the conflict. Hobson proposed that capitalist economies are inherently plagued by the dual crises of overproduction and underconsumption. Instead of redistributing surplus value domestically to elevate social welfare, capitalists sought to reinvest surplus capital abroad, giving rise to imperialism. In Hobson's view, imperialism can be succinctly described as "the attempt by industrial capitalists to expand surplus-value wealth through foreign markets and investment opportunities."²

German socialist theorists such as Rosa Luxemburg and Rudolph Hilferding further developed Hobson's insights, but Lenin emerged as the most prominent theorist of imperialism. His 1917 pamphlet **Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism** stands as an extension of Marx's analytical worldview. Lenin's primary contribution lay in broadening Marx's framework by situating capitalism within an intricate global structure. Lenin argued

¹ Prychitko David L, *Marxism and Workers' Self-Management: The Essential Tension*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991.

² *Ibid.*

that conflicts between the proletariat and bourgeoisie were omnipresent across geographical divides, stemming from the universal nature of class struggle. His analysis echoed Marx's renowned call: "Workers of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains." According to Lenin, rivalries among working classes of different nations dissolve when workers transcend the divisive ideologies imposed by dominant local bourgeois structures. Meanwhile, he observed that monopoly capitalism enabled a hierarchical global system. In this system, central powers exploit peripheral regions, and surplus value extracted from these peripheries is partially circulated back into central economies to appease the proletariat there. This dynamic led Lenin to revise the notion of unified worker interests at a global level.

From this perspective, one can interpret Lenin as the first structuralist theorist to recognize how the systemic center-periphery divide shapes relationships between bourgeoisie and proletariat worldwide. This observation plays a pivotal role in forming international Marxist thought by expanding its ontological foundations beyond nation-states—a sharp departure from realist and liberalist traditions. Lenin argued that social classes and their positions within global capitalist structures are more consequential in shaping international relations than state actors alone. These class dynamics determine both patterns of interaction among states and prevailing systems of domination and control within the global order.

It is important to note that Lenin's theory of imperialism held significant influence during the interwar period's debates about the causes of war, despite much of this discourse occurring as an implicit or "silent debate." This influence bridged classical realist perspectives centered on Western capitalist worldviews with broader systemic critiques of global power structures.

2- The theory of imperialism¹

Lenin's critical analysis of imperialism builds upon the Marxist framework regarding the evolution of the capitalist system while simultaneously addressing challenges posed by revisionist currents, particularly those led by figures like Edward Bernstein. These revisionists questioned Marx's assertions about the historical trajectory of capitalism, prompting Lenin to intervene theoretically. He asserted that capitalism was advancing into a new historical phase—monopoly capitalism, or imperialism—which, rather than deviating from Marx's observations, reinforced and extended them. For Lenin, this represented the highest stage of capitalism.

Like Marx, Lenin sought to construct a comprehensive theory explaining the rise of monopoly capitalism and the internal forces shaping its development. He argued that capitalist competition had evolved to a new qualitative stage with the dominance of monopolies. This shift transformed competition into international rivalry, leading to "imperialist" wars and fomenting conditions ripe for proletarian revolution and, ultimately, the dismantling of the capitalist system. Ironically, the origins of imperialist theory can be traced back to English liberal economist John A. Hobson, whose experiences as a journalist for *The Manchester Guardian* during the Boer War in South Africa exposed him to the destructive role of diamond monopolies in perpetuating conflict. Hobson argued that capitalist societies were consistently plagued by the issue of "overproduction and underconsumption." Rather than

¹ Barratt Brown, Michael. "A Critique of Marxist Theories of Imperialism." In *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*. Ed. by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe. London: Longman, 1972.

redistributing surplus wealth domestically to resolve this structural imbalance, capitalists channeled surplus capital overseas, giving rise to imperialism. This process involved expanding markets and investment opportunities abroad, defining imperialism as “the endeavor of [capitalists] industrialists to expand the channels of wealth resulting from surplus value by seeking [new] foreign markets and areas of investment.” Alongside Hobson, German socialist theorists such as Rosa Luxemburg and Rudolf Hilferding further developed these ideas, but Lenin emerged as the most significant theorist on imperialism.¹

In his pivotal 1917 work, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin extended Marx's insights with a broadened analytical perspective that incorporated the global dynamics of capitalism. His observations revealed how the fundamental conflict between the proletariat and bourgeoisie persisted irrespective of geography. This idea echoed Marx's renowned call for global unity among workers: “Workers of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains.” Lenin argued that workers' interests across nations could align if freed from the influence of their respective bourgeois ideologies. For the bourgeoisie, however, Lenin identified a hierarchical global economic structure created by monopoly capitalism. This system positioned a dominant center exploiting peripheral economies on the margins. Through this arrangement, surplus value extracted from peripheral regions was used by central bourgeoisie powers to elevate living conditions for workers in advanced capitalist nations. Thus, Lenin reevaluated the notion of global solidarity among workers while critically analyzing the contradictions within capitalism on an international scale.

Lenin can be considered one of the early structuralist theorists who emphasized that the interaction between the center of the capitalist system and its peripheries significantly defines the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This observation holds considerable weight in assessing the ontological foundations of international Marxism. Unlike the traditional perspectives of realism and liberalism, which often center on states as the primary actors in international relations, Marxism introduces an alternative focus—social classes and their positions within the broader structure of global capitalism. These positions play a crucial role in shaping the patterns of interaction between international units and the dynamics of domination and control that emerge within this system.²

Additionally, it is worth noting that the theory of imperialism gained prominence in debates surrounding the causes of war during the interwar period. Though often described as a “silent debate,” this discourse blended the classical realist (Western, capitalist-focused) perspective with the imperialist (Eastern, Marxist-oriented) perspective. However, its impact on theorizing about international conflicts remained limited. While realism attributed wars to the flawed nature of humanity and the anarchic structure of the global system, the imperialist viewpoint argued that wars arise from capitalism's inherent drive toward expansion. This quest for new markets and profitable venues for surplus value, extracted through the exploitation of peripheral regions by central capitalist powers, ignites conflicts among competing centers of capitalism. When mechanisms for peacefully distributing spheres of influence fail, these disputes escalate into war.

¹ *Ibid.*

² Kemp Tom, *“The Marxist Theory of Imperialism”*, In *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, Ed. by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, London: Longman, 1972.

The Dependency School marks a significant departure from earlier assumptions held by Marx, Lenin, and even staunch Latin American communists regarding capitalism. It challenges the notion that capitalism invariably brings industrial development to underdeveloped nations through its expansion. Marx envisioned that capitalism's global spread would dismantle regressive production systems and foster progress; however, history tells a different story. Rather than breaking these traditional structures upon contact with underdeveloped societies, capitalism fortified them by aligning with feudal forces to further its own agenda. This collaboration facilitated the extraction of surplus value from peripheral regions for the benefit of central capitalist nations. The American economist Paul Baran was among those who highlighted this reality in the mid-twentieth century, observing that monopoly capitalism no longer played a progressive role but rather acted as a barrier to industrialization in non-capitalist parts of the world to maintain monopolistic profits at the center.

The theoretical foundations of dependency theory emerged primarily from intellectuals linked to the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which operated under the guidance of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) during the 1960s and 1970s. This group aimed to explain why Latin American countries remained economically stagnant and underdeveloped despite decades of formal independence. Their disappointment with modernization theories and liberal assumptions about inevitable economic "take-off" in underdeveloped societies prompted them to seek more convincing answers. Key questions they addressed include: Why do Third World countries face persistent economic stagnation, trade imbalances, and monetary deficits? Why has replicating the developmental model of North America and Western Europe failed in much of the world? These inquiries formed the basis for understanding structural inequalities within global capitalism.¹

The lack of a unified and comprehensive theory of dependency is a notable gap in this field, as what currently exists is a set of theses and propositions emerging from inconsistent theoretical perspectives. While these perspectives converge in recognizing the reality of dependency, they remain divided in establishing a single theoretical framework to fully explain it. This lack of coherence led James Dietz to remark that the number of conceptual frameworks and theoretical trends within the dependency school surpasses the number of theorists contributing to the discourse on dependency itself. However, these trends are marked by their eclectic nature, giving an impression of methodological integration, to the extent that they might appear as components of a singular theory. It is within this context that two fundamental groups of dependency theory trends emerge: traditional trends and newer, evolving interpretations.

Raul Prebisch, as Executive Director of the ECLA Committee, stands at the forefront of the traditional trends within dependency theory. He extended Lenin's concept of exploitation between core and peripheral regions by highlighting the unequal trade relations that exist between them. Prebisch's unique contribution lies in his focus on global free trade mechanisms as perpetuating industrial stagnation in peripheral countries. Under his analysis,

¹ Koebner, R. and H. D. Schmidt. *Imperialism: the Story and Significance of a Political Word 1840-1960*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

peripheral nations are relegated to specializing in raw material production, which they exchange for manufactured goods from core nations through global market mechanisms. The crux of Prebisch's argument is that the terms of trade move inversely for raw materials compared to manufactured goods. Contrary to liberal political economy's assumption that all economies can benefit relatively from producing any type of product, Prebisch argued otherwise. For example, while the Windward Islands might specialize in growing bananas and import manufactured products in return, this trade relationship forces them to increase their supply of bananas disproportionately to maintain the same value of imports—a challenge compounded by international competition and limited demand for bananas compared to the growing demand for manufacturing goods.¹

Traditional dependency theorists like Prebisch, Paul Baran, and Paul Sweezy focused their analyses on the absolute losses inherent in peripheral-core trade relations. These thinkers disputed classical political economy's view of relative losses by emphasizing the enduring inequality embedded within such exchanges. Prebisch advocated an industrialization policy based on import substitution to counteract these dynamics. His approach supported protecting and nurturing local industries, enabling them to fulfill domestic demand while minimizing reliance on manufactured imports, aside from essential tools and technologies. However, when these strategies failed to trigger sustained development in underdeveloped countries, new approaches within dependency theory emerged. This paved the way for a generation of neo-Marxist, or neostructuralist, thinkers, including theorists such as Theotonio Dos Santos, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, A. Gunder Frank, Arghiri Emmanuel, and Samir Amin

2. Neo-Marxist (Structuralist) Theories and Approaches

✓ Dependency School (Emerging Trends)

The neo-structuralist movement within the dependency school criticizes the traditional structuralists for being reformist, arguing that the import-substitution industrialization policies were designed merely to enhance the position of Southern nations within the capitalist global economy. Traditional structuralists had aimed to dismantle the global capitalist system but maintained that such a shift could only occur once the productive forces in peripheral regions were sufficiently developed. This perspective led to a pragmatic alliance between traditional communists in Latin America and local bourgeoisies, as they believed that a socialist revolution could not succeed without first achieving a bourgeois revolution. By contrast, neo-structuralists asserted that all regions of the global economy had become capitalist due to their ties to the capitalist market. Consequently, they rejected official communism, aligning instead with rural guerrilla movements focused on disrupting the exploitative chain linking central metropolitan powers to peripheral regions. Neo-structuralists posited that the global trade system funneled resources from impoverished peripheries to affluent centers, leaving no viable pathway for reform that would benefit peripheral economies.

A more significant ontological shift is seen in their opposition to the statist approach of traditional structuralists. The neo-structuralists argued that this approach masked the true dynamics of the international political economy, which they claimed were determined not by states but by class relations. From their perspective, capitalists exploit workers globally and

¹ *Ibid.*

uniformly, with peripheral capitalists acting merely as subordinate partners to their central counterparts.¹

✓ World-System Theory

World-System Theory is most closely associated with the American scholar Immanuel Wallerstein, though it has been enriched by other contributors, such as the French historian Fernand Braudel, particularly in his seminal work **The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II** (1975).

For Wallerstein, the world-system serves as the fundamental unit of analysis for examining state and societal behavior. This framework rests on two core principles:

First, the components of this system are interconnected and dynamically interrelated. The roles, functions, and behavior of any given element cannot be fully understood without considering its position within the broader system it interacts with. Thus, Wallerstein contends that isolating components of the international system—whether economic, political, social, or cultural—leads to incomplete and misleading conclusions. Systemic understanding requires holistic analysis.

Second, interactions within the system are self-contained. Internal dynamics follow recurring patterns largely unaffected by external factors. Should external influences be removed, these interaction patterns and their outcomes would remain unchanged. Therefore, research efforts should prioritize understanding these internal systemic dynamics rather than seeking explanatory factors outside its boundaries.

There is a noteworthy terminological nuance regarding the translation of "World-System." A common misconception arises when equating it with "global system," which misrepresents Wallerstein's intent. In his discussion of **world-economy (économie-monde)**, Wallerstein emphasizes distinguishing between **world-economy** (a self-contained system) and **world economy** (a unified global economy). The prefix "world" in this context refers to a structured, interconnected system rather than implying comprehensive global coverage. Wallerstein further categorizes historical systems into two types: world-empires and world-economies. Even though certain world-empires encompassed only restricted geographical areas, they still merited the prefix "world"—reinforcing that it signifies structural complexity rather than geographic extent. Nonetheless, the modern world-system can legitimately be described as a global system, as it has evolved over time to encompass virtually the entire world.

The core distinction between a world-empire and a world-economy lies in how resources are distributed, or in other words, who gets what. In a world-empire system, a centralized political authority controls and redistributes resources, often funneling them from peripheral regions to the central hub—for instance, collecting taxes as seen in the Roman Empire. In contrast, a world-economy lacks such a central authority; instead, resource distribution occurs through competing power centers and is directed by market mechanisms rather than centralized

¹ J. A. Hobson, *Towards a New Liberal Internationalism The International Theory of*, p 97.

decreases. Despite this fundamental difference in the method of resource allocation, both systems achieve a similar outcome: resources flow from the periphery to the center.¹

The modern world-system, as defined by Immanuel Wallerstein, exemplifies the world-economy model. Emerging in Europe during the early 16th century, it expanded globally over time, driven by the relentless force of capitalism as a mode of production. According to Wallerstein, numerous institutions within this system are continually reproduced—not only economic entities like businesses and industries but also enduring social constructs such as families, ethnic groups, and states. He highlights that these institutions are not timeless; they evolve historically, and claiming otherwise neglects the historically contingent nature of social institutions. Furthermore, Wallerstein argues that the system itself is not static—it has a beginning, middle stages, and an eventual endpoint, emphasizing its continuous transformation throughout history.

A notable addition to world-system theory by Wallerstein is recognizing a third region within the global socioeconomic hierarchy: the semi-periphery. Traditional Marxist frameworks focus on core and periphery regions, but Wallerstein introduces this intermediary zone, which plays a stabilizing role in the system's structure. He underscores the exploitative interconnections among these three regions, where wealth flows from the periphery to the center, solidifying and reinforcing disparities between them. Over time, this process exacerbates inequality—the rich grow richer while the poor become poorer.

While these spatial dimensions provide a structural view of the world-system, Wallerstein also integrates temporal dynamics to deepen our understanding of systemic interactions across time. These include cyclical rhythms, long-term trends, inherent contradictions, and periodic crises—all of which shape the system's historical development.

Christopher Chase-Dunn has been among several Marxist scholars actively contributing to the advancement of Wallerstein's world-system theory. Unlike Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn assigns greater significance to the inter-state system, highlighting its critical role alongside capitalism in structuring exploitative economic and political-military dynamics. He posits that capitalism's logic relies on an intricate interplay between these two systems.

World-system theorists broadly agree that the capitalist world-economy and the inter-state system are deeply intertwined and mutually reinforcing. The success of capitalist economies depends on state actions that facilitate economic activity while alleviating some inevitable contradictions arising within this economy. Simultaneously, capitalism benefits from maintaining a fragmented inter-state system, composed of competitive sovereign states. Such competition prevents any single state from monopolizing global influence, which could hinder capitalist activities harmful to their own interests.

The unique organization of this integrated system effectively prevents the establishment of a centralized world state—a "world-empire," as Wallerstein described—because its competitive dynamics inherently resist unification. Instead, fierce competition among international capitalisms ensures fluctuating power balances among states within the system. Consequently,

¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *the Mediterranean and the Mediteranian World in the Age of Philip, II* 1975.

the world-economy and the inter-state system operate as inseparable components of a cohesive yet competitive whole.¹

This section delves into the contributions of Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), especially his influential work **Prison Notebooks**, which significantly shaped the literature of international political economy. From his ideas emerged the theory of neo-Gramscianism, often referred to as the Italian school, which has since gained prominence and evolved within this field.

The central question driving Gramsci's theoretical pursuits revolved around understanding why Western European societies had not transitioned to socialism as Marx had anticipated. Marx had asserted that revolutions would erupt in the most advanced capitalist societies, yet it was Russia—one of the least developed nations—that experienced the Bolshevik Revolution. Gramsci identified a critical gap in Marx's classical framework and took it upon himself to address this flaw, seeking a deeper explanation for this historical divergence.

Gramsci's response focused on the concept of hegemony, an idea that has since become a cornerstone in theorizing international relations over the past several decades. Hegemony came to symbolize the role of the most dominant state within the international system—or within specific strategic regions. In Gramsci's understanding, power relied not solely on coercion but also on consent, reflecting an enriched and nuanced perspective. Inspired by Machiavelli's metaphor of the centaur—a creature combining the human and the animal—he viewed power as a dual mechanism blending authority with force. Unlike classical Marxist theory, which portrayed social order as being sustained entirely through the coercive power of the state (described by Engels as a tool of class oppression), Gramsci argued this model only applied to less developed societies, such as pre-revolutionary Russia. In more advanced Western societies, systems of domination persist through both coercion and consent, particularly by fostering ideological appeasement.

Gramsci contended that domination operates through the moral, political, and cultural values disseminated by the hegemonic class. These values permeate civil society institutions, which, while appearing independent from state control, serve as primary channels for what he termed "soft coercion." This allows the state to consolidate its authority and stability without relying solely on force. Gramsci was among the first to identify this problematic intertwining of state and civil society, highlighting how these institutions subtly enforce submission and hinder systemic transformation.

Through his analysis, Gramsci redefined Marxist perspectives on the relationship between a society's infrastructure and superstructure. While the economic base reflects the sum of production relations, the ideological superstructure plays a decisive role in determining societal susceptibility to change. He emphasized the dynamic interplay between these two realms, introducing the concept of the **historical and ideological bloc.** This bloc functions as both a barrier to societal transformation and an instrument for preserving patterns of domination at both national and international levels. The historical aspect corresponds to a

¹ *Ibid.*

society's material conditions (infrastructure), while the ideological component encompasses political practices and ideas (superstructure).¹

Building on Gramsci's ideas, theorists like Craig Murphy extended these concepts to analyze persistent inequalities between the Global North and South. Murphy described a kind of historical bloc comprising ruling elites from industrialized nations alongside organizational bourgeoisie from dependent countries in the Global South. This alliance sustains a systemic pattern of dominance that entrenches underdevelopment and impedes transformative change within less advanced societies.

not take into account how the international system is deeply interwoven with the historical development of social relations. According to Rosenberg, international relations cannot be understood in isolation from the social and economic transformations shaping them. He asserts that these transformations are central to understanding the structural dynamics within international systems over time.

Rosenberg critiques the realist notion of timeless, universal principles governing interstate behavior, arguing instead for a historical-materialist approach that examines how international relations are conditioned by evolving social structures. He highlights that realist frameworks oversimplify complexities by disregarding the profound influence of historical and economic changes. For example, global interactions during different historical periods cannot be reduced to identical patterns of power politics since they arise from unique social conditions and modes of production.

Building on this perspective, Rosenberg proposes analyzing global social relations as a foundation for understanding international systems. This approach emphasizes how capitalist expansion and the evolving modes of production reshape not only domestic societies but also their external relations. In doing so, Rosenberg situates international relations within a broader context of historical change, challenging static models that fail to reflect the dynamic nature of global social structures.²

By integrating social and economic dimensions into international analysis, Rosenberg's approach attempts to bridge the gap between domestic and international spheres. He underscores the importance of understanding how shifts in production relations and class structures impact global interactions, offering a more nuanced explanation of international systems than traditional realist theories.

In conclusion, both Warren and Rosenberg offer compelling critiques of dominant theories in their fields. Warren reinterprets Marx's view of imperialism, arguing for its progressive role in transforming pre-capitalist societies, while Rosenberg challenges realism's ahistorical stance, advocating for a framework that connects international systems with their underlying social and historical contexts. Together, their perspectives enrich our understanding of the complex interplay between economics, society, and global relations, highlighting the need for historically grounded approaches in analyzing these phenomena.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

As an alternative to realist perception, Rosenberg argues that international relations theory must adapt to the evolving nature of global politics. He emphasizes the importance of expanding the theoretical framework to encompass broader patterns of social relations. In his view, the structure of society, shaped by the nature of production relations from the ground up, extends beyond societal organization to influence the nature of interactions between states. Consequently, the form of the state itself transforms in alignment with shifts in the prevailing mode of production within society. This perspective equally applies to the dynamics of interstate relations.¹

Rosenberg undertook a re-evaluation of key realist concepts, notably sovereignty and anarchy, through the lens of Marxist methodology. He determined that these concepts are emblematic of the capitalist mode of production. Sovereignty, in particular, reflects how the state under capitalism has become detached from the production process, assuming a purely political role. In earlier historical periods, states directly intervened in production, but under capitalism, the separation of sovereign authority from production allowed capitalist enterprises greater autonomy on an international scale, free from direct state regulation. As Rosenberg asserts, this phenomenon cannot be fully grasped without examining current social arrangements. Regarding anarchy, he argues that it is not an inherent feature of the international system but a product of the capitalist mode of production. Drawing from Marx's writings, Rosenberg highlights that in a society dominated by capitalism, anarchy manifests in the competitive relations among wage-earners, while despotism arises in the labor division enforced by employers. Thus, according to Rosenberg, anarchy exists as a characteristic of capitalist social relations rather than as a defining element of historical international relations.

4. Reflections on the End of the Cold War and Its Impact on Marxist Thought in International Relations

✓ Manifestations of the “Renaissance of Marxism” by Hobden and Jones

The conclusion of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies along with the global ascendancy of free-market capitalism, appeared to signal Marxism's decline. The apparent acquiescence of remaining communist regimes in China, Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea to market-oriented economic policies reinforced this perception. Many observers saw this as evidence that Marxist ideologies no longer posed a viable alternative to liberal capitalism. However, Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones present a compelling counterargument, suggesting that rather than fading into obscurity, Marxist thought experienced a resurgence a decade after these events.

Hobden and Jones identify two main factors contributing to what they describe as the rebirth of Marxist ideologies. First, many Marxists had long harbored misgivings about the Soviet experiment. After the October Revolution, wide support emerged for the Soviet Union as the world's first workers' state despite Stalin's oppressive policies at home and his control over Eastern European nations. While some critics openly voiced their concerns about these practices, others remained silent, hoping for internal reform within the Soviet system. The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states prompted Marxists to reopen

¹ *Ibid.*

discussions about advancing Marx's theoretical framework independently of justifying the actions of regimes claiming allegiance to those tenets.

Second, this collapse allowed for a critical reassessment of Marx's works beyond their association with Soviet-style governance. Hobden and Jones emphasize that much of what had been considered Marxist doctrine—such as "democratic centralism" and centrally controlled economies—was absent from Marx's original writings. By disentangling Marxist theory from Soviet practice, scholars sought to re-establish its relevance and applicability in analyzing contemporary global issues beyond association with historical state socialism.¹

Marxist social theory offers a robust set of analytical tools that have provided a thorough understanding of capitalism as a mode of production, unmatched in precision and relevance to date. Many argue that the growing influence of market mechanisms in diverse areas of life further underscores the enduring applicability of Marx's insights into capitalist dynamics and their intrinsic contradictions, affirming Marxism as a vital theoretical framework in contemporary times. Hobden and Jones emphasize Marx's assessment of crises within the capitalist system as one of the most compelling features of his theory. Prior to Marx, classical economic thought generally upheld the idea that free markets naturally gravitate towards equilibrium, making them inherently stable. However, modern economic crises—such as the 1987 market collapse and the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s—demonstrate otherwise, exposing the persistent vulnerabilities of global markets. For Marx, such crises, with their devastating human consequences, are intrinsic to the capitalist system itself.

Marxist Influence in Post-Positivist Theoretical Trends (Social Critical Theory as a Model)

Marxist thought exerts a profound influence on the evolution of post-positivist theoretical trends across their various manifestations. These influences are clear in leftist currents found within feminist theories and postmodernism. Among these, Robert Cox's social critical theory emerges as one of the most significantly shaped by Marxist principles in the realm of international relations. This is particularly evident considering its roots within the Frankfurt School, which provided an intellectual home for the remnants of leftist German thinkers. Additionally, the pervasive impact of Marxist thought extends to the broader literature of international political economy.

Social critique, as conceptualized through this lineage, primarily evolved within the framework of Marxist philosophy. This perspective posits a dialectical and conflict-driven relationship between marginalized classes and socially dominant groups. Marxism's emphasis on the role of cultural and ideological factors in shaping social relations and class conflict has also served as a foundation for one of critical theory's central assertions: the interplay of power and interest in the creation of theoretical knowledge. One of Robert Cox's seminal statements encapsulates this idea—"Theory is always for someone and to serve a purpose." Through this lens, critics argue that understanding any social phenomenon requires framing it

¹ محمد حمشي، الاتجاه الماركسي للتنظير في حقل العلاقات الدولية، نقلا عن: <https://arabprf.com/?p=2561>، تم تصفح الموقع يوم: 2024/12/11.

within its historical context, emphasizing the unmistakable imprint of Marxism on critical theory¹.

Frequently referred to as neo-Gramscian theory, critical theory also draws heavily from Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci's contributions, particularly his exploration of hegemony. Gramsci's notion of hegemony revolves around the consent or acquiescence of the majority to a dominant status quo shaped by ruling classes. This hegemony is sustained not through brute force alone but through ideology—a shared intellectual framework that determines societal structures and practices. As a result, the dominance of capitalist powers and their imposed relationships become normalized and seemingly unquestionable.

The Frankfurt School, which emerged in Germany after World War I, further expanded Marxist critical thought into previously overlooked societal domains. While classical Marxism concentrated predominantly on class dynamics and relations of domination within society, the Frankfurt School broadened this focus. It delved into areas such as the influence of power on the collective unconscious and examined patterns of political hegemony within social phenomena where dominance might appear subtle or altogether absent.

A key aspect of Marxist influence within social criticism lies in its challenge to the supposed objectivity and independence of the academic field. Critics question claims that theoretical work can remain untouched by material or ideological interests. For instance, they highlight how research in the United States—especially within security studies—benefits from significant financial investment compared to other fields or nations. This has allowed American scholarship to assert overwhelming dominance in international relations, further underscoring how theoretical endeavors are entwined with broader power dynamics.

By analyzing the key theories and approaches that form the foundation of the Marxist perspective, its primary assumptions can be outlined as follows:

- Highlighting the need to comprehend the broader context within which states and other entities interact. This is because explaining behavior at any analytical level—be it individual, bureaucratic, societal, inter-international, or inter-societal—requires a prior understanding of the overarching structure of the global system where such behavior takes place.
- Stressing the significance of historical analysis in understanding the international system. The current structure of this system cannot be fully grasped without tracing its historical evolution, with capitalism regarded as the defining and pivotal historical element shaping this framework.
- Assuming that mechanisms of hegemony have historically hindered Third World countries from advancing, thereby perpetuating a global pattern of unequal development. To analyze these mechanisms, it is essential to examine the dependence-based relationships between the industrialized nations of the North and the impoverished nations of the South.
- Postulating that economic factors continue to play a decisive role in explaining the dynamics of the global capitalist system. These factors are crucial to evaluating the potential for Third World countries to break free from cycles of subordination and dependency.

¹ المرجع نفسه.

In conclusion, as noted by Viotti and Kauppi, Marxist thought shares certain foundational similarities with pluralist or liberal perspectives. These include emphasizing international political economy as a core approach, rejecting the dichotomization of politics into high and low spheres, and focusing on processes, contexts, institutions, and actors both within and across nations. Additionally, there is notable interest in welfare issues and socio-economic dimensions.¹

Nonetheless, Marxist arguments within the field of international relations have faced considerable criticism, ranging from sharp to severe. Viotti and Kauppi have encapsulated these critiques, highlighting key points of contention directed at the Marxist approach to international relations.

1. The Problem of Causality:

Criticism has often centered on the inability of dependency theory, across its various approaches, to clearly address a fundamental issue: does dependency cause economic and social underdevelopment, as Marxists argue, or is it underdevelopment that leads countries into a state of dependency? In essence, the theory struggles to determine whether dependency is a cause or a consequence of backwardness.

2. The Problem of Economic Determinism:

Marxist perspectives tend to frame the entire operation of the international system as being driven by capital accumulation and its related dynamics, often downplaying non-economic explanations of imperialism and inter-state relations. For instance, this approach does not adequately account for systems of competition among political entities in pre-capitalist times, such as the Peloponnesian wars. In such cases, concepts like anarchy and the security dilemma, as outlined in realist thought, offer more explanatory power than the solely economic focus of Marxist analysis.

3. System Dominance:

Dependency theory places disproportionate emphasis on international factors when interpreting poverty and dependency in peripheral states, while often sidelining local variables. As a result, proponents—including Marxists supporting dependency theory—frequently attribute the economic, political, and social issues of Third World countries solely to industrialized nations in the global North. This perspective assigns blame to these nations for problems ranging from stunted economic growth and social instability to the persistence of authoritarian regimes.²

4. Theoretical Rigidity:

One notable limitation of Marxist theories lies in their rigid theoretical and methodological frameworks. These theories often rely on singular constructs—such as dependency or world-systems theory—to address diverse models and specific case studies. Adaptations to theoretical frameworks are typically made only when empirical findings challenge core assumptions. Furthermore, some Marxist theorists incorporate case studies selectively,

¹ المرجع نفسه.
² المرجع السابق.

favoring those that substantiate their arguments and avoiding those that might create tension between theory and evidence. Additionally, an reluctance to consider alternative hypotheses weakens the adaptability and robustness of this approach.

5. Accounting for Anomalies:

Marxist theories—particularly dependency theory—struggle to explain the economic progress observed in certain Third World countries like Venezuela, Brazil, Singapore, and South Korea. These nations have demonstrated developmental success, not through isolated or independent growth but by skillfully leveraging international economic relationships, such as negotiations with multinational corporations and engagement with global institutions.

Additional Observations:

Building on critiques highlighted by Viotti and Kauppi, Marxist international relations theories show significant deficiencies in addressing levels of analysis. While class conflict is their central unit of analysis, there is an inherent contradiction in their simultaneous focus on state dynamics within both core and peripheral regions. These theories explore how the state apparatus can function as a tool for class exploitation by the bourgeoisie or how it serves as a mechanism for proletarian advancement toward communism. Consequently, the role of the state emerges as a central factor in Marxist frameworks, which contradicts their professed emphasis on class-based analysis. Indeed, systemic approaches like world-systems theory further demonstrate this tension by prioritizing the system itself rather than class categories.

Despite these shortcomings, it is important to heed the cautionary note offered by Professor John Kenneth Galbraith in **A History of Economic Thought: The Past as an Image of the Present**. He warns that efforts to expose Marx's theoretical flaws—and those of his followers—have often served political agendas rather than mere intellectual inquiry. Such efforts can be understood as part of a broader campaign to diminish Marx's relevance due to his perceived threat to certain established systems.

In conclusion, despite its limitations and criticisms, the Marxist approach has undeniably enriched theorizing about international relations. Its significance is evident in several contributions:

5. Breaking Euro-American Hegemony:

This intellectual perspective has effectively challenged the dominance of Euro-American paradigms within the field. For instance, Hoffmann's assertion in 1971 that international relations was primarily shaped by American academic thought highlights this bias. A considerable majority of scholars in the discipline are either American or based in the United States; often, even European contributors have emigrated and integrated into the U.S. academic landscape...

Sixth: It remains to be emphasized at the end of this evaluation that the Marxist trend does not only inspire post-positivist theoretical trends as we saw in a previous section, but it also was and still is – and it seems that it will continue to be – inspiring most of the social movements opposing globalization across the world. It is sufficient to take a quick, close look at the literature of these movements to notice that they constitute nothing but an extension of the Marxist left, historically known for opposing the negative structural effects of the global

capitalist system on marginalized (peripheral/peripheral) peoples. Thus, it becomes acceptable to read the popular theses today such as “globalization is the highest stage of capitalism,” similar to Lenin’s historical thesis about “imperialism [as] the highest stage of capitalism.”¹

¹ المرجع السابق الذكر.

Feminism in International Relations: A Trend or a Theory?**1. Definition of feminist theory:**

The Oxford Dictionary defines it as: "The recognition that women have equal rights and opportunities with men" in various levels of scientific and practical life, considering the exclusion of women from it.

As for Webster's Dictionary, it defines it as: "Feminism is the theory that calls for the equality of the sexes politically, economically and socially, and seeks as a political movement to achieve women's rights and interests and to eliminate the sexual discrimination suffered by women."

Multiple concepts of feminist theory: Multiple readings of the concept of feminist theory were mentioned in one book by the writer Wendy K Colmar entitled *Feminist Theory, Selected Excerpts*. Among them is the definition of the feminist movement as a movement with a long history. It has three basic positions during 1400-1789:

1- A conscious position in opposing male slander and mistreatment of women; and the controversial exposure to misogyny.

2- The belief that the sexes may be formed culturally and not just biologically; The belief that women were a social group formed to fit male ideas of an inferior sex.¹

3- A point of view that transcended the then accepted value systems by exposing and opposing injustice and oppression; and the desire for a truly universal concept of humanity. Another concept of it: "It may be defined as a movement that seeks to reorganize the world on the basis of equality of the sexes (male/female) in all human relations; it is a movement that rejects all discrimination between individuals on the basis of sex. It abolishes all sexual privileges and burdens, and strives to establish a recognition of the common humanity of women and men as the basis of law and custom."

History of Feminist Theory: "The feminist movement can be dated back to the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the suffrage movement emerged in the United Kingdom, and then this movement moved to a number of European countries, and then to the United States of America. Feminist writings began to receive the attention and analysis of many political researchers since the middle of the twentieth century, when many writings appeared that presented a different intellectual orientation, and these writings began to gain wide fame and resonance on the international level with the success of the feminist school in presenting many new visions and concepts. Although the feminist movement has gone through many stages, the term feminist school refers in its entirety to "the chronological narrative of movements and ideologies that aim to call for women's rights." Feminists have differed about the scope and nature of these rights, depending on the time frame, culture, and geography of the proposal, but most feminist historians have agreed that all movements

¹ Bierema, L. Cseh, M. *Evaluating AHRD research using a feminist research framework*, *Human Resource Development Quarterly*, 14 (1), 5–26, 2003.

working to obtain women's rights should be considered feminist movements, even if they do not call themselves by this name."¹

2. The Role of Women in the Emergence of Feminist Theory:

By tracing the history of the emergence of feminism and the continuation of its movement and focusing on the presence of women and the role that women played in the emergence of this theory, the largest, most prominent and most important role played by the presence of women will be noted. Feminist theories first appeared as early as 1794 in publications such as *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* by Mary Wollstonecraft - in a letter after being arrested for illegal voting. In 1851, Sojourner Truth addressed women's rights issues through her publication "Ain't I a Woman". She is an American/African rights activist who addressed the issue of women's limited rights due to the misconception of men. Truth argued that if black women could perform tasks that were supposed to be limited to men, then any woman of any color could perform the same tasks. After Soering came Susan B. Anthony, an American social reformer and women's rights activist who was arrested for illegal voting and delivered a speech in court that addressed language issues in the Constitution, documented in the publication "Speech after Arrest for Illegal Voting" in 1872. Anthony questioned the principles of the Constitution. She asked why women were subject to punishment by law but could not use the law to protect themselves (women could not vote). She also criticized the masculine language of the Constitution and argued why women should abide by laws that did not serve women. Next came Nancy F. Cott, an American historian who distinguished between the modern and ancient women's movement, especially the struggle for suffrage. She placed the turning point in the United States in the decades before and after women gained the right to vote in 1920 (1910-1930). While during this period (20 years) her interests shifted primarily to societal discrimination, individual consciousness, and diversity. New issues deal more with the condition of women. Politically, this represents a comfortable shift in beliefs. It is noted that the history of feminism began with women who represented the main and basic engine for the continuation of feminism in the face of male and societal obstacles.²

3. The importance of feminism for both women and men

Uzor Darlington Ike sees in a discussion on the empowerwomen website that the importance of feminism is in breaking men's sense that they belong to a higher social class than women and in their fears that women will gain a greater foothold than men in society. Feminism contributes to men's awareness that they will not lose their rights if women gain more rights, but rather it allows them to deal with them more. The importance of feminism depends on the simple fact that equality does not pose a threat and that societies have always placed men in a position of power and the whole goal of feminism is to reach the same level and this will not cause them to descend from that level and does not pose a threat to them.

¹PincockK , *School sexuality and problematic girlhoods: Reframing 'empowerment' discourse*, *Third World Quarterly*, 39(5), 906-919

² Hooks B, *Feminism is for everybody: Passionate politics*, South End Press, 2000.

✓ **The nature of feminist theory:**

A question was raised in an article entitled "Intellectual Trends in Feminist Theory" talking about the nature of feminist theory, whether it is a research method, an ideological trend, a scientific theory, or a social movement. By tracing the history of feminist theory, it was possible to distinguish between three basic trends of feminist theory:

✓ **The trend of liberal feminism (individualism):**

This trend is the oldest trend of feminist theory historically and is based on the beliefs brought by the Enlightenment and the belief in rationality and that all people are created equal, and as long as men and women are similar in terms of the nature of existence, this similarity must extend to include similarity in rights as well. This trend achieved tangible development in the scope of civil and political rights during the nineteenth century, as calling for civil and political rights for women represents the main goal of the liberal trend of feminist theory.

✓ **Marxist Feminist Trend: Socialist Feminism**

This socialist feminist theory did not contradict the previous theory, but it objected to the concepts of value and status and focused on the larger framework within which men and women live together. It considered that corruption comes from the societal system as a whole, which lives in the shadow of bourgeois conflicts and contradictions. In the bourgeois marriage system within this society, women represented the oppressed class or slaves, and patriarchal authority represented the class of owners and business owners. Under this exploitative system, both men and women are oppressed, so how can feminist theory demand equality with men, who are an oppressed group? This theory focused primarily on class contradictions and accepted that the optimal solution lies in the success of socialist revolutions and the elimination of the class system. Feminist theory goes hand in hand with socialist revolutions and the socialist system in society.

Radical Feminism:

This trend does not only demand equality, but also sees that women are superior to men and demands that men submit to women, which may reach the point of enslaving men. This movement came as a counter-movement to the patriarchal authority, and as a result, two other intellectual trends were born within the scope of this trend:

- The first trend believes that the reason for the weakness and oppression of women is due to the patriarchal authority that makes them specialized in giving birth to children and caring for the family and the home, and as long as they continue to perform these tasks, their dependence on men and the weakness of their societal role will continue. This trend summarized that the optimal solution is for them to stop performing these tasks and exploit the modern technological revolution that brought about artificial wombs and separate the birth of the child from the woman's body or by avoiding sexual contact with men.

- As for the second trend in radical feminist theory, it took Simone de Beauvoir's saying "A woman is not born a woman, but rather becomes a woman." He considered that the defect

does not lie in the biological makeup of women, but rather the defect lies in patriarchal authority and societal traditions that see that everything that is feminine¹

3. Feminist contributions to the field of international relations

From the outset, feminist theory has challenged women's near complete absence from traditional IR theory and practice. This absence is visible both in women's marginalisation from decision-making and in the assumption that the reality of women's day-to-day lives is not impacted by or important to international relations. Beyond this, feminist contributions to IR can also be understood through their deconstruction of gender – both as socially constructed identities and as a powerful organising logic. This means recognising and then challenging assumptions about masculine and feminine gender roles that dictate what both women and men should or can do in global politics and what counts as important in considerations of international relations. These assumptions in turn shape the process of global politics and the impacts these have on men and women's lives. Rather than suggest that traditional IR was gender-neutral – that is, that gender and IR were two separate spheres that did not impact on each other – feminist theory has shown that traditional IR is in fact gender-blind. Feminist scholarship therefore takes both women and gender seriously – and in doing so it challenges IR's foundational concepts and assumptions

✓ The basics of feminism

If we start with feminism's first contribution – making women visible – an early contribution of feminist theorists is revealing that women were and are routinely exposed to gendered violence. In making violence against women visible, an international system that tacitly accepted a large amount of violence against women as a normal state of affairs was also exposed. For example, former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's 'UNiTE' campaign to end violence against women estimated that up to seven out of ten women will experience violence at some point in their lives – and that approximately 600 million women live in countries where domestic violence is not yet considered a crime. Violence against women is prevalent globally and is not specific to any particular political or economic system. Jacqui True (2012) has demonstrated the links between violence against women in the private sphere (for example, domestic violence) and the kinds of violence women experience in public, in an increasingly globalised workplace and in times of war. In short, nowhere do women share the same economic, political or social rights as men and everywhere there are prevalent forms of gendered violence, whether this be domestic violence in the home or sexual violence in conflict. In looking at violence against women in such a way, it is possible to see a continuum of gendered violence that does not reflect neat and distinct categories of peace, stability and so on. Many societies are thought of as predominantly peaceful or stable despite high levels of violence against a particular portion of the population. It also presents a very different image of violence and insecurity to that viewed through the security agendas of states, which is characteristic of traditional IR viewpoints.²

In making women visible, feminism has also highlighted women's absence from decision-making and institutional structures. For example, in 2015 the World Bank estimated that

¹*Ibid.*

² Sarah Smith, *Introducing Feminism in International Relations Theory*, <https://www.eir.info/2018/01/04/feminism-in-international-relations-theory>

globally women made up just 22.9% of national parliaments. One of the core assumptions of traditional perspectives that feminism has challenged is the exclusionary focus on areas that are considered 'high' politics – for example, sovereignty, the state and military security. The traditional focus on states and relations between them overlooks the fact that men are predominantly in charge of state institutions, dominating power and decision-making structures. It also ignores other areas that both impact global politics and are impacted by it. This is a gendered exclusion as women contribute in essential ways to global politics even though they are more likely to populate those areas not considered high politics and their day-to-day lives may be considered peripheral. Traditional perspectives that ignore gender not only overlook the contributions of women and the impact global politics has on them but also perpetually justify this exclusion. If women are outside these domains of power, then their experiences and contributions are not relevant. Feminist theorists have worked to demonstrate that this distinction between private and public is false. In doing so they show that previously excluded areas are central to the functioning of IR, even if they are not acknowledged, and that the exclusion and inclusion of certain areas in traditional IR thinking is based on gendered ideas of what counts and does not count.

This brings us to the second key contribution of feminism – exposing and deconstructing socially constructed gender norms. In making sense of IR in a way that takes both women and gender seriously, feminism has demonstrated the construction of gendered identities that perpetuate normative ideas of what men and women should do. In this regard, it is important to understand the distinction between 'sex' as biological and 'gender' as socially constructed. Not all gender considerations rest on the analysis of women, nor should they, and gender relates to expectations and identities attached to both men and women. Gender is understood as the socially constructed assumptions that are assigned to either male or female bodies – that is, behaviour that is assumed to be appropriate 'masculine' (male) or 'feminine' (female) behaviour. Masculinity is often associated with rationality, power, independence and the public sphere. Femininity is often associated with irrationality, in need of protection, domesticity and the private sphere. These socially and politically produced gender identities shape and influence global interactions, and IR as theory – and global politics as practice – also produces such gendered identities in perpetuating assumptions about who should do what and why. These gender identities are also imbued with power, in particular patriarchal power, which subordinates women and feminine gender identities to men and masculine gender identities. What this means is that socially constructed gender identities also determine distributions of power, which impact where women are in global politics. Whereas men can be feminine and women masculine, masculinity is expected for men and femininity of women.¹

Cynthia Enloe (1989) asked the question 'where are the women?', encouraging IR scholars to see the spaces that women inhabit in global politics and demonstrating that women are essential actors in the international system. She focused on deconstructing the distinctions between what is considered international and what is considered personal, showing how global politics impacts on and is shaped by the daily activities of men and women – and in turn how these activities rest on gendered identities. Traditionally, the military and war making have been seen as masculine endeavours, linked with the idea that men are warriors

¹ *Ibid.*

and protectors, that they are legitimate armed actors who fight to protect those in need of protection – women, children and non-fighting men. In practice this has meant that the many ways that women contribute to conflict and experience conflict have been considered peripheral, outside the realm of IR's considerations. For example, the issue of sexual and gendered violence in conflict has only recently entered the international agenda. Comparatively, the mass rape of women during and after the Second World War was not prosecuted as the occurrence was either considered an unfortunate by-product of war or simply ignored. This has since changed, with the 2002 Rome Statute recognising rape as a war crime. However, this recognition has not led to the curtailment of conflict related sexual violence and this form of violence remains endemic in many conflicts around the world, as does impunity for its occurrence.

In turn, these issues highlight the importance of intersectionality – understanding that IR is shaped not only by gender but also by other identities, such as class, race or ethnicity. Intersectionality refers to where these identities intersect, and in turn how different groups of people are marginalised, suggesting that we must consider each in tandem rather than in isolation. In examining wartime rape, Lori Handrahan has shown the intersection of gender and ethnic identities, where the enemy's women become constructed as 'other' and violence against them consequently comes to represent the 'expansion of ethnic territory by the male conqueror.' This rests on gendered constructions, which occur at the intersections with other forms of identity, such as ethnicity or race. Gendered constructions that see women characterised as protected mean that conquering them – through rape or sexual violence – is representative of power and domination over one's enemy. Applying feminist theory to the issue of male wartime rape also shows the gendered logics that inform its occurrence, in particular that the rape of male opponents is seen to 'feminise' (that is, humiliate, defeat) opponents. This again highlights the contribution of feminism in understanding how gender influences IR and how the feminine is undervalued or devalued.

As discussed above, feminism has exposed gender violence and women's marginalisation in global politics. However, it also challenges gendered constructions of women as inherently peaceful, as in need of protection or as victims. Feminists see these constructions as further evidence of gender inequality and also as contributing to the exclusion of women from traditional IR perspectives in the first instance. If women are assumed to be victims rather than actors or as peaceful rather than aggressive or as only existing in the domestic or private realm (rather than the public sphere), then their experiences and perspectives on global politics are more easily ignored and justified as marginal. Accounts of women disrupting these gender identities, such as being agents of political violence for example, have challenged these assumptions. This is an important contribution of feminism and one that challenges the construction of gendered identities that do not reflect the diversity of women's engagements with IR and in practice perpetuate women's limited access to power. Therefore, taking feminism seriously is not simply about upending the historical marginalisation of women, it also provides a more complete picture of global politics by taking into account a broader range of actors and actions.¹

¹ *Ibid.*

✓ **Feminism and peacekeeping**

Building peace after conflict is an increasingly central concern of IR scholars – especially as conflicts become broader and more complex. There are also questions regarding how post-conflict societies are to be rebuilt and how best to prevent relapses into conflict. Peacekeeping missions are one way that the international community seeks to institute sustainable peace after conflict and the United Nation's traditional peacekeeping role (understood as acting as an impartial interlocutor or monitor) has broadened considerably. Missions now frequently include a laundry list of state-building roles, including re-establishing police and military forces and building political institutions. Feminist theorists have demonstrated the ways that peacekeeping, as security-seeking behaviour, is shaped by masculine notions of militarised security. Post-conflict situations are generally characterised as the formal cessation of violence between armed combatants, ideally transitioning to a situation where the state has a monopoly on the use of force. It is this shift that peacekeeping missions seek to facilitate, conducting a wide range of tasks such as disarming combatants, facilitating peace deals between various state and non-state groups, monitoring elections and building rule of law capacity in state institutions such as police forces and the military.

However, as feminist IR scholars have shown, violence against women often continues in the post-conflict period at rates commensurate to or even greater than during the conflict period. This includes rape and sexual assault, domestic violence and forced prostitution, as well as those selling sex to alleviate financial insecurity. The dominant approach to keeping peace often obscures these kinds of violence. Issues like gender equality and domestic violence (and human rights) are considered 'soft' issues as opposed to the 'hard' or real issues of military security. This understanding of peace, then, is one in which women's security is not central.

In terms of structural and indirect violence, women are generally excluded from positions of power and decision-making in reconstruction efforts and have limited access to economic resources. Donna Pankhurst (2008) has theorised what she terms a post-conflict backlash against women, one that is chiefly characterised by high rates of violence and restrictions on women's access to political, economic and social resources post-conflict. The restriction of women's access to such resources – such as basic food, housing and education – makes them more susceptible to gendered violence. This often begins with women's exclusion from peace negotiations and deals, which instead focus on elite actors who are predominantly men, often militarised men. In peacekeeping missions, women are also under-represented. In 1993, women made up only 1% of deployed personnel. That figure had only risen to 3% for military and 10% for policy personnel by 2014. As gender inequality has become increasingly acknowledged, those involved in peacekeeping have paid more attention to the causes and consequences of women's insecurity in post-conflict settings.

In October 2000, the UN Security Council devoted an entire session to Women, Peace and Security – adopting Resolution 1325 as a result. This resolution called for a gender perspective to be 'mainstreamed' throughout peace operations and for women to be included in peace agreements and post-conflict decision-making – in addition to the protection of women and girls during conflict. Resolution 1325 calls on all actors to recognise the 'special needs' of women and girls in post-conflict societies, to support local women's peace initiatives, and advocates for the protection of women's human rights in electoral, judiciary

and police systems. However, consistent with the construction of a gendered understanding of peace discussed above, there remain limitations to the full implementation of Resolution 1325.

A United Nations study by Radhika Coomaraswamy (2015) found that gender in peacekeeping continues to be under-resourced politically and financially, and the gendered elements of post-conflict reconstruction are still marginalised in missions. Women still experience high rates of violence post-conflict, are still excluded from peace processes and still ignored in peace-building policy. This is demonstrated, for example, in national and inter-national attempts to disarm former combatants after conflict and reintegrate them into post-conflict society. This is a post-conflict policy area that feminist scholars have routinely exposed as being highly gendered and exclusionary of women who are former combatants. Megan Mackenzie (2010) has attributed this to constructed gender identities that minimise the idea that women are agents in conflict or involved in war-making, instead constructing them as victims with limited agency. In other words, they are subject to war rather than war's actors.

This means not only that women are excluded from disarmament programmes because of socially produced gender norms but also that they are unable to access the material and economic benefits that may flow from such programmes – or the political and social gains they could make from being recognised as legitimate veterans in post-conflict societies. This example demonstrates the power invested in gendered identities, the ways they can shape policy and how gender inequality is perpetuated via such policy.

Finally, international interventions such as peacekeeping missions also contribute to the continuation of violence post-conflict and are a site in which gendered identities are produced. There have been numerous reports of peacekeepers perpetrating sexual violence against women, girls and boys while on mission. This issue gained much attention in 2015 and into 2016, when a United Nations whistle blower exposed not only reports of sexual abuse of children in the Central African Republic by French peacekeepers but also the United Nation's inaction in the face of these reports. From a feminist perspective, the impunity that peacekeepers enjoy – despite rhetorical commitments to zero tolerance – is a result of gendered security imperatives in which militarised security and the coherence of the institution (whether that be an international organisation or a state) is prioritised over the welfare of the individual.¹

¹*Ibid.*

1. Post-colonialism: An Atmo-Epistemic Approach

The colonial approach has given its role in academic and theoretical references in the twenty-first century, as it has become an effective critical cognitive component in the shadows of the displacement of colonial models and the innovation of new models, thus raising a methodological and cognitive problem in defining the term post-colonialism or post-colonial discourse, as Arabic speakers reject the English term colonialism, while its alternative is available, and we mean by that the word post-colonialism, and thus the term post-colonialism is defined, according to the University of Dallas, as: "The study of the effects of colonialism/colonialism on cultures and societies".¹

The Encyclopedia of Post-colonial Studies also confirms that this discourse was methodologically established with the book *Orientalism* by Edward Said in 1978, while the year 1990 represented the actual and methodological launch, and then the flow of the research stream began through multiple studies, including the book "Anya Lomba", "Colonialism" "Postcolonialism" 1998, "Laila Gandhi's" book "Postcolonial Discourse Theory - A Critical Introduction" 1998, and "Bart Mo Gilbert's" theoretical writings "Post colonialism - Contexts, Practices and Policies" 1997, as the postcolonial approach intersects with many interconnected approaches including Marxism, post-structuralism, discourse analysis theory, feminism, deconstruction and others.²

The Algerian "Mohamed Hassas" confirms in his study of the theory of post-colonialism and its intellectual consequences in the era of post-modernism and post-secularism, that the new theorists believe that the theory of post-colonialism is what established the idea of post-modernism, as it is the one that viewed the post-modern society in a way that differs from the current modern society that was built and viewed by the West. "Bart Gilbert" confirms in his book "Post-colonial Contexts and Practices" the relationship between the theory of post-colonialism and post-modernism at the beginning of his statement that the theory has methodological affiliations as a work that was primarily shaped by the French high theory, especially "Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault", and this means the infiltration of the French high theory into the post-colonial analysis that opened several discussions in the sense that the discourse of post-colonialism depends mainly on the unity of knowledge and power relations, and the interconnectedness of the two, which "Michel Foucault" referred to for this interconnected situation of this cognitive approach, and the post-colonial approach is also, as "Jamil" pointed out Hamdawi is one of the most important critical theories that accompanied the post-modern era, especially since it appeared after structuralism dominated the Western cultural field.³

¹ رامي أبو شهاب، ما بعد الكولونيالية: المنظور النقدي والمقاربة المنهجية، مجلة أبولوس، العدد 02، 2019، ص 67.

² المرجع نفسه، ص 67-68.

³ أحمد عبد الحليم عطية، ما بعد الكولونيالية في ما بعد الحداثة: قراءة في المختبر الجزائري، مجلة الاستغراب، 2018، ص ص 168-169.

A/ Colonialism and the difficulty of escaping the trap of post-colonial interpretation

Many interested parties and critics warn against falling into the trap of the post that suggests chronology and succession, which suggests the conformity of the term post-colonialism, political and cultural in particular, and the fear is the extension of the effects of colonialism, which refers to the question: When does the post-colonial stage actually begin? Douglas Robinson has limited three definitions whose historical impact varies significantly, which are:

-1 Studying the former colonies of Europe since their independence, i.e. how they responded to the cultural legacy of colonialism, or adapted to it, or resisted it, or overcame it during independence. Here, the adjective "post-colonial" refers to the cultures after colonialism, and the historical period it covers is approximately the second half of the twentieth century, and we can call these studies here: post-independence studies. -2 Studying the former colonies of Europe since their colonization, i.e. how they responded to, adapted to, resisted, or overcame the cultural legacy of colonialism since the beginning of colonialism. Here, the term post-colonial refers to cultures after the beginning of colonialism, and the historical period it covers is approximately the modern period, starting from the sixteenth century. We can call these studies here European post-colonial studies. -3 Studying all cultures together/countries/nations, in terms of the power relations that link them to other cultures (groups/countries/nations; i.e. how the conquering cultures subjected the conquered cultures to that coercion, adapted to it, resisted it, or overcame it. Here, the term "post-colonial" refers to our view in the late twentieth century of political and cultural power relations, while the historical period it covers is all of history.

Thus, the first definition matches the concept of post-independence, where scholars focused on the political, cultural, linguistic, religious, and literary repercussions on colonized societies, while the second definition refers to the colonial period and what followed it and focuses on the colonizer as much as it focuses on the colonized, i.e. focusing on the colonial ambitions of the colonizing powers.

As for the third definition, it is the most comprehensive and broadest, as it includes colonial relations in all parts of the world and throughout the entire history. At this level, the post-colonial theory appears as a way of looking at the power between the cultural and the psychosocial transformations caused by the dynamics of domination and subjugation compatible with geographical and linguistic displacement.

Thus, an attempt was made to distinguish between three formal formulations of this term, namely.

✓ **Defining the exact concept of post-colonialism**

Post-colonialism:: While written with this hyphen - it includes a sequential arrangement in the sense of the change from the colonial state to the post-colonial state, Postcolonialism when written without a hyphen refers to the writings that were completed and that defend or resist in one way or another the colonial perspectives of the state, whether before or after colonialism.¹

¹ مديحة عتيق، ما بعد الكولونيالية: مفهوما، أعلامها، وأطروحاتها، مجلة دراسات وأبحاث، جامعة جلفا، (ب.ع)، ص 228.

Post/colonialism is the more appropriate of the two formulations because it focuses on the interconnected relationships between an unlimited number or complex interwoven state that unites colonial discourse, post-colonial discourse, colonialism and post-colonialism.¹

2. Post-colonial theoretical perspectives and lenses in the field of international relations

Post-colonial scholars criticize the neglect of non-Western states and societies in the field of theorizing in the field of international relations. For example, Stephanie Newman notes that the Third World countries in international relations have not been explored to a large extent in the theoretical literature of international relations that has remained silent on this issue. Thus, "Kenin Dan" argues that the marginalization of African and Third World countries in the political field has to do with their marginalization by the prevailing and Western-produced international relations theories. In classical realism, we find "Hans Morgenthau" in his book "Politics Among Nations"; he stated that Africa, which was a politically empty space, had no history before World War II. In neo-realism, "Kith Waltz" stated in his theory of international politics that it would be absurd to build a theory of international politics on Malaysia and Costa Rica. "Chang Chen" argues that there is no non-Western theory of international relations in Asia. Halwani Karam pointed out that relatively little research has been conducted on the regional contribution, i.e. the Asian contribution or African or Latin American in international relations theories where contextual factors dictated by the region shape both regional thinking and the choices of decision makers in international politics. In analyzing how basic concepts such as authority, state, security, power, and class reproduce the status quo, the post-colonialists criticize the realist and liberal approach to the centrality of the state as a unit of analysis instead of focusing on the individual and humanity as a whole, and focusing on the idea of a single global rationality and neglecting considerations of gender and race and downplaying the importance of identity issues in the field of theorizing in the field of international relations. They also criticize the Marxist approach by saying that class struggle is the origin of historical change instead of showing how race and history are shaped.²

The post-colonial approach essentially proposes the ontological openness of the system to issues and actors from a critical perspective that aims to correct the elitist and Western-centrist distinctions of dominant theories. The post-colonial interest also aims to critique Eurocentrism and focus on colonized regions or the developing world, and to give analytical priority to invisible or marginalized actors, and the central figure of identity, culture, and ethnicity³. Returning to the analysis of Patrice Collignon, to the interest in the way in which And the cancellation of the formation of Western identities, multiple societal groups according to the logic of the moment in a world characterized by instability and because identities are hybrid and therefore in constant movement, instead of this analysis, post-colonial advocates view it with a common sense towards the problem of cultural identities, which are seen as multiple and in a state of continuous transformation. Post-colonial advocates aim to re-read colonial history from the perspective of the complexity of the cultural relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. The post-colonial approach is characterized by three basic characteristics: strategic relativism, critical history, and

¹ المرجع نفسه، ص 229.

² محمد طاهر عبدلة، اسهامات مابعد الكولونيالية في نقد العلاقات الدولية الغربية، مجلة السياسة العالمية، المجلد 05، العدد 02،

2021، ص ص 30-35.

³ المرجع نفسه، ص ص 33-35.

methodological pluralism. Strategic relativism is a perspective that conflicts with the idea that all knowledge can have value globally, geographically, and culturally. It also proposes re-examining the world from perspectives that are aware of its historicity and status, meaning that it looks at social science from multiple angles and presents more comprehensive analyses. It also views the historical path as an incomplete path of fragmented elements and is composed of holes and gaps that must be questioned. From a methodological standpoint, the theory calls for rehabilitation at the center of analysis and emancipation from the normative point of view ⁽¹⁾ Postcolonialism's interest in identity and culture is neither chauvinism nor an enhancement of essentialism, which means that identities and cultures have their own characteristics that do not allow others to penetrate inside. Rather than calling for the fixity of identity/cultural authenticity, postcolonialism appropriates historical representations of identity and culture for their legitimate uses in fluid postcolonial contexts. In most of Africa, few postcolonial theorists use the idea of the nation without a degree of apprehension, because the colonized peoples who now constitute African nations cannot be said to be linguistically or culturally homogeneous entities. African states often contained under the umbrella of the nation groups speaking different languages, and a century ago they lived in separate political spaces.²

✓ An analytical reading of Edward Said and Malek Bennabi's analysis of the importance of culture in Arab societies

A/ Edward Said and the criticism of European colonial culture:

"Edward Said" attempts to criticize the colonial culture that was promoted by European centralism on the basis of which it is the axis of human history, and thus he was able to impose his dominance on areas far from it such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, and thus the rational justification of imperialism was achieved on what is called the dissemination of values, civilization, urbanization and human rights, and today what is called the war on terror and the struggle for democracy, the true face of the cultural colonialism that Said defined in the field of his writings, and he believes that the cultural colonialism succeeded in integrating the perspective of the colonizer into the visions of the colonized peoples until the latter felt that they were unable to appreciate any alternative, for Edward Said's research focused on the project of resistant criticism, that is, the colonial criticism of the Western cognitive system, and in particular the criticism of the authority and tyranny that it practices to establish the power relations embodied by the discourse of Orientalism ³.

On the other hand, Edward Said links resistance criticism to culture as a tool of resistance, and links the latter to a specific concept of the intellectual. Said believes that resistance criticism requires the intellectual to commit to using a national language, in the hope of forming a perspective that is unique to him. On the one hand, Said views Orientalism as the cognitive right that provided the mechanism that allowed for the establishment of the concept

¹ Afef Benessaïe , *La perspective postcoloniale. Voir le monde différemment, Chapitre dans Dan O'meara et Alex McLeod, dirs. (2010) Théories des relations internationales : contestations et résistances. Montréal : Athéna/Centre d'études des politiques étrangères et sécurité (CEPES), pp. 365-378.*

² تيم دان وآخرون، نظريات العلاقات الدولية: التخصص والتنوع، ترجمة: ديماء الخضراء، المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، الطبعة الأولى، 2016، ص 576.

³ مجدي عز الدين حسن، نقد الكولونيالية من منظور ادوارد سعيد، مجلة الاستغراب، ص ص 253-262.

of the East, then its introduction to Europe. Orientalism as a scientific movement in the world of politics is the accumulation of the East and its colonial possession by Europe. Thus, he attempts to reveal that the West has conceived of the East in a colonial, ethnic, horizontal way, rooted in power and the union of power with knowledge. He also asserts that colonialism has bequeathed to the individual in these countries a theory of his own inferiority, and the East that Said made the focus of all his writings is the East that the West created and perhaps opposed to it, and he calls for refuting this axiom.¹

B/ The centrality of the cultural dimension in Malek Bennabi's

educational approach Malek Bennabi was able to crystallize a theory of culture, and he continued to draw attention and interest to his theory, since his first book in which he talked about culture, which is the book (Conditions of Renaissance) published in French in Paris in 1949 AD, to his book that he devoted to this issue, which is the book (The Problem of Culture) published in Arabic in Cairo in 1959 AD, and so on in talking about it through the lectures he gave in Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, and in Algeria after independence. Bennabi addressed the problem of culture from two aspects: the psychological analysis of culture and the psychological composition of culture, and we will discuss these two concepts as follows:

A. Psychoanalysis of culture: In this dimension, Malek Bennabi focused on some historical features that contributed to the formation of the concept of culture, the source of this word, when it was used in the Arabic language, and how this concept crystallized among Europeans. The historical analysis of culture was only a preliminary introduction to confirm the idea that every society needs to form an independent concept And it is specific to him due to the nature of his cultural problem according to his historical stage, and that this observation according to Bennabi was not based on religious or political considerations, but rather on purely artistic considerations and that Bennabi's talk about the psychoanalysis of culture was intended to deepen the cultural distinction between Islamic societies and Western societies, and for this reason Malek Bennabi paid great attention to discussing the ideas of the pioneers of liberal thought and the pioneers of progressive socialist thought. Therefore, Bennabi's approach to building the Islamic personality, the human being of civilization, due to the connection of culture to him more than its connection to science, differs from that of Western and Eastern thinkers alike. - This is in terms of the method and general position, and in terms of knowledge and determining the cognitive position or scientific vision towards culture, it is also determined on the basis of cultural distinction and independence, and what confirms this cultural distinction is that it does not stem from a background of total and complete rupture and disconnection with European cultures and philosophies, nor is it formed on naive backgrounds in terms of cognitive and methodological formations.²

B. The Psychological Structure of Culture

In talking about the psychoanalysis of culture, Bennabi moves to talk about the psychological structure of culture to address the problem of culture from another angle, and on the basis of cultural differentiation, and the disparity in levels of civilizational development. Bennabi believes that the problem of culture between the Arab and Islamic world and the Western and

¹ المرجع نفسه، ص 262.

² صالح بوعزة، قراءة تحليلية لمقاربة مالك بن النبي في بناء الأفراد وإصلاح المجتمعات العربية في مجال العولمة الثقافية، وحدة البحث تنمية الموارد البشرية، جامعة محمد لمين دباغين، سطيف، ص 07.

socialist worlds does not lie in trying to understand culture, but rather is limited to achieving it and representing it in a practical and applied way. This is what Malek Bennabi means by the psychological structure of culture.

It is noticeable here that "Bennabi", who represents the personality of a sociologist, preferred to use psychological terms, although his research method is closer to sociology. Dr. Zaki Al-Milad tries to remove the ambiguity surrounding these two concepts: the psychoanalysis of culture and the psychological structure of culture.

The phrase psychoanalysis of culture is intended to answer the question: How do we understand culture? And the phrase psychological structure of culture is intended to answer the question: How do we apply culture? Or how does culture have an actual reality in our lives? And starting from the psychoanalysis of culture because it is necessary first to define the understanding of culture, an understanding that requires a method that defines the nature and determinants of this understanding of culture, which is supposed to be in harmony with and respond to historical conditions, the degree of civilizational development, and the type of social problem. This way of looking is what Ibn Nabih calls the psychoanalysis of culture. And working to transform this understanding of culture from the realm of theory and the world of ideas, to the realm of reality and the world of application, so that culture is connected to society, and society is connected to it, this task, Ibn Nabih calls the psychological composition of culture.¹

3.The structural transformation of African culture from traditional colonialism to globalized cultural colonialism.

Nadia Lotfi points out that it is difficult to separate language, thought, culture and society, and perhaps saying so is completely incorrect. Despite the disagreement of some philosophers, psychologists and sociologists about the relationship between language and thought, it does not mean that there is a complete separation between the speaker and the language and thus between his environment and its socio-cultural components. Linguistic studies have been interested in this topic, starting with the famous French linguist "De Soyser", the founder of structuralism, to the new structuralists in America, where there is a difference in their positions, but the sociolinguistics of "Sociolinguistics"; which is one of the sciences that is interested in the social and cultural influence on language, tried to study language in its relationship with society and its environmental, cultural and spatial components, in addition to the research of "William Labov", one of the founders of this science, who drew attention to the importance of studying language in its multiple relationships with the cultural environment. Thus, there is a difference between European structuralism and contemporary American structuralism; European structuralism distinguishes between language as a system or system of signs, language as the ability to speak, and language in relation to the act of enunciation or speaking, while American structuralism links language to historical and socio-cultural transformation, which is considered one of the determinants that distinguish language. Michel Foucault referred to this relationship when he spoke about language and society, and before him Ibn Khaldun drew attention to the specificity of peoples in the nature of their languages, and thus language carries values, customs, and traditions, and even patterns of thinking, and language often enables us to understand the characteristics of some

¹ المرجع السابق، ص 08.

peoples. In this context, we find Dr. Muhammad Abed al-Jabri in his project, *Critique of the Arab Mind*, relying on language as a determinant for understanding the nature of the formation of the Arab mind, saying, “Language determines, or at least contributes fundamentally to determining man’s view of the universe and his perception of it as a whole and in parts.” Alongside Abed al-Jabri, we find Dr. Taha Abd al-Rahman, who considers language a fundamental determinant of what he calls the communicative field, which Taha considers a condition for creativity and freedom from imitation, and it is “the position of communication and interaction between members of society as makers of a specific heritage, and that this position requires three principles: belief, language, and knowledge.” Language is thus one of the most important components of peoples’ identities.¹

A/ Security and Cultural Fragmentation of Post-Colonial Societies The post-colonial approach

represents a broad intellectual ground for setting the basic hypotheses for building a security perspective specific to Third World countries and building on the ideas of the post-colonial approach. Under the title of the security problem in the Third World, Muhammad Ayoub reviews the contributions of a number of researchers in the context of searching for security concepts that go beyond bias in Western discourse. For example, Caroline Thomas believes that the concept of national security in Third World countries should not be limited to studying the use of military force, like most Western discussions about the concept, but should include all issues that represent an existential threat to the political community of those countries, such as issues of identity and cultural fragmentation in post-colonial societies. Edward Azar and Chang Moon also believe in the priority of studying what they describe as soft threats in contrast to the hard threats that dominate the interest of Western countries. They define soft threats in an applied manner within the framework of three elements: building the political legitimacy of the state, institutional cohesion, and the ability to build institutions. From the point of view of Western arrogance, which ignores the history of non-Western societies and seeks to dismantle the distorted cultural and cognitive state. In post-colonial countries that represent what the famous Indian thinker Homi Bhabha calls a hybrid culture, meaning by that those cultural structures that arise from the mixing of the culture of the colonizer with the culture of the colonized, the colonizer cannot impose his culture completely on the colonized peoples from a position of superiority and power, as it must be exposed to counter-resistance from below. This process may not result in a complete victory for the ideas and culture of the colonizer, but rather a hybrid culture arises as well as hybrid structures, institutions, knowledge and discourse as a result of this forced cross-pollination that did not occur in a healthy or natural way.²

¹ نادية لطفي، الاستعمار الجديد: اللغة بين الانفتاح الحضاري والاستلاب الثقافي، 2019/01/07، نقل عن:
https://www.aljazeera.net/blogs/2019/1/7/%
² عبد الوهاب محمد، مفهوم الأمن بين تعدد المنظورات وتباين السياقات، المعهد المصري للدراسات، قسم تحليلات
سياسية، 2021/04/05، ص 05.

B/ France and the approach of the colonial continuation towards African countries

Referring to France, it presents itself as a model state with soft power that relies on traditional cultural and linguistic diplomacy, and even made it a vital sector organized in its political agenda, especially its cultural influence abroad, starting from the 19th century. The American soft power theorist "Joseph Nye" indicated that France is one of the countries that spends the most on foreign cultural relations, and Dr. Ayoub Dehqani indicates in an article he wrote entitled "The Cultural and Identity Dimension in French Foreign Policy" that the activity or manifestations of the value dimension (cultural and identity) in French foreign behavior are determined by three components:

- The Francophone Organization, scientific cooperation and cultural missions, foreign aid in the educational field and educational reforms.¹
- The Francophone Organization:

In the semantic meaning of Francophone, the Social and Economic Encyclopedia defines it as "a group of supporters of the language that represents a cultural trend called for following the independence of the country that was subject to French sovereignty with the aim of maintaining the common cultural connection in knowing the French language And its culture, and the first to develop this concept was the French geographer "Onessim Reclus" in 1880, as he described it in his book as "a linguistic idea and a geographical relationship" (²). The first Francophone gathering appeared in 1969 and was outside France in the city of Niamey, the capital of Niger, at the hands of a group of African trends that called for the necessity of establishing an international organization that brings together countries that share language and culture. Among the most important institutions that emerged to promote the idea of Francophonie are the Scientific Federation of Culture and the Spread of the French Language in 1906, the International Association of Writers in French in 1947, the International Federation of Journalists in French in 1952, and the International Association of Mayors and Officials of Capitals and Major Cities that Use French in Whole or Part in 1979, in addition to holding conferences that bring together the heads of states that use the French language.³

France is thus adopting an effective policy to develop Francophonie after French President Emmanuel Macron presented a comprehensive plan to promote the French language and multiculturalism in the world in March 2018. France sees its focus on the French language as the founding basis of the multilateral Francophonie, especially the International Organization of La Francophonie. As for the hidden agenda of the organization within the African walls, Fatani, one of the most prominent journalists working in French-language newspapers, indicates that one of the organization's goals is to extend French influence in the region, especially through the language and culture that it employed during the colonial period.⁴

¹ أيوب دهقاني، البعد الثقافي والهوياتي في السياسة الخارجية الفرنسية: دراسة وفق المنظور البنائي للعلاقات الدولية، المجلة الجزائرية للحقوق والعلوم السياسية، المركز الجامعي أحمد بن يحيى الونشريسي، تيسمسيلت، المجلد 03، العدد 06، 2018، ص 197.

² وليد كاصد الزبيدي، فرانكوفونية: دراسة في المصطلح والمفهوم والتطور التاريخي، المركز الاسلامي للدراسات الاستراتيجية، الطبعة الأولى، العراق، 2020، ص ص 14-15.

³ المرجع نفسه.

⁴ حسام الدين اسلام، الجزائر حديقة فرانكوفونية ترفض العبادة الرسمية، رأي اليوم، نقلا عن: www.raiv.alyoum.com.

▪ **Scientific cooperation and cultural missions:**

France has 151 French cultural institutions abroad located in 191 countries, and a network of 283 French associations, and works to promote the French language for the benefit of 88 million students of this language in 130 countries. France also cooperates in the academic field through the exchange of research and studies, especially in the field of university cooperation, where it manages 200 Francophone branches of higher education in the world.

▪ **Educational assistance and educational reforms:**

Aid in the educational field is mostly to ensure the French presence and cultural control, and the goal behind this is the cultural survival of societies. French educational and research institutions and agencies also work to spread French education, such as the Francophone University Agency, and naturally these mechanisms serve to embody the desire to spread and expand in its areas of influence.¹

¹ أيوب دهقاني، مرجع سابق الذكر، ص 199.

Outcomes

The development of science towards comprehensiveness depends on the ability to transform information acquired from one side to another or by reducing one concept to another, such as reducing light to electricity, heat to molecules, and chemistry to physics. Thus, we see science always growing towards reduction for the sake of explanation because reduction plays an important role in scientific explanation as the most economical method. In this way, the reductionist tendency dominated scientific thought from the sixteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century. However, the developments and discoveries witnessed by science since the beginning of the twentieth century in several fields, from natural and biological to human and social sciences, and with the resulting theories in various fields of knowledge, are concerned with studying dynamic groups during the interactions of different parts with each other, and not dividing them into parts.

A. The transition from modern physics to post-modern physics

All of this led to a transformation in the foundations and nature of science. We no longer imagine science as a linear concept based on regularity, causality, determinism, generalization, and reduction. (1) Rather, non-linearity has become the essence of science and an expression of its complex nature; Thus, it led to the demolition of the foundations on which reductionism was based, and even drew a new scientific revolution in the same way that the Copernican revolution drew. The complexity system is based on foundations that contradict the foundations of the simplification system, as chaos was a new key to scientific knowledge, after the system was the goal of studying natural phenomena and codifying and quantifying them mathematically. Indeterminism in contemporary physics, specifically in atomic physics, replaced the absolute determinism established by Newtonian mechanics. Thus, just as the science derived from Descartes' thought placed complexity in simplification in a very logical way, contemporary scientific thought attempts to make the complex appear simple.²

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the revolutions of the theory of relativity by Albert Einstein (1885-1955) and the quantum theory, which was founded by a group of physicists, led by Max Planck (1858-1947), Niels Bohr (1885-1962), Erwin Schrödinger (1887-1961), and Ferdinand Heisenberg (1901-1976). Together³, the theories of relativity and quantum theory overturned the axioms of classical physics, such as mechanical determinism, objectivity, and absolute causality. Quantum physics refers to specific amounts of energy that are emitted intermittently and not continuously. As an example, we refer to the theory of explaining black body radiation, where Planck made some assumptions based on the quantum theory of radiation, as follows:

¹ داود خليفة، استيمولوجيا التعقيد والفكر المركب عند إدغار موران، منشورات ضفاف، لبنان، بيروت، الطبعة الأولى، 2019، ص105-107.

² المرجع نفسه، ص107.

³ محمد حمشي، النقاش الخامس في حقن العلاقات الدولية، نحو إقحام نظرية التعقيد داخل الحقل، أطروحة مقدمة لنيل شهادة دكتورا علوم في العلوم السياسية والعلاقات الدولية، تخصص علاقات دولية، جامعة باتنة [قسم كلية الحقوق والعلوم السياسية، قسم العلوم السياسية، 2016-2017، ص101-102].

1- The amount of energy emitted or absorbed by the oscillator in the black body is proportional to its supply.

2- The energy of the oscillator takes specific (quantized) values $n = nh\nu$, and this quantum of energy carries a body called the neutron.

Based on these hypotheses, the physicist "Max Planck" was able to derive Planck's law for black body radiation, which he interpreted its scientific results as follows, as shown in the following equation:

Classical physics prevailed with the belief that energy travels in a continuous flow, from here "Planck" began to develop a new concept or hypothesis for the way in which energy is transmitted.¹

Planck assumed that energy is not transmitted in a continuous stream, but rather in the form of light packets or quanta, and from here the word quantum emerged, which means quantity in Latin. As for the scientific and practical importance of quantum theory, it has many applications, including applications in nuclear physics, particles, molecular physics, and computation. As shown in the following figure: No. 11: Various applications of quantum physics.

As for its basic assumptions, they can be adjusted as follows:

1. Uncertainty:

The state of uncertainty goes back to the concept of monitoring and measuring instruments when reaching the state of absolute accuracy. It has been proven that monitoring instruments, no matter how accurate they are and how complex their design is, they record the observation of measurements with very limited accuracy and the degree of absolute certainty remains unavailable. Therefore, the first ambition of experimental sciences in their various research fields was to reach the design of a more accurate and less suspicious measuring or monitoring instrument. The works of "Heisenberg" and other quantum physicists led to an increase in the gap between them and modern physicists (Einstein and his followers in studying some physical cases. On the other hand, quantum theory proved that subatomic particles such as electrons and photons do not behave inevitably but rather probabilistically.²

2. Duality:

Among the concepts of quantum physics is the concept of the duality of a directed body. Sometimes the behavior of an electron can only be understood by imagining it as a wave wandering through all of space. Quantum physics' answer to the old question was whether light particles are Whether they are particles or waves, which is the research that was achieved through the research of "Thomas Young" (1773-1889) the double-slit experiment, and Einstein, (1905) and concluded that a photon of light is an interfering wave that passes through both slits at the same time. This does not only happen to photons but also to other particles, such as electrons and neutrons, in addition to the "Neisz-Bohr" equation about duality as a form of complementarity (wave, particle). Thus, quantum physics opened the

¹ هيثم السيد، ياسر مصطفى، نظرية الكوانتوم بين العلم والفلسفة، مناظرة أكاديمية، مجلة متون، كلية العلوم الاجتماعية والإنسانية، جامعة مولاي الطاهر، سعيدة، الجزائر، العدد 11، أبريل 2016، ص 414-436.

² محمد حمشي، مرجع سابق الذكر، ص 430.

door to a new style of thinking about the world. Science before the twentieth century dealt with certain propositions on which Aristotelian logic is based, either it is (A) or it is not (A), but today science raises the idea of the possibility of both states being together.

Coincidence: Coincidence in quantum science is not a measure of action, but it is a natural and inherent property of it, and no additional amount of knowledge will allow science to predict the moment when a certain atom will decay. Quantum physics has presented that coincidence is absolute and irreducible, a source of disagreement with quantum physicists, led by Bohr and Einstein.¹


B. The chaos theory of the works of Lorentz and Poincaré

The method of chaos theory from "Lorentz and Poincaré", which can be used to study complex and dynamic systems to reveal the methods of order (non-chaotic), through the chaotic behavior of the phenomenon. Chaos theory is the study of the quality of irregular and unstable behaviors in deterministic, non-linear and dynamic systems. According to current mathematical theory, a chaotic system is defined as showing sensitivity to initial conditions. In other words, in order to predict the next state, you need to know the initial conditions accurately and infinitely. This explains the difficulty of weather forecasting. During the sixties, "Edward Lorentz", a meteorologist at "MIT", accidentally stumbled upon the butterfly effect after deviations in calculations in other directions and by the thousands. The butterfly effect reflects changes in small scales, which can affect large scales. For example, a butterfly flapping its wings in Hong Kong can change the patterns of hurricanes in Texas.² "Lorentz theory" has proven that weather forecasting for more than two or three days does not exceed the level of speculation and guesswork, and if it exceeds that, weather forecasting is lost. Its value is due to what he called the "butterfly effect," where relatively small elements of weather can render even the best climate forecasts worthless. An experiment by Edward Lorentz in his computer saw two different weather patterns appearing to be increasingly distant over time. ³ As the following image from a 1961 edition of his computer shows.

¹ المرجع نفسه/ ص 430.

² Lorentz Poincaré chaos theory, for more information see: pdf factory.com.

³ James Gleick, *Chaos Theory: The Science of the Unexpected*, translated by Ahmed Maghribi, Dar Al Saki, Lebanon, Beirut, first edition, 2008, pp. 36-38.


Figure 2: Shows the different Lorentz weather patterns

Source: James Gleick, Chaos Theory: The Science of the Unpredictable, op. cit., p. 33.

James Gleick explains the "butterfly's wings" as climate models carrying a series of points separated by a distance of about 120 kilometers, and yet many of the initial data contain many guesses because ground and air observations cannot see everything.

C. The strange attractor and the butterfly effect of Edward Lorentz's research.

Lorentz studied the behavior of two atmospheres sensitive to a small change in the initial conditions between them and then represented them on a computer with two identical points, but in reality they are close together and separated by a finite distance. The most important result of Lorentz's work is that even when studying a large number of atmospheres, the paths end up being represented in graphs that appear random and unpredictable, but they all accumulate around a shape that closely resembles the "wings of a butterfly", which is called the "Lorentz attractor" or "strange attractor", which describes the behavior of unpredictable systems.

Figure 03: Lorentz strange attractor

Source: Muhammad Hamshi, previously mentioned reference, p. 147.

In 1973, Lorentz presented a brief research paper at the American Association for the Advancement of Science Conference entitled: "Predictability: Can the flapping of a butterfly's wings in Brazil cause a tornado in Texas?" The title was then reformulated to ask whether the behavior of the atmosphere is unstable when measured by small-amplitude disturbances. James York then drew on Lorentz's paper and wrote a scientific article in collaboration with his colleague Tin Yan Lee entitled "The Third Cycle Means Chaos", which later turned into a

founding concept for a science in its own right, the science of complexity. () In addition to Henri Poincaré's research and the introduction of the "three-body problem", and the works of "binary bifurcation and self-similarity" by Robert May, who discovered the origins of chaos in biology, as well as the works of Benoit Mandelbrot and the introduction of the idea of "fractal geometry" from the founding branches of the science of complexity. It is true that this study specializes in studying irregular and complex shapes and groups, but it mainly seeks to discover patterns of repetition and self-similarity. The irregular and complex and the work of "Ilya Prigogine" in proposing self-organization and systems far from equilibrium through studies of systems far from equilibrium in the field of thermodynamics, and ended in his research on what became known as "nonlinear energy-dissipating structures" to equilibrium and far from equilibrium, where complexity produces forms of self-organization that occur automatically in systems far from equilibrium, while bifurcation means that the chaotic system when it becomes unstable in its environment due to some disturbance. 1

As for the concept of complexity, it refers to the Latin term "complexus", which means unifying a set of partial facts in a synthetic concept. As for complex thought, it is a philosophical concept proposed by "Henri Laborie" (1914-1995). "Edgar Morin" outlined the first formula for complex thought in 1982 in his book "Science with Consciousness". The concept of complexity from an etymological perspective always refers to what is complex and connected. Complexity integrates into its concept various theories that highlight its essence, known as complexity theories or complexity sciences, including chaos theory - cognitive psychology, computer science, evolutionary biology, general systems theory, and fuzzy logic.²

d. Introducing complexity as a new paradigm in the field of international relations

The increasing complexity in world politics is not only linked to the multiplicity of actors (the spread of non-state, sub-state and supra-state actors), or to the multiplicity and interconnectedness of issues, but it is more linked to a fundamental transformation in the international system itself, where traditional concepts such as chaos and the distribution of power have become empty of their content. Rather, another position has emerged in attracting supporters calling for starting to talk seriously about a global system based on post-international relations. The article published by "Emilian Kavalski" in (2007) entitled "The Fifth Debate and the Emergence of Complexity Theory in International Relations" is considered notes on the application of complexity theory in the study of international life. It is not possible to complete a review of the literature on complexity as a theory, philosophy or science in its own right without emphasizing its transdisciplinary nature. The researcher "Dylan Kissan" previously discussed a doctoral thesis in (2009) at the College of International Studies under the title: "Towards Moving Beyond Chaos: Complexity as an Alternative to the Realist Hypothesis", and he confirmed that the lists Readings on complexity theory involve a wide range of disciplines, with a mix of The social sciences and the natural sciences, as Kavalski called it, are a continuous cross-fertilization movement between the natural and social sciences (K) as well as the collective book edited by Neil Hirson and published in 2006 under the title "Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods for a New Paradigm".

¹ محمد حمشي، النقاش الخامس في حقول العلاقات الدولية، نحو إقحام نظرية التعقد داخل الحقل، مرجع سابق الذكر، ص 144-149.

² Campbell A.B, *Applied Choo's Theory a Paradigm for Complexity Academic press, Unc San Pie go, 1993.*

We should also not miss reviewing the literature on complexity in the field of international relations and reading the pioneering works left by the late James Rosenow, especially the collective book he edited in 1992 with Ernest Hugo Chamblee under the title “Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics”, where the phrase in the first part of the book’s title “Governance without Government” became the basis for the concept of “global governance” that some proponents of complexity theory present as a more appropriate alternative to describe the increasing complexity characteristic of international politics.¹

The attempt to introduce complexity theory into the field comes in the context of the recommendations of the final report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences, chaired by Immanuel Wallerstein in 1996, which called for reforming the institution of social research by directing it more towards the dynamics of disequilibrium. The epistemological climate that prevailed following the report not only emphasized redefining the boundaries between the natural sciences and the social sciences, but also encouraged the social sciences to redefine uncertainty, nonlinearity, and indeterminacy.

In the field of international relations, the theory of complexity in the field of international relations is based on indeterminacy, indissolubility, and nonlinearity.

✓ **Indeterminacy and indeterminacy:**

Thanks to the indeterminacy and indeterminacy characteristics of the international system, like any other complex/chaotic system, in complex systems, many actors interact, and the possibilities of their influence on the behavior of the system increase with the passage of time. Predicting the future path of a particular actor or group of actors is unavailable, especially in the global political system, which can be considered a complex system of several complex systems in which actors and factors of disturbance interact in an indeterminable manner. On the other hand, the ontology of complexity theory questions the assumption from which prevailing theories proceed, which states that in a given context and at any given moment in time, there is a single reality that exists there waiting to be revealed. In contrast, complexity theory emphasizes the existence of more than one reality.²

Indissolubility:

This impossibility is not due to the principle of the inability of complex systems to be reduced to the sum of their components, but rather is due primarily to the impossibility of identifying the characteristics and behavior patterns of all actors and factors influencing the behavior and development of the international system. This is evident in the intense and complex interdependence and interdependence that actors and interactions have reached at the level of the global system.

✓ **Nonlinearity:**

The existence of stable relationships between actors in the international system is possible, but this stability is often characterized as short-term, weak, and nonlinear due to the increasing anthropic nature of the system and its continued departure from equilibrium.

¹ محمد حمشي، مرجع سابق الذكر، ص 22-24.
² المرجع نفسه، ص 210

This lecture is one of the most important approaches to understanding the ongoing complexity of epistemological research and studies in the field of political science in general and international relations in particular, and it requires examining more in-depth assumptions to understand the context, results, and interactions of the global system with its complex feature.¹

✓ **The emergence of complexity science to understand the global system as chaotic in its behavior.**

Dylan Kissane believes that the international system is a complex system with chaotic behavior, and that the chaos hypothesis provides a reductive approach to an increasingly complex international system. Therefore, the approaches based on it remain unable to explain common patterns of interactions between states, such as cooperation or regional integration, and paths of hostility and friendship in post-international conflicts.² As Neil Harrison believes in his book entitled: "Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods for a New Paradigm" published in 2006, the paradigm of complexity can increase our ability to understand complexity in world politics, by creating a cognitive revolution in theories of international relations by going beyond the contents of internal criticism of the units of the international system, and the contents of external criticism that focus on the structure of the international system, i.e. dealing with the structure and the actors together.³

Through the "paradigm of disorder" proposed by James Rosenow in his book entitled: "Government Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics" written with Ernst Otto Schamel, he argues that the world has come to know a new type of post-international politics that is increasingly exposed to dynamics that produce nothing but more unexpected developments, more uncertainty, and more rapid and sudden changes. This paradigm allows us to see how post-international politics is characterized by the synchronization, influence, and coexistence of two systems: a state-centered system limited to states and actors subject to their sovereignty, and a multi-centered system teeming with actors free from sovereignty and capable of producing their own processes, structures, and rules. It also emphasizes the existence of paths that interact, synchronize, and coexist with each other. Rosenow proposes a set of causal factors as sources of disorder in world politics and as sources of complexity in global governance in the era of post-international politics. There are internal sources that come from political processes, and external sources that come from demographic, technological, economic, and cultural processes. The state itself can be considered one of the sources of disorder because it no longer represents the organizing and controlling unit of this system. Richard Haass believes that the current international system is witnessing a state of further disorder as a result of the spread of power and authority, a great multiplicity between power centers, and the increase in threats after the Cold War from regional destabilization, nationalism, governance challenges, and changing balances of power. The current system He became without restraint or restriction.⁴

¹ المرجع السابق، ص 214.
² محمد حمشي، نظرية التعقد والنقاش النظري الخامس : مراجعة للأدبيات، المجلة الجزائرية للأمن والتنمية، العدد: 12، 2008، ص 22-25.
³ المرجع نفسه، ص 23.
⁴ المرجع السابق، 24.

✓ **The limits of understanding the rise of China and the new economic and health transformations**

One of the most important transformations that the international system is witnessing at the present time is the emergence and growth of the role of major powers such as China and Russia in the global scene. They are powers that review the system because they reject the status quo and seek to change it and act on this basis. China has witnessed economic development and growth and a political and military transformation that enabled it to become a major power and an important player in international interactions. It entered into competition and conflict with the United States of America over the order of power in the hierarchy of the international system, in addition to the world entering a health crisis as a result of the emergence of the Corona virus and its spread in the world and the resulting repercussions on the health, economic and strategic levels. First: China's rise between rational and skeptical perspectives.

China's rise theoretically constitutes a testing tool for the various assumptions on which international relations theories are based, by reviewing the prevailing theoretical positions such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and partial theories such as the theory of power transfer, the theory of absorbing rising powers, and the theory of peaceful rise, which are rational theories that do not provide a sufficient and consistent explanation and understanding of the issue of China's rise in the international system. Therefore, we find it necessary to introduce complexity theory into the prevailing discussion on this issue. This is because China's rise is a non-linear and complex path, and cannot be understood through a set of reductive assumptions of rational approaches, but rather within complexity theory as an alternative approach to non-linear phenomena in an increasingly complex world.¹

Thus, we attempt to discuss the issue of China's rise within rational approaches with their currents within the team of optimists who see a peaceful rise for China and the team of pessimists who see that its rise will not be peaceful, and what complexity theory offers us regarding China's rise in the international or global system.

▪ **Pessimists:**

This trend is based on historical experiences in moments of global power transition. The theory of power transition has a structural conception of patterns of power distribution at the international level, because the distribution of power is organized in a hierarchical structure (the strongest, then the strongest, then the weakest, then the weakest... and so on). The great power that is at the top of the pyramid works to maintain its position by possessing a power that exceeds the power of the rest of the major competing countries, because the major powers have a power that enables them to challenge the dominant power. There may be alliances between the major powers to compete and challenge the great power, or an alliance with the latter to maintain the stability of the existing system. There may be major powers competing with the existing system because they did not participate in setting its rules. In the face of the refusal of the dominant power and its allies to reconsider the distribution of the advantages of the current situation, the rising powers seek to challenge in order to obtain a distinguished position in the international system. Then come the medium powers with regional roles and

¹ المرجع نفسه، ص 03.

they are not qualified to compete or challenge the great and major powers. At the base come the small countries that are a sphere of influence and dominance for the larger powers. There are two basic conditions for the transfer of power: equality in the relative power of the dominant and the challenger, and the dissatisfaction of the challenger with the status quo and acting on that basis. Proponents of this theory believe that China currently has a relative advantage over the United States (the dominant power), and therefore the international system is witnessing a transfer of power. Since China expresses its dissatisfaction with the status quo and acts on that basis, the transition process will not be calm and peaceful as long as the dominant power and its allies continue to resist. ¹ John Mearsheimer believes that China's rise will not be peaceful, because continued Chinese growth will push it to expand in its regional environment and attempt to control Asia, and the United States and its allies in the region will work to prevent China from expanding and contain it, and thus there will be intense security competition with increasing possibilities of wars.

▪ **Optimists:**

Supporters of this trend of institutional liberals believe that China is not considered an absolute threat, but it can be contained within the framework of policies that curb China's rise by taking a set of economic, political and even military measures and procedures, in order to balance China's power and ensure that it does not outperform the dominant power and its allies, and work to push China to engage more within the mechanisms of global governance and make it bear its responsibility as a rising major power. Institutionalists believe that China's greater engagement in global institutions will reassure the world about the repercussions of its transformation into a major power.

▪ **Complexity theory:**

Complexity theory believes that the current system is not an international system but a global system, and it is not chaotic and statist in the sense presented by rational approaches, but rather a complex, non-linear and uncertain system, and that China's rise can be understood as a holographic transformation more than the rise of a revisionist power that threatens to review the existing international system, undermine it and replace it when its power allows it to do so.²

✓ **.The global economy and the difficulty of presenting the limits of understanding who controls**

Revisionist countries such as China, Russia and other emerging economic powers seek to bring about changes in the international economy. China is the second economic power in the world after the United States of America, and plays a role in concentrating economic power in the continent of Asia. It is one of the countries that has been working on development, wealth and power since 1978 as a result of its relative openness to trade and foreign investment. As a

¹ Michael J, Mazar et al, *Understanding the Current International Order*, RAND Corporation, California, USA, 2006, pp. 2-3.

² محمد حمشي ، صعود الصين من منظور مغاير ، مجلة العلوم الإنسانية، المجلد: 06، العدد: 2019، ص ص 17-18.

result of the economic development achieved, China has become more influential in global affairs and is working to change the rules of the international game.¹

China is promoting its economic interests in the world through the Silk Road economic initiative known as "One Belt_One Road", which was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, which was able to attract several countries and invest in it, and thus became a threat to the economic and commercial interests of the United States of America in Asia, Africa, Europe and even Latin American countries. With the rise of Chinese economic power based on contracts, investments and technological progress, China entered into economic and commercial competition and conflict with the United States of America, which made the latter enter into a state of "economic war" with China, as it sees the expansion of China's economic power in the world as a threat to its interests as a dominant superpower, and this leads to China's quest to change the global balance of power and form a multipolar system in which America is one of its parties and not the greatest.²

Michael Swaine believes that China represents the most prominent challenges to the United States of America due to its increasing power in influencing the international system as a result of The growth of its economic power, in addition to the pattern of power distribution and international interactions, and thus global economic stability can only be achieved through coordination between the major economic powers, led by the United States and China. The global economic crisis in 2008 reinforced the competitive nature between the major powers, as many countries realized the extent of their connection to the American economic and financial system and the necessity of severing this connection, especially since the United States of America uses this system to impose economic and financial sanctions against countries that threaten its interests, which was a driving force for China to launch the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as an alternative financial institution to international institutions linked to America, and thus competition and conflict replaced the cooperation and interdependence that prevailed before the 2008 crisis, and the logic of economic relations became closer to the zero-sum equation between the poles of the global economy. The state of competition and economic conflict between the United States of America and China has taken on overlapping dimensions in many regions of the world, such as the South China Sea, Africa, and the Middle East, where the conflict is over energy, trade, and influence. This conflict intersects with the interests of major powers such as the European Union countries, which have become hesitant between their traditional ally (the United States of America) and their interests with China and Russia, the latter of which shares China's vision and policies in opposing American hegemony over the world.³ This economic conflict has affected the nature of the international system, as both powers have dimensions and elements of power. The United States of America wants to maintain the status quo that enhances its position as a superpower dominating the international system, while China, as a major emerging power, wants to change the status quo and rejects it and seeks to form a multipolar system or be at the

¹ Aseel Shamasneh, *The International System from the Cold War to the Present: A Study of the New International System in the Twenty-First Century*, Master's Thesis, Birzeit University-Palestine, pp. 59-60.

² OP CIT.

³ Sherifa Kala, *The Challenge of Growing Chinese Economic Power in Light of Declining American Hegemony: Moving from Trade Wars to Biological Wars through the Coronavirus*, Madarat Siyasiyya Magazine, Volume: 5, Issue 2, 2021, p. 82.

top of the system's pyramid. Thus, it is a competing power with America and threatens its position and interests on the global level.

Third: Covid-19 and the impossibility of global foresight.

Since the emergence of the Covid-19 virus or Corona (COVID-19) as a global pandemic since November 2019, it has caused a decline in the global economy's activity from a decrease in production and the cessation of many industrial production vehicles, transportation and navigation, and the cessation of many activities such as work and study and the closure of borders in many countries, and the accompanying state of psychological panic among peoples and individuals, widely. Although it appeared in the Chinese city of Wuhan at first, it spread throughout the world, causing a complex global health situation, revealing aspects that increase the degree of global connectivity and the fragility of health security for many countries, even advanced ones, and raising many controversies and syndromes at the international level such as the degree of global connectivity and the globalization of asymmetric threats, and the vulnerability of the international health system and the weakness of the national state to confront such challenges on the one hand, and on the other hand, the falsity of regional cooperation and integration because many countries found themselves alone in facing their fate, and thus the Covid pandemic revealed and exposed the characteristics of the existing international system, and affected it in terms of Structures and interactions, which may have medium- and long-term consequences that may lead to restructuring the system, changing its rules of operation, and re-arranging the active and influential forces in it.

The outbreak of the Corona virus has confirmed that the globalized structure of the global economic system can work to transfer risks and threats, which leads to increasing isolation of countries or regions that may represent potential sources of threats and risks that are difficult to predict and control, and working on this requires three axes:

1. Developing countries' scientific capabilities in research, prediction, and anticipation;
2. Developing objective systems with transparency for media and information exchange;
3. Developing effective capabilities to quickly contain and confront risks and crises, and coordinate with the rest of the parties to the global system.²

The Corona crisis, as a global health crisis, has led to a state of turmoil and complexity in the international system. It is a situation greater than chaos, conflict, and declining interdependence between countries. The post-Covid world will not be the same as the world before it, and more complex than this is the difficulty of predicting and anticipating the paths and trends of this system.

¹ OP CIT, PP 89-90.

² Al-Tijani Abdul Qader Hamid, *Political Science: The Post-Corona Phase*, in: Asma Hussein Malkawi and others (n.d.), *The Corona Crisis and Its Implications for Sociology, Political Science, and International Relations*, Ibn Khaldun Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Qatar University, p. 63.

Why is there no non-Western theory in international relations**1. West-centrism” in IR.**

It is by now a well-run argument that International Relations (IR), as a discipline, is a Western-dominated enterprise. IR scholarship has long focused on and attached importance to great power politics based on “the Eurocentric Westphalian system” much of mainstream IR theory is “simply an abstraction of Western history”. Furthermore, non-Western scholars have been excluded from “the mainstream of the profession” of Additionally, IR continues to seek “to parochially celebrate or defend or promote the West as the proactive subject of, and as the highest or ideal normative referent in, world politics” Let us take our pedagogical practice as a case in point. Based on an analysis of what is taught to graduate students at 23 American and European universities, Hagmann and Biersteker have found that “the none of the 23 schools surveyed here draws on non-Western scholarship to explain international politics. World politics as it is explained to students is exclusively a kind of world politics that has been conceptualized and analysed by Western scholars.” Publishing provides another case in point. A recent empirical study shows that “hypothesis-testing” works by American and other Global North scholars are published “approximately in proportion to submissions” in flagship political science and IR journals, while Global South scholars ‘fare less well’ in the review process In short, IR is too Western centric.¹

2. Call for “Non-Western” IR Theory

It should therefore come as no surprise that many critical IR scholars have called for “broadening” the theoretical horizon of IR beyond “the current West-centrism”. One of the early responses to this call was to draw renewed attention to non-Western societies’ histories, cultures, and philosophies and incorporate them in the theorisation of international relations; in this context, whether there are any substantial merits to developing a non-Western IR theory and what such a theory would (or should) look like have now become topics of heated debate. Of course, as will be discussed in detail in the following section, contemporary events such as the rise of China have contributed to the development of non-Western (or indigenous) theories and concepts. Advocates of Chinese IR and non-Western IR theory building often point out that Asia has histories, cultures, norms, and worldviews that are inherently different from those derived from or advanced in Europe.

This idea has also resonance with discontent with the epistemic value of mainstream IR theories, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism, all of which have Western—or, more specifically, “Eurocentricanalytical or normative underpinnings. Western theories, the criticism goes, misrepresent and therefore misunderstand much of “the rest of the world”. For example, in his well-known piece, “Gettings Asia Wrong,” David Kang notes that “most international relations theories derived from the European experience of the past four centuries ... do a poor job as they are applied to Asia.” Indeed, critiques of this kind have long served as a starting premise in theoretical studies on the international politics of Asia. Almost two decades ago, Peter Katzenstein wrote as follows: “Theories based on Western,

¹ Yong-Soo Eun , *Non-Western International Relations Theorization: Reflexive Stocktaking*, Apr 12 2020 • 11,539 views <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/04/12/non-western-international-relations-theorisation-reflexive-stocktaking/>.

and especially West European, experience have been of little use in making sense of Asian regionalism.” Similarly, Jeffrey commented that “[i]nternational relations theory, derived from an extended series of case studies of Europe, has become notorious for falling short of accounting for the richness and particularity of Asia’s regional politics.”¹

It is in this respect that Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan have put together a special issue and a follow-up edited volume, asking “Why is there no non-Western international theory?” *despite* the fact that “the sources of international relations theory conspicuously fail to correspond to the global distribution of its subjects. With the help of a group of scholars examining the status of IR theory or theoretical studies in various countries and sub-regions in Asia, Acharya and Buzan’s contributions show the reasons for the marginalisation of non-Western voices and histories in the global debates on IR theory and what needs to be done to mitigate the issue. Since Acharya and Buzan’s seminal forum was published, there has been a great deal of studies by non-Western IR communities that aim to develop new theories and concepts from their own perspectives

Here, China’s rise has added momentum to attempts to build new or indigenous theories—especially within the Chinese IR community. Yaqing Qin at the China Foreign Affairs University states that Chinese IR theory “is likely and inevitabl[y] to emerge along with the great economic and social transformation that China has been experiencing” The scholarly practices of building an IR theory “with Chinese characteristics” are a case in point. Although consensus on what “Chinese characteristics” actually are has yet to be determined, many Chinese (and non-Chinese) scholars hold that the establishment of a Chinese IR theory or a “Chinese School” of IR is desirable or “natural” in this light, Confucianism, Marxism, “Tianxia”, and the Chinese tributary system are all cited as theoretical resources for Chinese IR ².

3. is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?

Acharya and Buzan, in the introductory chapter, ask the question of why there is no non-Western IR theory and suggest possible explanations. Even though the book contains chapters covering both the theoretical experiences of individual countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, India and Indonesia, as well as regional study of Southeast Asia, this review will concentrate on this introductory question and the responses in the book’s final chapter. It also reviews a chapter written by Barry Buzan and Richard Little, in which they suggest implementation of the world historical perspective in IR theory in order to go beyond Western centrism. As this review is mainly concerned with analyzing whether or not Seyfi Say successfully integrated Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts into IR theory with the aim of saving it from the trap of Western centrism, it also gives special attention to the discussion of the Islamic worldview and IR theory in the chapter authored by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh.

In their introductory chapter, regarding the absence of a non-Western international theory, Acharya and Buzan suggest five possible explanations that concentrate on ideational and perceptual forces influenced by Gramscian hegemonies, ethnocentrism and the politics of exclusion.⁴ The first explanation for the Western dominance of IR is the universality of

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

Western IR theory, which implies that Western IR has discovered the right path in understanding international relations. The second one is that Western IR theory has gained a hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense, which in turn leads to an unconscious reproduction of Western centrism by others. The third explanation suggested by Acharya and Buzan for the nonexistence of non-Western IR theory claims that in reality, non-Western theories exist but are hidden due to difficulties such as language. The fourth is that local historical, cultural and political conditions discriminate against the production of IR theory. The last explanation suggests that the West has a big head start and the rest of the world is in a period of catching up. Acharya and Buzan leave the evaluation of these possible explanations to the final chapter, as how IR theory in different countries and cultures has emerged and developed is analyzed in a detailed way in the following chapters. For the first explanation, which attributes the nonexistence of non-Western IR theory to the success of Western IR theory, Acharya and Buzan claim that the cases in their collection proves that there is no evidence supporting this explanation.⁵ In fact, in Chapter 9, Buzan and Little identify five shortcomings of Western IR theories that prevent them from capturing the nature of international relations: *presentism*, or a tendency to see the past in terms of the present; *ahistoricism*, or the belief in the existence of universal regularities that are not bound by time and space; *Eurocentrism*; *anarchophilia*, or the equation of international relations with the existence of anarchic system and *state-centrism*.⁶ As to the second line of argument, Acharya and Buzan claim that in the absence of non-Western IR theory, the hegemony of Western IR is regenerated and reinforced by “essentialized Eurocentrism” in the works of non-Western IR scholars as well.⁷ The third explanation, which asserts the existence of non-Western IR theories but underscores their absence in the public eye, seems to be irrelevant for Acharya and Buzan. The fourth account,¹

On the other hand, stands very powerfully for them in explaining the absence of non-Western IR theory. In this respect, local conditions, even though they vary in form from place to place, may create material barriers that may prevent the emergence of a non-Western IR. Another strong explanation, according to the authors, is the fifth hypothesis, which suggests that the rest is trying to catch up the West. In this connection, the authors acknowledge that this is an important reason for the underdevelopment of the non-Western IR theory.

As Acharya and Buzan indicate, the goal of the book is “to introduce non-Western IR traditions to a Western audience and to challenge non-Western IR thinkers to challenge the dominance of Western theory.”⁸ However, they have not given special attention to developing an overall non-Western IR theory. Instead, they criticize how Eurocentric the dominant IR theories are and assess the possible contributions of the non-Western world to IR theory. Nevertheless, it is possible to extract some premises from their writings suggesting how to go beyond Western-centric IR.

For example, in their chapter, Buzan and Little try to show how an historical perspective may be employed by non-Western IR theories to move away from European history and Western IR theory. They suggest that non-Western IR theorists follow the route charted by non-

¹ Engin Sune, *Non-Western International Relations Theory and Ibn Khaldun*, *All Azimuth* V5, N1, Jan. 2016, 79-88, pp 79-82.

Western world history theorists, since going beyond Western dominance requires knowledge about the development of international relations in different regions.⁹ A global historical perspective may prevent the oblivious entrapment of non-Western scholars in a Eurocentric historical framework. In this sense, Seyfi Say's analysis of Ibn Khaldun's ideas as a source of a non-Western IR theory seems a meaningful initiative, even though his success in doing so is questioned in the following evaluation.¹

Another proposition to develop a non-Western IR theory is to apply classical traditions and the thinking of non-Western religious, military and political figures to IR theory. From this perspective as well, Say's initiative to develop a non-Western IR theory through applying Ibn Khaldun's ideas seems an important step. Furthermore, Acharya and Buzan suggest recovering civilizational histories previous to encounters with the West and scrutinizing them with the aim of finding alternatives to the Eurocentric Westphalian model. In this respect, for example, Say emphasizes Ibn Khaldun's notion of "*asabbiyah*" (a constitutive principle)¹⁰ for prioritizing a civilizational model to bypass the Westphalian one.

Apart from these ideas that may be discerned from the text, Acharya and Buzan directly suggest a method called "constitutive localization,"¹¹ which is argued to be more effective in explaining the universality of human experience and go beyond Western centrism. The method is defined as the active construction of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the latter developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices. In other words, it asserts a mutual adaptation of local and foreign ideas, giving dominant status to the former instead of projecting purely indigenous ideas or completely borrowing foreign ones.

In a similar vein, in her chapter, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh talks about hybridity as a remedy for going beyond Western centrism. As the main concern of the book is to explore whether Asia or Islam can be taken as the basis for International Relations Theory, one chapter is

devoted to an analysis of the Islamic world. This chapter as a potential source of non-Western IR deserves special attention within this review, as the upcoming pages concentrate on the integration of an Islamic scholar into IR theory.²

Tadjbakhsh claims that Islam as a worldview has sought a different foundation of truth and the good life; therefore it has the potential of presenting alternatives to Western IR theory.¹² She indicates that a potential non-Western IR theory differs in essence from Westphalian approaches. Within this context, she questions materialism and empiricism as the only acceptable methodology for organizing and processing data. As mentioned by Seyfi Say, Ibn Khaldun's methodology is a combination of materialism and idealism. However, Tadjbakhsh states that although an Islamic IR theory is possible and in fact exists, the challenge is to put it into practice. In this connection, I will turn to Say's work and critically review his attempt to operationalize Ibn Khaldun's ideas through creating a non-Western IR theory.

¹ *ipid*, pp83-85

² *Ipid*.

4. Ibn Khaldun's System of Thought and International Relations Theory

There are many studies on the relevance and importance of Ibn Khaldun's ideas for IR.¹³ However, Seyfi Say's book comes into prominence within these studies since it is one of the most detailed works on Ibn Khaldun and IR. The author states that the goal of his study is to analyze Ibn Khaldun's ideas on issues related to the IR discipline and to evaluate the thinker's theoretical contributions to the field.¹⁴ He also indicates that since IR as a scientific discipline came into being in the West and developed with a Western-centric perspective, it has ignored non-Western scholars such as Ibn Khaldun.¹⁵ Say underlines that because IR scholars only concentrate on Western philosophers such as Machiavelli, Grotius or Kant, and ignore non-Western ones, they reproduce the Western centrism of the field.¹⁶ Thus, Say also questions universalism and Western centrism by integrating Ibn Khaldun's ideas.¹

Say's book is composed of three chapters. While the first chapter is an introduction to Ibn Khaldun's life and his understanding of science, the second one is concerned with the concepts used by Ibn Khaldun. This review briefly discusses these first two descriptive chapters and mainly concentrates on the third part, where Say discusses Ibn Khaldun's ideas on the issues influencing IR, with a special focus on the last part. Say assesses that Ibn Khaldun's theoretical understanding relates to issues of IR but do not compose an IR theory by themselves.¹⁷ Therefore, in this section he tries to integrate Ibn Khaldun's concepts into the IR discipline in order to surpass Western centrism of the field. Thus, as being the only original part of the book, this subchapter deserves further attention.

Before analyzing and accounting for the relation of Ibn Khaldun's ideas with IR, Say explains the main concepts that Khaldun uses, such as *umran* (civilization), *asabbiyah* (constitutive principle), state and state authority and *bedavet and hadaret* (urban and rural life). The concept of *umran* resembles the term *civilization* but it defines social life with all of its aspects. In this sense, *umran* is viewed as an entire product of human beings; therefore, it is not possible to talk about Christian or Muslim *umrans*, just as we cannot talk about Christian or Islamic mathematics. Another concept, as indicated above, is *asabbiyah*, which defines the main elements that induce human beings to form a society. *Mulk*, on the other hand, describes an organization equipped with sovereignty. In this sense, the ultimate target of an *asabbiyah* is said to be the *mulk* or, a takeover of state authority. Within this context, Ibn Khaldun perceives the state as an avatar of *umran*, which, on the other hand, is composed of *bedevi* life (rural life) and *hadari* life (civilized life).

The introduction of these concepts is important within Say's study, since in the following parts of the book they are used as the sources of surpassing Western centrism in IR. However, before doing that, Say explores Ibn Khaldun's ideas on issues that may be categorized as the subject matters of IR. These ideas may show the originality of Ibn Khaldun's thinking. However, whether this originality has been transformed into an original study by Seyfi Say is a question to be answered in the last part of this review article.

¹ *ipid*, pp 85-86.

One example of these ideas in IR is the causal relation that Ibn Khaldun builds between geographical conditions and political events. In a similar vein, Say underlines that Ibn Khaldun analyzes how climate affects the behaviour of societies. Furthermore, the thinker perceives population as an important source of state power. Since he correlates population with production, he views an increase in population as the foundation of an increase in material capability. Natural resources are another source of state power, and Ibn Khaldun sees the existence of these in a state as a source of peaceful foreign policy.

In short, by assessing the relation that Ibn Khaldun establishes between the social form of life, economic structure, geography and physical environment, Say tries to demonstrate how Ibn Khaldun's ideas embrace issues related to IR and how original those ideas are. He underlines that according to Ibn Khaldun, societies do not have stable characters but they have environmental conditions. Say suggests that Ibn Khaldun's conceptualization of *asabbiyah* appears as an original term in understanding this changing character, since as environmental conditions change, the conditions providing a social group the potential to establish their power within a given territory change. In other words, the *asabiyyah* changes. Therefore, understanding the nature of *asabiyyah* and physical conditions such as population, climate, availability of natural resources, production, etc. may provide us a true understanding of IR, according to Say. Apart from that, Say thinks that through the ideas of Ibn Khaldun, IR may go beyond the international-domestic divide since his notion of "Mulk-u Hakiki" (*the real sovereignty*) deals with both the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty as it defines the situation of the effectiveness of a state in internal affairs and its ability to protect itself against outside powers. As indicated above, the last part of the last chapter evaluates the importance of Ibn Khaldun's ideas for the IR discipline. Two main propositions come to fore in this part. First, similar to Buzan and Little's proposition, Say underlines the importance of the historical perspective. He suggests that a process has already started in IR in which positivism is being replaced by historicism, enabling IR scholars to go beyond state-centric analyses.

He echoes Wallerstein's argument and claims that positivism enables Western-centric IR theories to assert objectivism and universalism by neglecting the fact that they are a product of their own historical conditions. He maintains that civilization as a level of analysis may be useful to get beyond Western centrism. In this sense, he points to Ibn Khaldun for the historicism and civilizational approach. He states that Ibn Khaldun does not accept dominant theories' unitary understandings of state and views them as functionally different. Say notes that Ibn Khaldun underlines not only the difference between states but also points out the structural transformation of such differences triggered by time and space. In this sense, Say claims that Ibn Khaldun has a historical perspective that reflects on changes in the context of time and space. In this way, according to Say, Ibn Khaldun appears as an important reference to capture the change, dynamism and renewal of IR. Furthermore, his *umran* science claims to enable us to go beyond the state-centric approach and think about civilizations as the unit of analysis in international relations. Say also contends that Ibn Khaldun's ideas may be seen as a source of synthesis of Realism and Idealism.²⁴ He asserts that, contrary to Machiavelli, who refuses idealism and buckles down to realism, Ibn Khaldun one can find elements of both Idealism and Realism. For example, while he accepts the importance of power, similar to realists, he makes a distinction between fair/unfair and faithful/unfaithful powers. Say

maintains that this understanding gives Ibn Khaldun a normative dimension that may be seen as a bridge between Idealism and Realism.¹

5. New Theoretical Openings and Research Directions

There are criticisms to global IR and non-Western IRs. Scholars have discussed the validity of existing IRs in explaining contemporary developments in the non-Western world. Ikenberry and Mastanduno (2003) argue that especially since China has re-evaluated its foreign policy and integrated itself more into the Europe-derived international system, there is no necessity to divide the discipline into West and non-West, because contemporary theories explain non-Western developments very well. Mearsheimer (2016) asserts that since American dominance is ‘benign’, there is nothing wrong with its dominance in the discipline. However, non-Western IR challenges parochialism in current IR and is “interested in exploring IR’s inadequacy for understanding key global problems of concern to the periphery and the ways in which the discipline has unfolded in distinct non-core settings”. Non-Western IR studies aim to broaden the discipline, adding new insights, methods and dynamics. They also aim to reveal the Gramscian hegemony of Western thinking and mobilise alternative approaches, histories and philosophies— to make IR an international rather than a Western discipline. The aim of IR theory is to ensure explanation of world events and thereof, it should be applicable worldwide. However, conventional IRs lack universality. Non-Western IR brings the Rest in and makes their voices audible. Locality is a salient contribution of non-Western IR studies, opening new theoretical and research directions. Locality encourages exploration of “indigenous histories, classical philosophy and religious traditions, the ideas of national leaders, the writing of contemporary scholars, and foreign policy practices of modern states and norms and process dynamics of regional interactions”. Dependency theory is an example; it challenges classical understandings of development as an organising principle in international politics, asserting that “underdevelopment and poverty are the result of political, economic and cultural influences exerted on such countries from the outside”. It reveals unfair and exploitative relationships between the Global North and the Global South. Moreover, ideas of human development and human security, which introduced by Mahbub ul-Haq of Pakistan and Amartya Sen of India; Nehru and fellow Asian and African leaders’ non-alignment movement, which ensured the neutrality of 234 Akgül For use by the Author only | Pınar Akgül Asian and African states in regard to the US and Soviet blocs during the Cold War. Furthermore, African scholars redefine the concept of agency. African agency has multiple dimensions: “as a collective international actor; as a collection of states with (in the ‘broadest of sweeps’) a shared history; and as a discursive presence, used both Africans and outsiders, in international politics and policy”.²

These dimensions reflect on regionalism such as in the formation of the African Union, security management, and Africa’s relations with the outside world. Other examples of non-Western theoretical and conceptual initiatives are; using notions of Nishida, who systematises a Chinese dialecticism into an Eastern-inspired ‘logic of emptiness’ focusing on building an identity that emerge through a coexistence of opposites; Ong (2004) studies building a theory with ‘Japanese characteristic’; Ibn Khaldoun in concept of ‘assabbiyya’ argues “the state

¹ *Ibid.*

² M. Kürşad Özekin and Engin Sune, *Critical Approaches to International Relations Philosophical Foundations and Current Debates*, 2022 Pınar Akgül, p233.

emerged as an outcome not of anarchy but of human cooperation, based on reason, social solidarity with an emphasis on group consciousness and social cohesion” and Kautilya, father of Indian realpolitik, in his book Arthashastra states notions on administration; law, order and justice; taxation, revenue and expenditure; foreign policy; defence and war. In addition, his theory of Mandala (sphere or circle of influence, interest, and ambitions) assumes and is prepared for world of eternally warring states by stressing ‘perpetual preparedness’ or punishment and sanction. All above-stated new concepts and theories derive their conceptual background from local history, politics and culture. Non-Western studies have also introduced new understanding of area studies and regionalism. Rather than the contemporary understanding of area studies, in which it is perceived as theory-testing, in non-Western thinking area studies are utilised for theory-building. In terms of the role of non-Western thinking in regionalism, ASEAN is an example. Although the Western understanding of regionalism has Eurocentric terms – the integration process of the EU is accepted as the great success of regional integration and often seen as a universal standard – ASEAN challenges with its localisation. Thus, new conceptualisation of regionalism, with the inclusion of the non-Western world, will mean more diversity, including issues such as migration, the environment or internal conflicts, rather than only the classical understanding, where such issues as trade liberalisation or conflict management are prominent.¹

¹*ibid*, p p 233-235.

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